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vPreface
Where I am and how I got here…
“Sex! Aliens! Harvard?” Got your attention, didn’t I? Every journalist who writes a news
story wants people to read it. Journalists might — and, I would argue, do — have other
motives as well, but their most pressing pragmatic objective is to write a story that people
will read, to write a story so that people will read it. From the National Enquirer to The
New York Times, journalists know that grabby headlines work. Sex always sells – it’s a
journalistic convention to focus on the sensational. Aliens? More sensationalism, in
accordance with the convention of reporting on the unusual. Harvard represents
(scientific) authority – it’s another journalistic convention to report on official,
authoritative sources.
But what else might stories about sex, aliens, and Harvard be about?
Given the prominence of science and the ubiquity of mass media in culture, and the
influence of media coverage on public understanding of science, it is important to
understand the cultural authority of science and journalism’s treatment of it. I aim to
contribute to this understanding by addressing this question herein: how do journalists
participate in the social construction of scientific authority in the mass media?
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I have addressed this question in a case study of elite print media coverage of Harvard
Medical School psychiatry professor John E. Mack’s alien abduction research. I chose this
case because it seemed to bring to the surface assertions about scientific authority –
involving credentials, credibility, authority, evidence, methods, peer review, publicity,
worldview. (I’ll return to the “surface” shortly….)
This project is a qualitative, interpretive study. I first conceived it as a predominantly
social study of science in the media employing tools of rhetorical analysis to examine
texts. I followed guidelines for qualitative, naturalistic research – selectively assembling a
sample of texts to consider rather than discard “outliers,” for example, and adjusting my
analytic framework over time as new findings came to light. As I proceeded with my
study I gradually came to (re)conceive it as a rhetorical analysis based upon a substrate
(conducted within a framework) of social theory. The language at play in this case was so
rich, provocative, and ambiguous that ultimately I chose to employ rhetorical analysis as
my primary analytic tool, proceeding on the assumption that rhetoric is a primary means
of constructing social reality. I have focused on meanings in this analysis. For the
purposes of this study, words are the means of making meaning.
My project has benefited from the guidance of a multiperspectival committee of Gurus: a
Sociology of Science Guru, a Productive Criticism Guru, a Science Communication Guru,
and a Journalism Guru. Each has contributed a different expert perspective. All of these
perspectives enhanced and also “complexified” the project for me. As a consequence of
these and other influences, my theoretical framework for this analysis is multiperspectival,
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drawing on social constructivism, critical theory, cultural studies, dramatistic and
productive rhetorical criticism, the concept of framing and the attitude of deconstruction.
I was aware from the very beginning that I was not mapping out a quick and easy route to
my final destination (that is, a “done diss”). Nonetheless I chose to proceed without
knowing what my final destination would be. I knew the journey would not be easy, but I
knew it would be interesting, and I believed that, in the end, it would be productive, in the
sense that my Productive Criticism Guru and other like-minded scholars have explored.
So I continued down what turned out to be a long and winding road – at some points
rather tortuous (“twisted,” my Sociology of Science Guru said), and rather poorly marked.
At times I felt lost. I would be certain I was beginning to see clearly what was going on in
these texts – I could identify the action taking place, the rhetorical motives of journalists
and their sources, the values and interests at play in their stories. Or so I thought. Then I
would read and re-read and think some more, reorient my analytical framework, and see
something else going on – other actions taking place, other rhetorical motives exhibited,
other values and interests at play. Over time, however, letting reason and intuition guide
me (in the vernacular, listening to my head and my gut), I finally began to see that I was
not looking at an “either-or” but a “both-and” situation. In these stories both pragmatic
social action and symbolic ritual action was taking place. What first appeared to be
conflicting interpretations turned out to be evidence of complexity.
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From the social constructivist perspective I could see journalists and scientists acting out
their roles as they perceived them, following professional conventions as they perceived
them, toward ends they perceived to be in their own interests. From the Burkean
dramatistic perspective I was able to scan the landscape of meaning in this case and
uncover and examine ambiguity, complexity, motives, and meanings. Burke’s pentad of
scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose was a useful matrix for analyzing symbolic action
in these texts, a good tool for examining them from different angles. From the critical
perspective I could more clearly see journalists’ (and scientists’) professional and self-
interested motives for their symbolic actions. And from the productive-critical perspective
I could see the possibility of raising their awareness of those motives, toward evaluating
whether they yielded the most useful results. From a cultural studies perspective, I could
see a mythic narrative being retold – I could see journalists enacting rituals in their
communications about science, maintaining the culture (the cultural authority) of science
over time. The metaphor of the frame enabled me to examine and compare text and text,
text and metatext. In keeping with the attitude of deconstruction I could pick apart the
range of possible meanings of key words employed in these texts.
My Productive Criticism Guru asked me if I could justify my idiosyncratic approach and
explain what I gained by sacrificing “efficiency” and stopping short of “closure.” Why is a
multiperspectival approach better? What might I have missed, he asked, if I had aimed for
efficiency instead of delving into ambiguity and complexity? Is it possible to remain open
to all possible interpretations and maintain some direction in such an analysis?
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As I began this study, following a cue from John Pauly (1991), I thought about the
“potentially rich mix of overt and covert meanings” that might be embedded in my sample
of texts, hinted at by words that glittered with the promise of gems buried in sand (but,
then again, might turn out to be a trick of the eye…). Examining these texts as pragmatic
social action, cultural maintenance, and ritual performance allowed me to consider the
range of motives, acknowledged or not, that journalists could enact in reporting news.
Without the benefit of multiple analytic perspectives, I might have gotten bogged down
indefinitely in what I initially perceived to be contradictions in and among my texts. With
the benefit of multiple perspectives, I was able to see competing narratives – boundary-
tending narratives of transgression, and boundary-testing narratives of heroic acts.
I could have focused solely on pragmatic social action – but then I likely would have
missed the ritual enactments performed in some of these texts. I could have conducted a
more strictly sociological analysis of boundary-work – but then I would have passed over
much of the richness of the rhetoric deployed in this case, where so much ambiguity and
complexity lurked. I could have conducted a more conventional framing analysis of
journalists’ texts – but I might have missed the ritual enactments, much of the richness of
rhetoric, and the operation of these texts as a sort of metatext. By foregoing the
perspective of productive criticism, I would have foregone the opportunity to consider
how my findings might be useful in the everyday action of science communication. By
stopping short of closure, I have left plenty of room for other analysts to conduct their
own explorations of various aspects of this case and also my findings and conclusions
xabout it. A “mono-perspectival” approach could have been more efficient, but it would not
have been as interesting, illuminating, and productive.
My Science Communication Guru and my Journalism Guru expressed concerns about my
findings about my sample of texts as a group (a metatext) when the texts I had chosen to
analyze varied so broadly. They appeared in newspapers and magazines, as news reports,
features, profiles, reviews, columns. Each story was unique, displaying the marks of
particular authors, editors, and sources and conforming to the styles of particular media
outlets. However, I found that these stories were linked; they hung together somehow as a
narrative. My general statements about these texts are a product of my understanding that
these individual texts somehow function as a metatext. By the end of this analysis I found
this effect almost overwhelming….
My Sociology of Science Guru helped me to articulate more clearly the role that I found
journalists played in the social construction of scientific authority in this case. “Aha!” he
said as we were discussing my findings. What is going in this case, he said, is that no
matter what journalists were doing in reporting on Mack’s research – no matter who they
were (science writers, book reviewers, feature reporters…) or what their interests might be
(trashing a book, reporting official views, providing entertainment…), no matter what
sources they cited (skeptics, supporters, friends, foes…), no matter what outlet they
reported for (newspapers, magazines, mainstream, fringe…), no matter what form their
stories took (news, features, profiles, reviews…), no matter how they framed those stories
(critical, skeptical, serious, humorous…) – journalists were reproducing scientific
xi
authority. They were maintaining the boundaries of science. At some point in our
discussion about my findings, my Journalism Guru asked whether it mattered what
position journalists took in relation to Mack. With regard to their role in constructing
scientific authority in this case, it appears that, no, it did not matter.
I saw pragmatic social action taking place in the stories I examined. But ultimately I came
to see that this pragmatic action was superficial  – not (turning to dictionary definitions)
“shallow” or “trivial” but “on or near the surface”; true to the derivation of the word from
“super,” on, and “ficies,” face; “apparent rather than actual.” The same stories that
performed pragmatic actions also performed symbolic, ritual actions. Following
established conventions and routines, journalists took practical action in these stories,
employing frames, headlines, and leads to construct interesting stories and pull in readers.
Following cultural cues, journalists took symbolic action in these stories, employing
rhetorical strategies that reinforced the boundaries of conventional science and at the same
time challenged them, all the while constructing meaning. And some also enacted rituals,
telling the story of a scientist’s heroic journey, engaging in a performance intended to
maintain order, their protagonist a stereotypically heroic scientist. Some or even all of
these actions were taking place concurrently in journalists’ stories about Mack.
In the end, my Science Communication guru observed that my study “contributes less to
our understanding of different journalists’ constructions of scientific authority than it does
to our understanding of journalists’ constructions – across media – of the cultural
authority of science. There were superficial differences, to be sure,” she said, in how
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journalists treated Mack. “But all the stories, at a deep level…reinforced the cultural
authority of science because it was in the interests of all the actors to do so,” she said.
“Even the portrayal of Mack as a hero in some stories did not detract” from journalists’
fulfillment of the task of reinforcing the boundaries of science.
This study affirms the findings of other scholars that the working world of journalists is a
world defined by professional practices; that journalists decide what is news out of routine
adherence to conventions; that by following conventions journalists maintain order, make
myths, manage symbolic reality; that journalists both reinforce and contest authority in
reporting on science, and they construct authority for so-called maverick science and
scientists simply by reporting on them; that communication can, indeed, function as ritual
performance.
In our final deliberations on my project, my Gurus asked me what changes are necessary
to make science journalism better. Building on the work of scholars before me as well as
my findings in this analysis, I believe that science journalism could benefit from a more
multiperspectival approach to reporting science news, that science journalists could
improve their reporting by taking a more mindful approach to the news, that rhetorical
frames of acceptance (open and inclusive) are more useful in reporting science news than
are frames of rejection (closed and exclusive). Frames of acceptance that Kenneth Burke
called comic correctives can provide a link between the journalistic right to inform and the
responsibility to do so thoughtfully. Such a corrective could be a bridge to the
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transcendence of debunking and other strategies of rejection that are all too common in
science communication today.
As my Productive Criticism Guru has said, an analyst is taking social action simply by
engaging in this sort of criticism, determining that a particular topic is worthy of analysis
and examining it from a particular perspective. I have attempted to maintain an awareness
of my purpose, intent, and perspective throughout this project. I intend for the results of
this act of productive criticism to be useful in heightening journalists’ awareness of their
own rhetorical strategies and aims, an awareness that might help them to make more
informed decisions about the ways in which they communicate about science. For this
reason I hope my findings will be useful to teachers of journalism and to scientists as well,
toward the same ends. I intend for my findings to foster discussion, and I would not be
unhappy if they stirred debate as well (though discussion can take place in a frame of
acceptance, while debates tend to occur in frames of rejection). I am already applying my
findings in my daily work with scientists and journalists. In my everyday social life, I
intend to promote dialogue in science communication.
My dialogue with my gurus enabled them to broaden their frames for considering my
analysis, findings, and conclusions, as my Science Communication Guru has observed, to
look at my work from different perspectives. My Productive Criticism Guru asked me
how I might amend my approach for another study of this sort: I would be more confident
about starting out without a rigid framework for analysis, as I have learned that an open
frame allows one to see more (and maybe further and better). It has been said that the
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exploratory sort of criticism I have engaged in rarely proceeds in a linear fashion. Now
that I have completed this work of criticism I can say, emphatically, with regard to that
warning: no kidding! This preface constitutes a map you can use to walk through this
study, with just enough details to keep you moving forward and plenty of room for side
trips if you wish.
And now, here is how I got here….
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Linda Billings
SEX! ALIENS! HARVARD!
RHETORICAL BOUNDARY-WORK IN THE MEDIA
(A CASE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF JOURNALISTS IN
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC AUTHORITY)
With science and the media playing prominent roles in contemporary life, it is important
to understand the cultural authority of science and the role of the media in maintaining
this authority.  This paper will report on a case study of journalists’ participation in the
social construction of scientific authority. The case involves print media coverage of
controversial scientific research conducted by a tenured professor of psychiatry at
Harvard Medical School, a Pulitzer Prize winner, and a well-known authority in his field.
When this elite scientist embarked upon the study of people who believe they have been
abducted by aliens he drew fire for stepping outside the boundaries of “real” science,
despite his stellar credentials and long history of accomplishment.  Much of this fire took
place on the field of the mass media.  The boundaries of science and scientific authority
were tested in this case, and journalists played a role in the boundary-work. Employing
the sensitizing concept of boundary-work to guide analysis of media content, this case
study explores how journalists constructed scientific authority in their coverage of
Mack’s abduction research, and to what ends, and how scientific and journalistic norms
operate in media coverage of science.  Rhetoric is a primary tool for constructing social
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reality, and the rhetoric of science is a key source — for the purposes of this study,
arguably the sole source — of the cultural authority of science.  Burke’s dramatistic
criticism is thus employed as a primary analytic tool in this study, to excavate the
landscape of symbolic communication.  The aim of this study is to illuminate ambiguity,
complexity, motives and meanings in this case.  It is intended to be thought provoking,
instructive, and productive, to enrich the ongoing examination of the cultural roles of
science and journalism.
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________
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1Chapter 1
Introduction to a case of a deviant doctor:
a rhetorical analysis of journalistic boundary-work
Alien abduction is a familiar theme in popular culture.  It is the subject of newspaper
reports and magazine features, true confessions and science fiction, television
documentaries and big-budget Hollywood movies.1 Toward the end of the 20th century,
alien abduction arrived on the campus of Harvard University.  And the authorities were
not pleased....
John E. Mack, M.D., was a tenured professor of psychiatry at — as well as a graduate of
— Harvard Medical School. He spent his entire career at Harvard, making a name for
himself through achievements such as the conversion of a declining urban hospital into a
thriving medical teaching center, the creation of Harvard’s well known Center for
Psychology and Social Change, the winning of a Pulitzer prize for a psychobiography of
T.E. Lawrence, and the continuing education of the public about the psychological effects
of war and other traumas. In the early 1990s, Mack embarked upon a new research
project: the study of people who believe they have been abducted by aliens —
extraterrestrial intelligent beings. Despite his stellar credentials and long history of
accomplishment, he drew fire from colleagues for stepping outside the boundaries of real
science. Much of this fire took place on the field of the mass media.
2Inside and outside Harvard’s home town of Cambridge, Massachusetts, members of the
scientific establishment expressed displeasure with their colleague for devoting his time
to people who believed they had been kidnapped by extraterrestrials. In the face of rising
criticism and a formal investigation of his research methods, this particular scientist,
instead of backing away from his new study subject, publicly and repeatedly asserted that
the conventional, positivistic scientific worldview2 might be too limited in scope to
explain the phenomenon he was investigating. Journalists writing about Mack’s new
research interest probed for personal and professional flaws, critiqued his research
methods and questioned his conception of reality.
A tenured professor affiliated with an elite institution at the top of the heap of the
scientific establishment, who used hypnosis and other controversial techniques to work
with alleged alien abductees, who published a best-selling book on his research before
publishing his findings in peer-reviewed journals, who appeared on popular television
talk shows and openly discussed the politics of science — this appeared to be a case of
transgression. This was the stuff of news.
But what exactly was the news?
Given “the centrality of science to modern life” (Leshner, 2003), the ubiquity of
journalism and mass media in contemporary culture, and the influence of media coverage
of science on public knowledge and attitudes about science (Pellechia, 1997), it is
3important to understand the cultural authority3 of science (that is, scientific authority) and
journalism’s treatment of this authority — what this authority is, where it comes from,
how it is used and to what ends. This study examines how journalists covered
controversial research conducted by an elite scientist in a case that appeared to involve
the definition, contestation, and reinforcement of scientific authority.
The key question addressed in this study is, how do journalists participate in the social
construction4 of scientific authority in the mass media? This study focuses on how a
select group of journalists reporting for elite mass media participated in the social
construction of scientific authority in their coverage of John Mack’s abduction research.5
Science in culture
Like science, culture has been widely and variously defined.6 For the purposes of this
study, Geertz’s (1973) definition applies: culture is “an historically transmitted pattern of
meanings embedded in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic
forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge
about and attitudes toward life” (p. 34). Thus conceived, culture is a context, within
which social action can be “intelligibly — that is, thickly — described” (p. 14). As Carey
(1983) noted, “Societies...are threaded throughout...by culture: by the production and
reproduction of systems of symbols and messages” (p. 313). Building on Geertz’s
conception, Carey (1992) described culture “as a set of practices, a mode of human
activity, a process whereby reality is created, maintained and transformed” (p. 65) and
4posited that Geertz’s theory of culture “progressively becomes a theory of
communication as well” (p. 40).
That is, “what is called the study of culture can also be called the study of
communications,” as Carey (1992, p. 44) observed. The conception of communication
explored in this case study is Carey’s conception of communication as ritual enacted to
maintain culture over time, a symbolic process of creating, maintaining, and transforming
reality. “Communication,” Carey said, “comprises the ambience of human existence” (p.
24), the way that we construct and experience reality. Science and journalism are among
the many symbol systems constructed communicatively to “express and convey our
knowledge of and attitudes toward reality” (p. 30). Carey’s concept of communication as
ritual locates this symbolic action in culture and also characterizes it as constituting
culture.
Culture is the context in which power arises and operates, and the mass media are an
integral element of culture and a site where power arises and operates. In Carey’s (1992)
view, it would be useful for communication studies to explore how various symbol
systems are constructed and used and how “groups in society struggle over the definition
of what is real” (p. 31) through the construction and deployment of these symbolic forms.
The question driving this study encompasses both of these questions. Zelizer (1997a)
noted that mass communication research has not addressed the ritual functions of
journalism, as narrative or performance; this study attempts to do so.
5The public representation of science is “part of scientific work, conducted by professional
scientists and other spokespeople who are actors in science social worlds [sic] or
networks,” according to Zehr (1994a, p. 604), and public representations of science are a
worthy subject of study “because of the authoritative position of science in society.” One
place where science is symbolically represented and constructed is the mass media. This
study explores the role of journalists in constructing scientific authority through their
public representations of science and scientists in the media. Its aim is to contribute
toward enhancing understanding of science in, and as, culture. It examines the symbolic
action7 by which journalists participate in the social construction of scientific authority,
the deployment of journalistic conventions, practices and values in the course of this
action, and the broader cultural context in which they operate.
I believe it is important to articulate some of the assumptions under which I have
proceeded with this study, as follows:
• Science — including scientists, the process and practice of science, scientific
knowledge, scientific institutions, scientific authority — is a social construction created
by scientists and others through the symbolic action7 of communication;
• Science has cultural authority, a quality created by scientists and others in the process of
the social construction of science, a quality that scientists claim and nonscientists grant
them to act as arbiters of reality;
• Journalists play a role in the construction of this authority; and
• Rhetoric is a primary tool in this construction.
6Setting the stage: the 1990s
Given his public prominence, professional credentials, and institutional affiliation,
perhaps John Mack would inevitably attract attention by announcing a new research
project. Mack drew considerable attention when he went public about his professional
interest in what he came to call the alien abduction phenomenon — his work with
emotionally traumatized people who believed they had been abducted by extraterrestrial
intelligent beings.  But why exactly was Mack’s research news?
The aim of the practice of psychiatry, Foucault (1965) asserted, is not to understand
mental states but to control and discipline them. The practice of psychiatry especially
exemplifies the mutual dependence of knowledge and power, he wrote (Foucault, 1977).
At the same time, according to Scull (1989), psychiatry historically “has enjoyed a
perpetually marginal and unenviable position in the social division of labor — a
profession always, so it seems, but a step away from a profound crisis of legitimacy” (p.
21).  Psychiatry is thus a newsworthy subject, with its focus on mental and behavioral
norms and deviance and its purported agenda of social control.
In addition, media coverage of Mack’s abduction research unfolded in the 1990s, a
decade permeated with the residue of the previous decade’s public skirmishes in the so-
called culture wars.8 In addition, the ‘90s encompassed many events marked as
skirmishes in the so-called science wars9, events at least in part a response to the cultural
critique of science that arose in the 1970s, questioning the philosophical foundations of
science (Harding, 1991), the role of science in society (Ben-David, 1991), and the
7legitimacy of “scientific rationality itself” (Ross, 1991, p. 12). LaFollette (1990) has
explained this critique as a reaction “to decades of mismatch between positive messages
and negative effects, between an idealized expectation of benefit and the reality of
unpredicted harm, between the scientists’ endless promises and the public’s unfulfilled
desires” (p. 17).
By the beginning of the ‘90s one observer (Ross, 1991) claimed: “It is safe to say that
many of the founding certitudes of modern science have been demolished” (p. 12). Some
scientists cultivated the defensive attitude that the public was not only losing interest in
science but also growing hostile toward it, and they pointed to postmodernism and
cultural studies as possible culprits, accusing relativists, deconstructionists, and other
non-believers of undermining public faith in science. Gross and Levitt’s (1994) Higher
Superstition — published in the same year as Mack’s book Abduction — drew a lot of
attention in circles where the cultural critique of science was of interest.10 The so-called
Sokal hoax of 1996 — publication of physicist Alan Sokal’s faux postmodern analysis of
quantum gravity in the cultural studies journal Social Text, and all the brouhaha that
ensued — generated extensive coverage in elite media.11
The ‘90s were also colored by ongoing public debate about the validity of Freudian
concepts and psychoanalysis and related disagreements over claims of repressed and
recovered memories (see Beaubien, 1994; Borch-Jacobsen, 1997; Carman, 1995; Crews,
1995; Gardner, 1994; Goleman, 1992; Kaminer, 1996; Loftus, 1993; Loftus & Ketcham,
1994; Ofshe & Watters, 1994; Showalter, 1997; Zitner, 1992). The so-called memory
8wars focused on controversy over the scientific reality of the psychoanalytic concept of
repressed and recovered memory, a contested idea virtually ever since Freud first put it
forward. Freudian literary critic turned Freud-basher Frederick Crews lit a fire under the
topic in 1993 when he published the first of a series of articles about the so-called
memory wars, the term he used to describe the ongoing dispute over the validity of
repressed and recovered memories, a struggle he deemed part of a wider argument over
the validity of all Freudian theories and methods, none of which, Crews insisted, had
received any scientific validation (Crews et al, 1995). Crews, an emeritus professor of
English at the University of California-Berkeley, rejected Freud’s theories and methods,
blamed Freud for the current belief in repressed and recovered memory, and pronounced
such memories false.
The debate over memory was further fueled through the ‘90s by the publication of several
popular and provocatively titled books about the subject, including psychologist and
memory expert Elizabeth Loftus’s The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memories and
Allegations of Sexual Abuse (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994); Lawrence Wright’s (1994)
Remembering Satan, an investigation of allegations of satanic ritual abuse that was
excerpted in The New Yorker; and psychologist and recovered-memory debunker Richard
Ofshe’s Making Monsters: False Memories, Psychotherapy, and Sexual Hysteria (Ofshe
& Watters, 1994). These authors claimed evidence did not show that memories could be
repressed and recovered and further argued that making a case for the reality of repressed
and recovered memories could be dangerous.
9Ofshe12, a professor at the University of California-Berkeley, an expert in his own right,
and one of the most sharp-tongued public critics of the idea of repressed and recovered
memory, wrote in Making Monsters that he intended “to prove without a doubt that
devastating mistakes are being made...within certain therapy settings” and to expose “a
pseudoscientific enterprise that is damaging the lives of people in need” (Ofshe &
Watters, 1996, p. ix). He called therapy for it a fad “as damaging as any the mental health
field has produced in this century,” practiced by “professionals who have built a
pseudoscience out of an unfounded consensus...[and] slipped the ties that bind their
professions to scientific method and sound research....” He accused recovered-memory
therapists of “brutalization and psychological torture” and claimed a subset constitute “a
new class of sexual predator...causing the same emotional and psychological trauma as an
actual rape or sexual assault” (p. 7). Ofshe dismissed Freud himself as “the very figure of
a recovered memory therapist” and the creator of a “pseudoscientific paradigm” and
“prescientific” theories “based on no reliable empirical evidence” (pp. 293-294). He
opened his book claiming that a “bitter debate” was raging “over...recovered memory
therapy,” and he closed it with the claim that “a civil war” was under way between
“romantics who rely on inspiration and myth and empiricists who argue that
practice...should be based on scientific observations” (p. 298), declaring empiricists were
winning the war because romantics made claims they could not prove. Some journalists
would turn to Ofshe for comment on Mack’s Abduction (Mack, 1994a), and Ofshe would
deliver, with harsh words for Mack and his validation of the idea (see Chapter 5). (In
Making Monsters, Ofshe listed media sources he claimed had contributed to the
construction of the idea of repressed traumatic memories.)
10
The False Memory Syndrome Foundation, created in 1992 in response to media reporting
on repressed and recovered memory, coined the term “false memory syndrome” as a
substitute for repressed and recovered memory and ultimately succeeded in replacing the
latter with the former term, consequently redefining the idea of repressed and recovered
memory as false, largely through media exposure (Pope, 1996).13 The foundation’s
advisory board of psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and cognitive scientists
helped disseminate the false memory syndrome thesis in scientific journals and expert
testimony as well as the mass media. Thus the foundation’s claims that all memories are
reconstructions and that no scientific evidence supports the so-called repression theory
surfaced often in media accounts. Meanwhile, the American Psychiatric Association
(APA), producer of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, linked
the experience of childhood sexual abuse, often coupled in the media with the idea of
repressed and recovered memories, with dissociative identity disorder, “a failure to
integrate various aspects of identity, memory, and consciousness” (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994, p. 484).  APA also noted that the accuracy of reports of such abuse
was questionable. In 1995, the American Psychological Association “approved [the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation] as a provider of continuing education programs for
psychologists” (False Memory Syndrome Foundation Newsletter, November-December,
1995, e-mail edition, as cited by Pope, 1996, p. 957).
News stories through the ‘90s offered a range of views about repressed and recovered
memories and false memory syndrome. In 1992 The New York Times reported that claims
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of recovered memories of childhood abuse had “set off a debate” among psychologists of
memory (Goleman, 1992). The Times cited two psychologists who claimed repressed
memories were a real problem and four psychologists — all affiliates of the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation — who dismissed such memories as the creations of
therapists. Reporting on “a problem that Freud himself struggled with: whether to trust
adult memories of childhood,” the Boston Globe (Zitner, 1992, p. 25) quoted the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation and a woman claiming to have recovered memories of
childhood satanic ritual abuse. Psychiatrist Walter Reich (1994) claimed in The New York
Times Book Review that the subject of recovered memory had captured popular interest
because of increasing attention to childhood sexual abuse, prompted in part by criticism
of Freud’s theories about such abuse. Reich asserted that reports of recovered memories
of childhood sexual abuse had drawn a great deal of attention in the mass media and that
experts, not journalists, should have the authority to determine what counts as legitimate
memory.
“Recovered memory is a fact, says Chicago psychiatrist, though others call it fiction,”
claimed a 1994 headline in the Chicago Tribune (Beaubien, 1994, p. C1).  Citing “bitter
national debate over the validity of recovered memory therapy” (p. C1), this story
claimed the practice was “destroying families and dividing the psychiatric profession.”
The story quoted Ofshe dismissing “the recovered-memory epidemic” as “quackery” (p.
C1). Meanwhile, the Des Moines Register claimed the media had gone “overboard” in the
1990s with coverage of false memory claims (A profession under siege, 1994, p. 1). U.S.
News and World Report (Schrof, 1997) called the debate over repressed and recovered
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memory “a furor that has ripped apart many families” (p. 67). In reporting a state
decision to stop paying therapy costs for people who claimed to suffer from repressed and
recovered memories, a story in the Sacramento Bee (Hallinan, 1997) began, “First, there
was the woman with 3,000 personalities, Then there was the one who said she was forced
to eat a baby’s heart” (p. F1). The Bee went on to claim the decision was “part of a
national backlash against recovered memory” (p. F1).
As the discourse of the ‘90s on memory continued to unfold, fretting continued in the
science community over scientific literacy and public understanding of science, or the
lack thereof (see Hartz & Chappell, 1997; Hofstadter, 1998; Lederman, 1998; Sagan,
1995). Scientists concerned about public science literacy, or the lack thereof, were quick
to remind journalists of their responsibility to help scientists educate the public.14 In
parallel with these currents in the public discourse about science, reports of unidentified
flying object (UFO) sightings, alien abductions, and government-coverup conspiracies
continued to proliferate in the mass media along with fictional treatments of these
subjects.15
Claiming the influence of pseudoscience was growing, the American Physical Society
proposed in 1998 that the science community should adopt a formal definition of science
and sought the approval of other scientific societies for the following:
Science is the systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and
organizing and condensing that knowledge into testable laws and theories. The
success and credibility of science is anchored in the willingness of scientists to: 1)
Expose their ideas and results to independent testing and replication by other
scientists. This requires the complete and open exchange of data, procedures and
materials. 2) Abandon or modify accepted conclusions when confronted with
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more complete or reliable experimental evidence. Adherence to these principles
provides a mechanism for self-correction that is the foundation of the credibility
of science” (American Physical Society, 1998).16
At about the same time, the prestigious journal Nature reported on “Calls for a cease-fire
in the science wars” (Henry, 1998, p. 557).  By the turn of the century Harvard scientist
Stephen Jay Gould (2000) was deconstructing the wars in Science. “The objectivist myth
of science as a fully general method,” he wrote, “rooted in observation by minds
consciously free of constraining social bias and using universal tools of reason to
accumulate reliable knowledge leading toward an increasingly synthesized theoretical
understanding of causes” (Section II, para. 1) creates a “false dichotomy” (Section II,
para. 1) between science, or realism, and social constructivism, or relativism, “that
defines and fuels the illusory science wars” (Section III, para. 1). He concluded:
The true, insightful, and fundamental statement that science, as a quintessentially
human activity, must reflect a surrounding social context does not imply either
that no accessible external reality exists, or that science, as a socially embedded
and constructed institution, cannot achieve more adequate understanding of
nature’s facts and mechanisms (Section IV, para. 7).
It is not clear what the science wars, or the memory wars, were, if anything, or what they
were about (though they appeared to involve disputes over claims to authority), or
whether they amounted to anything more than a jumble of public (or publicized) events
involving (or manufacturing) controversies somehow relating to science and plastered
with a catchy label. In any case, whatever did or did not happen, postmodernism and
cultural studies were not erased from the intellectual landscape, and science was not
vanquished.17 This analysis proceeds on the assumption that what journalists and
scientists called the science wars were simply, as Gieryn (1999) observed, particularly
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public episodes in the ongoing discourse on the origin, nature and functions of science in
culture, especially scientific authority and the ways in which that authority is sustained.18
This study considers a particular case in a particular cultural moment, a case in which
science was in dispute, memory was a cause for battle, and aliens were everywhere.
Parameters of the case
Media coverage of Mack’s abduction research initially drew my attention because it
appeared to be atypical science news. Stories were published in elite media, typical sites
for science news. They addressed controversial research, a typical focus of science news.
But they featured sensational headlines and leads, foregrounding a Harvard professor,
extraterrestrials, and alien sex. A story in the sedate, white-collar Boston Globe (Kahn,
1994) was one of the first that stood out with its tabloid-style headline, “ET, phone
Harvard: Dr. John Mack could use the help as critics rip his research on alien
abductions,” and lead, “The big Mack attack has just begun. And no one has heard from
the little people yet” (p. 61). On closer examination I found these stories not only
provocative but also thought-provoking.  It appeared that something interesting might be
going on beneath their superficial framing, emphasizing Harvard, aliens, and sex. Stories
clearly and consistently identified Mack as an elite scientist and often focused virtually
exclusively on his status. But the journalists who wrote these stories appeared to be
questioning Mack’s authority to speak as a scientist at the same time that they were
constructing him as a scientific authority and using him as an authoritative source. The
case of media coverage of Mack’s abduction research appeared to be sufficiently rich to
warrant a full-blown analysis.19
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The Mack case is interesting because it involves pace-setting elite media, a prominent
scientist and a member of the scientific elite, and what appears to be a controversy over
authority and legitimacy. In this case, Mack, his supporters and his critics argued over
whether his latest endeavor was legitimate or illegitimate science.20 Journalists and
scientists appeared to be questioning not only Mack’s claims and methods but also the
legitimacy of his work as science and his own credibility as a scientist. A systematic
exploration of this case yields new and useful insights into how journalists participate in
the construction of scientific authority. This study is intended to be thought provoking,
instructive, and productive21, to enrich the ongoing critique of the cultural roles and
functions of science and journalism.
Study approach, goals and purpose
This project is a qualitative, interpretive study. Its theoretical foundation is social
constructivism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), with guidance provided by the sensitizing
concept (see below) of boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983, 1995, 1999), which aims to explain
“when, how and to what ends the boundaries of science are drawn and defended in
natural settings often distant from laboratories and professional journals” (Gieryn, 1995,
p. 394).22 (For the purposes of this study, boundary-work is any rhetorical strategy or
tactic employed to reinforce, test, blur, erase, or reconstruct the rhetorically constructed
boundaries maintained by the scientific community to demarcate science legitimated by
consensus from claims made by individuals, inside or outside of that scientific
community, that do not fit within that consensus worldview.)
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In the constructivist view, the practice and process and worldview of science, and the
cultural authority of science, are social constructions contingent on their time and place.
Constructivist studies depend on observations of the world of everyday life, and so the
method of case study fits this research project. The case-study method is well suited to
accommodating “multiple realities” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 214), including those of
the researcher and the research subject(s), in a complex cultural context. Given its focus
on cultural authority, this study draws on the literature and employs some of the
approaches of cultural studies, with its critical, post-positivistic focus on the role of the
mass media in social life and power relations in communications and society (Carey,
1983). Because rhetoric is a primary means of constructing social reality, rhetorical
analysis is employed as a primary analytic tool in this study. The rhetoric of and about
science is a means of maintaining, defending, remodeling and demolishing the
boundaries of science, between science and non-science, between scientific disciplines,
between science and the public. This case study builds upon findings in studies of the
rhetoric of science to examine the deployment of rhetoric in a particular case of elite
media coverage of an elite scientist engaged in controversial research. Burke’s (1969a,
1969b, 1973, 1984) dramatistic criticism is the analytic method of choice for exploring in
depth the rhetorical strategies deployed in texts selected for analysis.
This study explores how journalists define and use key terms such as science and
objectivity in the texts selected for analysis, employing loose definitions of these terms
that may function as sensitizing concepts (Christians & Carey, 1989, pp. 369-370). Such
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loose definitions allow the researcher to consider a potential multitude of meanings and
uses of terms; they are intended to be meaningful to the researcher “yet sufficiently
powerful to explain large domains of social experience” (p. 369-370). A range of
definitions for the term “science” is reviewed in Chapter 2. This study employs a broadly
and loosely defined conception of science, operating on the assumption that what science
means depends on who is employing the term, and when, and where, and toward what
ends. Science herein is generally considered a cultural phenomenon, involving scientists,
scientific practices, scientific values, scientific institutions, scientific authority, and
scientific communication. As “objectivity” is very much tied up with conceptions of
science, a range of definitions for this term are reviewed in Chapter 2 as well.
Wilcox (2003) has asserted that analysis of media coverage of science requires
consideration of “the full circuit of communication, including discourse about [science]
originating from social locations other than science, the full set of studies produced by
science, and the requirement of the media for dramatic stories” (p. 241). According to
Fursich and Lester (1996), while science communication research has sometimes taken a
critical approach, researchers generally have not pursued analyses “based in a thorough
concept of science and culture” (p. 24). This project attempts to do so, following the lead
of studies that “focus on the diverse encounters with science and expertise that typify
everyday experience,” as Wynne (1991) has characterized them, “a central analytical
issue being the construction of authority” (p.  111). By documenting and analyzing a
particular case in considerable depth and breadth, this study aims to enhance
understanding of how journalists contribute to the social construction of scientific
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authority and the boundaries of science through the symbolic action of communication
and, perhaps, broaden understanding of science, communication, and culture. Given the
theoretical foundation and methodological approach of this study, the aim here is to
explore and reveal rather than explain and resolve complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty
in this case. I have conducted this analysis with an awareness of what Ivie (1995) has
described as “simultaneously representing and enacting reality-defining discourse” (n.p.)
while doing the work.
If, as Wilcox (2003) has claimed, “media coverage is part of a circuit of communication
between other institutions and knowledge communities,” then examining media content
within a broad cultural context is a means toward revealing “the active role of the media
in constructing narratives and meanings” (p. 244) through reporting on science. This
research project is intended to contribute to the scholarly discourse on science
communication, the practice of journalism, and the cultural roles of journalism and of
science. It aims to shed light on the processes by which scientific information and
scientific legitimacy are conveyed throughout the public domain, a subject that has been
declared a worthy goal of science communication research (Dunwoody, 1992). As this
study may broaden understanding of the role of the media in the social construction of
scientific reality, it may also broaden understanding of the role of the media in society, a
subject of continuing debate.
Rationale for case and approach
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Consideration of how journalists portray science and scientists in the media warrants
some consideration of the image of science and scientists in society and culture. The
common wisdom regarding the cultural role of science and scientists in contemporary
culture might be summarized as follows: science is a rational enterprise dedicated to
producing knowledge for the public good, public understanding of science is necessary to
maintaining a free and open society, scientists understand science and non-scientists do
not, and scientists are responsible for informing the public about science. The common
wisdom further posits that journalists are responsible for conveying this information
about science from scientists — the authoritative sources — to the ignorant public and
that good science journalism is a matter of getting the facts right.23 But what happens in a
case where journalists intent on getting their science right are reporting on an elite
scientist whose peers say he is wrong?
This case study documents a dispute over knowledge claims, examining elite-media
coverage of the controversial research and controversial claims of an elite scientist who
questioned the dominant scientific paradigm. Disputes over scientific knowledge claims
warrant more systematic study, according to Brante (1993). This study approaches the
discourse on Mack’s abduction research as a scientific controversy (Brante, 1993;
Hagendijk & Meeus, 1993; Martin & Richards, 1995; McMullin, 1987; Mendelsohn,
1987), a public conflict over scientific knowledge claims that some members of the
scientific community appeared to take seriously.24 Such conflicts have been described as
cognitive and social disputes over what constitutes legitimate scientific knowledge
(Gieryn, 1999) and “valuable sites for carrying out research into the nature of scientific
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knowledge claims” (Martin & Richards, 1995, p. 510) and scientific worldviews.
“Unresolved controversies” have been deemed “particularly rewarding sites” (p. 513) for
study. Conflicts over scientific knowledge claims tend “to reveal some of the
assumptions upon which science is built,” according to Brante (1993), and thus studying
them is “a useful method for determining hidden norms and values in scientific
communities” (pp. 186-187). Examining conflicts over who has “the right to speak”
about science, “who has the true (scientific) knowledge on his or her side” (p. 189) is a
useful way to attempt to understand struggles over scientific authority. A contextual,
multiperspectival approach to analyzing a controversy over scientific knowledge claims
promises to provide a useful view of the symbolic action taking place in the dispute
(Martin & Flores, 1998).
Rhetorical analysis of science news has been identified as “a potentially rich area of
study” that could broaden understanding of “the structure and significance of texts” and
“has not received the attention it deserves” (Evans & Hornig-Priest, 1995, p. 328).
Digging into the discourse of science25, through which scientific knowledge is
constructed (Woolgar, 1988), is a useful way of exploring the social construction of the
boundaries that separate legitimate from illegitimate science. Media coverage of science
is an especially interesting and public element of this discourse. The media content
chosen for examination in this study appears typical in its representation of science,
focusing on elite scientific credentials, scientific methods, and controversy. It is atypical,
however, in its focus on an elite scientist who engaged in what some argued was
illegitimate science. “The empirical naming and knowing of the physical world is nothing
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if not a cultural expressive act with fully political meanings,” according to Ross (1991, p.
13). Consequently, examination of the rhetoric employed to define and defend science
and scientific reality in this case is a useful method of exploring the social construction
process.
This study examines the symbolic action of communication in a particular case.  It is not
a content analysis but a meaning-of-content analysis. It is not concerned with the
accuracy or adequacy of explanation in science journalism, nor does it examine readers’
roles in the social construction of reality in this case. It focuses on the texts, the producers
of the texts, and the cultural context in which they produced them.
Analyst’s perspective
Because this is an interpretive analysis, I am attempting here to identify the values,
beliefs, and other personal factors I am aware of bringing to the project as they may
influence my process and outcome. I believe that the individual perspective and
idiosyncratic approach guiding this study inevitably have yielded research results that no
one else could replicate.
My choice of case, construction of theoretical framework, and selection of analytic
methods and tools are products of my upbringing, education, experience and interest in
the worlds of journalism, science, and politics. Just as a journalist makes subjective
decisions every time she chooses to do a particular story (or not) or consult a particular
source (or not), a qualitative researcher makes subjective decisions in choosing a subject
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of study and a method by which to study it. My interest in and perspective on the cultural
roles of science and scientists and journalism and journalists, which led me to choose a
particular subject and methodological stance for this study, are a product of a lifetime of
influences.
I began learning about the natural world empirically, through observation and experience,
guided by members of my extended family of Eastern-European-immigrant farm
workers, who validated the importance of wondering and learning about one’s
environment. These teachers were functionally illiterate; they learned about the world not
by reading and theorizing about it but by being in, doing in, and practically thinking in
and about it, and they passed on this way of knowing, which is both rational and intuitive.
Public educators supplied me with literate, primarily rational knowledge about the natural
world.  I am consequently equipped to employ reason and experience in learning how to
be and do and think in the world.
I developed what I think of as a political consciousness in the late 1960s and came to
assume (and, after frequent reconsideration, still do assume) that authority can be, and
often should be, questioned. A new wave of feminism played a prominent role in the
development of my thinking about the world. I received my undergraduate education at a
university of the liberal arts that encouraged its students to question everything,
especially authority and reality. Among faculty and students, politics were not hidden
from view. I majored in social sciences and planned to be a social worker. But with jobs
in the field scarce when I graduated, instead I ended up in Washington, DC, and in 1978 I
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began a career as a journalist, reporting environmental news. I was dispatched to the
White House, Congress, federal agencies, and elsewhere to decipher debates over toxic
waste cleanup, industrial air and water pollution, land use decisions and so on. Editors
and other colleagues worked with me to ensure that I learned and abided by the
conventions, values and practices of journalism — though no one, as I recollect, ever
identified them as such.
Over the next several years I came to specialize in reporting science and technology
news. My work as a journalist sharpened my political consciousness, and after my first
few years of reporting I began to realize that I had political interests that affected how I
saw the world of news. I began to realize that I could choose what to tell my readers to
think about — and what to think about those things. I had power of a sort, I suppose,
though I preferred to think of it as influence. From my perch inside the Washington
Beltway, I watched scientists acting as cultural authorities and gradually realized over the
course of these observations that I had not been, and should be, questioning why they had
that authority, or whether they should have it.
They were scientists; therefore they were authorities, I had been assuming. I watched
others validating that authority, for some time unaware that I myself was participating in
the process. I watched other journalists judging scientists’ authority according to their
institutional affiliations, ranks, prizes, publications — and I followed suit, without much
awareness of what I was doing and why I was doing it. I suspect that many of my
colleagues were in the same boat; we did not talk about where and how and why we
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learned the rules by which we did our work. But perhaps we should have been asking
more questions about our authoritative sources — why those particular people at that
particular time in that particular place on those particular issues?
By 1984, reporting on policies and plans for the commercial development of outer space,
I could see that the issue I was covering was an ideological rather than a practical matter,
a product of the Reagan administration’s “let the private sector do it” philosophy rather
than any real potential for profit. My publishers declined my request to start an opinion
column in my publication, for fear of offending readers. I realized I had other options for
reflecting my views in my work — for example, paying closer attention to what was said
and not said in my stories, who was quoted and who was not. I left journalism in 1988, in
part due to struggles with a publisher over what constituted news and who should have
the authority to make those decisions. I began consulting work for government clients,
observing from a different vantage point how credibility, authority, and power are
constructed and deployed.
Over years of following the politics of science, I observed how government, industry, and
academia defined science to serve their interests. As I watched scientists, and others, spar
over global warming, missile defense, asteroid threats, and other issues defined as
scientific problems through the 1980s and ‘90s, I began to wonder — and I still do
wonder, often — how does one decide who is telling the truth? And what is the truth,
anyway? These questions, among others, led me to pursue doctoral studies in
communication. Looking back, I suppose it is reasonable to say that I left journalism
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because I had become more interested in “how” and “why” than in the “who-what-when-
where” of social action. As many scientists have discovered in their work, I have found in
my research that the more I explore these questions, the further away I seem to be from
answers…. But I am more interested than ever in the exploration of space.
I do not believe that science is apolitical or value-free, and I do not assume that the
cultural authority of science is beyond question. I also do not assume that the scientific
establishment is not justified in its claims to cultural authority. I do assume that those
who possess it, or want to possess it, should be able to justify possession. My interest in
the cultural authority of scientists and journalists stems from working with scientists and
journalists. I want to better understand this cultural authority — where it comes from,
how it works, who has it and why. And given that scientists claim this authority and non-
scientists continue to validate this claim, I believe that contributing to a better
understanding of this authority is a productive social endeavor.
As a moderate social constructivist, I assume that a physical reality exists independent of
human perception and that social interactions define how we perceive and relate to this
reality. My inclination to look at the world from a critical perspective is a product of my
interest in authority. My interest in exploration as an analytic approach is a product of my
early experience in a family of self-taught naturalists as well as my two decades of
professional experience in the field of space exploration. I have an interest in things
extraterrestrial which is largely a product of my work with NASA’s search for
extraterrestrial intelligence program in the early 1990s. 26
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I also admit to a lifelong interest in, and ambivalent feelings about, psychology and
psychiatry. Through the 1970s, I studied the works of Carl Jung and developed a distaste
for all things Freudian. By the 1990s I ended up in the care of a psychiatrist for clinical
depression and resented it a lot. The neuroscientific perspective was (and still is)
dominant in psychiatry, and doctors treated my depression as a chemical imbalance. I
believed that my problem was more complex, not only neurobiological but also,
somehow, spiritual. I am still in treatment for depression, the chemical-balance treatment
is working, and I still feel the same way about my illness. I have developed a
considerable interest in psychiatry and in Freud. And I have joined a Unitarian
Universalist congregation to tend to my spiritual needs.
With regard to structuralist, functionalist, structural-functionalist, postmodernist,
poststructuralist, feminist, and deconstructionist perspectives on social reality, my own
perspective on social reality is none of the above in any strict sense and all of the above
in at least some small sense. I am interested in how structure, function, values, interests,
and any other social or cultural factors that appear to be operative and relevant may play
a role in the social construction of reality, in this case and in general. Though I am now
inarguably a member of the socioeconomic middle class, I continue to think of myself as
a member of the subordinate culture of the working class in which I grew up as well as
the subordinate culture of womanhood in which I still live. (My male colleagues and
associates argue with me that women are no longer members of a subordinate culture, but
I beg to differ.) I am familiar with the practices and perspectives of the dominant culture
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as well as those of my subordinate cultures, and consequently I have developed a
preference for considering multiple perspectives in exploring empirical and social reality.
As feminist theorists of science have observed, and I have come to believe, drawing on
multiple perspectives in attempting to understand the world is useful (Haraway, 1991;
Harding, 1991, 1987). And I agree with Walters  (1997) that understanding the origin,
nature and deployment of scientific authority is necessary to determining “the place of
science in shaping a democratic society” (p. 2).
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Notes
1. Some of the better known alien abduction vehicles include Stephen Spielberg’s
1977 film “Close Encounters of the Third Kind”; Whitley Streiber’s best-selling
book Communion (1987) and its sequels; numerous episodes of Fox TV’s “X-
Files” series of the 1990s; frequent documentaries on the Discovery Channel, the
History Channel, and other cable outlets; and, most recently, the Sci-Fi Channel’s
much-hyped 2002 mini-series “Taken.”
2. For the purposes of this study, worldview is a set of attitudes, beliefs, and values
employed to explain and understand one’s environment, a way of perceiving and
interpreting the world, “a collectively agreed-upon and thus collectively valuable
way of organizing social reality” (Rosenberg, 1996, p. 10.). For the purposes of
this study, the positivistic worldview is a way of looking at the world in which
legitimate, objective scientific knowledge is that acquired by observation,
experiment, and verification; the world of scientific reality is the world that can be
observed. Comte’s “positive philosophy” lent a name to this worldview and
conveyed the idea that scientific method depends on reason and observation.
3. This analysis uses the term “cultural authority” as defined in Gieryn (1999): “the
probability that particular definitions of reality…will prevail as valid and true”
(Starr, 1982, as quoted in Gieryn, 1999, p. 1). Gieryn says by this definition
cultural authority resembles what he calls epistemic authority, “the legitimate
power to define, describe, and explain bounded domains of reality” (p. 1).
Between these two definitions, the cultural authority whose construction is
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examined in this analysis is well described. The cultural authority of science is
also referred to herein as scientific authority.
4. In this proposal, the terms “social construction” and “construction” encompass a
range of activities, including building, maintenance, remodeling, renovation, and
demolition.
5. For simplicity’s sake I use Mack’s term “abduction phenomenon,” or “abduction”
for short, throughout this analysis to refer to the claims that people have made that
they have been abducted by extraterrestrial intelligent beings and the subject of
Mack’s research. This choice of terms is not intended to convey any judgment
about the reality or non-reality, truth or non-truth, validity or non-validity, of
these claims or Mack’s research project.
6. Fukuyama (1995) cites a single survey of research on anthropology, psychology
and sociology that includes 160 definitions of culture.
7. Blumer (1969) called the interaction by which people construct social reality
“symbolic interaction.” Burke (1973) called this social interaction “symbolic
action.” Since I will be employing rhetorical analysis as a primary tool in this
study, I will use the term “symbolic action” to describe the interaction by which
people construct social reality.
8. See, for example: Bloom, A. D. (1987). The closing of the American mind: how
higher education has failed democracy and impoverished the souls of today's
students. New York: Simon and Schuster; Hirsch, E. D., Jr. (1987). Cultural
Literacy; What Every American Needs to Know. (With an Appendix, What
Literate Americans Know, by E. D. Hirsh, Jr., J. Katt, & J. Trefil.) Boston, MA:
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Houghton Mifflin; Sine, Thomas (1995). Cease fire: searching for sanity in
America's culture wars. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co.; Jacoby, R.
(1994). Dogmatic wisdom: How the culture wars divert education and distract
America.  New York: Doubleday; Wallis, B., Weems, M. & Yanawine, P. (Eds.)
(1999). Art matters: how the culture wars changed America. New York: New
York University Press; Gitlin, T. (1995). The twilight of common dreams: why
America is wracked by culture wars. New York: Metropolitan Books.
9. An early volley in the science wars was a report from the American Association
for the Advancement of Science in 1991. “Science: End of the Frontier?” claimed
shrinking federal funding for academic research threatened an end to science as
we know it (Mervis, 1991). Fuller (1998) marked “the first salvo of the Science
Wars” as occurring in 1992 with the publication of Steven Weinberg’s Dreams of
a Final Theory and Lewis Wolpert’s The Unnatural Nature of Science, books
reflecting a positivistic worldview and criticizing historians, philosophers and
sociologists of science who had challenged the common wisdom about what
Wolpert termed the nature of science.
10. Gross and Levitt (1994) argued that “the status of science as a reliable, profound,
and productive source of knowledge ought to be beyond serious question” and
that humanists who were questioning this status were undermining the authority
of science. Not all “scientific” thinkers were in full agreement with them. A
review of Higher Superstition in Skeptic magazine (Shallit, 1994) faulted the
authors for “indulging in some of the same tactics it decries,” mainly “sloppy
polemic” (para. 1). However, Skeptic called the book “a revealing expose” of the
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science wars, described as “unprecedented efforts by certain members of the
academic left to topple science’s dominance as the pre-eminent tool of Western
rationalists” (para. 1). In this review, the claims of science critics were labeled
“ignorance, pure and simple...commentary without knowledge” (para. 3),
“pseudoscientific analysis” and “claptrap” (para. 4). At the same time, though,
Skeptic accused Gross and Levitt of “undisguised partisanship” (para. 12), calling
those they agree with authoritative and marginalizing others. And while Gross and
Levitt were praised for “poking fun at the rhetorical pretensions” of science
critics, they also were charged “guilty of the same offense” (para. 21). Martin
(1996) called Higher Superstition “a political intervention...a form of boundary
work...a means for bolstering ‘science’ against funding cutbacks and loss of
public credibility” (p. 170).
11. In the academic journal Lingua Franca, Sokal (1996a) said he was “troubled by
an apparent decline in the standards of rigor in certain precincts of the academic
humanities” and wrote his article “so that any competent [scientist] would realize
that it is a spoof” (pp. 62-63). That the editors of Social Text accepted his article
(Sokal, 1996b) for publication “exemplifies the intellectual arrogance” (p. 63) of
postmodern thinkers, he said. The Sokal hoax prompted more than a year of
heated public debate. In the New York Review of Books, physicist Steven
Weinberg (1996) praised Sokal’s hoax, claiming it “served a public purpose, to
attract attention to...a decline of standards of rigor in the academic community....”
(p. 11). Asserting his faith in the positivistic worldview, Weinberg said “if we
ever discover intelligent creatures on some distant planet and translate their
32
scientific works, we will find that we and they have discovered the same laws” (p.
14). He concluded by observing: “We will need to confirm and strengthen the
vision of a rationally understandable world if we are to protect ourselves from the
irrational tendencies that still beset humanity” (p. 15). In a 1998 Science magazine
essay entitled “Popular culture and the threat to rational inquiry,” physicist
Douglas Hofstadter echoed these concerns, claiming contemporary society was
anti-science.
12. Ofshe is emeritus professor in the department of sociology at the University of
California-Berkeley. Making Monsters was released in the same year as
Abduction, by the same publisher, Scribner’s. Ofshe describes his research
interests include “coercive social control; social psychology; influence in police
interrogation; influence leading to pseudo-memory in psychotherapy” (n.p.). His
published papers include such titles as "The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational
Choice and Irrational Action” (Denver University Law Review), "The
Consequences of False Confessions: Miscarriages of Justice and Deprivations of
Liberty in the Age of Psychological Interrogation” (Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology), and "Coerced Confessions: The Logic of Seemingly Irrational
Action” (Cultic Studies Journal).  I obtained this information on Ofshe’s research
and publications from his U.S.-Berkeley faculty Web page. Retrieved September
8, 2004, from http://sociology.berkeley.edu/faculty/OFSHE/. According to the
False Memory Syndrome Foundation, Ofshe has served as an advisor to that
group.
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13. The False Memory Syndrome Foundation claims its “focus [is] on science.” It
offers information on “the current controversy about the accuracy of adult claims
of "repressed" memories of childhood sexual abuse that are often made decades
after the alleged events, for which there is no external corroboration.” Information
accessed on the World Wide Web June 10, 1997, at: http://www.fmsf.org. The
foundation succeeded in its mass media campaign to reconstruct this concept into
something called “false memory syndrome”: I documented how the media
participated in reconstructing the concept of repressed and recovered memory as
“false memory syndrome” in a paper, “Controlling minds and memories:
medicine, the media, and the social construction of mental disorders,” written for
an independent study project supervised by James Capshew, Department of the
History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University, summer semester II, 1997.
14. One widely publicized report ostensibly aimed at journalists and scientists (Hartz
& Chappell, 1997) made the claims that: the public is ignorant about science but
needs to understand it to appreciate and support it, scientists are responsible for
informing the public about science, and journalists are responsible for working
with scientists to convey this information to the public.  Science in the United
States “has no organized constituency except itself...no spare cash...and little
experience in...Washington politics,” and thus “science is justifiably worried that
it is now playing a losing game.” The report expressed concerns about
“unscientific Americans,” “unfriendly assessments,” “rampant illiteracy,”
“scientists who don’t speak English [and] reporters who don’t speak science” (p.
v).
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15. Fox TV’s lineup for the ‘90s included the documentary “Alien Autopsy: (Fact or
Fiction?),” broadcast in 1995; the popular series “The X-Files,” frequently
dealing with alien visitations; “Strange Universe,” a paranormal-news program
broadcast Monday through Friday; “Dark Skies,” a series dealing with an alien
conspiracy, premiering in fall 1996; and “Alien Nation: The Enemy Within,” a
made-for-TV movie broadcast in November 1996.  Meanwhile, NBC offered its
humorous take on the alien-invasion story, the series “Third Rock from the Sun”;
PBS broadcast the “NOVA” documentary “Kidnapped by UFOs?” in February
1996; and the Hollywood blockbuster “Independence Day” opened on the 4th of
July, 1996, preceded by a sneak preview at the White House.
16. It is worth noting that the American Physical Society’s attempt to establish an
“official” definition of science, “to help the public sort science from nonsense,”
was a failure. Even its own members could not reach agreement on the public
meaning of science. See Fountain (1998).
17. The American Association for the Advancement of Science reported in the
November 2003 issue of the e-newsletter “AAAS Advances” that the U.S.
Congress would be approving “a record-breaking $126 billion” for research and
development in fiscal year 2004.
18. In Cultural Boundaries of Science, Gieryn (1999) sought “to make the science
wars historically mundane by showing that they are of a piece with the five
episodes of cultural cartography” (p. 337) he documented in the book.
19.  In Pictures at an Execution (Lesser, 1993), her analysis of murder in the mass
media and elsewhere in contemporary culture, critic Wendy Lesser explains that
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she chose a particular case to study — a controversy over media access to a prison
execution — because it was “odd and compelling” (p. 25). It was explicitly about
one thing — First Amendment rights — she says, and implicitly about many other
things -- public fascination with murder, controversy over the death penalty,
violence in the media. The Mack case intrigues me in a similar way. It is
explicitly about the legitimacy of a scientist’s work but could be implicitly about
other things.
20. In this study, “illegitimate science” refers to activities labeled “science” by some
but deemed illegitimate science, nonscience, pseudoscience or junk science by the
scientific establishment, though elsewhere these terms may have separate and
distinct meanings.
21. For a discussion of the idea of productive criticism, see Chapter 3, especially
Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland (1994) and Ivie (1995, 2001). Like rhetorical
criticism, mass communication research can be productive. It can heighten
awareness and understanding of public values and public interests; a scholar can
contribute to civic life by broadening understanding of communications between
scientists and journalists and the way that values and interests play out in these
communications. Productive criticism is addressed in greater depth in Chapter 3.
22. According to the sensitizing concept of boundary-work, boundary-workers use
intellectual constructs such as fact, reason, logic, and objectivity to establish and
maintain boundaries between science and other cultural practices associated with
what are considered to be “non-scientific” qualities, such as faith and belief. The
social constructivist perspective on boundary-work assumes, however, that “no
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demarcation principles work universally and...the separation of science from other
knowledge-producing activities is instead a contextually contingent and interests-
driven pragmatic accomplishment drawing selectively on inconsistent and
ambiguous attributes” (Gieryn, 1995, p. 393).
23. These common conceptions of science and journalism reflect the conventional
transmission or cognitive-deficit model (Carey, 1992; Gross, 1974) of
communication as a one-way process in which information is transmitted from
informed authoritative sources to uninformed audiences. In the case of science
communication, scientists determine what non-scientists need to know about
science and convey that information to ignorant non-scientists, and journalists
serve as conduits for relaying this information to the public. Though it may be
considered outdated, no longer the dominant model, in science communication
research, the deficit model is believed to be still “generally followed by scientists”
(Gregory & Miller, 1998, p. 97) and “pervasive” in public discourse about science
(Nieman, 2000, p. 21). See Chapter 2 for further discussion of these common
conceptions.
24. In my judgment, Harvard Medical School’s investigation of Mack’s abduction
research methods and the media’s interest in this investigation were evidence that
the scientific community has taken Mack’s work seriously.
25. For the purposes of this study, discourse encompasses spoken and written
communication among scientists, between scientists and journalists, between
scientists and the public, between journalists and the public in which cultural
roles, functions, and ideologies are defined, executed, affirmed, and questioned.
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26. I contributed a chapter to a book on the search for extraterrestrial intelligence
(Bova, B. (Ed.) (1990). First contact: the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.
New York: New American Library.) Since September 2002, I have been on the
payroll of the SETI Institute.
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Chapter 2
Science, rhetoric, and journalism studies:
context for analysis
Exploring the central question of this research project — how do journalists participate in
the social construction of scientific authority? — calls for some consideration of what
“science” is, in this case and elsewhere. No single, simple definition exists; science
means different things to different people in different situations. As Wynne (1991) has
noted, “There is no clear consensus even among scientists themselves as to what is
‘science’...in any specific contexts” (p. 112). “The extraordinary variation in responses”
to the question of what science is “should lead us to treat the idea of ‘science’ as an
evaluative resource,” Woolgar (1988) has observed, “rather than as a definitive entity” (p.
13). The aim of this case study, for example, is to examine what “science” was said to be
by various actors in various texts not as a factual description of what scientists typically
do, or know, but as a justification for the cultural authority that scientists typically claim
to delineate the boundaries of what counts as reality.
This study proceeds on the assumption that “science is a historically situated and social
activity...to be understood in relation to the contexts in which it occurs” (Shapin, 1996, p.
9). It also starts with the assumption that the conventional, public, scientific worldview is
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positivistic.1 Bacon (1955) defined science as a “marriage between the empirical and the
rational faculty,” dedicated to seeking knowledge and explaining the world (p. 425).
Bacon’s emphasis on observing, describing, cataloging, and categorizing the natural
world persists as a key element of the positivistic scientific worldview — to name it is to
know it. Western thinkers over four centuries have maintained this positivistic conception
of science as “a unique form of knowledge whose power transcends the particularities of
time and place” (Fuller, 1996, p. 31). In this worldview, reality is physical and objective2,
and science provides knowledge of this physical reality (Elias, 1982; Woolgar, 1988).
Science in this conception becomes a “major knowledge-producing institution” (Whitley,
1984, p. 11), “a privileged realm of knowledge” (Woolgar, 1988, p. 7), “an icon of
modern society” (Wynne, 1991, p. 112), “the major paradigm of a knowledge-seeking
enterprise” (Giere, 1987, p. 152). Scientific observation becomes “independent of any
theory or background beliefs, [and] nothing is meaningful unless it is empirically
testable” (Woolgar, 1988, p. 56). In this view, the practice of science is framed as “an
inherently unideological...heroic intellectual enterprise whose findings are apolitical,
ahistorical and necessarily true” (Dornan, 1988).
A contemporary definition of science, articulated by the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences (1998) and presented here as official and authoritative, reflects this positivistic
worldview:
Science is a particular way of knowing about the world.... In science, explanations
are restricted to those that can be inferred from...data...obtained through
observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists.
Anything that can be observed or measured is amenable to scientific
investigation.... ‘Understanding’ in science means relating one natural
phenomenon to another and recognizing the causes and effects of phenomena....
40
The statements of science must invoke only natural things and processes. The
statements of science are those that emerge from the application of human
intelligence to data obtained from observation and experiment (National Academy
of Sciences, 1998, pp. 27, 42).
In a vague nod to constructivism, the Academy has also conceded that scientific
knowledge is legitimated not only by empirical observations but also by scientists’
interactions, the peer-review and publication process, and the use of approved methods
(National Academy of Sciences, 1995). The Academy’s views point to what Shapin
(1996) called “the paradox that lies at the heart of science and that was, arguably, put
there in the seventeenth century [concerning] the relation between the objective and
disinterested identity of the natural sciences and the everyday world of subjectivity,
passions, and interests” (p. 164).
The construction of science, knowledge, and authority
To understand the nature and role of scientific authority, it is important to consider how it
is, and has been, constructed, and to examine the construction of scientific authority as an
aspect of the construction of science — as an ideology, a worldview, a belief system that
defines an authoritative role for science and scientists in culture, conveying credibility,
legitimacy, influence, and power.
The perspective of positivism originated as a 19th century political philosophy intended
to construct and sustain scientific authority (Ackerman, 1985). “In order to draw a
boundary around science to highlight its unique status...positivists construed science as
resting on paradigmatically clear, carefully prepared observation and experiment” (p. 16),
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with the aim of establishing that the only legitimate knowledge was knowledge validated
in this way. Positivistic science was constructed as the voice of reason and an essential
element of democracy (Ben-David, 1991), and scientists thus acquired an important
cultural role “as producers and validators of knowledge claims about their natural and
social environments” (Whitley, 1984, p. 1).
Positivists from Comte in the 19th century to contemporary positivist philosophers have
sought, according to Young (1995), “on the one hand to separate facts from values and
then...claim that the value-neutral, objective findings and theories of science somehow
bring forth an untainted set of values which magically emerges from the progress of
reason itself” (p. 5). In Latour’s (1987) view, science is “the outcome of attributing the
whole responsibility for producing facts to a happy few...to them alone is attributed the
power to make all the others believe and behave” (p. 174). These elite few maintain the
boundaries of science by labeling what they deem nonscientific knowledge subjective,
irrational belief, as compared to legitimate scientific knowledge, which they deem
objective, rational, “independent of who holds it” (p. 174).2
Though questions arose about the positivistic conception of science early in the 20th
century, nonetheless a positivistic, even scientistic3, worldview “dominated [Western]
intellectual circles” (Ben-David, 1991, p. 547) into the post-World-War-II period,
sustained by “popular belief in the omnipotence of science” (p. 551). Merton (1996)
articulated a conception of science as a collegial, objective social enterprise in which
scientists operated according to norms of worldview, methodology, popularization and
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publicity. To obtain and retain legitimacy and authority in their profession, scientists
agreed to uphold these norms. Their status in their organizations, and their peer-reviewed
publications, contributed to their legitimacy and authority as well (Merton, 1957, 1973).
Kuhn (1970) promulgated the idea that scientific reality and legitimacy — “normal
science” — depend on paradigmatic consensus among scientists. In his view, normal
science depends on “the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world
is like” and that community’s “willingness to defend that assumption” (p. 5). Since
Merton and Kuhn, scholars interested in the role of science in culture have examined the
worldview, practices, role, and value of science from various perspectives. “As a product
of human activity,” said Levins (1996), science “reflects the conditions of its production
and the viewpoints of its producers or owners.... The pattern of knowledge or ignorance
in science is not dictated by nature but is structured by interest and belief” (pp. 182-183).
Whether viewed as practice, process, institution, or ideology, science is “a cultural
phenomenon” (Woolgar, 1988, p. 12). It is “a part of common culture, integrally tied to
social practices, public policies, and political affairs” (Nelkin, 1995b, p. vii). “Science is
culture,” Haraway (1991, p. 230) observed, and media and other public conceptions of
science are social representations that can, and should, be studied (Farr, 1993).
“The primary ideal of science is ‘truth’, ” Collins (1993, p. 302) observed. This “sacred
object” of truth “arises from a social community and symbolizes membership in it. One
recognizes a scientist first of all as someone who participates actively in this cult of
Truth” (p. 303). Carey’s (1992) cultural studies perspective on science accommodates the
subjectivity and contingency of those scientific knowledge claims:
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Science, rather than a privileged, grounded set of representations, is merely part
of the conversation of our culture, though an exceedingly important part...a
pattern of discourse adopted for various historical reasons for the achievement of
objective truth, where objective truth is no more and no less than the best idea we
currently have about how to explain what is going on (p. 80).
Feminist theorists have challenged the primacy of the positivistic conception of scientific
“Truth” as well. Haraway (1991), Harding (1991), and Keller (1985) examined the
construction of scientific knowledge and argued that it is not the only legitimate form of
knowledge, making a case for the legitimacy of situated knowledge, constructed through
lived experience.
Studies of the social construction of scientific knowledge have critiqued the objective,
disinterested, value-free conception of science (Collins & Pinch, 1979, 1982, 1995;
Gieryn, 1983, 1995, 1999; Latour, 1987; Shapin, 1990). In exploring how scientists
construct knowledge claims, Collins and Pinch (1995) found that scientists tend to decide
case by case whether to accept or reject experimental results, considering contingent
factors such as the status of the scientists involved in the experiments. Scientists are
“constantly...transforming one another’s statements in the direction of facts or of fiction,”
said Latour (1987), “depending on how those statements serve their interests” (p. 25).
“To disbelieve...a fact, “ he observed, “is to weaken its case, interrupt its spread” (p. 29).
Stocking and Holstein (1993) examined how, like scientific knowledge, ignorance — the
absence of knowledge, or uncertainty, incompleteness, bias, error — is socially
constructed through claims making: in reporting on their research, scientists typically
construct areas of certainty in their field and then construct gaps in knowledge that their
own findings aim to fill.
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The focus of this study, the construction of scientific authority, has been identified as “a
central analytic issue” (Wynne, 1991, p. 111) in science studies. While the scientific
establishment derives cultural authority from an idealized conception of “genuine”
scientific knowledge (Hilgartner, 1990, p. 533), the authority of science tends, however,
to depend “less on what [science] can actually say or do than on the particular interests
with whom it is allied and the respect politicians, university officials, corporate
executives, investors, and consumers have for it” (Walters, 1997, p. 6). This cultural
authority is dependent on scientists’ claims of “disinterested commitment to absolute
knowledge” (p. 6). But this “dominant view” of science is ambiguous and flexible,
allowing “individual experts to gerrymander boundaries to suit their strategic purposes”
(Hilgartner, 1990, p. 533).
Research examining “the practical and ideological roles of science” in maintaining social
order approaches its subject, Fuller (1997) has claimed, assuming that “knowledge...is
rarely value free, but legitimates and reflects the place and thus interests of those who
employ it” (p. 9). The cultural or cognitive authority of science and scientists “is the
legitimate power (in designated contexts) to define, describe or explain bounded realms
of reality” (Gieryn & Figert, 1986, p. 67). This cultural authority derives “not from its
presumed capacity for verification across the lines of all the world’s cultures but from the
authority of...distinctive social entities... sharply bounded professional communities
characterized by rigorous procedures for the acculturation of their members” (Hollinger,
1997, p. 15). It is the product of institutions that embody the power of science,
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institutions “closely aligned with the general political/economic structures of the society
of which they are a part” (Ravetz, 1990, p. 223), and this alignment dates back to the
beginnings of American science (see below). This cultural authority has also been called
“epistemic authority,” characterized as “the probability that particular definitions of
reality...will prevail as valid and true” (Gieryn, 1999, p. 1), and it has been said to exist
“only in its local and episodic enactment” (p. 12). Competing, conflicting, or
controversial claims to scientific authority engender “credibility contests,” in which
“somebody somewhere seeks to ride science into the public’s trust or support or
vindication” (p. xi). Scientific credibility has become “an important focus for the social
studies of science” (Shapin, 1995, p. 255) since the 1970s because of the declining power
of “the grand old narratives that exempted scientific truth from the need to win
credibility” (p. 257).
If “the central social function of knowledge is...as a means of orientation,” then “people
who are able to monopolize the guardianship, transmission, and development of a
society’s means of orientation” tend to be powerful people (Elias, 1982, p. 37). Scientists
stake claims to power on “control over powerful and esoteric knowledge” (Barber, 1990,
p. 219), using “their capacity to predict the behavior of narrow closed systems to claim
the right to predict and order all human futures” (Carey & Quirk, 1973, p. 485). Claims to
scientific authority are claims to the right to declare what the world is like, what is real
and what is not, “to define certain kinds of knowledge as legitimate [and] exclude other
kinds of knowledge from legitimacy” (Walters, 1997, p. 6). Scientists construct this
authority through claims of “neutral reason” (Turner, 2001), and non-scientists contribute
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to this construction process by accepting these claims. The cultural authority and political
power of science stems in part from “the power of images and promises” of
improvement, progress and prosperity to come from advances in science, “all of which
can reinforce the power of any state” (Jacob, 1994, p. 2). If power is “the ability to get
what one wants” (Parenti, 1978, as quoted in Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 58), then
scientific authority may be seen as a source of the power of scientists to get what they
want. And one thing scientists want is to maintain their cultural authority. The cultural
space of science is a site of struggle for monopoly over authority, a struggle to determine
who has the right to speak for science (Bourdieu, 1991).
Science has come to be seen as “a rationality monopoly” (Ross, 1996, p. 10), and while
rationality is generally considered to be a norm of science, it has also been described as
“the mantle of those in power, those with authority” (Restivo, 1989, p. 158). One of
Latour’s (1987) principles for studying science in action is that “irrationality is always an
accusation made by someone building a network over someone else who stands in the
way” (p. 259). From Ross’s (1991) perspective, “science’s anxiety about authenticating
its belief in truths is...a question of power” (p. 24).
Rosenberg (1996) has argued that the apparent connection between scientific knowledge
and scientific authority is “not a necessary...response to complexity in social structure,
but an arbitrary imposition of interested control” (p. 5), and Fuller (1997) has argued that
even “democratic governments” have used “appeals to scientific authority...to coerce the
people” (p. 60). Like political institutions, members of the social institution of science
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sustain their chosen worldview by promising that in accordance with that view, science
can tame chaos, provide order and maintain control (Rouse, 1996). The Mertonian
scientific ethos— those “shared norms that foster scientific cohesiveness…and...restrict
entry to science” — is a tool that scientists can and do use to maintain and reinforce (that
is, construct) “the authority and autonomy of the scientific enterprise” (Brante, 1993, p.
184).
The conventional conception of science as  “pure” and “value-free” has been declared “in
shambles,” but at the same time, Jacob (1994) has claimed, “large numbers of
scientists...still believe in one version or another of it” (p.  5). While studies have
established that science exists and occurs in a social context, the idea that science exists
and operates independent of historical and cultural context persists, lending support to an
“authoritarian image” of science (Collins & Pinch, 1993, p. 142). While science
“generates reliable information about the empirical world,” it is also (to paraphrase von
Clausewitz) the continuation of politics and policy by other means (Harding, 1991, p.
10). “The authority of science legitimates particular positions and certain groups’ powers,
and it provides languages and metaphors that shape and limit debate” (Walters 1997, p.
5).
While “tacit knowledge” and “informed intuition” are important to science (Porter,
1995), “the public rhetoric of scientific expertise...studiously ignores” them (p. 7).
Scientists instead prefer to maintain an image of “impersonality...the exclusion of
judgment, the struggle against subjectivity” (p. viii), from which they derive cultural
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authority. Rhetorically invoking the symbols of science, such as objectivity, skepticism,
even the stereotypical white lab coat, conjures and reinforces the cultural authority of
science (Toumey, 1997). Scientific objectivity has been examined as “a rhetorical — and
political — tool, masking the rather messier and negotiated nature of the scientific
enterprise” (Rosenberg, 1996, p. 17). What counts as legitimate scientific knowledge in a
given social context “may count as mere belief in another” (Barnes, 1990, p. 60). “The
more a body of knowledge is understood to be objective and disinterested, the more
valuable it is as a tool in moral and political action” (Shapin, 1996, p. 164).
The conventional concept of scientific objectivity “carries with it a wealth of subjective
meanings,” according to Keller (1985), and conventional scientific knowledge claims
“are not themselves objective in origin but in fact grow out of an emotional substructure”
(p. 96). Haraway (1991) asserted that “feminist objectivity means quite simply situated
knowledge,” and so-called objective scientific knowledge claims can be deconstructed to
reveal their “radical historical specificity, and so [their] contestability” (p. 188).
Harding’s (1987) feminist empiricism, granting legitimacy to subjective knowledge
acquired by experience, provides a framework by which an observer can “see the world
in an enlarged perspective” (p. 127).
The institutionalization and professionalization of American science, from the 19th
century to the present, contributed to constructing the cultural authority, and the elite and
“official” status, of science and scientists (Ben-David, 1991; Bruce, 1987; Daniels, 1996;
Greene, 1984; Slotten, 1996; Walters, 1997; Weingart, 1982).4 American scientists
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established themselves as a “power elite” in the 19th century (Weingart, 1982, p. 71),
constructing their cultural authority through claims to knowledge that promised to solve
problems. Standardization of scientific procedures, the designation of certain tasks as
exclusively scientific, rhetorical claims for the public value of science, the appointment
of scientists “as interpreters of natural law” (Daniels, 1996, pp. 22-36) and the
demarcation of science from religion (Whitley, 1982) all contributed to the
professionalization of scientists as well.
Academics took the lead in creating an American scientific establishment and,
concomitantly, scientific authority, from the start (Bruce, 1987). Academic scientists
continue to “form the ruling groups of scientific work” and take the lead in “fighting
scientific controversies or establishing consensus” (Elias, 1982, p. vii). Science is a
“reputational organization” (Whitley, 1982, p. 315), and the cultural authority of
scientists depends greatly on their credentials and “the respectability of his or her
institution” (Collins & Pinch, 1993, p. 18). Membership in the scientific establishment
continues to depend on what the leaders of that establishment consider to be proper
credentials — degrees, affiliation, accomplishments, publication, recognition.
The language, discourse, and rhetoric of science
According to Gieryn (1983), “’science’ is no single thing: its boundaries are drawn and
redrawn in flexible, historically changing and sometimes ambiguous ways” (p. 781). This
study proceeds on the assumptions that “science” is a mutable, contextual, contingent,
constructed “thing” and that the boundaries of the cultural “space” of science5 are
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rhetorically constructed (Gieryn, 1983, 1995, 1999). Language, discourse, and rhetoric
are examined in this study as tools for constructing the boundaries of scientific reality and
authority, particularly as they are deployed in journalists’ stories about John Mack’s
controversial scientific claims.
Meaning and power, said Bourdieu (1991), derive from communicators themselves and
their social milieu, through discourse. The language, discourse, and rhetoric of science
are key sources — arguably the sole sources, for the purposes of this study — of the
cultural authority of science. They embody “a collection of formal understandings that
aim at communality and communal power” (Montgomery, 1996, p. 430). “The cultural
power of science, as embedded in language and metaphor, helps structure how Americans
think and talk about their society” (Walters, 1997, pp. 6-7). The study of the language,
discourse, and rhetoric of science is important because the language of science and the
content of science are interlinked (Golinski, 1990).
Scholars have examined the social construction of science in discourse (Collier with
Toomey, 1997; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984); the rhetorical construction of scientific
knowledge and ignorance claims (Latour, 1987; Stocking & Holstein, 1993 (see above);
Woolgar, 1988), the role of rhetoric in public understanding of science (Gross, 1994), the
language of science in the media (Dornan, 1988, 1990), rhetoric in the politics of science
(Jacob, 1994; Lessl, 1988; Montgomery, 1996; Walters, 1997), the rhetoric of scientism
(Lessl, 1996), scientific discourse in “deviant” science (Locke, 1994), the demarcation of
science from non-science as a rhetorical problem (Holmquest, 1990), and the rhetoric of
51
scientists in the so-called science wars (Mellor, 1999). Research has examined the kinds
of rhetorical strategies that scientists employ in constructing the boundaries of science
and the ways in which the language they use serves as a key source of their cultural
authority.
Studies of the rhetoric that scientists employ to construct and maintain the objectivity,
and thus the authority, of their work have examined how scientists in public discourse,
including media reports, work to establish and reinforce the limits of legitimate science in
debating, accepting, rejecting or excluding various claims. Scientists use the rhetorical
tool of demarcation, Gieryn (1983, 1995, 1999) wrote, to distinguish legitimate science
from non-science. Popularization, Hilgartner (1990) wrote, is a type of demarcation
scientists use to marginalize claims they want to keep outside the boundaries of
legitimacy. Hilgartner (2000) also explored how science advisory boards rhetorically
construct, or dramatically “enact” (p. 6), their credibility and authority as experts,
examining in detail how “the framing of problems, the presentation of evidence, and the
basic structure of texts” (p. 9) in scientific advisory reports contribute to this symbolic
action. Objectivity and subjectivity are “staple terms of discourse about science,”
according to Latour (1987, p. 183), continually deployed in the rhetorical construction of
scientific authority and legitimacy, and scientific objectivity may be the most important
rhetorical tool that scientists employ in maintaining their cultural authority.
Scientific and non-scientific “public” communities “are ceaselessly at work in defining
themselves and the nature of the distinctions that divide them,” Shapin (1990) wrote, and
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in the process of drawing these boundaries “they also define what is to count as
knowledge and the proper means of securing it” (pp. 998-999). Maintaining a public
image of “pure” science requires a contrasting idea of “contaminated” science, and
scientists use these concepts of purity and contamination in public discourse to draw
boundaries between official and popular, legitimate and illegitimate science in their
efforts to maintain their cultural authority (Hilgartner, 1990). The discourse of so-called
alternative scientific claims has been examined as “part of the ongoing demarcation
debate about ‘false’ and ‘true’ science” (Ross, 1991, p. 23), revealing that the
demarcation of the dominant culture of legitimate science from the subordinate culture of
non-science “is always...determined by the cultural and ideological circumstances of its
day, and thus by the particular claims that ‘science’ and ‘scientists’ make for themselves
in a particular time and place” (p. 23).
The claim has been made that “scientists are engaged in the process of persuasion,” the
classical aim of rhetoric, “in all of their professional and intellectual activities” (Gross,
1994, p. 3). “The persuasive power of much of science is connected to the notion that the
truth of science — scientific facts — is universal and demonstrated” (Collier with
Toomey, 1997, p. 152). Scientists employ their own specialized rhetoric in
communicating with peers, the press, and the public to establish that their claims are
legitimate and to reinforce or challenge beliefs (Gross, 1994). They also employ
interpretive flexibility in discourse, describing their work in different ways for different
audiences and different purposes (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Zehr, 1994b). They establish
their authority in discourse by using technical language to establish boundaries of
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expertise and by employing narratives and modes of expression “that enable collective
remembering and forgetting” (Fuller, 1997, p. 23). The detached, depersonalized
language of the specialist renders the ordinary and familiar extraordinary and unfamiliar,
in the process demarcating insiders, who can speak with authority, from outsiders, who
cannot (Montgomery, 1996). Deployment of this “orthodox rhetoric” (Lessl, 1988) of
science serves a ritual purpose, enabling scientists to continually reaffirm their authority
and reinforce the boundaries of legitimate science.
Epideictic rhetoric — the rhetoric of praising or blaming — can be employed to
“excommunicate” scientists who step outside those boundaries and publicly contest
orthodox scientific theory, Sullivan (1994) wrote, thus sustaining the cultural authority of
science. “Descriptions of science as…objective or rational,” Gieryn (1983) observed,
“may best be analyzed as ideologies…useful for scientists’ pursuit of authority” (pp. 792-
793).  Lessl (1996) has identified the rhetoric of scientism as “an enduring feature of the
public ideology of science, one that is key to deciphering the enabling symbolic forces
which scientists wield in their efforts to keep science at the center of modern culture” (p.
379). Research in the rhetoric of science has examined how scientists employ rhetoric to
persuade peers, the press, and the public that their claims are legitimate, to reinforce or
challenge beliefs (Gross, 1994). The discourse of science aims “toward securing the
cooperation of the media in the affirmation of [the proper] understanding of the scientific
endeavor” (Dornan, 1988), that is, “science as a heroic intellectual enterprise” (p. 55; see
above).  In this public discourse scientific literacy is commonly advocated as an
important social goal (Dornan, 1990), reinforcing the conventional, positivistic
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conception of science. Examination of the deployment of rhetoric in the discourse of
science, particularly as reported in the media, can shed some light on the roles, functions,
worldviews, and authority of scientists.
The construction of scientific controversy
Science claims serve particular interests (Evans & Priest, 1995), and public disputes over
claims relating to the uses and outcomes of science are often “struggles over...power and
control” (Nelkin, 1995a, p. 445). In scientific controversies “claims of expertise,
integrity, and disinterestedness battle against accusations of incompetence, dishonesty,
and bias, in a war of dramatic narratives” (Hilgartner, 2000, p. 15). As research has
highlighted the key role of rhetoric in the construction of scientific authority (see above),
so studies have explored the important role of rhetoric in the construction of scientific
controversies and controversial science (Brante, 1993; Collins & Pinch, 1982; Gieryn,
1999; Gieryn & Figert, 1986, 1992; Hagendijk & Meeus, 1993; McMullin, 1987;
Sullivan, 1994). Scholars have analyzed journalists’ rhetorical treatment of “maverick”
science and scientists (Bucchi 1996, 1998; Dearing, 1995), and they have considered the
role of the media in scientists’ efforts to reject or exclude other scientists deemed in
violation of the ethos of science (Collins & Pinch, 1993; Gieryn, 1992; Gieryn & Figert,
1986; Sullivan, 1994).
Scientific controversies are a fruitful site for studying the social construction of science,
according to Brante (1993), because they tend to foreground assumptions about science
that are usually kept in the background. Nelkin (1995a) said that studies of disputes over
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scientific knowledge claims could reveal the interests, the politics, behind the claims.
McMullin (1987) described disputes among scientists over competing or unproven claims
as situations “where the consensus of the community breaks down” (p. 63). Such
disagreements are commonly epistemic disputes, arguments over beliefs. Brante (1993)
identified “epistemological, sociological, and political reasons for studying...scientific
and science-based controversies,” including growing dependence on scientific
knowledge, the increasing politicization of science, and “the escalating occurrence” (p.
178) of these disputes.
Brante delineated a difference between controversial science — what he described as
epistemological conflicts over science claims, involving “contradictory scientific
beliefs… reflect[ing] the existence of contrary accounts of a phenomenon… that do not
necessarily lead to open confrontation”  — and science controversies — what he
characterized as sociopolitical conflicts concerning “contending knowledge claims where
at least one of the parties has scientific status” (p. 181). Making a point that is especially
relevant to this analysis, Brante himself also noted that, “in certain respects, the different
between scientific and science-based controversies is a matter of degree” (p. 181). From
the conventional positivistic perspective, scientific controversies appear to be
“asymmetrical” because “it is assumed that there is one basic truth underlying the debate”
(p. 183). From the constructivist perspective, however, it is assumed that truth claims are
constructed and that these claims can thus be deconstructed (Haraway, 1991).
“Controversy in science is best understood,” Mendelsohn (1987) claimed, “in terms of
both the intellectual content of the discussion and the context of social interests that
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guided the participants” (p.121). “Experts are the primary actors” in science-based
controversies, their role “located in between the realms of scientific knowledge and
political action,” Brante said (1993, pp. 181-182). In seeking evidence of “hidden norms
and values within scientific communities,” it is useful to look for expressions of
“indignation...charges of rule violation”  (p. 182).
Gieryn (1999) documented rhetorical tactics employed to draw and redraw the
boundaries between science and non-science in scientific controversies over phrenology
and cold fusion, for example. Gieryn and Figert (1986) examined what they called the
posthumous “status degradation” (p. 67) of prominent British scientist Sir Cyril Burt
following accusations of fraud, a case in which journalists played a key role by first
publicly airing these accusations. Collins and Pinch (1982) explored how orthodox
scientists reject controversial knowledge claims, employing “implicit rejection” by
ignoring rival knowledge claims and “explicit rejection” by engaging in controversies
over rival claims, in both the “constitutive,” or official, and the “contingent,” or popular,
discourse (p. 152). Strategies and tactics of rejection employed by scientists in both
official and popular discourse range from “blank refusal to believe” to “association with
unscientific beliefs...accusations of triviality...unfavorable comparisons with canonical
versions of scientific method” and ad-hominem arguments (p. 164).
Scientific controversies have also been explored as metanarratives employing the
interplay among a wide range of scientific and non-scientific actors, represented in an
equally wide range of scientific and non-scientific texts, to challenge or affirm
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knowledge claims (Hagendijk & Meeus, 1993). Journalistic and other types of non-
scientific texts have been shown to play a role in process of constructing scientific facts,
through intertextual references to knowledge claims and counterclaims (Hagendijk &
Meeus, 1993).
The practices of journalists
If the language, discourse, and rhetoric of science play a key role in the social
construction of science and scientific authority, then the mass media promise to be a ripe
site for observing work in progress. Studies of the practice of news production —
journalism in general and science journalism in particular — provide insights that are
useful to this study. “News” is not something that journalists find but something that
journalists participate in constructing (Berkowitz, 1997), and as scientists construct
“science” through discourse, journalists construct “news” through discourse (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1987). In Carey’s (1992) ritual conception of communication, “the purpose
of news is not to represent and inform but to signal, tell a story, and activate inquiry” (p.
82). News can be conceived as a form and a product of culture (Schudson, 1995),
maintaining culture over time through storytelling (Berkowitz, 1997). Journalists are
“cultural actors” who produce news according to a system of “stored cultural meanings
and patterns of discourse” (Schudson, 1995, pp. 14-15). Media content is a source and a
manifestation of culture, a form of cultural mapping that contributes to the construction
of social norms and deviance, and journalistic standards and practices are means of
defining media content, constructing news (Carey, 1997; Ericson, et al, 1987; Shoemaker
& Reese, 1996).
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As it has for scientists, professionalization has enabled journalists to construct and
maintain cultural authority for themselves — a role in defining what is news and what is
not (Berkowitz, 1997; Ericson et al, 1987; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Shoemaker & Reese,
1996; Schudson, 1991; Soloski, 1989; Tuchman, 1972, 1974). As it does for scientists,
journalists’ cultural authority and credibility depends on knowledge, in their case
knowledge of the so-called facts that make up the news and the authoritative sources of
these facts. Journalists construct their cultural authority by providing credible depictions
of social reality, employing their “god-terms of facts, truth, and reality” to do so (Zelizer,
2004b, p. 100). Just as a scientist’s claims to objectivity and truth support the idea of
science as a matter of facts and reality, a journalist’s claims to “being factual and
impartial helps establish the epistemological status of news as a source of factual
information and the authority of news as a mirror of reality” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.
62). Journalists, like scientists, work continually to maintain their credibility and
authority with the public as well as with their official, elite sources and audiences
(Schudson, 1995). “Journalists could not function without professional routines and gate-
keeping standards” (Bennett, Pickard, Iozzi, Schroeder, Lagos, & Caswell, 2004, p. 440).
Journalists make choices in constructing the news that favor the interests of elites, in
ways that are not necessarily conscious but “embedded in the routines of the
profession...and understood as good journalism” (p. 452). By adhering to professional
standards, practices, values and conventions, journalists participate in constructing and
reconstructing social norms and, thus, deviance (Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Ericson et al,
1987; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1972, 1974).
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Tuchman (1972, 1974) found that journalists: draw on and reproduce social institutions in
making news, create webs of “facticity” to legitimize news that also legitimate the status
quo, employ socially constructed “news nets” to order the social world and separate news
from non-news, identify news by complying with professional norms, typify events in
order to classify them as news, and rely on a narrative format that requires “facts” and
sources. Gans (1979) observed that social order is a key news value. He found that
journalists routinize news selection by following conventions regarding sources (who
counts as official, authoritative, and credible), substance (timeliness, controversy,
prominence, the unusual), value (utility, entertainment), and audience appeal (human
interest) in deciding what is news; and that they employ story selling, story buying, and
story highlighting – the construction of what he called a highlighted reality — in the
process of deciding what is news. Gans observed that journalists engage in self-
censorship by cooperating with people in power, and he noted that they do not appear to
be aware of conforming to social norms. Journalists reaffirm “the ideological status
quo...by ridiculing” deviance, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) reported; “the more deviant
people or events are... the more likely they are to be stereotyped” (p. 225), trivialized or
portrayed as dangerous. Journalistic practices that contribute to maintaining the status
quo range from organizational-level media routines (pack journalism, reliance on other
media, adherence to a standard set of news values) to professional conventions
(objectivity, balance, fairness) to individual biases rooted in factors such as gender and
class (Gans, 1979; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Among values and beliefs that contribute
60
to journalists’ decisions about what counts as news are ethnocentrism, “responsible
capitalism,” individualism, moderation, social order and leadership (Gans, 1979).
Like scientists, journalists adhere to professional conventions of objectivity, skepticism,
and verifiability as a way of sustaining their cultural authority. The journalistic
convention of objectivity has been deemed the most important in the profession
(Lichtenberg, 1991; Soloski, 1989), and journalists have been observed to employ it as a
“strategic ritual” (Tuchman, 1972, p. 660), a defensive routine to protect themselves from
criticism (also see Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1974). Journalistic objectivity is related to but
not the same as scientific objectivity (Nelkin, 1995b). Gans (1979) observed that
journalistic and scientific objectivity depend on “the use of similar fact-fathering
methods” and that both journalistic method and scientific method are “validated by
consensus” (p. 183). However, while both types of objectivity call for maintaining an
appearance of neutrality, empirical verification is central to scientific objectivity while
the values of balance and fairness are central to journalistic objectivity. Though
journalists subscribe to the convention of objectivity as a means of avoiding bias,
objectivity it has become a sort of bias in itself, according to Schudson (1978), an
element of the social construction of news that keeps journalists dependent on official
stories and sources. By accepting the idea of value-free reporting, journalists “accept the
boundaries, values, and ideological rules of the game established and interpreted by elite
sources” (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 244). “News routines are skewed toward
representing demands, individuals, and frames which do not fundamentally contradict the
dominant hegemonic principles,” Gitlin (1980) has said, including “the legitimacy of the
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social order secured and defined by dominant elites” (p. 20). “Simply by doing their jobs,
journalists tend to serve...elite definitions of reality,” he observed (p. 12).  Like most
scientific accounts of reality, most journalistic accounts “are presented from the inside
out,” according to Durham (M. G. Durham, 1998); “information is collected and
interpreted by people who are inside the dominant social order about those who are either
inside or outside it, with no overt acknowledgment of these social locations or the
implications thereof” (p. 129).
Researchers have variously described the social and cultural roles and functions of
journalists and journalism. Gans (1979) identified some of the functions of journalists as
leadership testing, supplying political feedback, distributing power, safeguarding moral
values, maintaining social order, constructing nation and society, performing prophetic
and priestly rituals, telling stories and making myths, and managing “the symbolic arena”
(pp. 291-299). According to Carey (1997), “explanation by rational motives is the
archetype of journalism as it is of the culture” (p. 176). But while what journalists are
expected to do is explain things, what they actually do is ritualistically construct and
enforce social norms, he observed. By engaging in what Marvin (1997) called “the ritual
practice of yielding interpretive authority to experts” (p. 122), journalists can convey the
appearance of distancing themselves from the worldviews and values they depict in their
stories. Media content tends to lean toward official stories, and journalists tend to rely on
expert, authoritative, official sources inclined to maintain the status quo (Ericson, et al,
1987; Parenti, 1993; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). “Giving serious attention to non-official
sources” is considered “unnewsworthy” (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 244). And if
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journalists should happen to challenge accepted, official norms, “elites…respond to
media as a class” (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 270).
Elite media are the primary focus of this analysis because they reach large audiences and
tend to set the boundaries of coverage for other media outlets. Elite media have national
reach, and their audiences include influential elites in government, industry, and
academia. The New York Times is the prototypical elite medium: a large-circulation daily
newspaper read nationwide (and worldwide). Typically described as “the most respected
newspaper in the country” (Tifft & Jones, 1999), it sets the agenda for other media,
serving as a newspaper of record, a routine channel for breaking official stories, and an
authoritative source for other news organizations. The Times has been declared the paper
“most likely to be read by other journalists and the most dominant influence on the daily
editorial decisions of other news organizations” (Bennett, Pickard, Iozzi, Schroeder,
Lagos, & Caswell, 2004). “The news media have always been a more important forum
for communication among elites...than with the general population,” Schudson (1991, p.
156) has observed. And “who writes the story matters,” Schudson (1995, p. 8) has said,
noting that mainstream journalists tend to be members of the same socioeconomic class
as their official sources and tend to share and thus reflect the views and values of those
sources. Gitlin (1980) explored how social structure outside the news organization shapes
the news, how news reflects the values of the dominant culture, and how journalists
participate in maintaining those values. Gans (1979) concluded that journalists function
as power distributors, moral guardians, barometers of order, agents of social control,
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managers of symbolic reality. And Altschull (1995) asserted that “the media are agents of
those who exercise political and economic power” (p. 440).
The practices of science journalists
While science journalism may have some features that distinguish it from other sorts of
journalism, journalists reporting on science generally adhere to the same professional
standards, practices, conventions, and values that other sorts of journalists do, and thus
the content of science journalism generally follows the same outlines as that of
journalism in general. As Gregory and Miller (1998) observed, “science journalism is
much more about journalism than it is about science,” and understanding how journalistic
conventions affect representations of science in the news “may offer some insight into the
science behind the headlines” (p. 131). Journalism studies have shown, as noted above,
that media content leans heavily toward official stories and that journalists routinely tend
to rely on official sources inclined to maintain the status quo. Given this official bias, the
role of the science journalist can be said to be serving as an intermediary between
scientists and non-scientists, translating, documenting and disseminating information to
an uninformed public.
Some differences between the practice of journalism and the practice of science
journalism have been noted. Science journalists may operate according to some
professional norms “that differ not only from those held by others in their media
organizations, but also from others in the occupation generally” (Dunwoody, 1992, p.
13). For example, science journalists tend to operate as information specialists while
64
other sorts of journalists tend to operate as information generalists. Like other journalists,
science journalists depend on official sources for news and validate the worldviews of
their authoritative scientist-sources in the news. But science journalists appear to be
especially dependent on official sources and official stories, and this dependency tends to
reinforce the conventional scientific worldview espoused by those sources and in those
stories (Nelkin, 1995b). Media coverage of science, Nelkin (1995b) claimed, “reflects the
tendency to idealize science as an ultimate authority…the press in effect uses the
imprimatur of science to support a particular worldview…with little attention to the
substance of science” (p. 25).
Dunwoody (1999) has suggested that science journalists and their sources participate in a
“shared culture” (p. 61). Studies have shown how journalists reinforce scientific authority
and the conventional scientific worldview through their dependence on official sources
(Dearing, 1995; Friedman, Dunwoody, & Rogers, 1986; Nelkin, 1995b). According to
Stocking and Holstein (1993), journalists tend to report scientists’ ignorance claims
without explanation and “emphasize claims that come from sources perceived as
culturally legitimate...usually officials or spokespersons for government agencies, or
establishment scientists...working at leading research universities or serving on advisory
panels to government agencies” (p. 203). Journalists tend to downplay scientific
ignorance claims “but when they do use them,” they argued, “it is in ways that reflect and
contribute to their own interests [emphasis in original]” (p. 189). They “never let on to
the constructive nature of their own accounts” and “give little attention to the constructed
nature” (p. 202) of the ignorance claims they report. Nelkin, 1995b) has argued that “the
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media convey a sense of awe about science” (p. 30). But Dearing (1995) has also noted
that while “journalists are trained to rely on scientific authority figures [they] are also
trained to distrust authorities” (p. 343).
Researchers have found that science journalists traditionally have served as science
boosters, heroicized scientists, typified science news as facts, emphasized facts while
neglecting practice, focused on individual scientists rather than the scientific endeavor,
and addressed practitioners of science rather than those affected by it (LaFollette, 1990;
Nelkin, 1995b).  Research has also examined how journalists have participated in
promoting the positivistic scientific worldview and the idea that public understanding of
science in the context of that worldview is of critical importance (Dornan, 1988; Fuller,
1997; Nelkin, 1995b; Woolgar, 1988). Journalists have tended to reflect the view of their
official sources that science is “an enterprise crucial to the welfare of Western societies”
(Dornan, 1990, p. 48), and many studies of science and the media have followed suit in
characterizing the public as scientifically illiterate and assigning the media a critical role
in improving literacy (Dornan, 1988, 1990). The claim that public understanding of
science is critical to democracy has also been challenged (Lievrouw, 1990). Since the
institution of science has “accumulated a great deal of social power,” Dunwoody (1992)
said, “one would expect [scientists] to try to maintain control over all processes in which
they become involved, including the public dissemination of scientific information” (p.
13). While journalists assert that they are “the ultimate arbiters of story content,”
Dunwoody (1999) observed, “the authority of science is so pervasive that most scholarly
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studies of media coverage of science easily detect the fingerprint of science in the
construction of meaning” (p. 62).
Lievrouw (1990) explored how scientists use the mass media to publicize their particular
representations of legitimate scientific knowledge. Nelkin (1995b) examined science in
the media and the “continuing efforts of scientists and scientific societies to manage the
media” (p. 157), finding that media coverage of science tends to reinforce “the widely
held belief that science is...a neutral source of authority” (p. 63) and that journalistic
dependence on scientists for authoritative information about science leads to journalistic
reinforcement of the conventional positivistic world view. A content analysis of The New
York Times’s “Science Times” section (Fursich & Lester, 1996), for example, showed
that while journalists appeared to attempt “to place science and scientists within a
political and social context,” science was generally depicted in “Science Times” as “a
pristine endeavor untouched by individual and structural constraints” (p. 37). In this
scenario, “scientists do not achieve authority through an arcane stardom but through their
participation in the pristine aspects of scientific endeavor”  (p. 24).
When journalists report on scientific fraud, “they project a coherent image of scientific
ideals,” according to Nelkin (1995b), intended to maintain “the purity of science” (p. 29),
and in these cases they tend to characterize data, practices, and scientists deemed
fraudulent as sinful, scandalous or contaminated (also see Hilgartner, 1990). On the other
hand, Dearing (1995) argued that as journalists apply the norm of objectivity to stories
about controversial or “maverick” science and scientists, they end up balancing favorable
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and unfavorable views on the controversial claims and claimants, in adherence to
journalistic conventions, thereby lending credibility to them even “even though the
journalists themselves thought that [they] lacked credibility” (p. 341). Journalistic
framing can contribute to this outcome as well, by “heightening risk or uncertainty” (p.
341) in order to make a story more interesting. Journalists tend to focus on uncertainty in
their reporting on science “because controversy and debate are importance criteria for
newsworthy stories” (Friedman, et al, 1999, p. xii).
In science journalism, a relatively small number of journalists affiliated with elite media
tend to take the lead in deciding what is news in science. This small pool of elite
journalists sets the pace because relatively few media outlets employ full-time science
reporters (Friedman, et al, 1986). Dunwoody (1997) described this elite group as an
“inner club” (p. 159), an informal association of reporters for elite media including The
New York Times, the Washington Post and Boston Globe, Newsweek, and the Associated
Press. Evans and Priest (1995) have argued that elite media “are over-represented in
science news studies in proportion to their readerships” and that some science news
studies “implicitly use elite media coverage as a surrogate for ‘general’ media coverage
of science” (p. 331), but this analysis purposely focuses on elite media because of their
pace-setting role.
Conclusion
I have found no reports in the literature on studies like this one, studies of the role of
journalists in constructing the cultural authority of science and scientists from the
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perspective of Burkean rhetorical criticism. Nor has research devoted much attention to
examining the cultural authority claimed by and attributed to journalism, “particularly its
reverence for facts, truth, and reality” (Zelizer, 2004, p. 110). While Dearing’s (1995)
study examined how journalists portrayed “maverick” science and scientists in reporting
on controversial claims, it was a quantitative content analysis that the researcher himself
described as “only descriptive” (p. 357). Dearing recommended that further research on
media coverage of maverick science address a broader range of topics and employ
methods other than conventional content analysis for exploring how journalists treat
maverick science and scientists.
Collins and Pinch (1993, 1982), Gieryn (1983, 1995, 1999), and Gieryn and Figert (1986)
provided insights into the role of media coverage of science in constructing the
boundaries of science but focused on the role of scientists rather than the role of
journalists in constructing the cultural authority of science, and while these studies
examined rhetorical strategies they were sociological rather than rhetorical analyses.
Sullivan (1994) examined the rhetorical excommunication of scientists by journalists for
violating the boundaries of legitimate science. But while he examined media content in
depth he focused on television coverage and disputes between the disciplines of
chemistry and physics. Nieman’s (2000) thesis examined “how the authority to speak
about or on behalf of science is established” (p. vi) in mass communication, but his study
focused on the discipline of physics, popular accounts of physics, and the visual culture
of science.
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I have not found any evidence of projects like the one reported here: a social
constructivist case study of how elite media have covered controversial research
conducted by an elite scientist whose credentials establish him as a legitimate authority
among scientists and non-scientists. I also have not located any evidence of mass
communication studies relating to this particular case. While building on the research
cited in this chapter, this analysis takes a new direction, focusing on an aspect of the
social construction of reality not yet addressed in depth and employing the analytic tools
of Burkean dramatistic criticism.
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Notes
1. See Note 2, Chapter 1.
2. Koertge (1996) is among philosophers of science who have considered the role of the
idea of objectivity in scientific legitimacy. In describing what she called the norm of
scientific objectivity, Koertge has written:
“ A) Data reported and the conclusions drawn should ideally be completely
independent from the personal preferences or idiosyncrasies of the individual
scientist.
 B) A good method for removing subjective elements from scientific findings is to
detach one’s own feelings or wishes from the process of scientific inquiry.
C) Although intuition…play[s] an essential role in…scientific discovery, [it]
should have no effect on the acceptance of scientific results….
D) A high value is also placed on the individual scientist’s curiosity and
intellectual fascination with discovery and puzzle solving. (These traits are
intimately connected with objectivity because ideally the only answers which
scientists find pleasing are correct ones!)” (para. 12).
3. Ben-David (1991) defined scientism as a worldview that “claims to be derived from
allegedly true scientific principles and which contains utopian promises for a dramatic
improvement of the human condition” (p.  550).
4.  “While science is without organization, it is without power,” said Alexander Dallas
Bache in 1851 (Bruce 1987, 217). “Inspired by elitist convictions,” (Slotten, 1996, p. 40),
Bache was one of the founders of American science, “an elite arbiter of scientific
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practice...a major leader in the scientific community” through his political and social
connections (p. 45). Bache was a graduate of West Point and a great grandson of
Benjamin Franklin; a grandson, nephew and brother in law of secretaries of the U.S.
Treasury; and a nephew of a Vice President. The aims of Bache and his colleagues were
to establish legitimacy for science, “raise the status of scientists,” increase financial
support for science and organize scientists “under an elite leadership...” (Bruce, 1987, p.
219). Bache and his allies created the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS), the National Academy of Sciences and a national network of research
universities. By 1846 the United States had 32 scientific societies (Bruce, 1987, 36). The
community of scientists in Bache’s hometown of Boston, with Harvard in its
neighborhood, became established as an elite intellectual community early in the 19th
century. By the late 19th century, Boston had become an American intellectual capital
and Harvard its heart (Greene, 1984, p. 61).
5. Gieryn’s (1983, 1995, 1999) sensitizing concept of boundary-work is a key analytic
tool in this study and is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
The Case of the Deviant Doctor:
theoretical foundation, methodological approach, analytic tools
People live their lives “by interpreting experience through the agency of culture,”
according to Christians and Carey (1989), and the aim of qualitative research, in their
view, is to “interpret these interpretations so that we may better understand the meanings
that people use to guide their activities” (p. 359). A qualitative approach to research
enables interpretations and insights that standard analytical methods would exclude,
Wynne (1991) noted, “especially [those] concerning the complexities of beliefs,
understandings, and responses” (p. 113). “The language of everyday life...is lushly
metaphorical, wildly contradictory, willfully connotative, and cynically strategic,” as
Pauly (1991) observed. Thus qualitative, interpretive communication research is a good
way to explore a potentially rich mix of overt and covert meanings, connotations as well
as denotations.
The aim of this case study is to provide some insights into the social construction of
scientific authority by exploring, describing, and analyzing the symbolic actions of
journalists and scientists as revealed by the texts chosen for analysis. Contextual studies
such as this one provide “a point of entry to the real-world encounters within which
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scientific knowledge is reconstructed to make it fit real situations in all of their rich
complexity (or rejected if it cannot),” and understanding this process “is crucial to
understanding the social authority...of science” (Wynne, 1991, p. 113). As a
constructivist researcher interested in science, communication, and culture — science in
communication and culture, science and communication in culture, science
communication as culture — I have pursued this particular research project to better
understand how scientific authority is constructed, how it works and what it does, and
particularly what role journalists play in the process.
Theoretical foundation
Social constructivism is the post-positivistic theoretical foundation of this study. This
foundation serves as a methodological approach to this analysis — a stance, a worldview
guiding choices of specific tools of interpretation and analysis. Like its antecedent
symbolic interactionism1, the theoretical perspective of social constructivism establishes
that people live in an empirical reality and construct their social reality in the empirical
world. Berger and Luckmann (1966) explained the constructivist approach to studies of
the social world: research situates the analyst and the actor on the same level, requiring
researchers to acknowledge their interests, values and worldviews in exploring the
interests, values and worldviews of others as they create social reality. This kind of
research proceeds on the premises that social reality is contingent, contested, and
continually under construction and that meanings are multiple and conflicting.
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The constructivist perspective is well suited to observing the empirical world, conducive
to interpretation, accommodating of multiple meanings (Pauly, 1991).2 It challenges the
idea that any single theoretical framework or research method is the only one that can
improve understanding of social reality. As Calhoun (1995) observed, “Theories remain
multiple not because we are confused but because all problems...can be seen in different
ways” (p. 8). To study the social construction of reality, an analyst must explore the
empirical world of everyday life, and the constructivist analyst should be able to alternate
between and among the various frames of reference under examination (Berger, 1963, as
cited in Collins & Yearley, 1992, p. 301).
As alluded to in Chapter 2, from a constructivist perspective communication is the
primary means — arguably the sole means — of creating social reality. This study
proceeds on the assumption that social reality is constructed primarily through the
symbolic action of communication. It focuses on this action as it takes place in everyday
life, represented in this case by the slice of life known as the mainstream mass media.
This analysis aims to shed light on how actors construct, maintain, repair and demolish
social reality by means of communication, using names and labels, categories and
classifications, definitions and descriptions, to create (or erase) borders and boundaries.
From a constructivist perspective, “no demarcation principles work universally,” Gieryn
(1995) noted; “the separation of science from other knowledge-producing activities is
instead a contextually contingent and interests-driven pragmatic accomplishment drawing
selectively on inconsistent and ambiguous attributes” (p. 393). Though researchers have
explored a range of cases involving the social construction of science, it may not be
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possible to explain completely and definitively how myriad groups of people with myriad
sets of values and interests define the construct of science. But it is certainly possible, as
many researchers have already done, to detail the ways in which different individuals and
groups rhetorically define and deploy “science” in specific cases, and, perhaps, to find
some commonalities among them.
Informing ideas and perspectives
While this study is informed by the critical theoretical perspective and work in critical
studies, it is critical only in a broad, rather than a strict, sense. Simply by choosing a site
of analysis, I am making a statement about its significance, identifying the construction
of authority as a phenomenon that deserves critical attention. I am proceeding with this
study on the assumption that as an analyst-critic, I am not detached from or disinterested
in my analysis — or, as Christians and Carey (1989) put it, “that the knower is
inextricably part of what is known” (p. 373). The critical theoretical perspective, as
Calhoun (1995) described it, is “self-conscious about its historicity...and its engagement
in the practical world” (p. 11). “Critical theorists are committed to the excavation of the
political underpinnings of all modes of representation, including the scientific,”
Conquergood (1991, p. 179) observed, and in this study I am exploring the origins and
nature of the power and authority of scientific representations. For the purposes of this
study I have found it useful to consider the proposition that the aim of the critical stance
— that is, critique — “is more than criticism,” as Young (1995) said: the writer’s aim is
to submit the subject under study to “a searching evaluation of its framework of ideas, its
assumptions, its terms of reference and especially its ideology...in a way which is quite
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overt in juxtaposing its object with a set of values held by the person mounting the
critique” (p. 1). A critical approach to the study of communication “challenges the
naturalness of the social order,” as Craig (1991) observed, “and questions the rational
validity of all authority, tradition, and conventional belief” (subheading “The critical
tradition,” para. 6). The point of critical study of communication is to effect change
through action. The critical perspective is thus useful to this study in providing ways to
think about motives for symbolic actions and possibilities for raised awareness, and
perhaps reconsideration of those motives.
This study is also informed by the cultural studies perspective. “Culture is not a power,
something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally
attributed,” as Geertz (1973) said; “it is a context, something within which they can be
intelligibly — that is, thickly — described” (p. 14), and “cultural forms find articulation”
(p. 17) through social action. In this case the social action is the symbolic action of
communication. Critical and cultural studies have examined “how symbolic and
institutional forms of culture and power are mutually entangled in constructing...the
social world” (Giroux, 2004, p. 59). The transdisciplinary approach of cultural studies
“provides a rationale for challenging how knowledge has been historically produced...and
used within disciplines to sanction particular forms of authority and exclusion” (Giroux,
2004, p. 66). With its focus on subjectivity and constructedness, the cultural studies
perspective is useful to consider in exploring the production of media texts in their
cultural contexts (Harms & Dickens, 1996) and “the meanings, symbols and symbolic
systems, ideologies, rituals, and conventions by which journalists maintain their cultural
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authority as spokespeople for events in the public domain” (Zelizer, 2004, p. 101).3 From
this perspective journalistic practices and conventions are situated, and journalists are
observers, interpreters and producers of culture who are in a position to pass judgment on
social reality, “what is good and bad, moral and amoral, and appropriate and
inappropriate” (p. 102). A constructivist framework for analysis informed by critical and
cultural perspectives provides the flexibility to explore broadly and deeply, to see further
into more corners of social reality.
Case study approach
The method employed in this project is case study, as reported in Chapter 1. Case studies
aim “to make clear the complexities of the context and the ways these interact to form
whatever it is that the case report portrays” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 214).4 Research
materials include a purposive sample of elite media texts and texts by John Mack,
interviews with journalists, and other materials and information useful for contextualizing
the case. (In accordance with Indiana University policy, I received approval for this
project from IU’s Bloomington Campus Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects
on February 18, 1999; see Appendix A for documentation.) Textual analysis is a useful
tool for this case study because it promises to reveal possibilities of meaning (Fursich &
Lester, 1996). Analyzing texts (individually and collectively) should, “in addition to
revealing something interesting and useful about the text itself...reveal something
interesting and useful about the kind of symbolic activity that the text represents,” as
Dow asserted (1996, pp. 4-5).
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Selection of texts for analysis
I selected texts for analysis in this study by purposive sampling, a technique suited to
post-positivistic inquiry. The aim of such selective sampling is to “increase the scope or
range of data exposed” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 201-202) rather than eliminate
deviant, extreme, or otherwise unusual cases. The investigator is responsible for defining
the sampling process, and she can continually adjust the sample to build on data already
collected (and the sample for this project was, indeed, continually adjusted and focused
as this analysis proceeded). Texts published in elite media, journalists writing for elite
media, and scientists affiliated with elite institutions are pace-setting, widely studied and
credible subjects for analysis.
Texts selected for this analysis include reviews of Mack’s book Abduction, news stories
pegged to publication of the book, interviews with Mack, and other types of articles.
Books and articles written by Mack about his abduction research — especially his book
Abduction (Mack, 1994a), itself a subject of much of the media coverage explored in this
study — were examined in depth. Selected texts also include some stories published in
what I call fringe media (such as UFOlogy magazines), for purposes of comparison.
My initial search of the Lexis-Nexis news database for texts, conducted in September
1996, was bounded by the search terms “John E. Mack w/4 [within 4 words of] Harvard”
and the dates January 1, 1992-December 31, 1995. This search yielded 187 stories from
newspapers and magazines. (According to Lexis-Nexis, material in its database dates
back to around February 1983.) I discarded a number of stories that cited Mack’s
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abduction research but were not substantively about Mack or his research. I used the
same search terms for subsequent searches bounded by different dates (see Chapters 4
and 5).
The purposive sample that I selected from the body of texts I found through Lexis-Nexis
and other modes of searching encompasses approximately 75 texts. (I say
“approximately” because, with regard to a few texts, it is difficult to draw hard
boundaries between texts treated as subjects for analysis and texts used simply for
context or details.)  These 75 texts include 39 daily newspaper stories, 7 weekly
magazine articles, 6 monthly magazine articles, 10 scientific journal articles (nine
published in Psychological Inquiry, including one coauthored by Mack; and 1 published
in the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association), 4 books (three by Mack,
counting the hardcover and paperback editions of Abduction as separate books; plus one
popular science book by Carl Sagan), 3 miscellaneous papers by Mack (not including the
one he coauthored for Psychological Inquiry), and a few miscellaneous online articles.
The 39 daily newspaper texts include 2 letters to the editor, 2 wire service stories
(counted only as single texts though they were published in multiple media outlets), 3
Sunday-magazine features, and 1 book excerpt plus news briefs, news features, and book
reviews. Virtually all of the daily newspaper articles in my sample were published in the
top 100 U.S. daily newspapers, by circulation, as identified by the Audit Bureau of
Circulations.5 Given the focus of this study on elite media, my purposive sample focuses
on elite media, and most of the 39 newspaper articles (save two or three) were published
in the top 20 newspapers. All texts selected for analysis are identified as such in my
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references. I have cited additional media texts and popular books in this study for the
purpose of providing context; these texts are listed in references but not marked as texts
selected for analysis, as they were not included in my purposive sample.
I have paid special attention in this analysis to a core group of texts, including three
books by Mack (1994a, 1995, 2000a) and seven stories that published in a select group of
mainstream, elite print media: Gleick, 1994, The New Republic; Kahn, 1994, the Boston
Globe; Miles, 1994, the Boston Globe; Neimark, 1994, Psychology Today; Rae, 1994,
The New York Times Magazine; Schorow, 1994, the Boston Herald (the Herald does not
qualify as “elite” but this story is included because of the “local” connection); and Tery,
1992, the Boston Globe Sunday magazine.
Elite media are worth singling out in the study of science communication not only
because of their “widespread national circulation and…influence on other media” as
trendsetters but also because they “cater to a substantially well educated audience,
including many scientists, with more than an average interest in scientific policy making”
(Fursich & Lester, 1996, p. 28). Science stories in these elite media “serve as a point of
reference…for journalists’ reporting for other media outlets” (Nelkin, 1995b, p. 8).
Another reason for my choice of core sample is that these articles refer to each other. All
together, the individual texts in my sample constitute a sort of  “metatext” or
metanarrative (Lyotard, 1984), in this case a text made up of texts, an overarching story
(or a story about a story). These texts are not simply replications of the same story for
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different publications. The texts are related; each text implicitly or explicitly is linked
with previous texts, recapping past events, recycling expert sources, adding new
information, and reflecting new perspectives. For their constructivist study of
controversial science in the media, Hagendijk and Meeus (1993) defined metanarrative as
“the texts that make up the textual corpus of the controversy” (p. 391). A scientific
controversy “is a developing corpus of texts” (p. 394), and the metanarrative of a
scientific controversy is the product of “the ways in which texts refer to other texts in
establishing facts, identifies of actors and accounts” (p. 391).
In addition to collecting and analyzing texts, I conducted interviews with journalists who
wrote stories about Mack’s abduction research, and with Mack himself. These interviews
were intended to be exploratory discussions, providing subjects the opportunity to share
their experiences and perceptions relating to the case and supplied material for fleshing
out the contexts within which selected texts were created. (See Appendices A and B for
interview questions and interview subjects.) I reviewed transcripts and videotapes of
many hours of broadcast media coverage of Mack’s abduction research during research
for this project. However, the coupling of words and images creates a different sort of
text, and different sorts of meanings, than words alone in print texts. Thus, because of
this study’s focus on words, I did not examine broadcast “texts” in this analysis or
compare them with print texts. In addition, I did not consider photographs and
illustrations included in print media stories selected for analysis. While I reviewed some
non-U.S., English-language texts in the course of research for this project, my analysis
focuses on texts published in U.S. media and forgoes intercultural comparisons. Finally,
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evaluation of the legitimacy or reality of the so-called abduction phenomenon in general
or Mack’s abduction research in particular is beyond the scope of this study.
Boundary-work: a key sensitizing concept
As explained in Chapter 1, this study has proceeded on the assumptions that: science is a
social construction created by scientists and others through the symbolic action of
communication; science has cultural authority (a quality created by scientists and others
in the process of constructing science); journalists play a role in the construction of
scientific authority; and rhetoric is a primary tool in this construction, which takes place,
as Gieryn (1983, 1995, 1999) has observed, in specific cultural contexts. While some
aspects of culture may endure over time, cultural contexts are constantly changing. This
mutable quality of social reality, Bourdieu (1989) observed, “provides a basis for the
plurality of visions of the world which is itself linked to the plurality of points of views”
that serves as a foundation “for symbolic struggles over the power to produce and to
impose the legitimate vision of the world” (p. 20). To ask “What is science?” is to inquire
about demarcation, to consider what sets science apart from other practices (Woolgar,
1988). From the constructivist perspective guiding this analysis, science appears to be not
an immutable social structure but a contextual and contingent cultural phenomenon. What
science (and scientific authority, and science news, as well) is depends on where and
when it is, and who is involved in defining it.
A question worth addressing, according to Gieryn (1983), is, “How do scientists
construct ideologies with style and content well suited to the advancement or protection
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of their professional authority?” (p. 783). Researchers interested in studying science in
society “must eschew the essentialist presumption of a priori, transcontextual definitions
of science, scientist, and scientific knowledge” (Gieryn & Figert, 1990. p. 69). The best
way to study the social construction of science, scientists, scientific knowledge, and
scientific authority is ‘to listen and watch as science gets built” (p. 69). Sensitizing
concepts are useful tools for qualitative study (Christians & Carey, 1989), and this study
employs Gieryn’s (1999, 1995, 1983) sensitizing concept of boundary-work as a guide in
exploring “when, how and to what ends the boundaries of science are drawn and
defended in natural settings often distant from laboratories and professional journals”
(Gieryn, 1995, pp. 393-394).
Boundary-work, according to Gieryn, is the attribution by scientists (and others) “of
selected characteristics to the institution of science” (1983, p. 782). It is “strategic
practical action” (1999, p. 23), cultural cartography, the location of science in space and
time. Boundary-work takes place in the “pursuit of a monopoly over cultural authority
through exclusion of those offering discrepant and competitive maps of the place of
science in the intellectual landscape” (1995, p. 394). What ends up inside or outside the
boundaries of science “is a local and episodic accomplishment, a consequence of
rhetorical games of inclusion and exclusion” (p. 406). The study of boundary-work is
thus a good way to explore how conventional and unconventional scientific worldviews
are constructed.6 Boundary-work “describes an ideological style found in scientists’
attempts to create a public image for science by contrasting it favorably to non-scientific
intellectual...activities” (Gieryn, 1983, p. 781), and “descriptions of science as
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distinctively truthful, objective or rational may best be analyzed as ideologies: incomplete
and ambiguous images of science nevertheless useful for scientists’ pursuit of authority”
(pp. 792-793). If ideology is employed to resolve disagreements and advance interests
(Geertz, 1973, as cited in Gieryn, 1983), then researchers would do well to “examine the
rhetorical style of ideological statements” (Gieryn, 1983, p. 782).
Rhetorical strategies, then, are tools for doing boundary-work, and rhetorical analysis
should prove to be a useful tool for examining the enactment of boundary-work. “The
qualities, practices, and accomplishments attributed to science are explicable as rhetorical
tools used by those whose practical ends and interests are served by making these
attributions” (Gieryn & Figert, 1990, p. 90). Tools for doing boundary-work include, for
instance, the ideology of scientism, deployed by scientists to demarcate legitimate
scientific knowledge from other kinds of knowledge (Gieryn, 1995). The mass media,
among other forums, provide “ripe spots for picking juicy episodes of cultural
cartography” (Gieryn, 1999, p. 24). The boundaries of science can be maintained by
actors who are perceived by legitimate scientists to be inside and outside the boundaries.
Journalists, for example, can do boundary-work. When journalists “use science to attach
credibility to their stories, they are also reproducing the cultural meaning of scientists as
the fount of authoritative knowledge about nature” (Gieryn & Figert, 1990, p. 91).
Analytic tools: exploring boundary-work by rhetorical analysis
Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s examinations of the creation, distribution and exercise of
power in specific cultural contexts are reviewed here briefly as they inform this study.
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Boundaries are important to what Foucault called the archeology of knowledge. Foucault
(1980, 1977, 1972) explored how power is constructed in everyday discourse, how power
and authority arise out of this discourse, everywhere, from the top down and the bottom
up. “It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge,” he wrote (Foucault,
1977); it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power” (p. 52). Knowledge is
power, and power is knowledge, and by studying their construction in discourse one can
“capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates
the effects of power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 69). According to Foucault (1980), it is useful to
study the relationship between power and knowledge because “the exercise of power
itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new
bodies of information” (p. 51), and knowledge “induces effects of power” (p. 52).
Discursive practices are not simply ways of producing discourses, Foucault (1977)
observed; they define “a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing
of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories” (p. 199). Such practices are tools
of boundary-work, as it were, and I explore them as a means for constructing scientific
authority in this case.
Bourdieu (1991) considered how naming and labeling create social reality and the power
and authority that operate in that reality. “Symbolic power is the power to make things
with words,” Bourdieu (1989, p. 23) asserted, and thus the words used to construct social
reality “are the stake par excellence of political struggle” (p. 21). For the purposes of this
study, words are the means of making meaning. This study explores language, discourse,
and rhetoric as means of articulating — that is, stating and constructing — the boundaries
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of science, by strategies that affirm or challenge elements of the positivistic scientific
worldview. It explores rhetorical strategies as ways of constructing the boundaries of
social reality — in this case, specifically scientific authority.
Geertz (1973) characterized human behavior as “symbolic action” (p. 10). Burke (1984,
1973) examined the symbolic action of communication in the context of culture. Carey
(1992) described the works of Burke and Geertz as sources of “fresh perspective on
communication” (p. 23). Carey’s (1992) conception of communication as ritual enacted
to maintain culture over time provides a model of communication as “dramatic action”
(p. 21). By this model, news reporting is a ritual, and “news is not information but
drama...a presentation of reality that gives life an overall form, order, and tone” (p. 21).
Thus social reality is produced by communication, “the construction, apprehension, and
utilization of symbolic forms” (p. 25). “To study communication is to examine the actual
social process wherein significant symbolic forms are created, apprehended, and used,”
according to Carey, to observe and analyze “attempts to construct, maintain, repair and
transform reality” (p. 30).
Dramatistic criticism
Rhetoric, in Burke’s (1969b) view, is “an essential function of language…the use of
language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to
symbols” (p. 43). For Burke (1973), the symbolic action of communication is the way
that people make meaning, the means of creating and maintaining subjective, social
reality, “the dancing of an attitude” (p, 9) toward that reality. This study employs Burke’s
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(1969a, 1969b, 1973, 1984) dramatistic criticism as a primary tool of rhetorical analysis,
to explore in depth the rhetorical strategies deployed in texts selected for analysis.
Dramatistic criticism, with its emphasis on accommodating multiple perspectives,
exploring ambiguity and complexity, and expanding frames of reasoning, is well suited to
exploring the rhetorical strategies that journalists employ in constructing scientific
authority. “A critic eager to define [her] position should explain...what to look for, and
why; [and] how, and when and where,” Burke wrote (1973, p. 68). What I looked for in
this case was boundary-work by journalists, rhetorical evidence of their participation in
the construction of scientific authority, the exercise of their cultural authority to define
what and who counts in the world of legitimate science. I conducted this search by means
of close reading of a collection of related texts, focusing on a core of elite media texts,
from the theoretical perspective of constructivism. I have used a variety of Burkean tools
herein to excavate for motives, as he suggested, to consider how and why various
strategies are conceived and employed and to speculate on possible alternative strategies
that might be more productive.
In Burke’s view, just as social structure is functional, so is textual structure, and the focus
of rhetorical analysis must be on the structure of the text. “The motivation out of which
[one] writes,” according to Burke (1973), “is synonymous with the structural way in
which he puts events and values together” (p. 20). A writer may be “conscious of
selecting a certain kind of imagery to reinforce a certain kind of mood” but “cannot
possibly be conscious of the interrelationships among all these equations” (p. 20). An
analyst, however, may be able to find these patterns by examining the completed text.
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Such an analysis aims to identify the rhetorical strategy employed in a text, the purpose
of the symbolic action in it, “the functions which the structure serves” (p. 101).
Using the tools of dramatistic criticism, such as Burke’s pentad of relational terms —
scene, act, actor, agent, purpose — I have attempted in this study to identify the basic
rhetorical equation of a typical Mack-abduction story and tease out the terministic screens
and associational clusters of word-symbols that writers have used to construct their texts.
This analysis considers the context of the text as well. “The main ideal of criticism,”
Burke (1973) wrote, “is to use all there is to use” (p. 23), and the critic/analyst may wish
to consider information about the author of a text and the time and place in which the
author produced the text, for example. I have tried to use all that I could find to use for
this analysis.
Writers build structures with words, words represent motives, and by examining these
screens and clusters an analyst can explore a writer’s motives, and work out “what kinds
of acts and images and personalities and situations” (Burke, 1973, p. 20) go with a
writer’s notions of themes explored in a text. What Burke (1973) called terministic
screens are rhetorical frames of power, act, and order that highlight some aspects of a text
and downplay others. They are frames by which rhetors choose one way of description by
not choosing another way, groups of words employed to filter stories and direct audiences
toward certain observations and interpretations and away from others. They affect the
scope and circumference of a text, determining what goes into it and what does not. By
examining terministic screens, an analyst can consider what meanings terms take on in
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the structure of a particular text. What Burke (1973) called associational clusters are
repeated relations of terms, “implicit equations” that an analyst can study to determine
“what goes with what,” what is opposed to what, what is linked to what — “what kinds
of acts and images and personalities and situations” (p. 20) for example, go with ideas
addressed in a text.
An analyst may employ what Burke (1973) called “perspective by incongruity” (p. 400)
as an approach to analysis. Burke described perspective by incongruity as “a rational
prodding or coaching of language so as to see around the corner of everyday usage…a
kind of metaphorical projection” (pp. 400-401) beyond common meanings of terms that
can enable consideration of new meaning(s). Terministic screens are structured to direct
audiences toward certain meanings and away from others, and perspective by incongruity
offers a way of transcending such screens by enabling consideration of other meanings.
Rhetorical transcendence — in Burke’s conception, a symbolic bridging or merging, a
way of getting past the either-or options of acceptance or rejection — can be upward or
downward (the strategies of debunking and polemic are examples of downward
transcendence). Burke’s (1984) concepts of victimage ritual — a negative rhetorical
strategy, a frame of rejection — and comic corrective — a positive rhetorical strategy, a
frame of acceptance — offer ways of comparing and contrasting either-or and both-and
rhetorical strategies (that is, frames of rejection and frames of acceptance).7
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Framing and deconstruction
The concepts of framing and deconstruction, broadly drawn, have informed this analysis
as they are relevant to dramatistic criticism. Because I am analyzing texts, my conception
of framing in this case study is the rhetorical structuring of a text, by foregrounding and
backgrounding, including and excluding, rhetorically creating some sort of boundary to
distinguish “inside” from “outside.” (A psychologist might call it cognitive framing. A
sociologist might call it interactional framing. These different conceptions of framing are
not necessarily exclusive.) My conception of Derrida’s (1997) attitude of deconstruction
is to take nothing for granted, question assumptions, and attempt to consider all possible
meanings; an attitude of deconstruction is in keeping with the postpositivistic stance of
this analysis. I have used the ideas of framing and deconstruction as supplementary
sensitizing concepts, as it were, in examining rhetorical strategies herein.
Gieryn’s (1983, 1995, 1999) boundaries and Goffman’s (1974) frames are
complementary concepts, constructions used to organize meaning. Goffman’s social
frameworks are schemata of interpretation. A group’s “framework of frameworks” (p.
336) functions as its worldview, and specialists such as scientists are the tenders of
worldviews and the referees of frame disputes. “Individuals exhibit considerable
resistance to changing their framework of frameworks,” according to Goffman (pp. 28-
30). Rhetorical framing is a means of doing boundary-work. In mass communication
research, frames have been explored as functional structures (Entman, 1991; Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989; Ghanem, 1997; Pan & Kosicki, 1993), ideological processes (Carragee
& Roefs, 2004; Durham, 1998), and particular constructions of social reality (Scheufele,
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1999). As Gitlin (1980) asserted, “any analytic approach to journalism must ask: what is
the frame here?  Why this frame and not another?.... Where do news frames come from?
How are they fixed into the appearance of the stable, the natural, the taken-for-granted?
And how, despite this, are the prevailing frames disputed and changed?” (p. 7).8  While I
have considered the literature on journalistic framing in conducting this study, I find the
typical conception of frames employed in journalistic frame analysis rather rigid for
application to this study. My thinking in this analysis is more influenced by the broader
concept of framing as articulated by Goffman (1974) and, even more broadly, by Burke
(1984).9, 10
Productive criticism
This analysis also draws on the principles of critical rhetoric and productive criticism as
they may usefully augment dramatistic criticism. In critical rhetoric, critique is “a
transformative practice rather than...a method” (McKerrow, 1989, p. 91), an orientation
rather than a methodology. The aim of critical rhetoric is “to unmask...the discourse of
power” and “understand the integration of power/knowledge in society” (p. 102). Critical
rhetorical analysis examines the rules of discourse that establish who may speak about
what, and when and where and how, and how these rules are “used by the dominant class
to control the discursive actions of the dominated” (p. 93). This sort of analysis requires
understanding and pursuing one’s own interests and writing to and for an audience, and
this self-reflexive process is the means of critical invention. This sort of criticism is both
served and confined by theory and method, with theoretical foundation and
methodological approach guiding exploration and also constraining the scope of analysis.
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And it rarely proceeds in a linear fashion (Nothstine et al, 1994). In critical rhetoric,
“texts are understood to be larger than the apparently finished discourse”; critics should
“look for formations of texts rather than ‘the text’ as a place to begin analysis” (McGee,
1990, p. 287). In attempting to construct a metatext, as it were, it may be useful to
consider “structural relationships, between an apparently finished discourse and its
sources, between an apparently finished discourse and its culture, and between an
apparently finished discourse and its influences” (p. xx).
What Klumpp and Hollihan (1989) have described as “socially and morally involved
criticism” (p. 84) aims at “exposing the strategies through which rhetoric transforms the
material events of the world into sociopolitical power” (p. 90). Criticism is itself “a
rhetorical act” (p. 94), an act of invention, and the socially and morally involved critic
focuses on “rhetoric converting the material world into support for the social order” (p.
91). According to Ivie (2001), “As a perspective on symbolic action, rhetoric is a
productive rather than a reductive theory” (para. 2). An analyst engaging in productive
criticism takes social action simply by doing criticism, deciding that a particular topic,
and one’s own assessment of it, is worthy of consideration (Ivie, 2001; Nothstine, et al,
1994). Productive criticism should be socially useful, provoking audiences to think or act
in different and socially responsible ways (Nothstine, Blair, & Copeland, 1994). This
analysis is intended to be productive and socially useful, to enhance human relations,
especially relations between journalists and scientists.
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Conclusion
The next two chapters tell the story of Mack’s abduction research, constructed in Mack’s
texts and in journalists’ coverage of him and his work.
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Notes
1. Blumer (1969) offered symbolic interactionism as an empirical social scientific
perspective for exploring the sources and uses of meaning in social life. In
Blumer’s view, symbolic interactionism can serve as a theoretical framework and
a methodological approach for observing and interpreting social interaction in the
empirical world.
2. Pauly (1991) has acknowledged that his approach to qualitative research is
“heavily influenced by...symbolic interactionism, and by a variety of idiosyncratic
individual interpreters, such as Kenneth Burke” (p. 15).
3.  Zelizer (2004) has explained how the so-called Illinois school of cultural studies,
led by Carey, “positioned the news media as conveyors of experience and shapers
of broadly defined cultural systems...journalism emerged as a key strain of
resonance for thinking about how culture worked” (p. 105).
4. I considered a number of case studies as models in planning this study. Studies by
Gitlin and Koestler were especially useful. In his study of “the nature, sources,
and consequences of news,” documented in The Whole World is Watching (1980),
Gitlin employed frame analysis in examining how the journalistic practices and
ideology affected media content. Gitlin approached his study as a constructivist,
asserting that the media orchestrate everyday consciousness and participate
maintaining cultural hegemony. Gitlin concluded that contemporary political
movements depend on the mass media to establish and maintain cultural
authority. In my case study I will explore the possibility that scientists and
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journalists may depend on each other to maintain their own cultural authority.
Koestler’s case study of the scientific establishment’s rejection of controversial
work done by a prominent scientist, documented in The Case of the Midwife Toad
(Random House, 1971), offers a good model for my study. As John Mack did,
Koestler’s subject Paul Kammerer wrote and lectured for non-scientists as well as
scientists; his colleagues in science criticized him for communicating with the
public just as Mack’s colleagues have criticized him for his popular writings and
lectures. Kammerer advocated a lamarckian conception of evolution in an
ongoing dispute between darwinists and lamarckians evoking “intense emotional
and philosophical passions,” according to Koestler. I observed a similar intensity
in discussions about Mack’s work. Like Mack, Kammerer did not start his career
doing controversial research but stumbled into it by chance after he had made his
reputation. As in Mack’s case, Kammerer’s personal practices and beliefs were
“abnormal” enough to bother his colleagues in science. In both cases, elite
establishment scientists ultimately accused the controversial researchers of
shoddy, even fraudulent, scientific practices. Koestler reconstructed in great detail
the personal and professional life of the subject of his case study as well as the
scientific and broader cultural milieu in which Kammerer lived and worked. He
drew on Kammerer’s personal and professional records, scientific literature,
popular media, and interviews with family and friends and colleagues of the
subject to flesh out his case.
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5. Information on reported circulations of daily newspapers was obtained from the
Audit Bureau of Circulations. Retrieved April 28, 2005, from
http://www.accessabc.com/reader/top100.htm.
6. At least one study (Winch, 1997) has employed the concept of boundary-work to
the examination of the social construction of the boundaries of journalism. Its
focus was on the demarcation of journalism from entertainment. This analysis
considered the cultural boundaries of journalism but focused on the role that
journalists play in constructing the cultural boundaries of science. What was at
stake in this boundary-work was journalism’s “authority, jurisdiction, and
autonomy” (p. 1). “The perceived credibility and objectivity of their work” (p. 9)
played an important role in this boundary-work. This study showed that
boundary-work in journalism “is done primarily by insiders — those who have
the most to lose through the loss of jurisdiction and autonomy” (p. 155).
Journalists were found to construct a conception of journalism that enhanced
“their power and prestige” (p. 9). “Much like the boundary-work rhetoric of
scientists,” journalistic boundary-work tended to distinguish journalism from
other domains in dualistic terms “such as professional versus amateur, responsible
versus irresponsible, ethical versus unethical, legitimate versus pseudo” (p. 155).
7. “Epic, tragedy, and comedy gravitate towards the positive side, while elegy,
satire, and burlesque stress the negative,” according to Burke (1984, p. 57). He
distinguishes humor, a strategy of downward transcendence (ridicule, rejection),
from comedy, a strategy of upward transcendence (identification, acceptance).
8. Some relevant findings in the literature on frame analysis are that:
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• Frame analysis should address which words in a text are part of the frame and
which are not (Entman, 1991).
• Framing involves choice of topic, presentation of information, and cognitive
attributes and affective attributes (Ghanem, 1997).
• Journalistic frames can be characteristics of a text or internalized guides
(Entman, 1991).
• Standard structural features such as headlines, decks, leads, subheadings,
callouts, closes, and photos and captions are among the mechanisms of
journalistic framing (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Ghanem, 1997).
• Comparing journalistic frames can “reveal the critical textual choices that
framed the story but would otherwise remain submerged in an undifferentiated
text” (Entman 1991, p. 6).
• Rhetorical framing is a way in which journalists make meaning in their stories.
Attributions to expert and official sources are a framing strategy employed to
comply with the convention of objectivity. Keywords, metaphors, concepts, and
symbols are important elements of media frames, too, and “sizing” — playing up
or playing down various elements of a particular construction of reality — plays a
role, too (Entman, 1991).
• As an ideological process, framing establishes a “right” conception of reality;
reporter-source relations are the site where the framing takes place, and framing
research should address how and why frames are constructed as modes of making
meaning (Durham, 1998).
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• “The reduction of frames to story topics, attributes, or issue positions ignores the
ways in which frames construct particular meanings and…advance specific ways
of seeing issues” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 218), and “the relationship between
media frames and broader issues of political and social power” (p. 214) warrants
exploration.
9. “The comic frame,” Burke (1984) wrote, “in making a man the student of himself,
makes it possible for him to ‘transcend’ occasions when he has been tricked or
cheated, since he can readily put such discouragements in his ‘assets’ column,
under the head of ‘experience.’ Thus we ‘win’ by subtly changing the rules of the
game” (p. 171), by making assets out of liabilities. (In addition to the comic
frame, the epic and tragic frames are frames of acceptance as well.)
10. Analysis of terministic screens may enable the analyst to address a criticism of
frame analysis as it has been applied in many media content studies. According to
F. D. Durham (1998), “the functionalist literature on framing” (p. 102) does not
adequately address the role of framing as a social process. These analyses have
tended to describe the frames that journalists employ without considering how
and why journalists construct and deploy particular frames or assessing the
motive and purpose of frames and framing, Durham claimed (see N. 8, above).
Frame analysis should consider framing as “an ideological process” and “reporter-
source relations as the site of the framing effort,” toward revealing “how and why
framing happens as a fundamental social process of meaning making” (pp. 100-
101).
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Chapter 4
The Case of the Deviant Doctor: a drama in three acts
The alien abduction phenomenon has been called a “hysterical syndrome of the 1990s,”
(Showalter, 1997, p. 203). John Mack called abduction a “phenomenon” existing “at the
margins of accepted reality” (1994a, preface), and he made it his subject of study in the
1990s. Journalists reporting on this work raised questions about its status as legitimate
scientific research and Mack’s status as a scientific authority.
Mack unquestionably qualified as an expert and an authority in his field. He considered
himself a clinician and a scientist and carried the proper credentials.1 He graduated from
Oberlin College (Phi Beta Kappa) in 1951 and obtained his M.D. from Harvard Medical
School in 1955. He completed his medical residency at Boston’s Massachusetts Mental
Health Center and then joined the U.S. Air Force, completing a two-year tour of duty in
Japan working as a psychiatrist. He graduated from the Boston Psychoanalytic Society
and Institute in 1967 and obtained certification as a child analyst in 1969. He then created
a psychiatry unit at Cambridge Hospital, heading the unit until 1977. In 1972 he joined
the faculty of Harvard Medical School, and from 1973 through 1977 he chaired the
school’s department of psychiatry.
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In 1977 Mack won a Pulitzer Prize for A Prince of Our Disorder, his 1976
psychobiography of T.E. Lawrence.2 Other books authored, coauthored, or edited by
Mack include: Nightmares and Human Conflict (1970), Borderline States in Psychiatry
(1975), Development and Sustenance of Self-Esteem in Childhood (1983), and Alchemy
of Survival: One Woman's Journey (1988). Mack wrote numerous articles as well, on
subjects ranging from psychoanalysis and biography to nationalism and the self,
addiction, and “power, powerlessness and empowerment in psychotherapy,” publishing
in scientific journals ranging from the American Journal of Psychiatry and Journal of the
American Psychoanalytic Association to The Psychohistory Review.
Through the 1970s and 1980s Mack participated in a wide variety of professional groups
ranging from the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the International Society
for Political Psychology to the American Association of Chairmen of Departments of
Psychiatry and Physicians for Social Responsibility. Through the 1970s he was active in
the APA, his discipline’s official boundary-tending organization.3 Mack served on APA’s
Task Force on Psychohistory and Psychobiography from 1973-1975 and its Task Force
on Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs from 1975-1977. In 1977, he also participated in
APA’s Task Force on Psychosocial Impacts of Nuclear Advances and its Committee on
Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs. Through the 1980s he held leadership positions at
Harvard Medical School and Cambridge Hospital and founded what came to be known as
the Center for Psychology and Social Change, a research organization dedicated to “the
science of human experience.” In 1983 he testified to the U.S. House of Representatives
on the psychological impact of the nuclear arms race on children. In 1985 he coauthored
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an op-ed for The New York Times on the psychological effects of nuclear weapons
buildup (Coles & Mack, 1985). In 1988 he won the American Association for
Suicidology’s Louis Dublin Award for his contributions to that field.
Born in 1929, Mack grew up in what he described as “a secular American family of
German Jewish heritage” (Mack, 2000a, p. 4). In attempting to explain the origin and
evolution of his scientific and spiritual worldviews, he wrote:
The idea of a great bearded figure suspended somehow in the heavens was the
only representation of God I remember being taught, and my logical rational mind
rejected this notion as impossible and absurd. Spirituality was a vaguely pleasant
but unrealistic concept. My father, a professor of English at New York’s City
College, read the Bible to my sister and me as culture and literature. In medical
school any thought that the complex life-forms we were studying were created by
purpose or intelligent design rather than simply through Darwinian selection was
disparagingly labeled ‘teleology,’ a kind of academic expletive. The experiences
of native peoples with spirits, and the religious beliefs of the faithful, I looked
upon, with Freud…as animism, primitivism, and illusion. Psychoanalysis and
psychiatry, while expressly addressing the inner life, at the same time fit well into
my materialist worldview, offering mechanistic explanations for human behavior,
feelings, and experiences (Mack, 2000a, p. 4).
In the early 1980s, according to New Age Journal (Lawler, 2001), Mack began to explore
“the realm of spiritual questing and the world of political activism,” in response to “the
urging of his children” (para. 9). Mack’s “entire family was arrested in 1986 at the
government’s Nevada Test Site for protesting underground nuclear detonations” (para. 9).
 On January 10, 1990, shortly after his 60th birthday, Mack came upon a new mystery he
decided he wanted to explore. Through a mutual acquaintance, he met Budd Hopkins, a
self-described artist who worked with people who believed they had been abducted by
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aliens. Mack would later claim he thought at the time that Hopkins must have been crazy
and that alleged abductees must have been suffering from some other more familiar sort
of trauma (Mack, 1994a). But the Harvard psychiatrist became intrigued by what he came
to call the abduction phenomenon, and he began working with abductees and studying
abduction in the spring of that year. In 1993, Mack established a Program for
Extraordinary Experience Research (PEER) as a research and education project of the
Center for Psychology and Social Change.4 “Research into extraordinary experiences is a
developing science,” PEER said about its work. “The discipline of science enables us to
examine the material that emerges.  Through open discussion of data collected from
across methodologies and disciplines, human knowledge moves forward” (What is
PEER?, 1996, p. 4).
In “The Case of the Deviant Doctor,” the drama to be described herein, Mack first
appeared on stage as a scientific authority, an expert, with decades of experience in the
study of trauma and identity, and a lifelong tendency to nudge the boundaries of
convention. Act I of this drama opened with the 1992 MIT abduction conference,
providing exposition of Mack and of abduction. The conference, and the attendant
beginnings of media scrutiny of Mack’s new line of research, served as a point of attack
in this drama, the beginning of a series of complications and conflicts that ultimately
should lead to a climax. Act II depicted the publication of Abduction and the action that
followed: criticism, media frenzy, the doctor’s response, and the Harvard Medical School
investigation.
103
The third and final act of a typical drama supplies a climax, and audiences might have
expected that the complications and conflicts in this particular drama would lead to either
Mack’s excommunication from the Harvard community or the scientific community or
both, or a discovery that would vindicate his claims. But Act III in this play was
anticlimactic, the denouement unfinished. After the Medical School’s investigation of his
research, Mack maintained a relatively low public profile. He continued to serve as an
expert and authority, for audiences ranging from readers of The New York Times (Mack,
2000b) to communities on the fringes of scientific legitimacy (Mack, 1996b). In 2000, he
published a second book on his abduction research (Mack, 2000a), and in 2003 he
concluded his 10-year PEER program of abduction research. His research project
concluded, Mack continued to speak about abduction but also worked on other things
(see Act III, below). Still a tenured professor at Harvard, still a recognized authority, still
a sought-after speaker, Mack appeared to have survived the conflict over his research
with his credibility and authority at least in part intact. Observers were left to wonder
whether the mystery of abduction would ever be solved, at least by this particular expert.
What follows in this chapter is a documentation of this drama, drawing primarily on
Mack’s texts and also citing supporting materials.
Act I, “The doctor is an expert”: expertise, authority, deviance
In the years before he began his abduction research, Mack’s communications about his
work took place comfortably within the conventional boundaries of science. He began his
career with a helping of  “instant credibility” in the form of his Harvard degree, soon
104
adding a Harvard professorship to his plate. His 1977 Pulitzer completed a sort of iron
triangle of credibility that would prove durable when he came under fire in the ‘90s.
Mack’s 1970 book on nightmares foreshadowed what would become his lifelong interest
in consciousness, trauma, identity, and the boundaries between objective and subjective
(external and internal) reality, interests that eventually would lead him to the study of
abduction. “If we demonstrate the sexual significance of a nightmare,” he wrote, “we are
still faced with the more fundamental task of explaining why such sexuality should be
overwhelming, terrifying, and associated with violence, crushing and destruction” (Mack,
1970, p. 3). Looking at the recorded history of nightmares, “one is struck,” he continued,
“by the objective reality people of earlier centuries attributed to these visions” (p. 9).
Nightmares, he observed, reflect the human “struggle to integrate internal and external
realities” (p. 11).
Through the 1970s, ‘80s, and early ‘90s Mack published in peer-reviewed journals and
participated in professional societies. In the ‘80s he established a research center (the
Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, later renamed the Center for
Psychology and Social Change) through which he could pursue his interest in social
issues of psychological importance. He spoke and wrote as an expert and authority for
scientific audiences (e.g. Mack, 1983; Mack, 1986; Mack, 1988; Mack, 1992c) and, on
occasion, general audiences (e.g. Mack, 1991). Journalists who used Mack as a source
cited him as a Harvard authority in stories relating to his area of expertise, the
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psychological effects of trauma and conflict (e.g. Bower, 1985; Bruckner, 1985; Hand,
1988).
Though Mack did not speak or write about abduction in the mainstream media before his
first book on abduction came out, he did write about abduction in articles published by
his Center for Psychology and Social Change (Mack, 1992b) and the Institute for Noetic
Sciences (Mack, 1992a), an organization dedicated to consciousness studies. In one of
those articles (Mack, 1992b) he linked his interest in abduction to what he called the
politics of ontology. “We” — presumably scientists and scientifically minded people —
“having internalized the assumptions and ways of knowing of scientific and philosophical
materialism and dualism” (p. 5), cannot accept the possibility of a nonmaterial reality, he
wrote, as it conflicts with the conventional Western scientific worldview. Resistance to
the idea that abduction might somehow be real, Mack argued, was more political than
scientific, relating to what scientists believe, and allow others to believe, is real:
We rarely stop to think that what we have come to accept as real may be
determined by individuals and groups whose point of view in a culture at a given
time [emphasis in original] is seen as authoritative, or who have the power to
impose upon the rest of the society their methods and criteria for perceiving and
defining reality (p. 5).
In the other article (Mack, 1992a) Mack wrote, “The fact that a phenomenon defies
conventional explanation, or even challenges our notions of reality, should not permit us
to ignore its existence or prevent us from exploring [it]” (p. 5).
In June 1992, with MIT physics professor David Pritchard, Mack cochaired a conference
at MIT on abduction research. In a paper prepared for presentation to the conference,
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Mack (1994c) addressed “why the abduction phenomenon [could] not be explained
psychiatrically” (p. 372). He asserted that abduction was not a psychiatric syndrome but
something that “lies outside the range of realities that are possible in the Western world
view, and what is mental illness but thinking and behavior that do not fit that which we
have become accustomed to including within the boundaries of accepted reality?” (p.
372). Explanations proposed by others for reported abduction experiences —
hallucinations, delusions, dreams, hysteria — do not “consider, let alone account for,
several fundamental elements of the abduction experience” (p. 372), he said, including
the consistency of reported experiences and a lack of psychopathology in experiencers.
Citing Carl Jung’s musing on “flying saucers, written long before abductions were being
widely reported,” Mack suggested considering Jung’s idea of “the UFO/abduction
phenomenon as a kind of contemporary myth, a structure of belief manifesting
throughout the culture at a given time,” some evidence of:
Resonance between the psyche or inner world and physical phenomena in the
outside world…. If we were to stretch the notion of the collective unconscious to
this degree then the distinction between internal and external, psyche and reality,
would be lost. World and psyche or consciousness become one (p. 374).
“No psychiatric diagnosis applies usefully to these cases,” he concluded.
We are left then with a profound and important mystery.... Some sort of
intelligence seems to have entered our world, as if from another dimension of
reality…. All we can do is try to learn more about the abduction phenomenon and
have the courage to look at it honestly, resisting the natural impulse to try to force
it into familiar categories (p. 374).
Mack would consistently reassert these claims over the next decade in constructing
abduction as a problem worthy of scientific study, and himself as a scientist with the
appropriate credentials to tackle the problem.
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Act II, “The doctor steps out on a limb” — lighting and fighting firestorms
 Scene I, The book and reaction to it
In its press release5 announcing the April 20 issuance of Abduction, publisher Scribner’s
billed Mack as a “Pulitzer prize-winning author...noted Harvard professor...scientist,
researcher” and asserted that “when a Harvard psychiatrist validates being abducted by
aliens it’s time to listen.” Describing the book as “a work that will forever change our
perception of reality,” the release quoted Mack’s claim that abduction “has important
philosophical, spiritual, and social implications...this work has led me to challenge the
prevailing world view or consensus reality.” The packaging of the book itself
incorporated these themes. The book was tagged on its cover as “science/psychology.” It
was declared “eye-opening, provocative, and above all authoritative” in cover blurb.
According to book-flap blurb, Mack “takes his clients’ accounts seriously” and “makes
clear” in the text “why he believes their testimony may transform the foundations of
human thought.... [Mack] illuminates the vast implications” of the phenomenon “for his
understanding of human psychology and our identity as a species.”
Invoking a well known scientific authority to justify his views, Mack (1994a) wrote in
Abduction that he had consulted Thomas Kuhn, whom he identified as a lifelong friend,
about exploring abduction. Mack wrote that Kuhn told him the conventional scientific
worldview “had come to assume the rigidity of a theology...[a] belief system...held in
place by the structures and polarities of language, such as real/unreal, exists/does not
exist, objective/subjective, intrapsychic/external world, and happened/did not happen. He
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suggested that in pursuing my investigations I suspend to the degree that I was able all
those language forms...putting aside whether or not what I was learning fit any particular
worldview... This...has been the approach that I have tried to follow” (p. 20).
Nonetheless, Mack rhetorically constructed himself as a legitimate scientist and a
conscientious clinician in this book, his research as legitimately scientific and
conscientiously clinical. “I will report...what I have learned primarily from my own
cases…make interpretations and draw conclusions on the basis of this information,” he
wrote in his introduction (p. 3). And in his conclusion he noted, “As a clinician, I have
spent countless hours trying to find alternate explanations” (p. 400).
Mack called abduction stories a “phenomenon,” and he called the people who reported
them “experiencers.” He reported that these people believed they had been abducted and
that he believed that they believed they had had these experiences. He avoided stating
directly that he believed his experiencers had been abducted by extraterrestrial beings.
But he also wrote of abduction experiences in a way that could lead readers to assume
that he believed abductions and abductors were real. “The abduction phenomenon has led
me to see,” Mack wrote in his introduction, “that we participate in a universe or universes
that are filled with intelligences from which we have cut ourselves off, having lost the
senses by which we might know them”  (p. 3).
And in his concluding chapter, “Alien intervention and human evolution” (p. 387), Mack
wrote:
Although the alien beings seem to be intervening to alter our consciousness in
such a way that our aggression would be reduced, they seem genuinely puzzled
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regarding to degree of our…gratuitous destructiveness (p. 396)…. For me the
future role that the [human-alien] hybrid offspring are being prepared to play
represents one of the most puzzling aspects of the entire abduction
phenomenon…. My impression is that we may be witnessing...an awkward
joining of two species, engineered by an intelligence we are unable to fathom….
I base this view on the evidence presented by the abductees (p. 415).
Revealing some awareness of the rhetorical strategy he was employing, Mack wrote in
the preface to Abduction that in exploring “phenomena that exist at the margins of
accepted reality, old words become imprecise and must be given new meanings” (p. xi).
For instance, “thinking of memory too literally as ‘true’ or ‘false’ may restrict what we
can learn about human consciousness from...abduction experiences” (p. xi). His account
of his discussion with Kuhn advanced this rhetorical strategy as well. Mack addressed
epistemology and ontology in his introductory chapter, asserting that his work with
abductees “has led me to challenge the prevailing world view or consensus reality…the
materialist/dualist scientific paradigm” in which what is real is “what can be perceived by
the physical senses” (p. 3). According to the conventional scientific worldview,
“intelligence is largely a phenomenon of the brain; by this worldview if “intelligence is
experienced as residing in the larger cosmos, this perception is an example of
‘subjectivity’ or a projection of our mental processes” (p. 3). The question of  “whether
abductions are really taking place leads…to…questions about perceptions and levels of
consciousness. The most glaring question is whether there is any reality independent of
consciousness” (p. 8). (In his conclusion to the book he wrote, “An expanded
epistemology, especially in psychology, may demand the legitimization…of neglected
aspects of ourselves as instruments of knowing” (p. 390).)
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Turning up the heat of his challenge to the boundaries of conventional science and
extending his expertise from human consciousness to human survival, he also declared
that through his work with abductees, “It has become clear to me…that our restricted
world view…lies behind…major destructive patterns that threaten the human future —
mindless corporate acquisitiveness…hunger and diseases; ethnonational violence…mass
killing…nuclear holocaust; and ecological destruction”  (pp. 3-4).
In his concluding chapter Mack wrote of “transformational and spiritual phenomena” (p.
396) relating to abduction. “Many abduction experiences are unequivocally spiritual,” he
claimed. “The alien beings…may…be seen as intermediaries, closer than we are to God
or the source of being. Sometimes…they may even be seen as angels or analogous to
God” (p. 397). Distinguishing between spiritual and “religious implications” (p. 409), he
observed:
Religious leaders instruct us in the nature of God, and determine for us what spirit
beings or other entities may exist in the cosmos…. There can be little place,
especially within the Judeo-Christian tradition, for [extraterrestrial] beings who
administer an odd mixture of trauma and transcendence without apparent regard
for any established religious hierarchy or doctrine (p. 412).
 “My own impression,” he wrote, “is that consciousness expansion and personal
transformation is a basic aspect of the abduction phenomenon,” but he also admitted, “my
focus upon growth and transformation might reflect of bias of mine” (p. 399). He
suggested in conclusion:
As we suspend the notion of our preeminent and dominating intelligence, we
might open to a universe filled with life-forms different from ourselves to whom
we might be connected in ways we do not yet comprehend. The connecting
principle…appears to be love. In the discovery of a fundamental, loving
interconnectedness, we might…evolve toward wholeness (p. 422).
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Mack described what he called the phenomenology of alien abduction in Chapter Two of
his book, relaying a synthesis of abduction stories reported to him. “Although some
abductees may recall only a single dramatic experience…it generally turns out that
encounters have been occurring from early childhood” (p. 29). These experiences
typically begin, Mack wrote:
In homes or when abductees are driving automobiles…. In some cases the
experiencer may be walking in nature…. The first indication that an abduction is
about to occur might be an unexplained intense blue or white light that floods the
bedroom, an odd buzzing or humming sound, unexplained apprehension, the
sense of an unusual presence or even the direct sighting of one of more humanoid
beings in the room, and, of course, the close-up sighting of a strange craft….
After the initial contact, the abductee is commonly ‘floated’ (the word
most commonly used) down the hall, through the wall or windows of the
house, or through the roof of the car. They are usually astounded to
discover that they are passed through solid objects, experiencing only a
slight vibratory sensation. In most cases the beam of light seems to serve
as an energy source or ‘ramp’ for transporting the abductee from the place
where the abduction starts to a waiting vehicle. Usually the experiencer is
accompanied by one, two or more humanoid beings…to the ship. At some
point early in this process the experiencer discovers that he or she has
been numbed or totally paralyzed by a touch…or an instrument (pp. 33-
34).
Mack summarized “procedures” that abduction experiencers reported:
The abductee is usually undressed and is forced naked, or wearing only a
single garment such as a T-shirt, onto a body-fitting table where most of
the procedures will occur…. The [alien] beings seem to study their
captives endlessly, staring at them…often with the large eyes up close to
the humans’ heads. The abductees may feel as if the contents of their
minds have been totally known, even, in a sense, taken over. Skin and
hair, and other samples from inside the body, are taken….
Instruments are used to penetrate virtually every part of the abductees’
bodies…. Extensive surgical-like procedures done inside the head have
been described…. The most common, and evidently most important
procedures, involve the reproductive system. Instruments that penetrate
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the abdomen or involve the genital organs themselves are used to take
sperm samples from men and to remove or fertilize eggs of the females.
Abductees experience being impregnated by the alien beings and later
having an alien-human or human-human pregnancy removed. They see the
little fetuses being put into containers on the ships, and during subsequent
abductions may see incubators where the hybrid babies are being raised….
In sum, the purely physical or biological aspect of the abduction
phenomenon seems to have to do with some sort of genetic or quasi-
genetic engineering for the purpose of creating human/alien hybrid
offspring. We have no evidence of alien-induced genetic alteration in the
strictly biological sense, although it is possible that this has occurred (pp.
38-39).
Mack also reported on “the provision of information and the alteration of consciousness”
reported by abduction experiencers:
This is not a purely cognitive process, but one that reaches deeply into the
emotional and spiritual lives of the experiencers…. The information
concerns the fate of the earth and human responsibility for the destructive
activities that are taking place on it.  It is conveyed by…mind-to-mind
telepathic communication…and through powerful images shown
on…screens on the ships…. Scenes of the earth devastated by a nuclear
holocaust, vast panoramas of lifeless polluted landscapes and waters, and
apocalyptic images of giant earthquakes, firestorms, floods and even
fractures of the planet itself are shown by the aliens (pp. 39-40).
Other abduction researchers, Mack wrote, “believe…the beings…are deceiving
[abductees] into believing that they are concerned with our fate while they proceed to
take over our planet…. The aliens themselves…say that we are not ready to acknowledge
their existence, and would treat them…as an enemy…. [T]he aliens say…[t]hey do not
wish to bring about change through coercion but rather through a change in
consciousness” (p. 40).
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The Washington Post published an excerpt from Abduction (Mack, 1994b) in its weekly
opinion section, beginning with Mack’s declaration:
I feel sometimes that in the mental health profession we are like the generals who
are accused of always fighting the last war, invoking the diagnoses and mental
mechanisms with which we are familiar when confronted with a new and
mysterious phenomenon, especially if it is one that challenges our way of thinking
(p. C1).
In this excerpt Mack rhetorically constructed himself as a scientific insider and an
outsider, a competent scientist doing legitimate research and a challenger of convention
as well. He framed his research as conventional, inside the boundaries, relying on
standard scientific language of “testing,” “sample[s]”, “evidence,” and “the literature”
(pp. C1, C4). He said he based his views “on the evidence presented” (p. C4), situating
his work within the boundaries of legitimate science (though this evidence was narrative,
provided by abductees). He employed another kind of language to present his work as
boundary-breaking: “the phenomenon...seems to shatter the notion that we are the
preeminent intelligence in the cosmos…we [may] now learn about the physical world
with only limited use of our faculties…we may need a different kind of consciousness”
(p. C4).
In Abduction Mack (1994a) constructed his claims about the legitimacy of abduction as a
research subject in ways that made him appear to be anticipating, and attempting to
deflect, criticisms. (In an interview conducted in 1999, Mack told me that he had, indeed,
anticipated criticism of claims made in Abduction; see below.) In what appeared to be
anticipation of claims that alleged abductees were recalling elements of fiction rather than
experience, Mack (1994a) wrote, “Most of the specific information that the abductees
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provided about [aliens, spacecraft, procedures] had never been written about or shown in
the media” (p. 1). In what appeared to be anticipation of claims that experiencers were
crazy, seeking attention, or swapping stories, he wrote that the people he had worked
with “had not communicated with each other…seemed in other respects quite sane, had
come forth reluctantly…[and] had nothing to gain materially from telling their stories….
There was nothing to suggest their stories were delusional, a misinterpretation of dreams,
or the product of fantasy” (pp. 1-2). In what appeared to be anticipation of claims that he
had not methodically evaluated his subjects, he wrote, “Efforts to establish a pattern of
psychopathology other than disturbances associated with a traumatic event have been
unsuccessful…. Psychological testing of abductees has not revealed evidence of mental
or emotional disturbance that could account for their reported experiences” (p. 16).
“Virtually no scientific authority has evolved that I might use to bolster my arguments or
conclusions” (p. 3), he wrote, placing himself on the frontiers of scientific research, that
boundary area between legitimated and new, not-yet-legitimated, knowledge.
Mack labeled his client-subjects “co-investigators” and “co-creators” in his scientific
explorations, blurring the conventional boundary between scientist and subject and
bumping up against that old Mertonian ethos of disinterestedness (Merton, 1996). He
justified this approach: “In this work, as in any clinically sound investigation, the
interaction of the psyches of the client and the clinician is the means of gaining
knowledge” (p. 25). He detailed his method of hypnosis (which would prove to be highly
controversial, as revealed later in this chapter and in Chapter 5) but reported that while it
“seems to be highly effective…I do not quite understand why this is so” (p. 21). “Critics
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and skeptics cite work on the inaccuracy of recall with hypnosis,” Mack noted. “I believe
that these criticisms cannot be supported,” he wrote:
Daniel Brown, a noted expert in the field of hypnosis research, determined after
carefully reviewing the literature on recall among trauma sufferers under
hypnosis that there are simply no studies of the accuracy of memory in this
population…. Rather, conclusions regarding the inaccuracy of recall under
hypnosis have been based on studies in which an environmental context was
created and memory was tested in relation to events that were of peripheral
importance to the subject (p. 24, emphases added).
(Mack cited a personal communication with Brown as his source of information on this
subject.) Mack dismissed concerns about lack of physical evidence by emphasizing the
primacy of experience:
The physical phenomena that accompany abductions are important, but gain their
significance primarily in that they corroborate the experiences themselves, for the
effects tend to be subtle and would not by themselves convince a Western trained
clinician of their meaning (p. 41).
In the end he re-declared himself a proper skeptic:
The abduction phenomenon was, in the beginning, as unbelievable to me as it is to
any skeptic...I have tried to be aware of any inclination to form new beliefs and
convictions that might take the place of the previous ones that have been so
radically called into question (pp. 389-400).
Mack opened and closed his book with ignorance claims, observing at first that the
“difficulty in estimating the prevalence of abductions lies in the fact that we do not know
what an abduction really is” (p. 15) and reporting at last, “I cannot say that the cases
selected have been ‘typical,’ because I do not know what a typical case would be, or even
that there is such a thing… The ultimate source of these experiences remains a mystery
[emphases added]” (p. 389).
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Act II, Scene II: Scientists and skeptics have their say
In constructing abduction experience and “experiencers” as subjects worthy of
psychiatric, scientific study, Mack validated the idea that people could repress and
recover memories of abduction experience, and he employed hypnosis to help clients
recall these traumas. The fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) did not recognize or otherwise validate repressed and recovered
memory or the abduction phenomenon as legitimate mental disorders. Mack did not refer
to abduction experiences as a psychiatric syndrome or mental disorder; he labeled them a
“phenomenon.” He also claimed that determining whether memories of abduction were
real or not was not his goal: if such memories, true or false, were causing pain then his
aim was to alleviate that pain. With this attempt to maintain his credibility as a clinician,
he thus circumvented the traditional system of classifying mental disorders.
In the Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association6, Cambridge psychiatrist
Sanford Gifford (1994) reviewed Abduction for Mack’s peers. The book “calls for a
response from his fellow analysts, who see him as a friend and respected colleague,
admired for his clinical work, his scholarly biography of T.E. Lawrence, and his activities
for peace and…conflict resolution” (p. 1291), Gifford began. But “in his new self-chosen
role as a Prince of Our Unreason,” he said, Mack has produced a book “that is easy to
dismiss as a wide-ranging attack on Western European traditions of rationality and
experimental science” (p. 1291). Gifford deemed Abduction “a subversive assault on
psychoanalysis as a science” (p. 1291). Mack’s “co-creative method…leaves him open
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to…mutual suggestibility [emphasis in original],” and his “abduction scenarios prove to
be banal and highly monotonous”; it is likely that “their similarities reflect the
universality of the human unconscious” (p. 1293), Gifford observed. “Just as Freud
tenaciously defended his adherence to Lamarckian theories…against Ernest Jones’s
scientific reasoning,” otherwise “highly intelligent, even skeptical minds can become
converts to irrational beliefs” (p. 1296), he concluded. Mack would be compelled to
respond to Gifford’s critique in the paperback edition of Abduction (see below).
In his 1995 best-selling book The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the
Dark, astronomer and science popularizer Carl Sagan — a friend of Mack — wrote about
abduction in general and Mack’s abduction research in particular (along with topics such
as “the face on Mars” (p. 41), “antiscience” (p. 245), “”significance junkies” (p. 367), and
“science and witchcraft” (p. 401).) In a chapter entitled “Hallucinations” (p. 97), Sagan
took on the debunking of alien abduction accounts, offering more mundane explanations
for them, and he cited Mack’s (1970) own book on nightmares (on p. 107) as an
authoritative source of information about how easily the boundaries between waking and
dreaming life can be blurred in the human mind. In a chapter entitled “Therapy” (p. 153),
Sagan tackled Mack’s claims about abduction, focusing on the idea that traumatic
memories can be repressed and recovered. Sagan wrote that in Abduction (Mack, 1994a):
Mack explicitly proposes the very dangerous doctrine that ‘the power or intensity
with which something is felt’ is a guide to whether it’s true…. Doesn’t Mack,
himself the author of a book on nightmares, know about the emotional power of
hallucinations?” (p. 153).
Again assuming the debunking stance, Sagan concluded:
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Why should we imagine we recollect…any better than we know when we’re on
firm ground? Why should we suppose that, of the vast treasure of memories
stored in our heads, none of it could have been implanted after the event…? (p.
168).
“That remorseless taskmaster called the scientific method,” Sagan wrote in a chapter
entitled “Aliens,” dictates that “everything hinges on the matter of evidence” (p. 61).
With regard to claims that alien spacecraft have visited Earth, he argued, “on so
important a question, the evidence must be airtight. The more we want it to be true, the
more careful we have to be. No witness’s say-so is good enough” (p. 69). He debunked
reports of UFO sightings, dismissing “essentially all the UFO cases” he knew of as “
anecdotes, something asserted” (p. 69). “Most people honestly reported what they saw,”
Sagan claimed, “but what they saw were natural, if unfamiliar, phenomena” (p. 70), and
“many UFO photos turned out to be fakes” (p. 71).
Chapter 1 explained how the publication of Abduction (Mack, 1994a), and all the
attention it stirred up, took place amid a vigorous public debate spanning the 1990s
(though originating decades earlier with Freud’s original idea) over the validity of the
concept of repressed and recovered memory. As psychiatrist Walter Reich (1994)
claimed in no less an authoritative source than The New York Times Book Review, the so-
called memory wars appeared to be struggles over authority, if nothing else. The memory
wars provided a backdrop for expert and other responses to Mack’s abduction claims.
Commenting in the ‘90s, Geertz (1997) characterized the ongoing tug-of-war for
authority over mind and memory as a conflict between the constructivist worldview of
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what he called cultural psychology and the reductionist worldview of scientific
psychology. While scientific psychology assumes that human behavior, cognition, and
affect are products of neurobiological processes, according to Geertz, cultural psychology
assumes, alternatively, that people actively participate in constructing their selves —“out
of materials lying about in…society” — their methods of understanding others, the
meanings they impart to things, and the stories by which they make sense of the world.
While criticisms of Mack acknowledged both of these worldviews, the most strident
critiques reflected the reductionist/scientific perspective (see Chapter 5).
Act II, Scene III: The year after, and aftermath
The year 1995 encompassed the completion of Harvard Medical School’s investigation of
Mack’s research methods and the paperback reissue of Abduction. In the Harvard
Crimson, Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz (1995) criticized the medical school for
investigating Mack’s work, claiming it was Mack’s ideas, not his methods, that were
being questioned. “No great university should be in the business of investigating the ideas
of its faculty” (p. 2), Dershowitz wrote, continuing:
If Dr. Mack had taught at the Divinity School, it is unlikely that any investigation
would be tolerated, since divinity schools are not governed by the laws of science.
Indeed, it is at least as likely that space aliens exist as it is that God exists. The
former is, however, a scientifically testable hypothesis (at least in theory);
whereas the latter—for at least most theologians—is not. It is a matter of ‘faith,’
not proof, and faith is not subject to the scientific method. But the paradigm of the
scientific method—propositions subjected to double-blind and replicable
experimentation—is not the only criteria [sic] for evaluating academic
undertakings. This is certainly true in the formative, exploratory phases in the
development of an idea (p. 2).
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Harvard Medical School concluded its investigation without censuring Mack. “Dean
Tosteson...has urged Dr. Mack that, in his enthusiasm to care for and study this group...he
should be careful not, in any way, to violate the high standards for the conduct of clinical
practice and clinical investigation that have been the hallmark of this Faculty,” the
Medical School said in a statement. “ He also reaffirmed Dr. Mack’s academic freedom
to study what he wishes and to state his opinions without impediment.  Dr. Mack remains
a member in good standing of the Harvard Faculty of Medicine” (Emery, 1995c).7
The paperback edition of Abduction (Mack, 1995) featured a new introduction in which
Mack explicitly stated that he was responding to criticisms from fellow psychoanalyst
Gifford (1994) and, more surprisingly, journalists James Gleick (1994) and Milo Miles
(1994), who had reviewed Abduction (1994a) for The New Republic and the Boston
Globe. Though he alluded in the paperback to “critics, especially…colleagues in science
and medicine, and even…those in the UFO field itself” (p. 424), Mack named no other
critics (and among all the texts about Mack’s abduction research examined for this
analysis, only Gifford’s, Gleick’s, and Miles’s texts were included in Mack’s references
for the paperback Abduction (Mack 1995, see pp. 449-455).
Mack deleted a number of contentious claims he had made in the hardcover Abduction
from the paperback edition of the book, including the following:
The experience of working with abductees has affected me profoundly…. We
participate in a universe or universes that are filled with intelligences from which
we have cut ourselves off…. Our restricted worldview...lies behind most of the
major destructive patterns that threaten the human future (1994a, p. 3).
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Mack reprocessed some of his rhetoric from the hardcover to the paperback (1995)
edition, to the apparent end of making his claims more rather than less ambiguous. In the
hardcover, he had claimed “experience, the reporting of that experience, and the
receiving of that experience through the psyche of the investigator” were “the only ways
that we can know about abductions...in the absence of physical verification or ‘proof’
(always quite subtle in the abduction phenomenon...)” (1994a, p. 25). In the paperback,
he wrote instead that experience and the reporting and receiving of it were “ in the
absence of physical verification sufficiently robust to satisfy scientific requirements of
proof (there is physical evidence but not proof), the only ways that we can know about
abductions” (1995, p. 11). “I ask [abductees] if they can find any explanation for feelings
that intense,” he wrote in the hardcover (1994a, p. 26). He revised this statement in the
paperback to report that he asked abductees to “explore other possible explanations for
feelings that intense” (1995, p. 12). What he called “conscious recall or recall with the
help of hypnosis” in the hardcover (1994a, p. 2) he relabeled “conscious reports or
reports with the help of hypnosis” in the paperback (1995, p. 2).
Mack also added two new appendices to the paperback Abduction: “a brief review of
issues relating to the reality of the abduction phenomenon” (Mack, 1995, p. 423) and “a
historical and cross-cultural perspective on reported encounters”  (p. 437, coauthored
with Dominique Callimanopulos). In his “brief review” he addressed questions critics had
raised about:
The nature of the physical evidence which accompanies abduction reports; the
clients’ expectations and possible investigator influence; the reliability of memory
in relation to the experiences; the degree to which hypnosis influences the
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accuracy of memory; and alternatives to the hypothesis that what the experiencers
describe is…what occurred  (p. 423).
About his use of hypnosis, Mack wrote in the hardcover Abduction:
The inducement of a nonordinary state, a modified form of hypnosis...seems to be highly
effective.... Abductees seem to move readily into trance.... Sometimes the simplest...of
relaxation techniques is all that is needed to bring back many memories. It is as if
hypnosis undoes...the forces of repression (Mack, 1994a, p. 21).
In the paperback, he removed the words “hypnosis” and  “trance” from this passage and made
some other changes as well:
The inducement of a nonordinary state, using even the simplest of relaxation
techniques, seems to be highly effective.... Most of the abductees I have worked with
seem to move readily into a non-ordinary state of consciousness.... It is as if the
changed state...undoes the forces of repression (Mack, 1995, p. 9).
In the hardcover, he wrote:
The type of hypnosis or nonordinary state I employ has been modified by my
training and experience in the holotropic breath work method [which] utilizes deep,
rapid breathing, evocative music, a form of bodywork, and mandala drawing, for the
investigation of the unconscious and for therapeutic growth (Mack, 1994a, p. 22).
He deleted this passage from the paperback. In the hardcover Mack wrote of retrieving
memories; in the paperback he wrote, instead, of exploring the abduction experience. What he
called “hypnotically recovered memories” in the hardcover (Mack, 1994a, p. 24) became
“hypnotically recovered material” in the paperback (Mack, 1995, p. 11). In the hardcover, Mack
said he found no reasons to think that abduction stories were the products of dreams, delusions,
or fantasies. In the paperback, he said he found no reasons to think these stories were not real.
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The overall effect of Mack’s revisions was one of distancing or detachment from some of the
more controversial statements he had made in the hardcover Abduction (for example, about
hypnosis, repressed and recovered memory, holotropic breathwork) and at the same time
reinforcement of his overall assessment of the abduction phenomenon. But while he tempered
the language of some of his claims, he did not abandon any of them, and in one of his new
appendices, “A brief review of issues relating to the reality of the abduction phenomenon”
(Mack, 1995, p. 423), he defended and bolstered them. Over the next few years, Mack would
stick to his claims; his narrative of the abduction phenomenon and his examination of it would
remain consistent, with only minor adjustments made, apparently to meet the needs of different
audiences. For example, in an essay published by his Program for Extraordinary Experience
Research (PEER) on the "science of not knowing," Mack (1996a) framed abduction as a subject
of scientific study. Public discourse about abduction, he wrote:
Remains focused largely on the question of whether or not it is real in the strictly physical
sense…. Some skeptics even claim…that, insofar as the physical evidence for the reality
of the phenomenon does not meet standards of scientific proof, we can presume…that it
does not exist…. But what if the phenomenon were subtle in the sense that it may
manifest in the physical world, but derive from a source which by its very nature could
not provide the kind of hard evidence that would satisfy skeptics for whom reality is
limited to the material? (p. 5).
The abduction phenomenon may be “intrinsically mysterious and, ultimately, beyond our present
framework of knowledge” (p. 5), he suggested. “An attitude of humility…an open attitude…[an]
opening of consciousness,” he concluded, “could result in greater knowledge not only about the
physical aspects of the phenomenon, but about numinous dimensions as well” (p. 5).
Following the publication of Abduction (Mack, 1994a), critics had homed in on Mack’s
failure to publish his research results in peer-reviewed journals and his decision to
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publicize his findings in mass media (a popular book, TV talk shows, and so on; see
Chapter 5). In the wake of the “firestorm” of publicity for the book and the Medical
School investigation, Mack chose to decline most journalists’ requests for interviews8,
subsequently showing a preference for audiences sympathetic to his views. For example,
Mack spoke to the 27th annual MUFON symposium (July 1996), a “star wisdom
conference” on “exploring contact with the cosmos” (May 1998, cohosted by PEER and
the Interface Foundation), the “7th World Symposium on Unidentified Flying Objects and
Related Phenomena” (May 1999) sponsored by an Italian UFOlogy group, and a
conference on “the UFO abduction phenomenon” sponsored by Budd Hopkins’ Intruders
Foundation (May 2000).9
Peer-reviewed publication
The longer the social construction of facts takes, the more texts come into play in the
construction process, and “the scientific article,” as Latour (1987) pointed out, is “the
most important and the least studied of all rhetorical vehicles” for the social construction
of scientific authority (p. 31). In 1996, Mack published his first peer-reviewed paper
about abduction, coauthored with two colleagues from PEER (McLeod, Corbisier, &
Mack, 1996). Certainly the most “scientific” of the array of articles he wrote, the paper
appeared in Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal of Peer Commentary and
Review, which dedicated an issue to the subject of the abduction phenomenon.
This abduction issue included a “target” article by psychology professors Leonard S.
Newman of the University of Chicago and Roy F. Baumeister of Case Western Reserve
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University (1996b) offering alternative explanations for the abduction phenomenon,
along with a number of commentaries providing a wide range of judgments on the
Newman-Baumeister target article and the McLeod, Corbisier, and Mack paper. The
authors of all of these papers addressed their subject dispassionately, clinically,
scientifically — in a way that was rhetorically appropriate for the venue. At the same
time some of the authors also reflected their own particular interests in their texts.
In their target article Newman and Baumeister (1996b) proposed that abduction stories
were the products of hypnotic elaboration, spurious memories, fantasies of extraterrestrial
sadomasochism, and a desire to escape the self. “UFO abduction accounts express the
goal of escaping from awareness of the self’s most burdensome aspects, such as its needs
for esteem and control” (p. 100), they claimed. References for this article included
several papers and books authored or co-authored by Baumeister on “the struggle for
self,” “escaping the self,” “how the self became a problem,” “masochistic scripts,” and
“masochism and the self.”
In a commentary, “Fantastic accounts can take many forms: false memory construction?
Yes. Escape from self? We don’t think so,” University of Arizona psychology professors
Jamie Arndt and Jeff Greenberg (1996) faulted Newman and Baumeister for “continually
rely[ing] on questionable sources of data without sufficient acknowledgement or
consideration of their unreliable and biased nature [emphases added]” (p. 127) — that is,
for not being scientific enough. Arndt and Greenberg called for “systematic collection of
new data, along with more systematic, less biased, and more comprehensive analysis of
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existing archives [emphases added]” (p. 131). Yale University psychology professors
Mahzarin R. Banaji and John F. Kihlstrom (1996) claimed in another commentary, on
“The ordinary nature of alien abduction memories,” that such memories were delusions,
“false, but highly valued, beliefs about oneself” (p. 133). Claims of abduction memories
“should not merely be dismissed as evidence of…credulity or lunacy, or mass hysteria,
or…preoccupation with the supernatural and paranormal,” Banaji and Kihlstrom wrote;
“explaining them in naturalistic terms and demystifying them ought to be
[psychologists’] business” (p. 135). References for this article included a paper
coauthored by Kihlstrom on hypnosis and the psychology of delusions.
University of Waterloo psychology professors Kenneth S. Bowers and John D. Eastwood
(1996), in a commentary entitled “On the edge of science: coping with UFOlogy
scientifically,” began, “One of the interesting issues raised by Newman and
Baumeister’s…article is the boundary that separates scientific from nonscientific claims”
(p. 136). While they found Newman and Baumeister’s explanation for abduction
memories “more plausible than the literalist view they reject” (p. 136), Bowers and
Eastwood asked, “is their theory empirically tenable, or is its claim to being scientific due
primarily to the fact that it replaces an extremely implausible, literal account of such
abductions” (p. 137)? They ultimately rejected Newman and Baumeister’s explanation,
concluding that such a “motivational account of UFO memories” would suffer the typical
fate of “psychoanalytic hypotheses regarding the human condition, which have never had
much appeal to the mainstream scientific establishment and…are now being seriously
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challenged because of social problems that adherence to some of them has wreaked” (p.
139).
In a commentary on “the construction of space alien abduction memories,” psychology
professors Steven E. Clark of the University of California-Riverside and Elizabeth F.
Loftus of the University of Washington (1996) claimed people can invent false memories
“with some help” (p. 140) — that is, suggestion, or what they called “the misinformation
effect” (p. 141). Clark and Loftus invoked the authority of “the Council on Scientific
Affairs of the American Medical Association…the International Society of
Hypnosis…and the society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis” as scientific
organizations that “have published strong warnings concerning the use of hypnosis as a
tool in memory retrieval” (p. 142). Loftus had already established herself as an expert on
false memories at the time this article was published (see Loftus, 1993; Loftus &
Ketcham, 1994).
In his commentary, “When scientific explanations fail: science and pseudoscience in
psychology,” Dartmouth College psychology professor Jay G. Hull (1996) claimed
Newman and Baumeister’s explanation for abduction memories was “entertaining” but
flawed “as a reasoned argument” and constituted an effort “to legitimate a
pseudoscientific enterprise that is to the detriment of this field” (p. 149). Hull asserted,
“The arguments constructed by Newman and Baumeister are no less post hoc than the
arguments they attack” (p. 149). Newman and Baumeister had relied on
“nonexperimental research — content analyses of retrospective oral and written
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accounts” (p. 149) — to formulate their explanation, and thus their explanation was not
scientific. Hull declared it “pseudoscience,” and not even “good pseudoscience,” because
it “is not internally coherent, is less parsimonious than existing accounts, and…lacks
plausibility” (p.150).
Robert Wood Johnson Medical School psychiatry professor Donald P. Spence (1996)
examined “abduction tales as metaphors” in his commentary for the Psychological
Inquiry issue, speculating that perhaps abduction stories could “be better understood as
metaphors for an ongoing cultural crisis” (p. 177). Spence agreed “that masochism and
loss of self are two key ingredients in the stereotypical abduction story” but said those
features “might be secondary to…the modern sense of powerlessness, helplessness, and
anomie” (p. 178). “As we move into the 21st century,” Spence concluded, “escape from
freedom has been followed by escape from reason…. Systematic analysis of UFO
abduction stories might be one of the best ways to understand and eventually counteract
this” trend (p. 179).
In their response to these commentaries, Newman and Baumeister (1996a) agreed with
their critics that they had not provided scientific proof of their theory. Their point, they
said, “was to argue that…other phenomena provide a plausible way of understanding
UFO abduction narratives…we remain firm in our belief [emphasis added] that ignoring
the motivational themes of the UFO abduction narrative will only hinder our
understanding of it” (p. 196).
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The commentary by McLeod, Corbisier, and Mack (1996), entitled “A more
parsimonious explanation for UFO abduction,” was rich with the rhetoric Mack had
previously employed to establish his abduction research as legitimate. The rhetoric
employed in this paper was more conventionally scientific than the rhetoric Mack
employed in Abduction and other writings about this research. Such an adjustment was
proper for publication in a scientific journal. However, Mack’s typical abduction story —
his description of the phenomenon and his approach to studying it — remained
essentially intact. The description and justification of the research in this article firmly
located the PEER researchers within the boundaries of the established scientific
community and their abduction research within the boundaries of legitimate science. “As
members of a culture that defines reality in a very structured way,” they wrote:
Scientists are motivated to embrace a simplification of anomalous data like
abduction experiences. This minimizes our own cognitive dissonance and allows
us all to dismiss this phenomenon before we are forced to examine more closely
the data involved. Were it not for clinical contact with individuals who demand of
us compassion and careful evaluation, the authors of this commentary would also
find it expedient to dismiss the phenomenon (p. 156).
Mack and his coauthors described what good science ought to be and placed their
research firmly inside the boundaries they drew: “In the interest of science,” they
asserted, “abduction experiences should be a matter of investigation rather than belief”
(p. 156). “It is the job of scientists to observe and ask questions about…anomalies rather
than to come to conclusions based on inadequate categories of knowledge [emphases
added]” (p. 160). Abduction “challenge[s] very basic tenets on which Western
civilization is based,” they wrote, “tenets that we, as Western scientists, are personally
invested in defending” (p. 156). Scientists and other “Western” thinkers have a “cultural
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bias” against accepting abduction as a subject of scientific study because the idea of
abduction “dethrones us “from our position of mastery and predominance in the
universe,” they asserted, “threaten[s] our personal sense of safety [and]
challenge[s]…dualistic thinking”  (p. 157). Enhancing this bias, “most of the information
about the abduction phenomenon has been disseminated by the popular press, which is
neither educated in psychological complexities nor motivated to present subtleties,” they
wrote. “The press tends to sensationalize and polarize issues,” and thus “few serious
scientists are interested in pursuing it” (p. 157).
More boundary-work was done in this paper with the delineation of a difference between
the clinician’s (e.g. Mack’s) and the research psychologist’s approach to studying
“psychological events,” justifying their own approach to the study of abduction and
explaining away others’ resistance to it. Here Mack and his colleagues described the
research psychologist’s perspective on the abduction phenomenon as “truncated,” thereby
implying that their own perspective was broader:
Research psychologists tend to study and evaluate psychological events separate
from the individual who reports them. Clinicians evaluate psychological events
within the context of the person who is speaking. From the truncated view of the
research psychologist, the abduction experience is hardly worth studying. The
content is ‘crazy’ because it significantly deviates from our understanding of
shared reality -- the common definition for craziness. From the view of the
clinical researcher, the content of the abduction material is interesting because of
its role in a person’s life story (p. 158).
Mack and his colleagues dismissed alternative explanations one by one in this paper,
including Neumann and Baumeister’s theory that abduction experiences are masochistic
fantasies, in the same way that the scientists who had offered those alternative
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explanations had dismissed their claims about abduction. “Newman and Baumeister, like
the majority of the scientific community, have felt obliged to declare their belief in the
nonreality of the phenomenon” without the benefit of  “careful, first-hand study of these
experiences”  (p. 156), they observed.
The authors who evaluated Mack and his colleagues’ claims about abduction for
Psychological Inquiry were properly respectful of their fellow researchers but ultimately
applied their own pet theories – their own (in some cases, their own published) frames of
meaning – to interpreting those claims. They followed a typical pattern of scientific
critique, focusing on what Bowers and Eastwood (1996) called “the boundary that
separates scientific from nonscientific claims” (p. 136), questioning claims of physical
evidence, empirical observations, data collection. The one contributing author identified
as a psychiatrist (Spence, 1996) strayed from this pattern, considering “abduction tales as
metaphors” (p. 177) and addressing how the abduction phenomenon “can be better
understood” rather than picking at specific claims about it. The end result was nothing
more or less than what the journal’s title promised – “peer commentary and review.”
Authors drew the boundaries of science to justify and legitimize their claims, and Mack
once again drew those boundaries to justify and legitimize his abduction research.
Act III, “The expert’s authority at risk”:
Benign neglect — another book, sans firestorm
Following the completion of its investigation of Mack’s abduction research methods,
Harvard Medical School continued to treat Mack as a member of its faculty in good
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standing. The Medical School’s Department of Psychiatry newsletter continued to report
on Mack’s activities and accomplishments.10 In April 1999, responding to a
recommendation of the Medical School’s investigating committee and reinforcing his
own ongoing efforts to legitimize his abduction research, Mack’s research organization
PEER brought together a multidisciplinary group of academics from Harvard and other
institutions for a two-day meeting “to consider how to effectively examine anomalies of
human experience that seem not to reveal their secrets to the familiar approaches of
Western medicine and science” (see Mack, 2000, p. 6).11 Among the group’s findings and
recommendations were that “methods of science must fit the subject being
considered…new ways of knowing need to be explored…careful phenomenological
description and greater precision of language are essential…anomalies are central to the
progress of science” and, of course, further studies were needed. Harvard Medical School
emeritus professor Arnold Relman (see Chapter 7) said in a letter he wrote to Mack as a
contribution to the meeting’s proceedings, “If these stories are believed as literal factual
accounts, they would contradict virtually all of the basic laws of physics, chemistry, and
biology on which modern science depends.”
Another book comes out
Through the late 1990s and into the next decade, Mack kept up his abduction research,
and he continued to speak and write about it (e.g. 1996b), prompting the odd mainstream
news report (e.g. English, 2000; King, 1999). In 2000, Mack published his second book
on abduction, Passport to the Cosmos (Mack, 2000a). Mack was identified on the front
cover of Passport as “Pulitzer Prize-winning author of the best-selling” Abduction
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(Mack, 1994a). The cover blurb continued: “Mack powerfully demonstrates...[writes]
with...authority...breaks provocative ground.... For Mack, questions of science...lead to
questions of religion...Mack further solidifies his reputation as a...pioneer on the forefront
of the science of human experience, an authoritative voice” (Mack, 2000a, back cover).
While Abduction (Mack, 1994a) included no footnotes, no citations, and no index,
Passport… included footnotes, extensive citations, an index, and a more extensive list of
references. Mack took pains in this second book to be more scientific, qualifying claims
and identifying limitations, omissions, biases, and conflicts.
As he had done in Abduction (Mack, 1994a), Mack (2000a) began and concluded
Passport… with ignorance claims: “I wish to stress at the outset that I am not…seeking
to establish the material reality of the abduction phenomenon.” (Mack, 2000a, p. xi); “I
cannot offer proof of the material reality of the abduction phenomenon.” (p. 271). He
continued to traverse the boundaries of science in Passport. He said abduction “seems to
violate what…we have come to think of as real” (p. 19), and he noted that he would
address “the problem of reality”  (p. 19) in this book. He wrote of “uncharted terrains”
remaining to be explored, “anomalies within the anomalous…. The boundaries of
fantasy, metaphor, and actuality seem…to blur” (p. 19). Six years after the publication of
Abduction (Mack, 1994a), he wrote in Passport… (Mack, 2000a): “we are just
beginning...to understand” the abduction phenomenon. And he persisted in suggesting
that the best way to understand this phenomenon may be to adopt “an attitude of not
knowing, a kind of Buddhist-like ‘empty mind’” (p. 10; also see preface, p. xii).
134
Mack stated at the start of Passport… (Mack, 2000a) that he would be focusing more
upon “the informational and transformative elements” (p. 13) of abduction than he did in
Abduction (Mack, 1994a). In Passport… he argued that a “radical split between spirit and
matter…has dominated both Judeo-Christian tradition and Western science” (Mack,
2000a, p. 130), an idea he had explored at the end of Abduction (see above). In Abduction
(Mack, 1994a) Mack had written that, for him, the phenomenon raised “fundamental
questions…which seem to lie outside the ontological framework of modern science and
appear to be unapproachable by its methods” (p. 404). He wrote in Passport… (Mack,
2000a) of  “the epistemological and ontological walls that we have erected between the
unseen realms of the cosmos and ourselves,” claiming “the materialist juggernaut is
loose…and the only thing that can stop it is a radical change in consciousness” (pp. 271,
277).
In Passport… Mack placed abduction in a category of “crossover phenomena” (p. 9)
including, by his description, near-death and out-of-body experiences, cattle mutilations
and crop circles  — phenomena that “violate [the] barrier so sacred to the rationalist,
between the forces of the unseen world and the material realm,” he wrote; “any cosmic
mystery might at least theoretically be thought of as simply a reflection of laws of the
universe or subtler energies that we do not yet comprehend or know how to measure,
rather than as ‘paranormal’ or ‘supernatural’” (p. 9). He persisted in his contentious claim
that these “anomalies...may require a new paradigm of reality” (p. 9), and at the same
time he wrote that Harvard Medical School’s investigation of his abduction research
methods “brought home to me…how deeply held” (p. 5) the conventional scientific
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worldview is held. He ascribed intelligence and agency to the so-called subtle realm and
suggested that, in the material world, this intelligence might be acting like a trickster.
“This crossover seems to be regarded as a regular occurrence in many…indigenous
cultures, but in our Western or scientific/materialist society, the domains of spirit and
matter have been kept separate” (p. 5).
Compared with the so-called firestorm of media coverage generated by Abduction (Mack,
1994a), Passport… (Mack, 2000a) received little mainstream media attention. Mack
appeared on NBC’s “Today” show and was heard on the syndicated “Dreamland” radio
program, specializing in paranormal and pseudoscientific subjects, to talk about the book.
But Passport… was not as widely reviewed in mainstream print mass media and certainly
not in elite print mass media. Reviews did appear in fringe media such as The Golden
Thread (a “new-age” newspaper) and the magazines Fate, Night, and UFO.12 Later that
year Mack published an op-ed in The New York Times on the presidential election results.
Identified as a “professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School,” Mack wrote that the
Gore-Bush presidential 2000 election standoff might be the work of a mythological
Trickster, “sent when a society is in crisis and no longer serving the needs of its people”
(Mack, 2000b, p. A35).
In October 2002 Mack participated in an online “chat” about UFOlogy, sponsored by the
SCI FI Channel. 13 Mack was identified as “a leading authority on the transformative and
spiritual aspects of alien encounters.” Asked “where aliens come from,” Mack responded,
“The first task in addressing that question is moving away from literal thinking” (answer
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1). Asked “how are your relations with the Harvard faculty after your ‘difficulties’
surrounding your first book,” Mack answered, “Pretty good. I’m not retired but I’m past
retirement age. And as I often say, a Harvard prof can only make a fool of himself once.
And I’m past that” (answer 4). On abduction, he said, “We’re never going to pin all this
down in 3-dimensional reality with the usual tools of science…. If we don’t try to reduce
it to our language we might appreciate and understand more than we realize” (answer 6).
Scientific methodology “may be the wrong methodology” (answer 11) for studying
abduction. “That’s why I’ve looked at the profound experience that stands in its own
light…. I tend to downplay the literal experience for the mystical” (answer 11). A month
after this “chat” Mack spoke at a SCI FI-Channel-sponsored symposium in New York
City on the UFO-abduction phenomenon. Also in 2002, Mack wrote an article on
“Looking beyond terrorism: transcending the mind of enmity” for publication in a
scholarly book, The Psychology of Terrorism.14 And the following year Mack published
an article on “shamanic journeys and UFO encounters” in a shamanic studies journal.15
In October 2003, the curtain effectively came down on the drama of Mack’s abduction
research and the media discourse about it when Mack’s Program for Extraordinary
Experience Research (PEER) was officially concluded. Described as a 10-year research
initiative, the PEER project had run its course. The project had been financed by $1.2
million in gifts from philanthropist Laurance Rockefeller, who died in 2000;
contributions from Mack and other members of his PEER board of directors; and
donations from individual contributors.16 Neither Harvard University nor Harvard
Medical School had provided any support. About the ending of the project, PEER simply
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said its time was up. About findings and conclusions, Mack claimed nothing more
definitive than that his work with abductees:
Reveal[ed] an experience that touches people deeply, affecting their outlook on
spiritual, environmental, and social aspects of life.... The nature of aliens (whether
or not they are ‘real’) [was] secondary to PEER's primary interest in how alien
encounters affect people's lives and worldview (n.p.). 17
In an interview I conducted for this analysis (see Appendix B), Mack described his
abduction research, his interest in the subject, and his scientific worldview the same way
he did in his own writings and in interviews with journalists. In this interview, he said of
abduction experience, “it was not dreams, fantasy...all the other things...it behaved
absolutely clinically,” as if it had really happened. With regard to what he meant by
“happened,” he told me, “You can deconstruct words like ‘happened’ if you like...what
do we mean by ‘something happened’?” Of abductees, he said ”they don’t seem to have
psychiatric problems, the stories they tell are consistent…. The problem, then,” he
explained, “was that what they were talking about was impossible from the standpoint of
our worldview.”
The “ideology” of conventional science dictates that phenomena “can’t cross over...the
sharp divide” between physical reality and the non-material world, Mack said in this
interview, but in addition to the physical world of “manifest reality” there appears to be a
“deeper reality.” Mack told me he “had to open up” his thinking about the nature of
reality, and he said he knew that taking this route would “cause a flap…. I was a little
naive in that I didn’t realize how far I had gone in opening to other possibilities.” He told
me that before Abduction (Mack, 1994a) was published:
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I would try to argue more for why I thought [abduction] was true, what was the
clinical basis...I’d present the data and my psychiatric judgment about the data....
And I was a little naive in not appreciating that that was not sufficient. I didn’t
recognize that the data itself would not be enough. [And] data presented in certain
forms is more acceptable.
Narrative, for example, his chosen form of data recording, is not as acceptable as, say,
comparative studies, he told me. “I was mapping new territory,” he continued, “I wasn’t
in a position” to do standard research.  “Now I’ve gotten more able to work with peoples’
resistance in advance of presenting information”; starting off by acknowledging that
abduction seems impossible seems to work better, he said. “You can’t just start by
shooting the messenger,” he told me, claiming that while this approach was the one
journalists typically took with him, “I can’t do [it] to them.” With regard to challenging
or defending the boundaries of conventional science, Mack observed in this interview,
“When you’re defending a worldview, anything goes, you don’t have to know anything,
you can just make pronouncements and they will fall on sympathetic ears because they’re
consistent with what the dominant worldview is.”
There’s credibility, and then there’s credibility…
Mack’s unique credentials — Harvard professor (and graduate), psychiatrist, Pulitzer
prize — appeared to be durable enough to enable him to continue functioning as an
expert and authority, at least to an extent that satisfied him. He could still command a
coveted slot in the op-ed pages of The New York Times (e.g. Mack, 2000b), if not to talk
about abduction then to address another interest. As noted above, he continued speaking,
writing and publishing about abduction as well as other less controversial subjects. It is
worth considering, briefly, how other experts with similar credentials and a similar
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interest in abduction have talked about the subject, and how they have fared in their own
credibility contests (Gieryn, 1999).
David M. Jacobs, Ph.D., an associate professor of history at Temple University
specializing in 20th century American history and culture, has studied UFOs and alien
abductions for decades.18 He wrote his doctoral dissertation in history (University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 1973) on “the controversy over unidentified flying objects in
America.” Jacobs has employed familiar rhetorical strategies to construct his work as
scientific and himself as a credible researcher. On his UFO-abduction Web site he labels
himself, for example, “one of the foremost UFO abduction researchers worldwide” and
developer of “the first scientific typology of the abduction experience” (n.p.). For over 25
years, Jacobs has offered what he calls “the only regular curriculum university course on
UFOs” (n.p.) at Temple. He recently created something called an International Center for
Abduction Research (ICAR), which he heads, to disseminate “trustworthy information
about abductions [and] help cope with the myriad of problems that arise from the use of
hypnosis and other memory collection procedures” (n.p.). (Jacobs has claimed he has
conducted around 900 hypnotic regression sessions with abductees since 1986.) “I have
tried to be as objective and as ‘agenda free’ as possible,” he says on his Web site:
I have no New Age, spiritual, religious…program to promote. I try to stay as
close to the evidence as I can…. The majority of evidence for the alien abduction
phenomenon is from human memory derived from hypnosis administered by
amateurs. It is difficult to imagine a weaker form of evidence. But it is evidence
and we have a great deal of it. Still, readers must be skeptical of what I say and of
what all others say in this tangled arena of alien abductions, hypnosis, popular
culture, and memory (n.p.).
Jacobs has authored Secret Life: Firsthand Accounts of UFO Abductions (1992),
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published two years before Mack’s Abduction (1994a), and The Threat (1998), published
two years after Abduction, a book that, in his words, “presents the first evidence-driven
hypothesis that provides a falsifiable solution to the UFO mystery” (n.p.). (Both books
were issued by Abduction publisher Simon & Schuster.) Mack cited Jacobs and his books
several times in Abduction (Mack, 1994a, pp. 14, 15, 16, 19, 27, 38, 166, 414), at one
point crediting him with “pioneering work” (p. 414). Jacobs has said he “is a strong
advocate of strict scientific and ethical research methodology,” with an interest in
“ascertaining the proper methodological techniques for the hypnosis and therapy of
abductees” (n.p.). In an article entitled, “Thinking clearly about the abduction
phenomenon,” based on a talk given at a 1998 Mutual UFO Network (MUFON)
conference, Jacobs wrote:
All UFO researchers are aware of the muddled and ‘shoot-from-the-hip’ thinking
that non-UFO researchers, skeptics, and, especially, debunkers have employed
over the years [linking] the abduction phenomenon to a myriad of internally
generated phenomena with a wide range of causative factors.
These explanatory systems are based on either a fundamental lack of knowledge
of the abduction phenomenon or on a systematic disregarding of the
disconfirmatory evidence within it…(Part 1, para. 1-2).
As John Mack says, the phenomenon is what it is. All we can do is investigate and
chronicle what is happening…and try to make sense of it…. The evidence clearly
indicates that the aliens know exactly what they are doing (Part 3, para. 6, 8).
Jacobs joined the Temple faculty in 1975 and received tenure in 1981.  He received
Temple’s College of Liberal Arts Distinguished Teaching Award in 1999 and the College
of Liberal Arts Distinguished Advising Award in 2000. Jacobs is known beyond the
Temple campus for his interest in UFOs rather than his expertise in history. He has
succeeded at establishing himself as an expert on UFOs and alien abductions, by
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publishing (popular) books, speaking at conferences, serving as a source for journalists,
and being a “talking head” in what seems to be an endless series of television
documentaries about UFOs and aliens. But his own list of publications does not include
any papers on his UFO research published in mainstream academic journals. And an
associate professorship at Temple is not equal to a full professorship at Harvard,
credibility-wise.
“I am still Associate Professor,” Jacobs notes. “There is a price to pay for academics
when they enter into the field of UFO and abduction research and find positive, rather
than negative, evidence for its existence.”19 Finally, Jacobs has earned nothing like a
Pulitzer prize for his work. He has established his credibility among UFOlogists, and
perhaps to some extent among journalists given his university position and his books. In a
profile of Mack, the Wall Street Journal (Jefferson, 1992) cited Jacobs as an expert
source on abduction, identifying him as the teacher of a course at Temple on UFOs in
American society. The Journal article reported: “‘Temple believes in academic freedom,’
says Dr. Jacobs. ‘Besides, I also have tenure, so there’s not much they can do about it’”
(p. A7).
In all of my searching for texts about Mack and abduction and for information on Jacobs
and other academics and scientists involved in the public discourse on abduction I found
no evidence that either scientists or journalists have publicly taken Jacobs to task, as they
did Mack, for his research interests or even his use of hypnosis (a more questionable
method for a historian than for a psychiatrist, in my own non-expert view). It may be
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rather easy for scientists to ignore him since historians are humanists, not scientists.
David E. Pritchard, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics at MIT, cochaired
the 1992 MIT abduction conference with Mack. He also served as a moderator of
a 1997 workshop on physical evidence related to UFO reports, organized by
Stanford University physics professor Peter Sturrock (see Chapter 7). Pritchard earned
his B.S. from the California Institute of Technology in 1962 and his Ph.D. from Harvard
in 1968.20 He is a principal investigator in the Molecular and Optical Physics Group in
the Research Laboratory of Electronics. In 1999, he was elected to the National Academy
of Sciences — a credential that, at least among scientists, outshines even Mack’s Pulitzer.
Pritchard has been a member of the MIT faculty since 1968. Various UFO web sites that
I reviewed in the course of research for this project refer to  Pritchard as a “UFOlogist” or
“UFO Advocate.” In its profile of Mack, the Wall Street Journal  (Jefferson, 1992)
reported Pritchard’s opinion about an upcoming television miniseries on abduction: “‘I
think it’s a disaster in the making,’ adds David E. Pritchard, an abduction expert and
physics professor at [MIT]” (p. A1). Omni magazine once identified Pritchard as “a
scientist at the Massachusetts Institute Of Technology who believes scientists should
look seriously at the abduction phenomenon” (Huyghe, 1995, n.p.). Omni reported that
Pritchard had analyzed what was alleged to be alien implant removed from the body of an
abductee and “agreed to analyze the ‘implant’ for one simple reason: ‘Proving that life
exists elsewhere in the universe would be the biggest scientific discovery of all time’”
(Huyghe, 1995, n.p.). (Omni also reported that Pritchard found the alleged implant was
made of common terrestrial materials.)
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While Pritchard apparently has not denied having an interest in UFOs and abductions, his
MIT Web page and biography include no reference to his involvement in the 1992 MIT
abduction conference (along with Mack) or the 1997 UFO workshop or any interest in the
subject of UFOs and aliens, although literature searches turn up his name as a coauthor of
the proceedings of the conference, along with Mack. Mack cited Pritchard twice in
Abduction (Mack, 1994a), for his involvement in the MIT conference and for his work on
analyzing alleged alien implants (see pp. 42, 314). Mack’s list of references in Abduction
also include a chapter authored by Pritchard for the book Experienced Anomalous
Trauma: Physical, Psychological, and Cultural Dimension (R. L. Laibow, B. N. Sollad,
& J. P. Wilson, Eds., 1992, New York: Brunner/Mazel – see Mack, 1994a, p. 425).
Pritchard apparently has chosen to maintain his scientific credibility by keeping himself
situated comfortably within the boundaries of conventional science, a decision that
appears particularly practical for a physicist….
The following chapter documents journalists’ performances in the Case of the Deviant
Doctor.
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Notes
1.  Information on Mack’s education, experience and accomplishments was obtained
from his curriculum vitae. Obtained from the Program for Extraordinary
Experience Research, Cambridge, MA, March 1999.
2. In a review of A Prince of Our Disorder, the Saturday Review (Crain, 1976)
judged the book “among the most comprehensive treatments of Lawrence’s life to
date.  Cautious, at times almost to a fault, in the face of the controversies that still
swirl around [Lawrence], Mack yet works adroitly and judiciously with the
sundry conundrums of the Lawrence legend.... Although psychological probings
in the writing of biography can often be outlandish and distorting, they are
notably clarifying in Mack’s hands” (p. 40). This review did not recite Mack’s
credentials or even mention that he was a psychiatrist or Harvard professor.
3. The American Psychiatric Association produces the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), widely held as the official “dictionary” of
mental and behavioral norms and deviance.
4. PEER characterized itself as “a nonprofit...group that contributes to the scientific
and philosophical exploration of experiences that do not fit our usual
understanding of reality.  The program takes on the scientific, yet inescapably
social, challenge surrounding the study of reports of extraordinary experiences.”
(Source:  PEER press kit, undated material, obtained from PEER, Cambridge,
MA, March 1999.)
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5. I obtained a copy of the original Scribner’s press release from the Web site of the
John E. Mack Institute. Retrieved August 9, 2004, from
http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/passport/abduction_pressrelease.html.
6. The American Psychoanalytic Association, founded in 1911 and with a current
(2005) membership of about 3,500, defines psychoanalysis in scientific terms, as
“a general theory of individual human behavior and experience” and “a
developmental theory…. It is, in addition, a method for learning about the mind”
(n.p.). Information obtained from “Facts about ApsaA and Psychoanalysis,’
January 31, 2001, retrieved April 19, 2005, from
http://www.apsa.org/ctf/pubinfo/about/geninfo/facts.htm.
7. Harvard Medical School issued a statement on August 3, 1995, announcing the
results of its review of Mack’s “clinical care and clinical investigation.” The
contents of this statement were quoted in the Skeptical Inquirer (Emery, 1995c).
Harvard Medical School’s “Principles and Procedures for Dealing with
Allegations of Faculty Misconduct” — retrieved February 20, 1998, from
       http://www.hms.harvard.edu/integrity/miscond.html — stress:
      The importance of the Faculty’s maintaining standards consistent with
       the highest traditions of teaching, patient care, and research...the
       responsibility of the Faculty to the public and the scientific
       community...[and] the necessity of the Faculty’s protecting the rights
       and reputations of all individuals, including the person who is alleged
       to have engaged in misconduct (n.p.).
     The policy dictates that the school’s Dean, in consultation with its
     Committee on Faculty Conduct, may, “if there is a dispute over facts or for
     other good cause,” appoint a panel of inquiry “to inquire into the facts.”
           The policy defines “misconduct in science” as “fabrication, falsification,
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            plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly
            accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting or reporting
            research” (n.p.). Misconduct, according to this policy does “not include error or
            honest differences in interpretations or judgments of data” (n.p.).
8. Mack told me about his decision to decline interviews in his 1999 interview with
me (see Appendix B).
9. Unless otherwise cited, I obtained information on Mack’s speaking engagements
with fringe groups from newsletters of Mack’s Program for Extraordinary
Experience Research (PEER Perspectives, Volume 1, No. 1, Summer 1996; No.
2, n.d.; and No. 3, n.d.; hard copies obtained from PEER, Cambridge, MA, March
1999) and from PEER’s Web site (retrieved August 9, 2000; and November 2,
2000; from http://www.peer-mack.org/news.html). I have not included calendar
listings and other briefs from the PEER Perspectives newsletters in my list of
references as these articles were not bylined and they appeared in issues that were
not dated and paginated.
10. Harvard Medical School’s Department of Psychiatry newsletter, issue No. 3,
Volume 3, October 1996, reported that Mack received an award for “contribution
to the Advancement of New Science” from the International Association for New
Science. Issue No. 2, Volume 3, June 1996, reported that Mack had “authored a
best-selling book about anomalous experiences.”  Newsletters obtained from
PEER, Cambridge, MA, March 1999.
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11. Information on the multidisciplinary workshop was obtained from an issue of the
newsletter PEER Perspectives, No. 3, pp. 1, 12-14. Newsletter obtained from
PEER, Cambridge, MA, March 1999.
12. Personal communication, PEER staffer Will Bueche, November 3, 2000. Bueche
told me via email that the publisher of Passport… apparently had not invested
much effort in promoting the book and that Mack had not been too concerned
about publicity for it. Additional information on reviews of Passport… was
obtained from the Web site of the John E. Mack Institute, accessed on the World
Wide Web August 9, 2004, at:
http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/passport/blurbs.html.
13. I retrieved the transcript of the SCI FI Channel chat November 21, 2002, from the
archives link at http://www.scifi.com. (The transcript is now available at:
http://www.scifi.com/transcripts/2002/drjmack1023.html). The transcript was not
paginated, and it was formatted in question-and-answer form; thus in citations to
the transcript I have provided answer numbers rather than paragraph numbers.
14. Stout, C. E. (ed.) (2002). The Psychology of Terrorism: Volume I, A Public
           Understanding. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Citation obtained from
           Mack’s online c.v., retrieved April 13, 2004, from
           http://www.johnemackinstitute.org.
15. Mack, J. E. & & Jamieson, S. (2003). Shamanic journeys and UFO
           encounters: a consideration of two avenues to an expanded reality.
          Shamanism: the Journal of the Foundation for Shamanic Studies, 16(1).
          Citation obtained from Mack’s online c.v., retrieved April 13, 2004, from
148
          http://www.johnemackinstitute.org.
16. Personal communication (email), Will Bueche (former PEER staffer, currently
with the John E. Mack Institute), May 16, 2005.  Specific PEER research projects
also received some grant funding from various foundations and organizations
such as the Fetzer Institute and the National Institute for Discovery Science.
Projects included a study of “Personality Differences Related to Reports of
Anomalous Experiences Commonly Called Alien Abduction" and a “Multiple
Witness Study” (“Comparative Narrative Reports of Multiply Witnessed
Anomalous Experiences Commonly Called Alien Abduction”). Costs for specific
projects and for the PEER project as a whole were not provided.
17.   I retrieved Mack’s statement and other information on the conclusion of his
PEER project from the Web site of the John E. Mack Institute (JEMI),
http://www.jemi.org, on August 30, 2004. (The URL for this Web site is now
http://www.johnemackinstitute.org.) Mack served as chair of JEMI, an outgrowth
of the Center for Psychology and Social Change, which he founded in 1982.  On
its Web site JEMI states that it is dedicated to “exploring consciousness and
transformation” and aims “to apply emerging knowledge to pressing
psychological, spiritual and cultural issues.”
18.  I retrieved information about Jacobs on November 17, 2004, from a Web site
maintained by Jacobs himself, http://www.ufoabduction.com. I have used
information from the pages titled “home,” “biography,” and “articles” (not dated
or paginated). Jacobs provides some details about his interest in and publications
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on UFOs on his official Temple University Web page as well (see
http://www.temple.edu/history/jacobs.html).
19. Personal communication, April 24, 2005 (Jacobs gave me information on his
tenure and awards at Temple by email).
20. I retrieved information about Pritchard on November 17, 2004, from his own
official MIT Web page, http://rleweb.mit.edu/rlestaff/p-prit.htm (not dated or
paginated).
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Chapter 5
The Case of the Deviant Doctor: journalists weigh in…
As explained in Chapter 1, media coverage of Mack’s abduction research unfolded
through the 1990s, a decade of so-called science wars and memory wars and continued
popular interest in UFOs and alien visitations. The range of media texts examined for this
analysis show how journalists rhetorically employed their own professional conventions,
and how they interpreted and deployed what they perceived to be the conventions of
science, to participate in the social process — the symbolic action — of boundary-work.
In “The Case of the Deviant Doctor” Mack appeared on stage as a scientific authority,
and journalists appeared onstage as observers, chroniclers, and commentators, variously
attempting to construct or deconstruct Mack’s credibility and authority. The drama
opened with the 1992 MIT abduction conference co-chaired by Mack, arguably the
highest-profile academic event of its kind. It depicted the publication of Abduction,
reactions to it, and Mack’s reaction to the reactions. And it apparently came to end
without a satisfying conclusion.
My initial close reading of a select group of the media texts I found on Mack’s abduction
research convinced me that the stories were overtly critical and negative.1 But, as
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) reported, “Empirical evidence shows...most news content is
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neutral” (p. 43). And journalistic conventions call for objectivity, balance and fairness in
reporting the news (ibid.; Gans, 1979; Schudson, 1978, 2003; Tuchman, 1978). These
stories thus appeared anomalous to me, and I decided to dig deeper into them. Deeper
examination revealed that these apparently biased stories also appeared to be carefully
structured in accordance with journalistic conventions of objectivity, balance, and
fairness. Indeed, when picked apart sentence by sentence, word by word, many could be
fairly described as consistently neutral in overall content.2 The seeming dissonance
between structure or framing and actual content, especially the possible meanings of
content, signaled to me that whatever was going in this case was worth exploring in
greater depth. Following these preliminary assessments and further searching for more
texts, I sorted all the stories I collected into chronological groups, as described below, in
order to consider how various events in the Mack abduction research story drove media
coverage. The stories sorted out into the following “acts” (see Chapter 4).
Act I, “The doctor is an expert,” covered the period from February 1983 (the approximate
beginning of the Lexis-Nexis database, according to the company) through February
1994 (the month before media coverage of Abduction began). I found 26 stories
published in this period citing Mack as an expert (for example, on nightmares and
trauma), a scientific authority (for instance, founder of the Association for Political
Psychology), and even a peace activist. All of these stories identified Mack as a Harvard
psychiatrist or professor. Though Mack began his abduction research in 1990, I found no
stories in the mainstream media connecting Mack with abduction research published
before May 1992. I found no texts on abduction authored by Mack dated before 1992. In
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June 1992, the MIT conference on abduction research, cochaired by Mack, took place.
Around the time of the conference, the Wall Street Journal (Jefferson, 1992) and the
Boston Globe (Chandler, 1992) ran stories about Mack’s involvement in abduction
research. Later that year the Boston Globe profiled Mack in its Sunday magazine (Tery,
1992), and over the next year Mack and his abduction research were featured in a few
other mainstream media such as Newsday (Falk, 1993), USA Weekend (USA Today)
(Kuznik & Vega, 1993) and Time magazine (McDowell, 1993).
The action in Act II of our drama, “The doctor steps out on a limb,” commenced in
March 1994, when media coverage linked to the April 20, 1994, publication of Abduction
began, and concluded in December 1995. In the spring of 1994 Mack participated in a
publicity campaign for Abduction that generated extensive coverage in mainstream
newspapers and magazines including the Boston Globe (Kahn, 1994) and Boston Herald
(McKenna, 1994), Psychology Today (Neimark, 1994), The New York Times Magazine
(Rae, 1994), People (Rosen, Podolsky, & Brown, 1994), and Time (Willwerth, 1994).
The campaign also landed him on television with Larry King, Charlie Rose, Oprah
Winfrey, and the Cable News Network’s “Crossfire” team, among others, a development
reported in some of these stories. (I reviewed transcripts of these TV appearances, but I
have not used them in this analysis because I have limited this study to print media, as
explained in Chapter 3.)
Act II also encompassed Harvard Medical School’s investigation of Mack’s abduction
research methods (see Emery, 1995a), initiated after the release of Abduction and
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completed in August 1995. A mass-market paperback edition of Abduction came out in
1995, with revisions by Mack responding specifically to media criticisms. In May 1995
Mack broke a self-imposed embargo on media interviews by holding a teleconference
call with reporters, prompting a few stories, including reports by the Washington Post
(Daly, 1995), Reuters (Emery, 1995b), the Boston Globe (Grunwald, 1995) and the
Boston Herald (Weber, 1995). More stories followed when the medical school
announced the results of its investigation, in publications ranging from The New York
Times (Honan, 1995) and the Los Angeles Times (Thompson, 1995) to the Skeptical
Inquirer (Emery, 1995c). Another story in the Boston Globe (Beam, 1995) was prompted
a month later by the alleged leak of a letter from the dean of the medical school to Mack,
reportedly sent in addition to the official report of the investigation and more harshly
worded.
Act III, “The expert’s authority at risk,” covered events from January 1996 through
October 2003.3 Through this period, Mack continued to speak and write about his
abduction research (see Chapter 4), prompting occasional mainstream news reports such
as a story in the San Francisco Chronicle about a talk Mack gave in one of the city’s
suburbs (King, 1999). In 2000, Mack published his second book on abduction, Passport
to the Cosmos (Mack, 2000a). In October 2003, Mack’s Program for Extraordinary
Experience Research (PEER) concluded.4 What follows is a roughly chronological
account of reporting on Mack’s abduction research, capturing journalists’ rhetorical
responses to Mack’s idiosyncratically “scientific” rhetoric. Throughout this account I will
make occasional parenthetical references to the journalistic values, practices, and
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conventions described in Chapter 2 as they are reflected in the texts, toward
characterizing how these stories are constructed, although at any given point in a story
multiple values, practices and conventions may be reflected.
Act I, “The doctor is an expert”: expertise, authority, deviance…
Act I of our drama began with Mack appearing onstage as an expert and authority.
Before 1992, when Mack began to talk about his abduction research, journalists
occasionally turned to him as an expert source or scientific authority, always mentioning
his Harvard affiliation. The New York Times cited Mack in a story on the psychological
effects of nuclear war on children (Bruckner, 1985): “among the best-known studies” of
the psychological effects of fears of nuclear war on children “is that of Dr. John Mack, a
psychiatrist at the Harvard Medical School, and some colleagues” (p. 24). In a similar
story, Science News (Bower, 1985) cited Mack and three other Harvard researchers as
expert sources. Mack himself coauthored an op-ed for The New York Times on
disarmament (Coles & Mack, 1985). The Los Angeles Times reported that “Harvard
psychiatrist” Mack delivered the opening address at a local peace conference (Hendrix,
1986); the paper also reported Mack’s arrest in a nuclear weapons protest at the Nevada
Test Site (Record 149 arrested, 1986). The Chicago Tribune cited Mack as an expert on
nightmares (Hand, 1988): “John Mack, a psychiatrist at the Harvard Medical School, has
written that schizophrenic patients often describe periods of being immersed in a world in
which boundaries between reality, fantasy, illusion and hallucination are lost” (p. C1). In
a story on why people “love to hate,” Newsweek (Gelman, 1989) cited Mack as a Harvard
expert on the subject. In a story about political psychology, The New York Times
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(Goleman, 1991) quoted Mack as an expert on that subject: “’When someone has
immense political power, he transcends any psychiatric label you might give him,’ said
Dr. John Mack, a psychiatrist at Harvard Medical School and a founder of the
International Society of Political Psychology” (p. C1). In a story about California’s
Esalen Institute, the San Francisco Chronicle (Carroll, 1991) identified Esalen as “a
touchy-feely New Age spa and psycho-babble conference center” (p. 83), but it cited
Mack more soberly, as a Harvard psychiatrist and “president of the International Society
of Political Psychology” (elite and official source), who reportedly described Esalen as a
pioneer in U.S.-Soviet relations. None of these texts questioned or criticized Mack’s
views. All of these stories cited Mack’s Harvard affiliation.
Harvard Magazine (Lambert, 1992) was apparently first to report on Mack’s abduction
research, in 19924, pegging its article to an upcoming CBS TV miniseries on abduction
featuring a character modeled on Mack. Dubbing abduction a “strange phenomenon” and
“an authentic mystery,” this story reported “no theory that jibes with our current
understanding of the universe can explain these occurrences” (p. 6) and “nothing in the
experiencers’ lives or mental makeups [can] justify an explanation based on
psychopathology” (p. 7). Stories about Mack’s involvement in abduction research also
began to surface in elite mainstream media. Like Harvard Magazine, the Wall Street
Journal (Jefferson, 1992) made Mack’s abduction research timely news by reporting on it
in conjunction with the airing of the miniseries (timeliness), described by the Journal as a
story “about a psychiatrist…who helps people overcome the trauma of abductions by
extraterrestrials” (p. A1). (The miniseries was broadcast in May 1992, a month before the
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MIT abduction conference.) The Journal article was entitled “A Harvard doctor offers
trauma relief for UFO ‘abductees’: extraterrestrials play rough, so there are many injuries
for John E. Mack to heal.” “More sensational fantasy lifted from supermarket tabloids?”
the story asked about Mack’s claims; “not quite” (p. A1). Mack was quoted on abductees:
“’These are people who have no reason to lie’” (p. A1). This story claimed Mack’s career
had been “peppered with projects that aren’t in the mainstream” (p. A7). Malkah Notman,
then acting head of Harvard’s psychiatry department at Cambridge Hospital (official
source, balance), was quoted about Mack’s research: “’Many great ideas sound offbeat at
the beginning.... There is some concern, but…I think the department feels it’s useful to
encourage creative work, as long as it doesn’t get in anybody’s way or do any harm’”
(pp. A1, A7). (Notman would later pass tougher judgment on Mack’s abduction research
in The New York Times Magazine (Rae, 1994).)
The Journal article displayed what would soon become a familiar structure for stories
about Mack’s abduction research, following standard journalistic conventions: a grabby
headline including “Harvard” (official, elite) and “aliens” (unusual), an engaging lead
describing an abduction experience (human interest, entertainment), a description of the
news — who-what-when-where: a Harvard expert is now studying abductees
(controversy), a reporting of a range of expert opinions on the news (balance, official
sources), the views of the news maker (fairness, official source), and sometimes a
conclusion that hinted at things to come. The Boston Herald ran a news brief on Mack’s
abduction research shortly before the MIT conference (Meyers, 1992), reporting that,
“aside from being a professor at Harvard…[Mack] is a highly regarded writer, having
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won a Pulitzer Prize” (p. 7). The Boston Globe reported on the MIT conference
(Chandler, 1992) as local news (proximity) and science news, citing the involvement of
Mack, a local and a scientist (official source).
A few months after the MIT conference, the Boston Globe profiled Mack in its Sunday
magazine (Tery, 1992). Ambiguously titled “Alien territory,” this story gave Mack plenty
of space to tell his story his way (fairness), from the evolution of his thinking about
abduction from skeptical to “fascinated” to the reinforcement of his authority and
credibility. Mack was quoted: “’I trust myself, clinically...it’s a question of clinical
judgment…I’ve spent most of my professional life...learning to make clinical
psychological discriminations’” (p. 23). Mack was also quoted identifying his interests:
“’this has all kinds of implications for our scientific world view, for our identity as a
species’” (p. 23). The story addressed Mack’s methods in a conventionally balanced way:
hypnosis is “a practice criticized by disbelievers but defended by Mack as an important
tool for uncovering repressed information” (p. 23).
This story also depicted Mack as a stereotypically heroic scientist (human interest), a man
of  “convictions,” working “at the front lines of…research” (pp. 20, 23). The story cited
only one other expert (balance, official source), a self-described “agnostic” Harvard
colleague. The sexual aspects of abduction accounts (unusual, human interest,
entertainment) were addressed in the middle rather than the lead of the story, with the
qualifying statement that “Mack is well aware that the [abduction] stories stretch the
bounds of credibility” (p. 24). The story made a link between Mack’s abduction research
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and the stuff of supermarket-tabloid stories, with their “outrageous headlines” about
“Elvis sightings” and “the Abominable Snowman” (pp. 24, 25) as well as alien
visitations, an association that was not played out further in this story but would reappear
in other texts. The Globe story also informed readers that “Mack tends to turn down
interview requests, because he believes too many reporters trivialize or sensationalize
abductee cases” (p. 23). Mack was quoted making an assertion that he would consistently
repeat in talking about his abduction research: “’If we can be in that place of not
knowing…we’re likely to learn more than if…we close our minds and try to keep this
under control’” (p. 24).
Perhaps most significantly, at least for this analysis, a terminology of spirituality surfaced
in the Globe piece that would resurface often in other stories: “’I have a kind of faith’” (p.
25), Mack was quoted about his abduction research. “Disbelievers” and “doubters” were
mentioned; a colleague of Mack was quoted saying that Mack had led “’a lot of
believers…to think again”; the colleague described himself as “’somewhere between
being a disbeliever and an agnostic’” (p. 27).
A 1993 story in USA Weekend (published by USA Today), “Abducted by aliens?  Carried
away?” (Kuznik & Vega, 1993), cited Mack as a Harvard expert (official source)
sympathetic to alleged abductees (human interest). Time reported in a 1993 story on
abduction, “It came from outer space” (McDowell, 1993), that “Mack...takes the
[abduction] stories seriously” (p. 56). In a 1993 feature entitled, “That alien feeling: why,
ask true believers, would thousands of men, women and children fantasize such strange,
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unpleasant and strikingly similar experiences?”, Newsday (Falk, 1993) reported,
“Once...grist for the supermarket tabloid mill,” abduction accounts “have become so
common...that academics and psychologists are debating their significance” (p. 4)
(controversy). This story opened with an abduction account — “As Joseph came around a
corner of a darkened road…his car was enveloped in a sunburst of blue-white light…” (p.
44) — and then went on to describe Mack’s involvement in abduction research, make the
supermarket-tabloid link, and report the opposing views of “the camp of the True
Believers,” “the legion of skeptics,” and “the camp of the debunkers” (p. 4) (balance,
conflict). In this story Mack was reported to dismiss debunkers (fairness, conflict) as
“unqualified to diagnose his patients at a distance...scientifically insincere”; he was
quoted, “‘These are not scientists.... They are ideologues, defending a fixed notion of
reality’” (p. 4).
Act II, “The doctor steps out on a limb”
Scene I, Lighting and fighting firestorms —
the book and reaction to it
Before the publication of Abduction (Mack, 1994a), as previously noted, Mack had
established a record of willingness to talk about his work with public audiences by way
of the mass media. With the book’s release came plenty of media opportunities, and
plenty of commentary from scientists tapped by journalists as sources. “Disputes among
scientists,” as Dearing (1995) noted, “sometimes encourage journalists to ‘play’ with
stories and write tongue-in-cheek reports” (p. 342), and once Abduction came out,
journalists started to play with Mack’s story. They continued to employ the familiar story
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structure described above, but they began to embellish it, leading with accounts of alien
sex, physical probes, bodily implants, and hybrid babies and emphasizing the sexual
aspects of abduction stories (unusual, entertainment).
Headlines for stories published from spring 1994 through 1995, encompassing the
publication of Abduction in hardcover (Mack, 1994a) and paperback (Mack, 1995),
typically mentioned Harvard, aliens, and sex. In keeping with conventional news values,
stories were timely, pegged to the book’s publication, for example, or Harvard Medical
School’s investigation. Reporters homed in on Mack’s use of hypnosis and its association
with the controversial idea of repressed and recovered memory and began citing more
experts who were skeptical or critical of Mack’s abduction work. And even though
journalists were reporting on Mack’s research because he had published a book about it
— the book was, ostensibly, the news — their stories were critical of Mack for
publishing the book. It appeared that Mack was being penalized for publishing his
research results in a popular medium instead of a peer-reviewed journal, for seeking
publicity, and for collaborating with the mass media. Stories typically concluded with last
words from either Mack or an abductee or both, closing on a somewhat hopeful note and
leaving an opening for a followup.
Dearing (1995) examined how journalists cover maverick scientists and maverick
theories in such a way as to transform them into scientific controversies, in the process
constructing them as credible. Dearing defined his terms thus:
Maverick science is unorthodox scientific theory which is believed as credible by
only one or a few scientists. A maverick is an outspoken proponent of unorthodox
161
scientific theory. Mavericity, the property of making unusual associations in ideas
and of doing the unexpected, is a cherished entrepreneurial trait [emphasis in
original] (pp. 343-344).
Following the journalistic conventions of objectivity, fairness, and balance, Dearing said,
reporters may attempt to cover a range of scientific opinions, but they also may pay
“more attention to criteria that may heighten the newsworthiness of a scientific
controversy” (p. 341). The resulting stories often “resemble ‘David and Goliath’
struggles, with a seemingly bright go-it-alone scientist bucking an intransigent,
conservative scientific establishment, whose representatives subjectively attack the
personal credibility of the maverick” (p. 344). Beneath the journalistic veneer of a “good
science-bad science?” story, coverage of Mack’s abduction research appeared to fit the
pattern Dearing described, though in this case journalists tended to frame Mack as not
just seemingly bright but, as one of them put it, “one of the best and the brightest”
(Neimark, 1994, p. 46).
In his exploratory content analysis Dearing (1995) focused on cases of scientific
controversy involving  public risk and uncertainty. In the Mack case, though some critics
claimed his abduction research posed a public risk, the threat his work presented was to
the conventional scientific worldview. Reacting to Mack’s claims, some members of the
scientific elite, such as Richard Ofshe (see Chapter 1) — and a few members of the
journalistic elite, such as former New York Times science writer James Gleick (1994) and
Boston Globe critic Milo Miles (1994) (see below) took rhetorical steps to defend what
they perceived to be the boundaries of proper science.
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“The Harvard professor and the UFOs; alien abductions”
In its March 1994 issue, preceding the release of Abduction (Mack, 1994a), the magazine
Psychology Today published a 5,000-word feature by this title (Neimark, 1994) about
Mack and his abduction research, emphatically situating them both inside what was then
a rather heated public controversy over repressed and recovered memories. This story
contained more information about Mack’s scientific training, experience, practices, and
worldview than any other text examined for this analysis, suiting it to the magazine
format and this particular magazine’s audience. Psychology Today framed Mack as a
legitimate, authoritative researcher and his abduction research as controversial research.
Spiritual terminology was deployed prominently in the first 100 words of this story,
where Mack was introduced as a man who had “made himself into a high priest” and
become a “paterfamilias and healer” (para. 1). Mack was said to be “seeking God” (para.
1), and abductees were said to be “spiritual seekers” (para. 3) who “flock to him” (para.
2).  The story later described Mack as a “high priest at a most sanctified temple of
science…with a halo of perfection about him” (para. 32). This story described but did not
dwell on the sensational details of abduction stories (unusual): “buried memories” (para.
3), “kidnappings” (para. 5), “intergalactic hybrid-breeding…sperm and egg samples
taken, alien fetuses implanted and removed, and probes inserted” (para. 2). Mack was
quoted: “’Some other intelligence is reaching out to us. It’s the most exciting work I’ve
ever done....  I’m shocked…to hear myself saying such things, But I’ve been as careful as
possible to exhaust conventional explanations’” (para. 4).
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Psychology Today singled out Mack’s use of hypnosis to “recover buried memories”
(para. 2) as a weakness of his research and made it a primary focus of the story
(controversy). This story included blunt criticisms from psychologist Richard Ofshe and
psychiatrist Fred Frankel (official sources, balance) and also a claim Jill Neimark, the
journalist who wrote the story, identified as her own5, that Mack was “stunningly”
biased: “the issue is not whether Mack is right or wrong, but that he has abdicated
scientific objectivity” (para. 49). Neimark further observed that “perhaps the most
interesting aspect of [Mack’s abduction research] is not whether it is valid, but the intense
furor surrounding it” (para. 58) — a point that would be echoed in other stories about
Mack. This story concluded:
The jury on UFOs may forever remain out.... When Mack says this phenomenon
gets at the very core of ‘who we are’ and ‘makes us question all realities,’ he is
right…. Ours is an age of rockets and radio waves, an era mesmerized by the
pleasures of purging and confession, caught by the belief in widespread abuse,
and both troubled and inspired by questions of consciousness itself. If anyone is
an emblem of our age, John Mack is. The real disappointment is that he brings us
no closer to the truth — even though he could (para. 59).
On March 20, 1994, The New York Times Magazine published a 3,300-word feature
about Mack (Rae, 1994) that in its first 200 words established itself as an account of a
scientific authority’s pursuit of boundary-violating work. In contrast to Psychology
Today’s, The New York Times Magazine’s story began with an attention-grabbing, first-
person abduction account, a type of lead that would be replicated in later reports on
Mack: “’I didn’t realize I was having sex with aliens until just a few months ago’” (para.
1), the story began, quoting an alleged abductee (unusual, human interest, entertainment).
This and other abduction experiences were reported to involve “anal probes and forced
sperm-taking…artificial insemination and removal of embryos,” and “nonstop” sex (para.
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3). With the stage set for sensationalism, Mack was then introduced as “a Pulitzer Prize-
winning Harvard psychiatrist” and “Freudian psychoanalyst” (official source,
prominence) whose interest in abduction stories, “and the book he was writing about
them, would not have caused a stir. Except that he believed them” (para. 4-5). While
“there have been a spate of books” about alien abduction,” this story reported, there have
been “none by an author with the credentials of John Mack” (para. 6). Early on, the story
declared it a “given” that Abduction was “likely to obscure all [Mack’s] past
accomplishments” (para. 11).
Like Psychology Today (Neimark, 1994), the Times Magazine presented the idea that
false memories can be implanted during hypnosis, claiming one of Mack’s abductee
clients was “enlightened...by an alien who sounds just like Mack” (para. 25) (skepticism).
But this story did not dwell on the hypnosis/false memory issue, instead focusing on
Mack’s character, and even addressing his sanity:
Colleagues...feared their beloved professor had gone mad…people thought Mack
was crazy…. A straight-ahead guy who passed up the chance to take LSD in the
50’s...Mack had sat out the 60’s drugfest. He made up for that now (paras. 8, 16).
The story reported (without attribution) that “Mack is increasingly being compared with
Timothy Leary, who gave LSD for homework and was dismissed from Harvard in 1963”
(para. 29) (controversy). But it also noted, “Clearly, Mack was anything but nuts” (para.
8). Mack’s interests were further explored:
[He] cut a quixotic figure.... [His] quest led him down what are considered
heretical paths...this prominent member of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and
Institute questioned psychoanalysis.... Mack found est...plunged into Eastern
philosophy and shamanism...read Huxley’s ‘Doors of Perception’ and
Castaneda’s ‘Teachings of Don Juan’ [and] emerged from these explorations
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possessed of the notion that humanity’s present predicament was rooted
in…Western dualism...and...materialism....  So Mack was predisposed to seeing
entities (paras. 12, 13, 15-18).
The story cited other experts on Mack’s research:
‘Nobody believes it,’ snaps Dr. Malkah Notman…Mack’s boss. ‘I wish he were
doing something else. This is so off-base’.... Notman gives the clear impression
she would rather be swallowing glass. ‘I think it’s part of an ongoing search that
he’s had for issues he defines as spiritual,’ she ventures sympathetically (para. 28)
(official sources, balance).
UFO debunker Philip Klass (see Chapter 7) was quoted on Mack’s persuasiveness: “‘I
would almost buy the Brooklyn Bridge from him’” (para. 32). An anonymous “friend” of
Mack was quoted: “’We’re terribly concerned that he is hurting himself, his patients and
psychiatry’” with his “’obsession’” (para. 31). The story reported that this friend raised
“the specter of Wilhelm Reich, the psychiatrist whose notions about orgone energy
destroyed his career” (para. 31). Astronomer Carl Sagan, described as “an old friend”
(para. 33) of Mack, was quoted: “’I tried to argue that...extraordinary claims demand
extraordinary evidence.... And John would have none of that’” (para. 34). Another
anonymous source was quoted about Mack: “‘He really is...a do-gooder’” (para. 11); the
story added that Mack had “always [been] a seeker” (para. 11) as well (fairness, balance).
Approaching a conclusion, the story reported, “His friend was kind. Others will be less
so. But Mack is almost mystically detached and certain that he is right” (para. 37).
In an interview with Publishers Weekly (Daniel, 1994), Mack was reported to have
“defend[ed]...himself against those who have said that [he]...has succumbed to the lure of
sensationalism and big money with Abduction” (para. 1). This article, tailored to the
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audience of the magazine, reported on Mack’s efforts to get the book published and on
the content of the book itself — characterized as featuring “an astonishing amount of sex
with aliens” (para. 2). Mack was quoted, “’This book touches some kind of
nerve…publishers realize that a Harvard professor is going out on a limb...putting my
credentials on the line, and that’s saleable’” (para. 8). Mack was further quoted doing
some boundary-work in this story, declaring his work legitimate science:
‘We are on the edge of some kind of real advance in science, in knowledge of
ourselves and the universe, and the culture senses this.... There is even a sense in
some of the scientific community that we may be on the edge of a shift in world
view that is open to a larger reality’ (para. 10).
About his critics, Mack was quoted in Publishers Weekly: “’We don’t kill people
anymore for unpleasant messages. We try to attack their reputations’” (para. 11). And he
was quoted on the politics of science: “’A kind of political restriction has been imposed
on our ontology by whoever decides what’s real in a culture — a mix of scientific,
political, religious and media elite’” (para. 9).
Abduction (Mack, 1994a) was reviewed in major magazines and newspapers. The Boston
Herald (Dykes, 1994), Los Angeles Times (Dewan, 1994), and San Francisco Chronicle
(Berry, 1994) took the book seriously. The New York Times Book Review (Gordon, 1994)
critiqued but did not dismiss the book or the abduction phenomenon, and its reviewer
credited Mack with performing “a valuable and brave service” by writing Abduction.
Newsweek (Plagens & Bryant, 1994), the Washington Post (Rucker, 1994). and the
Boston Globe (Miles, 1994) published negative reviews. The New Republic (Gleick,
1994) ran a feature-length screed in the form of a review of Abduction, excoriating Mack
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for flouting the conventions of science and for sloppy writing and thinking as well. Other
newspapers and magazines pegged news reports on Mack and his abduction research to
the publication of the book.
“Aliens attempt to save Earth!”
Under this headline freelance writer Susan Dewan (1994) wrote in her review for the Los
Angeles Times that Abduction was “not fiction” and “not quite fact” but rather “about the
unknown or the unknowable…a challenge to any reader” (p. BR13). “This provocative
work,” providing “thoughtful documentation” of abduction cases, “should not be judged
in a debate over whether UFOs and their alien crews are ‘real’,” Dewan wrote (p. BR13).
The book “raises questions about how we live on this planet” and “opens the door to a
very serious redefinition of life as we know it” (p. BR13). The Boston Herald
characterized Abduction as a book about “close encounters of the spiritual kind” (Dykes,
1994, p. 46) in the headline for its review. Herald reviewer Steve Dykes (1994) wrote
that the book was “extraordinarily rich and strange…disturbing...threatening [and] mind-
expanding,” and he deemed it “the book of the season...a transcendent, landmark work”
(p. 46).
On the West Coast, the San Francisco Chronicle headlined its review of Abduction “A
disturbing look at ‘alien abductions’”  (Berry, 1994). The review was written by Michael
Berry (1994), a reviewer of science fiction and fantasy books for the paper.  Berry
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opened his review by observing, “The idea of alien abductions runs so counter to the
beliefs of most people that the very mention of the subject often produces eye-rolling
jokes about the fate of Elvis Presley” (p. E5). But he did not dismiss Mack’s book.
Echoing Dykes, Berry called Abduction “strange and disturbing” (p. E5), and he wrote
that what distinguished Abduction “from the aliens-among-us nonfiction pack [was] the
lack of sensationalism in Mack’s presentation” (p. E5). Berry wrote that Mack’s
discussion of “the metaphysical aspects of abduction” made the book worth reading.
“Something — even if only a form of mass hysteria — is powering this rash of abduction
claims,” Berry concluded, “making it worth...serious investigation” (p. E5).
“Irresponsible, dangerous claptrap…”
Back on the East Coast, science fiction author Rudy Rucker (1994) reviewed Abduction
for the Washington Post’s “Book World.” Like Berry (1994) and Dykes (1994), Rucker
called Abduction “disturbing.” But Rucker gave the word a different meaning in this
review, as he went on to explain that he was disturbed to find that the book was
“irresponsible, dangerous claptrap” (p. X2). Rucker began his review, “As a science
fiction writer, I am predisposed to enjoy such things as psychotronic space-invader films,
crazed saucer cults and the modern pop myth of UFOs. But with...Abduction, ufology has
reached a vile new low” (p. X2). Rucker claimed Mack “brings a hard-eyed huckster’s
zeal to his trade” (p. X2). He said “the emphasis on sex” in Abduction was “icky and
pervasive” (p. X2). Abduction should be funny, he wrote, but instead it was “written with
the complete lack of humor characteristic of the true believer. And what makes the book
very actively unfunny is the feeling that Mack’s procedures may be really
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damaging...subjects” (p. X2), Rucker asserted, referring to Mack’s attempts to help
clients recover repressed memories. “I love the idea of UFOs, and Abduction drags this
idea into the mud,” Rucker concluded; “UFOs should be a witty and inspiring notion, but
in [Mack’s] hands, UFOs become boring and above all humorless” (p. X2). Newsweek’s
review (Plagens & Bryant, 1994) was shorter but not much kinder. Headlined “Invasion
of the body snatchers,” Newsweek’s take on the book began with the claim, “Scientists
are hard-line skeptics. Only after failing to debunk...do they accept the evidence. But in
Abduction...Mack makes only a cursory pass at disbelief before buying the idea” (p. 79).
Newsweek concluded its critique, “If we ever do accept the existence of alien body
snatchers, it will be in spite of Mack’s book, not because of it” (p. 79).
“Are you reading this, aliens?”
Under this headline, physics professor and science writer Chet Raymo (1994) wrote
about Mack and his book in his April 11 “Science Musings” column for the Boston
Globe. Raymo reported that he had linked stories of alien abductions with “the witchcraft
hysteria of the late-Middle Ages” in a previous column, speculating that “the cause of the
abduction reports may lie…in the mysterious complexities of the human psyche” (p. 28).
He said “John Mack called me up [about it] and we had a chat. He is thoughtful and
sincere, and I liked him immediately. Of course, neither of us convinced the other of the
correctness of our views” (p. 28). Mack rejected “psychological explanations” for
abduction, Raymo wrote, and claimed “the reason many scientists...are unsympathetic to
his evidence is that we [scientists] are not open to explanations that run counter to
conventional wisdom” (p. 28). Raymo concluded:
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He’s right. We should ‘run counter’ only when we need to; that’s the essence of
science. Mack, of course, thinks the time is now. However, I insist on more
convincing evidence…. I doubt if anyone will show up to spirit me away — but
I’m prepared to be astonished (p. 28).
“The man from outer space:
Harvard psychiatrist John Mack claims that tales of UFO abductions are real.
But experts and former patients say his research is shoddy”
Under this headline, Time magazine published a story about Mack (Willwerth, 1994) in
its April 25 issue. Billed as the product of investigative reporting, the story — which
would be cited in a number of subsequent texts about Mack and Abduction — opened
with a quote from an alleged abductee with “troubling memories and wondering where to
go for help”: the man was quoted, “‘I saw this article in the newspaper about Dr. Mack.
And I thought if you can’t trust a Harvard professor, who can you trust?’” (para. 1). The
story thus established Mack as an expert and authority — that is, someone to be trusted
— and then it went on to question whether Mack deserved that trust. In this story Mack
was depicted as both an insider (Harvard psychiatrist) and an outsider (“from outer
space”) and also “more than a Harvard professor,” a Pulitzer Prize winner and “noted
scientific advocate of environmental and antiwar causes” (para. 2). Like The New York
Times Magazine (Rae, 1994), Time reported “Mack believed every word” (para. 2) of
abductees’ stories. Time reported that “UFO believers” deemed Abduction “the most
important step yet in scientifically validating” (para. 3) the phenomenon and that
“psychologists and ethicists” were questioning not Mack’s sanity but “his motives and
methodology” (para. 4).
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At the center of Time’s story, and apparently a reason why some other reporters cited it in
their stories, was an account of a so-called “undercover debunker” (para. 5) named
Donna Bassett, who told Time about “her life in the UFO cult” (para. 10) posing as an
abductee, joining Mack’s research project, and fooling him, she claimed, with made-up
abduction stories. Time reported Bassett’s claims that “Mack’s work was riddled with
scientific irregularities...[and] lacked a formal research protocol as well as legally
required consent forms that advise potential research subjects about potential risks” (para.
5). The story claimed “Bassett’s account is supported by others who had close encounters
with Mack” (para. 11), and it identified one “other” by name. Like Psychology Today
(Neimark, 1994), Time cited psychologist and repressed-memory debunker Richard
Ofshe and Harvard psychiatrist Fred Frankel as experts on hypnosis and reported their
criticisms of Mack’s use of the technique and of the idea of repressed and recovered
memory. Time reported that Mack “declined to discuss [Bassett’s] case” and quoted
Mack saying “’the attacks on hypnosis didn’t begin until it began to reveal information
that the culture didn’t want to hear’” (para. 15).
But in the end, even this critical story closed on a hopeful note (balance, fairness).
“Mack’s view of the UFO phenomenon reflects a larger philosophical stance,” Time
observed, concluding with a quote from Mack to explain that stance: “‘The world no
longer has spirit, has soul, is sacred.  We’ve lost all that ability to know a world beyond
the physical...I am a bridge between those two worlds’” (para. 16). Among journalists
who would cite this Time story to bolster their own (counter)claims about Mack and his
abduction research were Milo Miles (1994) and James Gleick (1994), authors of two of
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the most critical reviews of Abduction (see below).  The Boston Herald (McKenna, 1994)
and the Boston Globe (Kahn, 1994) would cite Time’s story in news reports on Mack as
well.
“Author says case studies show alien contact is no hoax”
In a feature about him and his abduction research, published April 19 under this headline
(which, notably, did not mention “Harvard” or “sex”), Mack was taken relatively
seriously by Boston’s blue-collar newspaper, the Boston Herald (McKenna, 1994). This
story led with accounts from three of Mack’s abductee-clients and introduced Mack as a
“Harvard psychiatrist and Pulitzer Prize-winning biographer [who] thinks” — not
believes —  “they are telling the truth” (p. 41). While citing abductees’ “memories of
being artificially inseminated” and their feelings of “deep personal violation” (p. 41), this
story did not spotlight the prurient aspects of abduction stories as so many others did.
Mack was clearly identified as the news in this story, a “linking presence...a well-
respected clinician, administrator and advocate for environmental causes [whose]
imprimatur on these formerly derided tales has ignited huge controversy” (p. 41). The
Herald reported “academic reaction has veered from dismay at [Mack’s] forthrightness
and relief that he [has] tenure” (p. 41). This story referred to “pointed stories in
‘Psychology Today’ [sic] [Neimark, 1994] and the New York Times [Rae, 1994] [which]
have suggested that Mack is at best credulous and at worst deluded” and mentioned that
Time’s story (Willwerth, 1994) provided an “account of a supposed ‘debunker,’ who
claims to have faked her abduction accounts and accuses Mack of misusing hypnosis” (p.
41). The Herald’s story closed with a quote from Abduction (fairness, balance): “’The
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abduction phenomenon…is about what is yet to come. It presents…visions of alternative
futures, but it leaves the choice to us’” (p. 41).
“E.T. phone Harvard;
Dr. John Mack could use the help as critics rip his research”
In a feature published April 21 under this headline, the Boston Globe (Kahn, 1994) made
its story about the publication of Abduction timely with citations to Time’s just-out story
about Mack (Wllwerth, 1994). Noting that Time’s story was written by a “veteran
investigative reporter...a specialist in health-research abuse,” the Globe relayed Donna
Bassett’s claim to Time that “Mack’s work is riddled with scientific improprieties” (p.
61). Linking criticism of Mack’s research with publicity for his book, the Globe
observed, “these attacks on [Mack’s] credibility have hit a raw nerve. Mack is in the
launch phase of an all-out publicity blitzkrieg” (p. 61). The story noted, as others did (e.g.
Bernays, 1994, in The Nation; Rae, 1994, in The New York Times Magazine; Van Matre,
1994, in the Chicago Tribune, 1994), that Mack’s “credentials far outweigh those of any
previous investigator publicly aligned with the abduction recovery movement.” The
Globe reported that Time’s story “hits below the professional belt, [Mack] contends” (p.
61). The rest of the story related Mack’s response to Time’s allegations; comments from
the reporter who wrote the Time story, James Willwerth, who, the Globe reported, said
“Time’s lawyers thoroughly vetted his piece” (p. 61); and remarks from Donna Bassett.
Like previous stories about Mack (Neimark, 1994; Rae, 1994; Willwerth, 1994),
however, this story, too, closed on an upbeat note, with a quote from Mack (fairness): “’I
have this innocent confidence that if you do your work in a comprehensive and objective
174
way...it stands on its own.  I’m not worried the attacks will silence me.  What I worry
about is giving [abductees] support…. I don’t want to disappoint them’” (p. 61).
“Aliens land at Harvard!
John Mack lends his reputation to a dubious starship enterprise:
the study of UFO abductions”
This is how Harvard’s hometown newspaper, the Boston Globe, headlined its April 24
book review of Abduction (Miles, 1994). Written by Globe music critic Milo Miles, this
review introduced author Mack as a scientific authority whose “studies of nightmares are
revered among professionals” (p. B15). Mack’s book, Miles declared, followed “the
standard arrangement of sober research” but relied “on no more valid evidence than a
supermarket tabloid” (p. B15). Mack “tosses logic and science overboard…[and] fails to
perform even the simplest control experiments” (p. B15) in conducting his research,
Miles claimed. Following the lead set by at least one other journalist (e.g. Neimark,
1994), Miles reported “Mack’s method of recovering memory through hypnosis is a
flashpoint of furious controversy” (p. B15). Legal challenges to claims of recovered
memories “have exploded into headlines,” Miles claimed, but “Mack breezes past the
issue” (p. B15) by arguing that the validity of recovered memories has not been
disproved. “Consensus reality is going to be overturned with this thin reed? Many earthly
explanations are out there, but Mack brushes them aside” (pp. B15, B17), he asked in his
review. Reaffirming Mack’s authority, however, Miles said “perhaps Mack’s eminence
will force more measured study until a consistent, useful psychological paradigm of
meetings with aliens emerges” (p. B17). Miles deemed Mack “eager...to believe” and
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assert that “uncorroborated anecdotes...are simply insufficient” (p. B17) to support
Mack’s claims. “Anecdotes might be enough to further a particular agenda of mystical
ethics, however” (p. B17).
With this assertion Miles got to his apparent point, that Mack’s research threatened the
hard boundary between science and religion. Speculating that Mack’s abduction research
might be “more a task for a guru than a psychiatrist” and claiming “Mack makes little
distinction between these roles” (p. B17), Miles declared Mack’s claim “that the West is
hampered by too much dualistic logic and science…a perilous delusion” (p. B17):
The secular world and the spirit world must be kept as separate as church and
state in a free society.... Lucid reasoning is endangered nowadays...the post-
scientific subjectivity [Mack] advocates is so slippery it could just as easily
become a tool of fear and violence as of spiritual unity.... Mack should beware
that if rationality and objective truth are thrown out the door, no one can predict
what will rush in (p. B17).
“Harvard psychiatrist John Mack has never had sex with a space alien,
 nor does he care to…”
An Associated Press story about Mack and his book (Thompson, 1994) was printed in a
number of daily newspapers over the last two weeks of April under a variety of headlines,
highlighting the Harvard professor, aliens, sex, and belief.  AP’s story began: “Harvard
psychiatrist John Mack has never had sex with a space alien, nor does he care to. It could
compromise his objectivity. Mack, a Pulitzer Prize winner and Harvard faculty member,
firmly believes those people who claim to have had extremely close encounters with
beings from other worlds” (p. 4A). Though a typically terse AP report, this story was
nonetheless representative of stories about Mack’s abduction research, with its catchy
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lead mentioning Harvard, aliens and sex; account of abduction experience; description of
Mack’s research; commentary from Mack; and comments from critics. “As ‘Abduction’
hits bookstores this week, Mack hits daytime television. His fellow academics have been
less welcoming than talk show hosts” (p. 4A), the story reported. This story appeared in
papers from Biddeford, Maine, to Bellingham, Washington6, sporting headlines such as:
“Pulitzer winner believes in close encounters”
“Research on human-alien sex stirs ripples in academe”
“Aliens mate with humans! Harvard professor believes it!”
“Professor says tales of alien abduction true”
 “Harvard doctor gives close encounter claims credibility”
 “Ivy-covered weird?”
“Sex with aliens? Doctor believes it”
 “Sex with an alien? Could be…”
 “Aliens mate with humans! Harvard professor believes it!”
 “Doctor a believer”
“Sex with aliens? Believe it”
 “Those sexy space folks are real, prof says”
“Someone to watch over us”
Under this odd headline The New York Times Book Review devoted two pages to
Abduction in its May 1 issue. This review was authored by psychiatrist James Gordon,
who had previously written about abduction in the Atlantic Monthly (Gordon, 1991).7
Gordon opened his book review with the observation that Mack — whom he identified as
a “noted psychiatrist,” Harvard professor, and “Pulitzer Prize-winning author” —  “is
respectfully trying to describe and explain a wildly sensational and much derided
experience” (p. 13). Gordon deemed Mack’s book “fascinating, suggestive, and even
inspiring” and indicated that in his own exploration of abduction (for the Atlantic) he
himself had been, like fellow expert Mack, impressed “by the absence of gross
psychopathology in people who believed they were abducted and by the elusive nature
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and transformative character of the abduction experience” (p. 14). Nonetheless Gordon
cataloged Abduction’s shortcomings. Abductees’ accounts as reported by Mack,
according to Gordon:
Lack the weight of authority that Dr. Mack and a sympathetic reader would like to
give it. It is not so much that Dr. Mack doesn’t prove his case as that he doesn’t
offer some of the crucial data he might have collected, or present the critical and
self-critical analysis that such provocative material demands (p. 13).
Abduction is “most vulnerable to criticism,” Gordon wrote, “precisely on the clinical and
scientific ground to which Dr. Mack has the strongest claim,” given that the book “gains
its authority from the author’s psychiatric experience and scholarship” (p. 14). Mack
should have supplied “data from psychological testing…equally disturbing is the dearth
of material about Dr. Mack’s methodology,” and Mack’s “discussion of his own biases is
sketchy” (p. 14). Gordon concluded, however, that Mack had “performed a valuable and
brave service” in writing Abduction, “enlarging the domain and generosity of the
psychiatric enterprise” (p. 14).
The New York Times Book Review subsequently published letters to the editor about
Gordon’s review. In one a reader asked, “Do you think your readers are a bunch of
morons?” (Ligon, 1994, Sec. 7, p. 23). The reader deemed Mack part of “a small but
influential group in the psychiatric profession who have thrust the recovered-memory
theory upon [us] with disastrous results” and deemed Gordon “one of these unbelievably
misguided psychiatrists” (Sec. 7, p. 23). In the other letter, a self-described “student of
U.F.O.’s” (Anderson, 1994) blamed Gordon for “missing the mark as to methodological
and analytical standards…in the very act of criticizing” (Sec. 7, p. 23) Mack for missing
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that same mark. In addition to these critical readers, at least one other reviewer (Gleick,
1994; see below) would take Gordon’s review as unwarranted praise and fault its author,
as a credentialed M.D., for not trashing Abduction.
 “The doctor’s plot”
For the May 30 issue of The New Republic, best-selling author8 and former New York
Times science writer James Gleick (1994) wrote a lengthy review of Abduction,
published under this headline. In his review Gleick attempted to depict Mack as a
disreputable researcher and a traitor to science. In his lead Gleick declared Mack a
believer rather than a knower, “a Mark” — a gullible dupe — “masquerading as a Smart”
(para. 2) — a discriminating observer. “What really makes Mack different from the
standard flying-saucer nut,” Gleick wrote, “is that he’s got authority” (para. 20). Gleick
declared abduction “mythology,” equating it with “anti-science cults” (para. 5). He
associated Mack with “ufo-obsessed therapists” (para. 25) and charged this lot with
attempting “to persuade [psychologists and psychiatrists] there is something clinically
respectable about looking for ufos” (para. 44) as they explore patients’ histories. He
declared Mack’s research “grossly lacking in respectable methodology” (para. 29).
Gleick claimed Mack’s abduction research was part of “a dangerous trend” toward “the
“blurring of distinctions between real knowledge and phony knowledge” (para. 5), and he
claimed a possible cause of the problem was that, “outside of hard science, too many
academics have fallen into the literary conceit that anyone’s version of reality is as valid
as anyone else’s” (para. 48). As to Mack himself, Gleick observed, “no amount of
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rational discourse can change the mind of a believer” (para. 48).  (See Chapter 6 for
further analysis of Gleick’s review.)
“Spaced out — and other delusions:
gullible travelers, claims of space ships and alien abductions”
Taking a critical but short-of-polemic approach to the Mack abduction story, under this
headline The Nation ran an opinion piece on the subject (Bernays, 1994). “At the height
of the nuclear movement,” the piece began, “John Mack, a psychiatrist and professor at
Harvard…chained himself to a fence” at the Nevada Test Site, a “gesture…altogether in
character” (p. 904), thus establishing Mack as a suitable subject for a progressive political
magazine. This piece, by Anne Bernays, described Mack as “far more convinced…than
he is skeptical” (p. 904) of abduction stories and criticized him for his uncritical stance.
“If John Mack were the local chiropractor…few would pay much attention to him…. But
this man is a Harvard professor,” Bernays wrote. “I see nothing to distinguish alien
abduction…from such other foolishness as astrology…pyramid power” and other “wacko
responses to the normal anxieties of everyday life,” she declared. Echoing Gleick (1994),
Bernays compared belief in abduction to “the conviction that the Holocaust never
happened, claiming such beliefs defied “reason, common sense and logic.”
Characterizing Mack as “a man of undeniable talent,” Bernays concluded her story, “I’m
baffled by his eagerness to…breed gullibility” (p. 904).
“Out of this world”
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Meanwhile, under this headline People magazine ran a feature on Mack and his book
(Rosen, Podolsky & Brown, 1994). People’s story opened with the assertion that
abduction stories have been tabloid news but have “never attracted serious interest from
scientists. That may change with the publication of Abduction” (p. 38). People structured
the story to fit its particular format, focusing on people and reporting abductees’ stories
rather than scientists’ criticisms. This story profiled Mack as “a believer in close
encounters of the most lurid kind,” “obsessed,” “too deeply committed to abandoning his
studies now” (p. 38), ultimately achieving the effect of framing him as a stereotypically
heroic explorer-scientist.
The Chicago Tribune (Van Matre, 1994) described Mack as an expert with “impeccable
credentials” who was comfortable exploring “fringe fields…an alternative
approach…issues outside the mainstream” (p. 1). This story followed a now-typical
outline, providing details of abduction accounts, Mack’s views and criticisms, presenting
Mack as a heroic figure standing up to his opponents in the name of greater
understanding. Two Harvard psychiatry professors were asked about Mack: “’he’s never
been afraid to take a stand or follow his intuition…. His whole career has been about
blazing trails’,” David Jacobs was quoted; “’people who are idealistic take risks’” (p. 1),
George Valliant was quoted.
“True believer takes on UFO skeptics”
In June 1994 the Seattle Times reported on Mack’s appearance at a local conference
sponsored by Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal
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(CSICOP), an organization of self-described skeptics dedicated to defending the
boundaries of positivistic science (see Chapter 7), on the topic of  “the psychology of
belief” (Dietrich, 1994, p. B1). Headlined “True believer takes on UFO skeptics,” this
story9, published in a Friday edition of the paper, framed Mack’s local appearance as
news (proximity, official source, unusual, controversy, entertainment). “John Mack is a
Harvard psychiatrist…and a Pulitzer Prize-winning biographer “who also believes about
90 of his patients have been abducted and molested by space aliens” (p. B1), according to
the story’s lead. Mack’s claims about abduction were reported in this story, along with
counterclaims from University of Kentucky psychologist and abduction debunker Robert
Baker and California psychiatrist William Cone, who was identified as someone who had
treated people who claimed they had been abducted. (A shortened version of this story
was reprinted in the Seattle Times the following day, in the paper’s Saturday edition, with
this same lead but under the new title “You can fool some of the people….”) In
accordance with the conventions of balance and fairness, this story did not overtly favor
any particular claims over others, but by labeling Mack a believer it tipped the balance
against him in this debate.
CSICOP’s Skeptical Inquirer magazine reported (Genoni, 1995a) that the Seattle
conference was intended “to explore the various ways in which our minds operate, how
our views are formed, and how our memories can be influenced, altered, and even
manufactured” (para. 1). The conference “featured sessions on UFOs and alien
abductions [and] the highly controversial recovered-memory debate,” Skeptical Inquirer
reported, and “the first session, with...Mack discussing alien abductions...created the most
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controversy” (para. 1). Tagged “the most visible spokesman for the abduction
phenomenon,” Mack was quoted telling the conference, “’There is a world of other
dimensions, of other realities that can cross over into our own world’,” and he called
abduction stories "authentic mysteries” (para. 4).10
Act II, Scene II: Scientists and skeptics have their say
Following the journalistic convention of dependence on expert and official sources,
reporters consulted other scientists about Mack and Abduction, as noted above.
Psychology Today (Neimark, 1994) quoted Boston psychiatrist Fred Frankel: “’Mack’s
use of hypnosis runs counter to all we know about it’” (para. 45). People magazine
(Rosen, Podolsky, & Brown, 1994) quoted Johns Hopkins University psychiatrist Paul
McHugh: “’I worry about John. He’s a brilliant man who is easily persuaded of things,
and this time he has lost it’” (p. 38). Harvard Medical School psychiatrist Malkah
Notman was quoted in The New York Times Magazine (Rae, 1994, see above). Notman
was also quoted by AP (Thompson, 1994): “’There’s a split between how people regard
[Mack] as someone with past accomplishments and skills and how they regard this
project…. People are skeptical because it just seems quite remote and unsupported’” (p.
4A). Psychologist Richard Ofshe — like Mack, a Pulitzer Prize winner, expert, and elite
scientist (see Chapter 1) — was quoted in Psychology Today (Neimark, 1994) claiming:
’[Mack] made a stellar, absolutely impressive, world-class series of mistakes.
First, he was in bed with Sigmund Freud, and we are already beginning to see the
obituary of Freud. Then he was in bed with Werner Erhard, another big-time
loser. Now he’s in bed with E.T.’s evil brother’ (para. 43).
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Psychology Today identified Ofshe as “a crusader against what he calls extreme forms of
influence,” including “therapist-induced false memories retrieved in trance” (para. 42).
Ofshe was quoted in Time (Willwerth, 1994) claiming Mack’s techniques were
“’substantially harming lots of people’” (para. 3). Time also quoted Ofshe saying Mack’s
abduction work showed “’how foolish psychology and psychiatry can be in the wrong
hands’” (para. 3). Ofshe addressed the CSICOP conference in Seattle where Mack also
appeared (Dietrich, 1994, see above). According to the Skeptical Inquirer (Genoni,
1995b) Ofshe told the CSICOP audience that using hypnosis to recover repressed
memories was “subjecting people to the closest thing to the experience of rape and
brutalization that can ever be done without actually touching them” (para. 18). He
reportedly “compared the proliferation of recovered-memory therapists to the grim
lobotomy operations [of] the thirties, forties, and fifties” and declared that while “there is
no evidence for the existence of recovered memories, there is data establishing the
dangers of hypnotherapy” (para. 18).
CSICOP fellow and Mack friend Carl Sagan was quoted in The New York Times
Magazine saying that he had told Mack “’that on issues of this importance, extraordinary
claims demand extraordinary evidence’” (Rae, 1994, para. 34). CSICOP fellow,
aerospace journalist and UFO debunker Philip Klass (1994a). in his “Skeptics UFO
Newsletter” (published by CSICOP) quoted Mack telling a “sympathetic” audience at a
UFO conference, “’I don’t know where to draw the line’” — presumably between what’s
real and what’s not in abduction accounts — “’so I tend to document the whole thing
[and]…I antagonize the UFO community which is crazy to receive objective scientific
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legitimization’” (para. 2). Under the headline “Mack‘s Harvard tenure reportedly
threatened by faculty investigation,” Klass (1995) later reported in his newsletter that
Mack, “a leading guru in the UFO-abduction movement...is under fire from his
colleagues” (para. 1). In this story Klass quoted from a letter from Mack’s attorney
claiming that a draft report of the school’s investigation panel had stated:
‘It is professionally irresponsible for any academic, scholar or practicing
psychiatrist to give any credence whatsoever to any personal report of a direct
personal contact between a human being and an Extraterrestrial Being until after
the person...has been subjected to every possible available battery of standard
psychological tests which might conceivably explain the report as the product of
some known form of clinical psychosis.... To communicate, in any way
whatsoever, to a person who has reported a `close encounter' with an
Extraterrestrial life form that this experience might well have been real...is
professionally irresponsible’ (Klass, 1995, para. 3).
Act II, Scene III: Meanwhile, on the fringes…
While intellectual elites shape public opinion about science, “different versions of and
various challenges to...elite languages [appear] in popular and alternative cultures,” as
Ross (1991) observed, “apprentices, amateurs, semi-legitimates, and outlaws” (p. 10)
who challenge the dominant scientific paradigm and at the same time respect and emulate
it. For comparison with stories that appeared in elite media, texts on Mack’s abduction
research appearing in popular and what I will call here “fringe” media dedicated to
coverage of unidentified flying objects and other so-called paranormal phenomena were
examined.
“Mack’s Harvard credentials, plus the fact that he won a Pulitzer Prize…have helped
make him the leading light in the UFO field,” according to the Skeptical Inquirer (Emery,
1995a, para. 2). In a “UFO update” with a headline claiming Mack “says alien
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encounters, while traumatic, may be our gateway to God” (Baskin, 1994), the borderline
science-science fiction magazine Omni called Mack “the first world-class scientist to
jump on the abduction bandwagon” (p. 77). While “most of Mack’s fellow [abduction]
investigators put little stock in his ideas,” according to Omni, and “many abductees also
vehemently disagree with Mack’s findings” (p. 77), psychiatrist John O’Brien, chief
executive officer of Cambridge Hospital, was reported to have “only praise” for Mack,
and an American Psychiatric Association representative was reported to have commented
on Mack’s research that the APA supports “any responsible scientific research into
human behavior” (p. 77).
In a review of Abduction for UFO Magazine, reviewer Michael Miley (1994), identified
as the editor of Propaganda Review, posed the question: “How do you scientifically
frame the exploration of a disturbing phenomenon...? Skeptics might argue that even
accepting such a characterization is in itself an abandonment of the scientific standpoint”
(Miley, 1994, p. 36). Miley structured his review in a conventional fair-and-balanced
way, though he proceeded from the assumption that UFOlogy is a legitimate scientific
endeavor. And while he approached Mack’s book as a scientific study he himself
redefined “scientific” — specifically, what constitutes a qualified scientific researcher —
to fit with Mack’s approach. He thus ended up praising Mack for his study of abduction,
labeling him courageous (perhaps even heroic) for it. Like mainstream-media journalists
(e.g. Kahn, 1994; McKenna, 1994; Miles, 1994), Miley cited other reporters’ claims
about Mack, noting “mainstream magazines like Time and Newsweek...have fallen all
over themselves to debunk Mack’s work” (p. 36). Sticking to the standard UFOlogist’s
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argument that real science can solve the UFO-abduction mystery, Miley wrote that one
“cannot understand Mack’s book, UFOs, or the abduction phenomenon itself without a
broad range of credentials” (p. 37). People unfamiliar with altered states of consciousness
and alternate dimensions, “something that’s true for many ufologists and abduction
researchers,” Miley wrote, “really have no credentials for comprehending them” (p. 37).
To attempt to understand the UFO-abduction phenomenon, Miley asserted, one “should
be aware of the latest developments in theoretical physics.... The world that emerges in
these theoretical models is non-material, multi-dimensional and largely invisible” (p. 37).
One should also have “some understanding of the findings of transpersonal psychology,
near-death research, and the study of world shamanism.... Furthermore, the evidence
shows that the world as we know it is partially a construct of human consensus...there is
finally no purely ‘objective’ truth...but only an ‘intersubjective’ truth.... Finally, [one]
should have some sense of the global ecological crisis engineered by international
capitalism” (pp. 37-38). Mack “meets all of these criteria,” Miley asserted, “and for his
troubles, he’s getting lambasted everywhere in the press (and even in a MUFON review)
for his methods [and] findings” (p. 38). Critics’ “slanted and malicious reading” of
Abduction is “propaganda [emphasis in original],” Miley claimed, “used to enforce a
worldview and to support a status quo” (p. 38), Miley claimed. “That said,” he continued,
Abduction “is not without flaws,” Miley wrote, but he concluded by praising Mack for
“the open-minded courage [he] has shown in publishing Abduction” (p. 38).
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The MUFON UFO Journal review of Abduction that Miley (1994) referred to in his
review was written by Timothy Heaton (1994), an associate professor of earth sciences at
the University of South Dakota. (MUFON is the Mutual UFO Network.) Heaton, like
Miley, proceeded with his review from the assumption that UFOlogy is a legitimate
scientific endeavor, approached Mack’s book as a scientific study and redefined
“scientific” — though in a different way, by identifying the UFO-abduction phenomenon
as an important scientific mystery and Mack’s unconventional approach the way to solve
it — to enable himself to pass positive judgment on Abduction and also depict Mack as
courageous, even heroic, a “genius” (p. 14). Heaton (1994) opened his review by
explaining that MUFON originally “was organized to win UFOs back from the
‘contactees’ and the tabloids and to promote scientific investigation of a phenomenon that
the scholars had rejected” (p. 13). He said MUFON had “a chip on its shoulder” about the
scientific legitimacy of UFOlogy, manifested in an “emotional emphasis on scientific
reporting...prestigious titles offered to scientists willing to join the cause” (p. 13) and the
“dogma” of UFO conspiracy theories, a dogma that “has been moderately successful in
gaining scientific respectability…and avoiding any overlap with the lunatic New Age
fringe” (p. 14).
Nonetheless, Heaton wrote, “the more we learn, the more enigmatic the UFO
phenomenon becomes,” and “the UFO has now become synonymous with the so-called
‘abduction phenomenon’” (p. 13). “Ufology has long been plagued by a reliance on
amateur investigators,” Heaton commented, and thus UFOlogists had “great
expectations” when they learned that Mack, a professional researcher, “distinguished
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Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, espoused the cause” (p. 13). But
Abduction “aroused nothing but controversy in both the UFO and psychiatric
communities” because Mack “linked UFO encounters with all the shady New Age
phenomena that the skeptics had always lumped it with...little critical analysis or
justification”  (p. 13). Heaton claimed, nonetheless, that Abduction was “a landmark
contribution” (p. 13) to UFOlogy.
The book’s “strongest theme,” Heaton asserted, “is human spiritual evolution, a topic that
falls on thin soil in both the psychiatric and UFO communities” (p. 13). In considering
why Mack chose to pursue this theme, Heaton said it was important to consider “the
transformation in [Mack’s] thinking that took place during…his abduction study” (p. 14).
“Science, as we know it today, is the study of the physical world,” Heaton wrote; “it
attempts to explain all phenomena on a physical basis, even psychological issues such as
religious faith and visions” (p. 13). Heaton noted in his review that Mack had reported in
Abduction about Kuhn’s advice to “circumvent Western dichotomies” (p. 14) in his study
of abduction. “Kuhn has shown that scientific objectivity is largely a myth and that our
cultural biases shape our perception of reality” (p. 14), Heaton wrote, observing that
Mack had apparently heeded Kuhn to the benefit of his study of abduction. Heaton
concluded:
It took someone with Mack’s genius to realize that the abduction phenomenon is
bound to change our whole epistemology as well as our world view, and therefore
a ‘scientific’ study did not seem appropriate...he is trying to break new ground by
not playing by the rules.... Mack’s book is enormously thought provoking and
deserves a more careful look…. It is not the last word on anything, but it is a
beginning (pp. 14-15).
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Mack also drew the attention of Saucer Smear, the self-described “Official Publication of
the Saucer and Unexplained Celestial Events Research Society.” Saucer Smear, which
bills itself as “dedicated to the highest principles of UFOlogical journalism” and
“shockingly close to the truth” (Moseley, 1995a), takes an interesting approach to
UFOlogy, simultaneously serious, skeptical, and debunking. (Saucer Smear editor James
W. Moseley is described in the publication as both a serious and semi-serious UFOlogist
and a UFO “hoaxer” as well.) Saucer Smear reported on Harvard’s investigation of
Mack’s abduction research as follows:
It looks like...Mack has beaten the rap, regarding the effort to censure (and
censor) his UFO work...the details are clouded in academic top-secret security,
but the announcement has been made that Mack will not be censured, though he
was issued ‘an unusual public warning from the Dean not to let his enthusiasm for
UFO research steer him from the path of professionalism.’ Smear believes that
Mack is gullible and also very subjective in his tentative conclusions about
abductions, but we are extremists when it comes to Freedom of Speech.
Therefore we are delighted that Mack will presumably be free to rave on
(Moseley, 1995a, n.p.; see also Moseley, 1995b).
Act II, Scene III: The year after, and aftermath
In 1995 Abduction was reissued in paperback, with a new introduction and two new
appendices explicitly responding to criticisms leveled in two key book reviews (Gleick,
1994; Miles, 1994); and Harvard Medical School completed its investigation of Mack’s
research methods. In his introduction to the paperback edition, Mack said he had added,
deleted, and altered text in revising the hardcover Abduction for paperback publication
specifically in response to criticisms levied by journalists: James Gleick, in his review of
Abduction for The New Republic, and Milo Miles, in his review of the book for the
Boston Globe. Mack deleted a number of claims made in the hardcover Abduction from
the paperback edition of the book, including the following:
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The experience of working with abductees has affected me profoundly…. We
participate in a universe or universes that are filled with intelligences from which
we have cut ourselves off…. Our restricted worldview...lies behind most of the
major destructive patterns that threaten the human future (Mack, 1994a, p. 3).
Due largely if not solely to Mack’s self-imposed embargo on media interviews with
journalists, media coverage of Mack’s abduction research was sparse throughout that
year. The Washington Post mentioned Mack’s research in a story about UFOs (Vick,
1995), asserting that Abduction “set the high-water mark in the [UFO] subculture’s
mainstreaming” and at the same time embarrassed “the nuts-and-bolts crowd” in that
subculture by posing the possibility of  “another consciousness” (para. 11). In May, as
Reuters reported (Emery, 1995b), Mack broke a self-imposed media embargo on
interviews with journalists to hold a teleconference with interested reporters about the
Medical School’s investigation. The Reuters story claimed Mack “seemed to be a man
wrestling with two parallel universes” (Emery, 1995b, para. 3). Reuters noted that
Abduction had “put [Mack] on virtually ever major U.S. talk show. And he is the man of
the moment among UFO enthusiasts because his Pulitzer Prize and Harvard credentials
have lent an air of credibility to beliefs and theories long shunned by…the serious
scientific community” (para. 7). The Reuters story mentioned the Boston Globe’s “E.T.
phone Harvard” headline of the previous year (Kahn, 1994) as well as Time magazine’s
piece on Mack featuring Donna Bassett’s debunking claims (Willwerth, 1994). About his
work, Mack was quoted saying that, “’from the point of helping the people, I think it’s
been worthwhile’” (para. 19).
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A New York Times news roundup, under the headline “Fair Harvard, please meet
Geraldo” (Bloom, 1995), lumped the Mack investigation together with other current
Harvard “scandals.” This story claimed “the nation smirked” over the Medical School’s
“scathing criticism” (para. 3) of Mack and noted, “At least part of the fascination is in
watching the mighty fall…the public is interested in seeing the school heaped with
indignity” (para. 8). In another New York Times news roundup (Honan, 1995), Harvard
University provost Albert Carnesale was quoted on the Mack investigation, “’Not one
person has raised that with me as having anything to do with Harvard’” (para. 14). In a
metro section Harvard news roundup, under the headline “At Harvard, a higher than ever
profile,” the Boston Globe made passing mention of the medical school’s investigation of
Mack (Grunwald, 1995). According to the Boston Herald, the medical school’s report on
its investigation of Mack was expected to be harsh (Weber, 1995).
The Washington Post reported on Mack’s troubles as well (Daly, 1995). This story stated
in its lead that when Abduction was published in 1994, “reaction was strong and swift”
(1995, para. 1); that is, the book became a bestseller, and Harvard Medical School
initiated an investigation of Mack’s work. Mack, “an eminent senior psychiatrist” (para.
3), became “the country’s most credible spokesman,” the Post reported, “for the view
that” people who believe they have been abducted “are not deranged” (para. 3). In
academia, however, “Mack was considered over the top,” according to the Post,
“methodologically suspect and perhaps a bit unhinged” (para. 5). “What makes Mack’s
case so troubling, according to his supporters, is that [he] is not suspected of any bad acts
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— only of bad ideas” (para. 19), the story asserted. According to the lead of an
Associated Press (AP) story on the investigation (Thompson, 1995):
A year ago, Harvard psychiatrist John Mack cruised the talk-show circuit
promoting his best-selling book about people who say they had sex with aliens.
Now, a committee of colleagues is investigating. Before he started talking about
space aliens, Mack was a well respected professor at Harvard Medical School” (p.
A13).11
“The review began after Dr. Mack, [a] professor who studies UFOs,” AP said in this
story, “appeared on ‘Unsolved Mysteries’ and other television programs to promote” (p.
A13) Abduction. When the medical school announced its findings on Mack (it issued a
public statement but withheld the final report on the investigation), the Skeptical Inquirer
reported Mack was “off the hook, but with something akin to a warning” (Emery, 1995c,
p. 4). Tagging Mack “possibly the country’s best-known and best-credentialed proponent
of the idea that people who think they have been kidnapped by space aliens actually may
have been” (p. 4), the Skeptical Inquirer reported that the medical school “refused to
release the report of its probe, or to answer any questions raised by its statement” (p. 4).
The story quoted the school’s public statement on the Mack investigation:
‘During the past year, a committee of peers was appointed by the Dean of
Harvard Medical School to review the clinical care and clinical investigation that
Professor John Mack has carried out with persons who believe that they have
been abducted by aliens. The review has been completed. Dean Tosteson has
discussed the issues raised in the review with Dr. Mack. He has urged Dr. Mack
that, in his enthusiasm to care for and study this group of individuals, he should
be careful not, in any way, to violate the high standards for the conduct of clinical
practice and clinical investigation that have been the hallmark of this Faculty. He
also reaffirmed Dr. Mack’s academic freedom to study what he wishes and to
state his opinions without impediment. Dr. Mack remains a member in good
standing of the Harvard Faculty of Medicine. It is the School’s long-standing
practice not to disclose the content or findings of such reviews. No further
comment will be made’ (p. 4).
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A month after the conclusion of the investigation was announced, the Boston Globe
reported, under the headline “Harvard professor faulted on UFO work” (Beam, 1995), on
an alleged leak of a critical letter from Dean Tosteson to Mack about the investigation.
The story began with the claim that while the medical school had “declined to
censure…Mack, an official letter summarizing the still-secret investigation…criticizes
his research methods, his accounting procedures and his use of the Harvard name and
insignia to promote his treatment of UFO ‘abductees’” (p. 35). The Globe’s story noted
Mack had “discussed…his findings on television talk shows and in his 1994 best-seller
‘Abduction,’ prompting severe criticism from his Harvard colleagues”  (p. 35).
Act III: Benign neglect — another book, sans firestorm
Following the conclusion of the medical school’s investigation, Mack appeared to focus
his communications on more receptive audiences, and journalists, skeptics and critics
appeared to be paying less attention to his work. Literary critic and self-styled memory
warrior Frederick Crews (1996) worked Mack into a critique of mysticism, occultism,
and, of course, Freud, for The New York Review of Books. In this article Crews placed
“belief in extraterrestrial visitation” among “an array of ludicrous and generally harmless
New Age practices” (p. 39) and claimed “the sublimely gullible Harvard psychiatrist
John Mack…accepts UFO abductions at face value” (p. 44). “Having been hypnotically
reinforced in the belief that alien kidnappers once played doctor with them in hovering
spacecraft, those patients must be regarded as classic victims of therapeutic occultism”
(p. 44). Like “established religion” (p. 44). Crews declared, this sort of psychotherapy
appeals to “the unquenchable human thirst for meanings that can ease our doubts,
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sanction and regulate our urges, and flatter our self-conception…. Does mere empirical
rationality stand a chance against an appeal that speaks so directly to our needs?” (p. 44).
Critic Wendy Kaminer (1996) addressed Mack’s Abduction (1994a) in a review of
several “best-selling spirituality books” (para. 2) for the Atlantic Monthly magazine. In
this review, entitled “The latest fashion in irrationality,” Kaminer claimed the popular
books she was critiquing shared “a general belief in immortality and the presence of
extraterrestrial or celestial beings devoted to our welfare…[and] a general disdain for
reason, enshrined by therapeutic culture” (para. 5). Noting that abduction stories tend to
“end in enlightenment — the revelation that we are not alone in an indifferent universe”
(para, 4), she claimed these pop-spirituality books “offer membership in a spiritual elite,”
while their authors “tend to see themselves as messiahs” (para. 18). What these books
have in common, she wrote, is “denigration of skepticism…encouragement of habits of
unreason” and “the elevation of personal truths and personal testimony over logic and
verifiable fact” (para. 20). “Propaganda of the extreme right,” she said, “employs the
same techniques of argument” (para. 21).
In 1997 the Boston Herald ran a Sunday-morning front-page story (Schorow, 1997) about
a local public event featuring Mack, a “dialogue” sponsored by PEER and including
abduction researcher Budd Hopkins. “Call this a close encounter of the academic kind,”
the story led off, “two of the biggest names in alien abduction squaring off over the most
divisive issue in UFO research” (p. 1). The issue was “not whether abductions are real”
(p. 1) but whether aliens were abducting humans for good, as Mack asserted, or for ill, as
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Hopkins claimed. “Mack raised eyebrows even within Harvard’s arched walls over his
bestseller ‘Abduction’” (p. 1), the Herald noted. This story about the “battle of UFO
titans” (p. 1) was framed as local news and as drama of an entertaining sort, opposing not
only Mack’s and Hopkins’ views on abduction but also their contrasting personal styles.
Mack was described as the “intense, acerbic and a compulsive note-taker,” while Hopkins
was characterized as “beaming, affable, and relaxed” (p. 1).
In 2000, the San Francisco Chronicle also reported on a local appearance by Mack in the
city’s suburbs, in an article entitled “ET may want to call Contra Costa [County]” (King,
1999). “The topic of extraterrestrial life was served up with lunch yesterday in Pleasant
Hill,” this story opened, and “not one of the 60 people on hand was delayed en route by
an alien abduction” (para. 1). But “luncheon speaker John E. Mack would have known
what to do. After all, he’s the Harvard professor who wrote the book on the subject”
(para. 2). The story quoted an amazon.com reader review of Mack’s Abduction: “’The
fact that anyone can believe in stories such as those presented here is an indication that
our society has lost whatever ability it once had to thinking critically and scientifically’”
(para. 9). It then noted that, at the Mack event, “there wasn’t a hint of skepticism voiced”
(para. 10) about his abduction research.
Passport to the Cosmos: more scientific?
In 2000, Mack published his second book on abduction, Passport to the Cosmos, drawing
far less attention than he did with his first. Mack took pains to qualify all of his claims
and identify all potential limitations, omissions, biases, and conflicts  — that is, he made
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a great effort to be scientific. He explained his study method in greater detail than he did
in Abduction. He also continued to traverse the boundaries of science, citing several
philosophers of science, for example, to back what he framed as scientific claims. Mack
was identified on the cover of Passport… as “Pulitzer Prize-winning author of the best-
selling Abduction.” The cover blurb continued: “Mack powerfully demonstrates...[writes]
with...authority...stunned the world...breaks provocative ground.... For Mack, questions of
science...lead to questions of religion...Mack further solidifies his reputation as
a...pioneer on the forefront of the science of human experience, an authoritative voice....”
Fate, a magazine dedicated to “true reports of the unknown,” called the book
“fascinating…thoroughly engrossing…written with a scholarly elegance and refinement
of tone” (n.p.).12 UFO Magazine (Interview with John Mack, 2000) reported, “That a
doctor and author with such impressive credentials should take seriously [abduction]
stories...was very important to the UFO community, who now felt they had an ally in
their battle for ‘scientific respectability’” (para. 1).
English professor Robert Begiebing (2000) wrote about Mack’s abduction claims in a
commentary for The World, the magazine of the Unitarian Universalist Association. For
the religious community that was his audience, Begiebing labeled Mack’s account of the
abduction phenomenon “the latest in an ancient and honorable line of mythic
transformation narratives” (para. 3). Mack’s claim that the universe “contains
intelligences beyond the material realm” is something “religions have…long taught”
(para. 5). While Mack’s research might challenge the boundaries of astrophysics and
psychiatry, he wrote, “that doesn’t negate the urgent, transformational imagery of
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ecological cataclysm reported by his patients” (para. 12). In 2001, New Age Journal
published an interview with Mack (Lawler, 2001).13 In this article Mack was identified as
a Harvard psychiatrist with a “long and controversial career as a scientist and activist”
(para. 1). He was characterized as “ever the intellectual peripatetic” (para. 8), a man with
“the cautious traits of a scholar, the wariness of a maligned media figure, and the
enthusiasm of a college student discovering himself” (para. 11). Responding to the
question, “do you see what you are doing as science?” Mack was quoted:
Knowing is not the same when you can’t create a controlled experiment, but there
still can be reliable ways of knowing. I can’t create an experiment that brings a
bunch of UFOs together. But I do believe there is a quality of openness of mind
and rigor we can apply. We can develop standards of authenticity, reliability,
multiplicity of witnesses. This might be considered a science of the sacred or of
human experience (para. 14).
Asked how he determined the reliability of abduction claims, Mack reportedly said his
approach was to evaluate the claimant’s mental state and take the claimant’s
psychological history — “the standard clinical exam and, in some early cases, batteries of
psychological testing. I will get character witnesses” (para. 13). “And there is something
more,” he added; “it is feeling that a person is speaking as if they’ve been there — this
comes from body language, the look in their eye, from having no other agenda. I’m
working to better define this” (para. 13). Asked whether he was “trying too hard to drag
science into an area that is the domain of religion” (para. 18), Mack talked about
geneticist and Nobel laureate Barbara McClintock. Mack was quoted:
She fused with what she was working with…. Your instrument of knowing is
your whole self, your intuitive self, your full consciousness. What really good
scientists and those who take us ‘beyond the veil’ have in common is full
engagement with that other self, with the matter at hand (para. 18).
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(In one short answer Mack thus aligned himself with a Nobel laureate and “really good
scientists” as well as “those who take us ‘beyond the veil’.”) Asked “do you…believe in
this phenomenon?” Mack was quoted responding, “’It’s a no-brainer. It can’t be
accounted for in purely interpsychic ways…. It has to come from somewhere’” (para.
24). On whether his ideas about abduction had gained acceptance since the publication of
Abduction in 1994, Mack was quoted, “‘No, on the contrary…there is a kind of heating
up [of] a not-very-friendly discourse between contending worldviews’’’ (para 21). About
the personal and professional consequences of engaging in abduction research, Mack was
quoted:
I don’t have any regrets…. I’ve probably gained more colleagues and friends
since I began this than I had…before…. Life is short, and one tends to gravitate to
people one is in turn with. It’s been more of an expansion of my horizons...than it
has been a suffering (para. 25).
The anticlimactic conclusion of Mack’s abduction research program in October 2003 (see
Chapter 4) appears to have gone largely unnoticed by journalists, at least those reporting
for elite media….
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Notes
1. I delivered a paper on this initial analysis, conducted in 1996, to the Association
of Educators in Journalism and Mass Communication in August 1997 in Chicago.
Entitled “An Elite scientist at the boundary: the power of evidence and the
evidence of power in media coverage of science,” this unpublished paper reported
on a close reading of the following texts, which have been reexamined for this
case study (one additional text examined in my 1996 analysis was not reexamined
for this analysis): Chandler, 1992; Emery, 1995a; Kahn, 1994; Mack 1994a, Mack
1994b; Mack, 1995; McKenna, 1994; Rae, 1994; Thompson, 1995; Willwerth,
1994.
2. In spring 1998, I conducted a small-scale, quantitative content analysis,
examining a convenience sample of nine elite-media texts (including Chandler,
1992; Kahn, 1994; McKenna, 1994; Rae, 1994; Schorow, 1997; Tery, 1992; and
Thompson, 1995). The unit of analysis in this study was the sentence, and N=579.
The concept assessed was media commentary on Mack’s abduction research.
Dimensions measured were credentials and credibility, methods and
methodology, evidence and proof, publicity, and personal interests. Positive,
negative, and neutral indicators of each of these dimensions were identified and
quantified. Results of this analysis — which was limited, not replicated and
therefore inconclusive, though nonetheless intriguing — showed that Mack’s
scientific credibility and research methods appeared to be of greatest interest to
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journalists among dimensions analyzed. More interesting to me, however, results
also showed that a majority of the content analyzed had a neutral valence, despite
what appeared to be a negative framing of the manifest content of the stories. I
chose to conduct a qualitative analysis in this study for reasons described in
Chapters 1 and 3.
3. I concluded my formal search for texts at the end of 1999 because Mack told me
in March 1999 that he intended to avoid media interviews for the foreseeable
future. I collected a few texts dated after December 1999 that I found by means
other than Lexis-Nexis searching.
4. According to Mack’s PEER staff, the Harvard Magazine article was the first
media report on Mack’s abduction research (personal communication, Will
Bueche, PEER staffer, November 3, 2000). I found nothing dated earlier in my
searching.
5. I am referring to the publication, rather than the author of the story in the
publication, in citing the contents of texts for this analysis, except in cases where
an author is writing in the first person, as Neimark (1994) did at some points in
her story for Psychology Today, or otherwise clearly expressing a personal rather
than ostensibly objective editorial view, as, for example, Gleick (1994), Miles
(1994) and others did in book reviews of Abduction.
6. The following list includes citations to Anne Thompson’s 1994 Associated Press
story about Mack, found in the Lexis-Lexis-Nexis database and in the archives of
the Program for Extraordinary Experience Research (PEER). The list is not
intended to be comprehensive. Thompson’s story as cited in the text of this
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chapter was published in the Memphis (TN) Commercial-Appeal and is listed in
References; the following citations are not included in References:
• April 19: New Bedford (MA) Standard-Times, Professor says
tales of alien abduction true; Taunton (MA) Daily Gazette, Harvard doctor gives
close encounter claims credibility.
• April 20: Annapolis (MD) Capital, Prof: aliens mate with humans; Ann
     Arbor  (MI) News, Ivy-covered weird?; Bellingham (WA) Herald, Book charts
     close encounters of the sexual kind; Biddeford (ME) Journal Tribune, Sex with
     aliens? Doctor believes it; Bennington (VT) Banner, Aliens and parallel universes;
     Borger (TX) News Herald, Harvard professor’s book centers on close encounters;
     Corry (PA) Journal, Sex with an alien? Could be…; Dublin (GA) Courier-Herald,
     Harvard professor believes space aliens have mated with humans; Cape Cod Times
     (Hyannis, MA), Professor backs alien-abduction reports; Little Falls (NY) Evening
     Times and Aberdeen (WA) Daily World, Aliens mate with humans! Harvard
     professor believes it?; Manchester (NH) Union Leader, Close encounters of the
     Harvard kind: prof believes sex-with-aliens stories; Shelby (NC) Star, Harvard
     professor release book about close encounters; Shelbyville (IL) Daily Union,
     Harvard prof believes aliens mating with humans; Steubenville (OH) Herald-Star,
     Doctor a believer; Vineland (NJ) Daily Journal, Sex with aliens? Believe it.
• April 21: Dayton (OH) Daily News, Those sexy space folks are real, prof
says; Harrisonburg (VA) News-Record, Dr. Yes: Sex-with-aliens tales win
respect; The Times (Pawtucket, RI)  Book outlines sex with aliens; Sheridan
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(WY) Press, Pulitzer Prize winner writes book on sexual encounters with space
aliens.
• April 26: Fitchburg (MA) Sentinel & Enterprise, Harvard psychiatrist
writes of space abductions in new book.
7. In 1996, before I began my doctoral studies, I met James Gordon when we both
participated in a panel discussion on UFOs and the search for extraterrestrial
intelligence sponsored by American University’s School of Communication.  As
far as I recall, we did not discuss abduction. Gordon did not respond to
subsequent, repeated requests by phone and letter for an interview for this
research project. Gordon now runs the Center for Mind-Body Medicine at
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.
8. Two of Gleick’s popular science books reportedly have been best sellers and
National Book Award nominees (Christopher, n.d.) — Chaos: making a new
science (1987, New York: Viking) and Genius: the life and science of Richard
Feynman (1992, New York: Pantheon).
9. I found Dietrich’s Seattle Times story also published in the following papers (this
list of citations is not intended to be comprehensive): Amarillo (TX) Daily News,
June 25, p. 1A, True believer argues with UFO skeptics; Buffalo (N.Y.) News,
June 25, p. A4, UFO issues heats up as Harvard expert faces skeptics; Denver
Post, June 25, p. 5A, Patients abducted by aliens, psychiatrist believes; St.
Petersburg Times, June 25, p. 4A, You can fool some of the people…
10. Mack debunker Donna Bassett, who took her story to Time (Willwerth, 1994),
also spoke at CSICOP’s Seattle conference. CSICOP reported in its Skeptical
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Inquirer magazine (Genoni, 1995) that at the conference Mack implicated well
known UFO debunker and CSICOP fellow Philip Klass “in having a hand in
Donna Bassett’s work” (para. 9), prompting Klass to respond: “Taking the
microphone, [Klass] chastised Mack for making what he labeled ‘false
innuendoes.’ ‘Before you made accusations . . . why didn't you check with me? I
could have told you that the first time I talked to Donna and her husband about
you and your work was when they called me on January 9.’ After a few more
exchanges, Paul Kurtz intervened and brought the session to a conclusion”
(Genoni, 1995, para. 10). Donna Bassett was married to Ed Bassett, who
reportedly used to work with Klass at the trade magazine Aviation Week & Space
Technology. On August 9, 2004, I conducted a Google search for further
information on Donna Bassett and her abduction claims.  I found no information
about her background, credentials, or motives.  But I did find more than 500 sites
maintained by self-described skeptic, UFO or paranormal groups reporting on
Bassett’s claims to Time. A sampling of these sites showed that most had repeated
what Time had reported about Bassett’s story, with no additional information.
Truth Seekers International Review, Vol. 1(2), February-March 1995 (retrieved
August 9, 2004, from http://www.truthseekers.freeserve.co.uk/truth/tr2mack.html)
reported on an interview with Mack in which he responded to a question about
Bassett’s allegations: “I am constrained by patient confidentiality. I'm not free to
speak about what her motives were or the details of the case when she came to
me. I saw Donna Bassett in good faith several times. If in fact she did fool me,
which could happen - it's not impossible - then she was lying to me
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consistently…. In fact, she has established herself as an effective and thorough
on-going liar, [so] how can she be considered an authority on matters of integrity
regarding my work, methodology, patient-client and physician relationship?…
The fact is I didn't use one word she had to say in my book. Does that mean I
didn't trust her, or that I didn't think she was telling the truth?… The other
experiencers who knew her well…believe she's an abductee who became
disturbed and couldn't deal with her experiences. I'm not saying that I believe that,
but others do. So it isn't clear. I tend to credit that as a possibility, given that I
know what my sessions with her were like. I think that's consistent with the
sessions. What I found troubling with the Time magazine article was that the
writer - who I guess had a connection with Donna's husband, Ed Bassett, a
journalist - took this story on face value and used it to discredit me. The things
Donna Bassett says about me and my work are not accurate. They are not true. He
did not go to the 50 or 60 other abductees who would have supported my work,
who found it helpful, useful, positive - he went with the one person, an admitted
liar, or liar claimant, and made that the story” (n.p.). This particular episode in the
Mack case is intriguing and worth this extended footnote, but it is beyond the
scope of this analysis to pursue a full account of it.
11.  Anne Thompson’s 1995 AP story was also found in the following papers with
these headlines (this list is not intended to be comprehensive): Harvard questions
alien abduction research, Asheville (NC) Citizen-Times, May 25, p. 2A; Harvard
investigating sex-with-aliens research. Charleston Gazette, May 5, p. 2D; Harvard
panel targets scholar, alien abduction, Chattanooga Times, May 5, p. A14;
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Harvard probes ‘alien sex’ research, Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 5, p. 4A;
Out of this world: Harvard scrutinizes alien-sex research. Phoenix Gazette, May
5, p. A2; Harvard questions space alien research: professor faces peer review after
book puts him on talk show circuit, Rocky Mountain News, May 5, p. 45A.
12. Information on reviews of Passport to the Cosmos was obtained from the Web
site of the John E. Mack Institute. Retrieved August 9, 2004, from
http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/passport/blurbs.html.
13. In the interest of disclosure, I should note that the reporter who interviewed Mack
for New Age Journal is a friend of mine, and this assignment was the product of
my suggestion that he might enjoy writing about Mack’s abduction research.
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Chapter 6
The Case of the Deviant Doctor:
rhetorical strategies and boundary-work explored
As noted in Chapter 1, culture has been described as a “pattern of meanings…a system of
inherited conceptions” (Geertz, 1973, p. 34), a process whereby reality is created, maintained,
and transformed. In the Case of the Deviant Doctor, as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, journalists
and scientists referred to a “system of inherited conceptions” (p. 34) of what constitutes
legitimate science in evaluating Mack’s controversial claims, maintaining social reality as they
perceived it by rhetorically defending what they believed to the tenets of good science. The case
explored in this analysis was a case of communication as ritual, an enactment of culture (Carey,
1992), a case in which journalists struggled over “over the definition of what is real” (Carey,
1992, p. 31), referring to the views of expert scientist-sources to lend authority to their stories.
This case involved deviance from what many journalists, and scientists, as detailed in Chapters 4
and 5, appeared to consider accepted scientific conventions, relating to such things as data
collection, methods, and worldview. Jill Neimark (1994) in Psychology Today noted, for
example, that Mack appeared to have “abdicated scientific objectivity” (para. 49). Framed as an
elite scientist by Neimark, and, indeed, virtually all journalists who wrote about his involvement
in abduction research, Mack was also typically depicted in these stories as a maverick (Dearing,
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1995) and, in some stories, even a heroic figure who was challenging the powers that be in the
world of science, raising questions about the ontology, epistemology, and phenomenology of
science. According to Nelkin (1995b), journalists depend on scientists for information about
science and thus tend to reinforce what she claimed to be the conventional scientific worldview
in reporting about science. Most journalists whose texts were examined for this study appeared
to follow this pattern, exhibiting what appeared to be a disinclination to reconstruct the
boundaries of science as they perceived most scientists were publicly delineating them.  But at
the same time some of these same journalists who appeared to be affirming the conventional
scientific worldview also appeared to be unable — perhaps even unwilling? — to dismiss
Mack’s expanded conceptions of the boundaries of scientific practice and scientific reality, in
keeping with the journalistic conventions of fairness and balance. The New York Times
Magazine’s story about Mack (Rae, 1994), for example, ended with a question (in the form of a
quote from one of Mack’s experiencers) “Is it real?” (para. 49).
As I noted in Chapter 1, I began to construct a body of texts for this analysis with stories I
first identified as atypical, and in the early stages of reading and rereading these texts I
found myself thinking that these stories were somehow alike in their atypicality. As I
proceeded with my analysis, however, I began to read these stories as both a body of
related texts and a diverse and multilayered lot, ranging from respectful profile (e.g. Tery,
1992) to strident polemic (e.g. Gleick, 1994) to playful entertainment (e.g. Schorow,
1997). Further rereading and deeper probing revealed that beneath this variety of
structures, styles and strategies might be a common drama. The texts examined for this
analysis tended to repeat a common narrative of an elite scientist pursuing controversial
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research, scientific authorities insisting on compliance with accepted procedures (and
worldviews), and the maverick scientist insisting on his freedom of thought. But these
stories were not simply replications. The texts were related: each text implicitly or
explicitly made links to previous texts, by recapping previously reported events, citing
previously cited expert sources, and referring to other elite-media texts such as stories in
Time magazine (Willwerth, 1994) and The New York Times (Rae, 1994).
Each text was also unique. Some were constructed to fit a particular medium. Neimark’s
(1994) story for Psychology Today was a deeply detailed profile of a psychiatrist and his
work as well as an exploration of a controversial practice (hypnosis) and an even more
controversial idea (repressed and recovered memory) in the field of psychology, framed
and fleshed out to serve the interests of the magazine’s audience. Time’s story about
Mack (Willwerth, 1994) was billed as a piece of investigative reporting, appropriate for a
news magazine. Stories published in urban daily newspapers were appropriately short and
snappy (e.g. Kahn, 1994; McKenna, 1994; Thompson, 1994) and in at least one case (i.e.,
Schorow, 1997) tailored to fit a Sunday-edition page-one slot. Stories in the Boston
papers (e.g. Kahn, 1994; Tery, 1992; Schorow, 1997) reported on Mack as local news,
though other papers (e.g. Thompson, 1994; Thompson, 1995) framed essentially the same
content as national news given Harvard’s and Mack’s national reputations. In his science
column for the Boston Globe, physicist Chet Raymo (1994) focused on holding up
Mack’s abduction research to what he claimed were accepted conventions of science:
“Scientists have traditionally chosen the explanation that involves the least number of
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causes that fall beyond that which we already know…. We should ‘run counter’ [to
conventional wisdom] only when we need to; that’s the essence of science” (p. 28).
In keeping with the news value of timeliness, most stories were pegged to a current event
such as the publication of Abduction (e.g. McKenna, 1994; Kahn, 1994) or the conclusion
of Harvard Medical School’s Mack investigation (e.g. Emery, 1995c; Honan, 1995;
Thompson, 1995). And while a number of stories featured the same expert sources
(Richard Ofshe and Fred Frankel were cited, for example, in Neimark, 1994; Willwerth,
1994), many stories featured something new — for example, a different abduction story
or expert source or a local event (e.g. King, 1995). Stories in fringe media targeted to the
UFO community were less likely than stories in mainstream media to cite elite-scientist
critics of Mack, and they were more likely to give overt credence to Mack’s controversial
scientific worldview. But even while some stories in the UFO media praised Mack for
pushing at the boundaries of the conventional scientific worldview to make room for
abduction (e.g. Miley, 1994), others called Mack “gullible” and “subjective” (e.g.
Moseley, 1995a), just as some mainstream journalists did (e.g. Gleick, 1994; Neimark,
1994), for taking abduction seriously.
Some stories were relatively straightforward accounts of Mack’s abduction work and
claims (e.g. Chandler, 1992; Meyers, 1992; Lawler, 2001; McKenna, 1994; Rosen,
Podolsky, & Brown, 1994; Tery, 1992). Some stories were skeptical (e.g. Jefferson,
1992; Neimark, 1994). Others were overtly critical, some with a good dose of sarcasm
(e.g. Bernays, 1994; Gleick, 1994; King, 1999; Miles, 1994). Among the media texts
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examined for this analysis, all identified Mack as an expert and authority, making his
Harvard affiliation prominent. Virtually all mentioned his Pulitzer Prize as well. Stories
described Mack as controversial and unconventional (Rosen, Podolsky. & Brown, 1994);
respected (Willwerth, 1994) or “well-respected” (McKenna, 1994, p. 41) — one story
(Thompson, 1995) described him as “well respected…before he started talking about
space aliens” (p. A13) — brilliant (Neimark, 1994; Rosen, Podolsky, & Brown, 1994);
talented (Emery, 1995b); “intense but scholarly” (King, 1995, p. A11); earnest (Daniel,
1994); sincere, passionate, and committed (Rosen, Podolsky, & Brown, 1994); cautious,
wary, but enthusiastic (Lawler, 2001). Stories made note of this authority’s bypassing
peer review and seeking publicity.
Throughout the conduct of this analysis, I was intrigued — and frustrated – to discover
that virtually every rereading of these texts, singly or collectively, revealed more
evidence of possible meanings. Continued examination of these texts as a body kept
yielding new ways of labeling and connecting them. The meanings, labels and
connections discussed here are those for which I believe I can make a good case, within
the framework for analysis described in Chapter 3 and based on the literature review
documented in Chapter 2.
The unfolding drama
Literary action is symbolic action, and words are the modes of this action, “acts upon a scene”
(Burke, 1973, p. xvii). The symbolic action of communication is the enactment of a drama, a
ritual for the purpose of maintaining culture over time (Carey, 1992), and the structure of the
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drama can reveal its actors’ motives. The drama in this case, as journalists framed it, centered on
a controversy over Mack’s abduction research. Journalists reported on an expert and authority
who had overstepped the perceived bounds of professional, academic, scientific propriety by
studying the so-called abduction phenomenon. In the course of this drama, journalists charged
Mack with multiple transgressions: believing abduction stories, using hypnosis, validating the
concept of repressed and recovered memory, questioning the conventional scientific worldview,
mixing science with politics and religion, and acting like a pseudo-scientific therapist rather than
a scientific M.D.
The case under study here provided what Wynne (1991) called “a point of entry” to a
“real-world” encounter in which “scientific knowledge [was] reconstructed” — by Mack
and by journalists, toward different ends, though both to serve their own interests — “to
make it fit real situations…(or reject it if it cannot)” (p. 113). In this case actors (rhetors)
constructed boundaries between science and non-science, between psychiatry and
psychology, Freudian psychoanalysis and neuroscientific psychiatry, “psych” sciences
and “hard” sciences, science and philosophy, science and politics, and, perhaps most
importantly, science and religion. Mack rhetorically traversed all of these boundaries in
several senses of the word. He crossed and re-crossed them, he scrutinized them, and he
also went counter to them. He challenged their adequacy, validity, and utility. But at the
same time, he constructed his research as scientific by locating it within the conventional
boundaries of science, thereby reinforcing the very same boundaries he was attempting to
alter. Mack described the abduction phenomenon as a violation of the conventional
scientific worldview. Journalists reported Mack’s research as a violation of scientific
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convention, consensus, propriety, standards; a violation of public trust. They blamed
Mack, not alien abductors, for violating his clients — their trust, peace of mind, mental
health. Journalists seemed to be operating under an assumption that someone with
Mack’s credentials had a responsibility to serve as a scientific authority, a responsibility
requiring him to police, not breach, the conventional boundaries of science.
Structure and strategy
An individual text is an element of a dramatic dialogue, “a strategy for encompassing a
situation,” an answer to “assertions current in the situation in which it arose” (Burke,
1973, p. 109) grounded in an “unending conversation” colored by interests that “do not
‘cause discussion’ but...shape it” (p. 112). In keeping with Carey’s (1992) conception of
communication as ritual, stories in this case can be interpreted as ritual enactments of
journalists’ roles as boundary tenders, monitors of social and cultural norms and
deviance.  It is likely that journalists would not have found the research in this case worth
reporting on except for the scientist who was conducting it: a member of the scientific
elite (tenured Harvard professor, Pulitzer winner), a properly credentialed professional
(Harvard M.D., accredited psychoanalyst) an expert and authority (widely published,
cited, and known). Some journalists explicitly made this point.
Mack structured his texts as scientific investigations-cum-philosophical inquiries, a boundary-
blurring exercise in itself, enacting a drama of exploration. Mack made the story of his abduction
research theater by performing it in public, for audiences of commoners as well as for elites. He
presented his drama as an unsolved mystery and an epic in progress. The scene of this drama, the
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late 20th century, was a time rife with ideas about extraterrestrial life, fears of global havoc, and
power struggles over who may speak for science. Critics defined abduction as illegitimate
because it did not fit onto the standard cognitive map of science, and Mack acknowledged that
within the boundaries of conventional science abduction claims made no sense, but he declared
the standard cognitive map inadequate because it could not accommodate abduction.
The superficial structure of the typical media text examined for this analysis followed the
conventional who-what-when-where model of news and reflected core news values of timeliness,
controversy, authority, and human interest. Journalists reported on the who-what-when-where of
Mack’s abduction research, focusing on the publication of Abduction or some other current and
related event to make their stories timely. Longer magazine features addressed the “how” and
“why” as well. With headlines and leads showcasing Harvard, aliens, and sex, these stories
established journalists as proper skeptics. For most journalists, Mack’s status as an expert and
authority and his credibility and credentials were at the heart of the news.
Mack’s abduction research and his book about it were worthy of journalists’ attention, were
news, mainly because Mack had credibility, authority, and elite status, a Harvard affiliation and a
national reputation. Stories were made interesting by emphasizing the sensational aspects of
abduction stories and by providing human interest with accounts of abductions. Stories also
appeared to be conventionally balanced “on the one hand, on the other hand” reports, fair
assessments with quotes from Mack, from supporters, from skeptics and critics. As mentioned
earlier, texts were interlinked, with elite media referring to each other and second-tier media
referring to the elite. For example, the Boston Globe (Kahn, 1994; Miles, 1994), the Boston
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Herald (MacKenna, 1994), and The New Republic (Gleick, 1994) cited Time’s story. The New
Republic (Gleick, 1994) and the Washington Post Book World (Rucker, 1994) cited the New
York Times Book Review (Gordon, 1994). The cover of Abduction (Mack, 1994a) quoted the
Boston Globe Magazine (Tery, 1992), and the New York Times Magazine (Rae, 1994) echoed the
quote. The Boston Herald (MacKenna, 1994) cited the New York Times Magazine (Rae, 1994).
The scene of the drama was science — the world of scientific authority and elitism, epitomized
by Harvard. The world of psychiatry was also part of this scene, a world of respected M.D.s
treading the fuzzy borders between the objective, neuroscientific psychiatric worldview and
contested ideas and practices such as repressed and recovered memories, intersubjectivity, and
hypnosis. Science as the scene in which the rhetorical acts in this case took place influenced the
agents, or actors, in the drama. Though different agents appeared to deploy different rhetorical
strategies (acts) on the same scene (science) in this drama, their basic conceptions of science and
scientific authority ultimately did not vary much. However, different agents foregrounded and
backgrounded different aspects of science and its authority to advance or protect their particular
interests.
The scene was complex. Onstage was an elite scientist, a credible expert studying an incredible
subject, along with journalists who were questioning his credibility, the validity of his research
methods, the propriety of the publicity he was receiving, and the influence of his personal
interests on his work. Offstage were the cultural institutions of science and journalism — their
norms, values, practices, methods, worldviews. Other elements of scene in this drama were the
scientific elite, represented by Harvard; an ongoing dispute over the validity of the concept of
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repressed and recovered memories and the method of hypnosis for recovering such memories;
controversy over Freudian psychoanalytic ideas and techniques; and the persistent presence of
stories about extraterrestrial visitations. For Mack, science was the scene from which he could
depart on his journey of scientific exploration (and the scene to which he could return). For
journalists, the scene of science was a bounded conception of reality: what could be sensed,
measured, and explained.
Mack’s motive in telling his story was to expand the boundaries of science in order to
accommodate the abduction phenomenon. Journalists’ motives in telling their stories were to
define and reaffirm the accepted boundaries of science and thus explain the abduction
phenomenon as something that was not real because it did not fit within these boundaries.
Rhetorical strategies employed by Mack, journalists, and Mack’s scientist-peers in this case
served to affirm favored conceptions of scientific authority, scientific legitimacy, and scientific
worldview and refute competing conceptions. Mack made consistent, but ambiguous, claims for
his authority as a scientist and the legitimacy of his research as science, while journalists labeled
him, his practices, and his interests in ways that appeared intended to refute Mack’s claims and
reaffirm the conventional, positivistic worldview. Journalists tended to lean hard on the
unwritten rules of science in reporting on Mack’s controversial claims, raising questions about
scientific evidence, scientific methods, scientific propriety.
For journalists, perhaps the most important element of the scene on which this drama unfolded
was the world of news, defined according to conventional news values: current events,
interesting people and occurrences, experts and authorities, conflict, deviance. Journalists used
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their system of conventions to process Mack’s abduction research as news, his world of news,
focusing on current events (conferences, new books), conveying the views of expert and
authoritative sources (Mack, Mack’s peers, and self-proclaimed skeptics), highlighting conflict,
and flagging deviance. In talking with journalists about his abduction research, Mack attempted
to stretch the boundaries of science to accommodate his thinking about his work. In texts
examined herein, Mack’s critics — journalists framing their stories and scientists cited by those
journalists — appeared intent upon placing him and his claims outside the boundaries of
“normal” science, focusing on credentials, methods, evidence, interests, publicity and
worldviews.
The texts examined for this analysis constituted a metatext — a metanarrative or metadrama, as
it were. The metanarrative was a story about a member of the scientific elite (a tenured Harvard
professor, Pulitzer winner, and established authority) transgressing the boundaries of
professional convention (peer review, approved methods, positivistic worldview) and the
intriguing and titillating occurrence (abduction accounts) that prompted his transgression of the
boundaries of science. This dramatic dialogue took a familiar and popular form. Like episodes of
“The Twilight Zone” and “The X-Files,” the drama began in the mundane world of ordinary
people and places but veered off into the extraordinary, in the end leaving its audience
contemplating an unsolved mystery. The metanarrative about Mack’s abduction research was a
story about a power struggle, an apparent conflict over where the boundaries between legitimate
and illegitimate science lie and who has the right to establish where they lie.
217
Mack was sometimes explicit about his interest in this struggle. He told one journalist “the
official intellectual community” (Tery, 1992) could not let go of the conventional scientific
worldview. “It’s the elite people, my colleagues, who decide what we’re supposed to believe,”
Mack told another (Thompson, 1994). This case was, undoubtedly, a credibility contest (Gieryn,
1999). At first glance, it appeared that journalists covered Mack’s abduction research as a subject
of controversy. But on second glance, it was not clear what exactly the controversy was about:
the reality of the abduction phenomenon, the validity of hypnosis, the authority of psychiatry, the
credibility of a particular elite scientist, all of the above, or something else. On third glance,
Mack’s linking of science with spirituality migrated to the foreground as the possible heart of the
controversy.
Agents, acts, and agency
“When you begin to consider the situations behind the tactics of expression, you will find
tactics that organize a work technically because they organize it emotionally,” Burke
observed (1973, p. 92). The situation in which Mack deployed his rhetorical strategies
and tactics, the scene on which his drama unfolded, encompassed an elite institution —
Harvard in particular and the scientific community in general — discomfited by his
interest in abduction, a broad public audience — newspaper readers, television watchers,
UFO buffs — interested in abduction, and his own complex array of personal and
professional interests.
Mack was the primary agent in this drama, supported by abductees, his “co-creators.”
Mack’s colleagues in elite science were his antagonists. The act as Mack described it was
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the mapping of new epistemological territory. The agency driving Mack’s mapping was
scientific authority. Mack identified himself as an M.D., psychiatrist, clinician, Harvard
professor and expert in trauma with a lifelong interest in issues of identity and a growing
curiosity about “crossing over” the conventional scientific boundary between the material
and immaterial worlds. Mack saw his purpose in this drama as exploring the unknown
and sharing what he found, the archetypal cultural function of the hero. Campbell (1956)
described the mythic journey of the hero as a journey of departure, initiation, and return
— the crossing of a threshold from the known world into “darkness, the unknown, and
danger” (p. 77), a “separation from the [known] world, a penetration to some source of
power, and a life-enhancing return” (p. 35). During this ritual passage, the hero-seeker is
introduced to secrets, to knowledge, which he/she then brings back to the point of
departure. The heroic journey is one of transcendence, a dangerous foray into “self-
discovery and self-development” (p. 10). “A hero ventures forth from the world of
common day into a region of supernatural wonder,” as Campbell said (p. 3). Many
journalists superficially attempted to rewrite the drama that Mack performed, resorting to
debunking in some cases. But substantially, many reproduced the epic form of Mack’s
heroic journey.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, Mack depicted himself on a heroic journey into a
numinous realm of supernatural wonder in his exploration of abduction. And, wittingly or
unwittingly, journalists recapitulated the tale of Mack’s journey. At the same time that
journalists criticized Mack for his choice of research subject and methods, questioned his
credibility, and framed his work as violating scientific norms and tainted by personal
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values and interests, they also played to stereotype in casting Mack as a heroic figure,
larger than life, with almost superhuman abilities — “a high-profile idealist” as one
writer put it, “a man with a halo of perfection...one of the best and the
brightest...paterfamilias and healer...a high priest” (Neimark, 1994).
The sensitizing concept of boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983, 1995, 1999) has proven to be a
useful tool in examining rhetorical strategies in this case. Boundary-work, as Gieryn
(1983) explained, “describes an ideological style found in scientists’ attempts to create a
public image for science by contrasting it favorably to non-scientific
intellectual...activities” (p. 781), and “descriptions of science as distinctively truthful,
objective or rational may best be analyzed as ideologies: incomplete and ambiguous
images of science nevertheless useful for scientists’ pursuit of authority” (pp. 792-793).
Elite scientists maintain the boundaries of science by making a distinction between
knowledge, which they label objective, and belief, which they label subjective, Latour
(1987) observed: “A partition is made between those who have access to the nature of the
phenomena, and those who, because they have not learned enough, have access only to
distorted views of these phenomena” (p. 183).
Lessl (1996) called this rhetoric the rhetoric of scientism, and he claimed it is  “an
enduring feature of the public ideology of science” (p. 379) that scientists employ to
maintain their cultural authority. This case shows how journalists employ this sort of
rhetoric to reinforce the cultural authority of scientists. As shown in Chapter 4, Both
Mack and his peer-critics employed scientistic rhetorical strategies to defend the
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boundaries of their own divergent conceptions of scientific reality, and as shown in
Chapter 5, journalists tended to reproduce these distinctions. In this case I found
journalists reinforcing what they perceived to be the prevailing ideology of science by
describing science as objective, rational, firmly rooted in the tangible physical world. By
protecting their authority as providers of authoritative information, journalists at the same
time reinforced the authority of expert and official sources who subscribed to this
ideology.
Journalists reported on Mack as a scientific authority, though they tended to frame him as
a maverick authority who was questioning the conventional ideology of science. In the
texts examined for this study, journalists and their scientist-sources criticized Mack for
ignoring what they labeled obvious explanations for reported abduction experiences.
They could not definitively make the case, however, that Mack had not learned enough,
did not know enough, to understand such things as dreams and sleep paralysis. Mack
used the same argument to respond to his critics, claiming they had not learned enough,
did not know enough, to understand the full extent of reality as he conceived it.
Mack’s rhetorical strategy was intended to persuade his peers and others that he faced a
problem requiring a solution: abductees’ trauma. Journalists’ rhetorical strategies tended
to convey that the problem to be solved was Mack’s violation of the boundaries of
scientific authority, legitimacy, and propriety. Many journalists bore down on hypnosis,
the method Mack used to help people recall their memories of abduction experiences, as
a weakness in Mack’s research. Some critiques placed the story of Mack’s abduction
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research in the larger context of the so-called memory wars, an extended public dispute
over the validity of the concept of repressed and recovered memory, and the use of
hypnosis to recover such memories.
Selective vocabularies, debunking strategies
People seek “vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality,” Burke (1969a) observed,
but in practice they necessarily “develop vocabularies that are selections of reality, and those
selective vocabularies “function as a reflection of reality” (p. 59). As far as it provides the
necessary reflection, a selective vocabulary “has the necessary scope,” but “in its selectivity, it is
a reduction,” Burke said. “Its scope and reduction become a deflection” (p. 59) when such a
vocabulary fails to explain its subject. In Mack’s view, the scope of the selective vocabulary of
positivistic science was too narrow, too reduced, to fully describe reality, a reality he perceived
as extending beyond the observable material world. Mack’s motive was to open the door to all
possibilities. Journalists’ motive was to guard the door and protect the boundaries, to defend
norms and fend off deviance, thereby maintaining order. Burke said names embody attitudes or
motives, and the way an act is named reveals the motives of the namer. Mack named abduction a
“phenomenon” and abductees “experiencers,” to keep the boundaries of scientific reality fuzzy.
He named himself “clinician” and “psychiatrist” to legitimate himself as a researcher and
objectify his interest in abduction. Journalists named abduction accounts tales and myths; they
did not call them lies but they did not deem them real. They called Mack a believer — not a
scientist or a knower. But at the same time they made much of Mack’s status as a scientist and
knower….
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Mack was consistent, if not always clear, in describing his interests, for audiences
ranging from the expert to the mainstream to the fringe — his sense of self and mission,
his research rationale, his conception of science and the role of his research as a scientific
endeavor. Mack superficially employed a conventional, deliberative, “scientific”
rhetorical strategy to convince his audience of the legitimacy of his claims, and himself.
In his one peer-reviewed publication on abduction (McLeod, Corbisier, & Mack, 1996),
he and his coauthors emphasized this scientific strategy.  But Mack more effectively
employed an underlying rhetorical strategy of acceptance, emphasizing ambiguity and
complexity to keep the picture of the abduction phenomenon fuzzy and the boundaries
between material scientific reality and his own expanded conception of reality open.
By this strategy, which he employed in his peer-reviewed paper, his books, and in
interviews with mainstream and fringe journalists, Mack conveyed that simple
explanations and quick answers would not be forthcoming in this case. “The original
information was obtained non-dualistically, i.e., through the intersubjective unfolding of
the investigator-abductee interaction,” he wrote (1994a, p. 25); “the information that is
obtained does not fit within accepted notions of reality” (ibid. p. 31). This rhetorical
ambiguity drew sharp criticism from at least one journalist (e.g. Gleick, 1994). While
Mack reprocessed some of his rhetoric in revising Abduction for paperback publication,
he stuck to his strategy of ambiguity and complexity and even turned up the heat a few
degrees. Mack took his critics’ knowledge claim — abduction is not possible — and
reasserted it as an ignorance claim — we don’t know if abduction is possible or
impossible. He acknowledged that within the boundaries of orthodox science, abduction
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claims made no sense. But if the boundaries were broadened, abduction might make
sense, he said. Rather than insisting that abduction claims fit onto a standard cognitive
map, he said a different map was needed to explore the phenomenon.
Undermining his own attempts at deliberative rhetoric, Mack made it clear that clarity was not
what he had to offer. He took seriously Kuhn’s warning to avoid “the structures and polarities of
language” (Mack, (1994a, p. 20) that came packaged with the conventional scientific worldview.
Mack told one reporter Kuhn warned him to “watch out for the traps of language” (Daniel,
1994). But while Mack did plenty of rhetorical hedging, he nonetheless could not escape the
strictures of the dualistic vocabulary he claimed he was trying to avoid (real/unreal,
happened/didn’t happen) in his efforts to establish the legitimacy of his work. Mack frequently
resorted to dualistic terminology in explaining his abduction research, unable to break free of the
boundaries of his own native language, claiming, for example, that knowing requires an attitude
of not knowing, framing himself as an expert and yet calling himself naïve and innocent as well.
As explained in Chapter 2, journalists and scientists do their jobs according to conventions aimed
at clarifying, simplifying, explaining, answering. Some journalists interpreted Mack’s ambiguity
and complexity as credulity, confusion, sloppiness, bad science or non-science. Mack was
rhetorically consistent, and consistently rhetorical, in presenting his abduction research: he was
consistently ambiguous, with his emphasis on not knowing, and consistently boundary
challenging, with his assertions about the limitations of the conventional scientific worldview.
The aim of rhetoric, in Burke’s view, is identification, which is compensatory to division.
A rhetor attempts to find a point of identification with an audience and symbolically
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create conditions for connecting with it. Mack’s rhetorical strategy of strategic ambiguity
allowed him to present himself as a scientific authority and expert, someone journalists
and other non-experts could and should heed, and at the same time identify with
audiences by calling himself “naive” and “innocent” and “not knowing.”  He told one
reporter “we don’t understand” abduction and admitted his “inability to explain” it (Tery,
1992). He presented himself as a properly detached researcher but also attempted to
identify with his audience as a “co-creator” and a “stranger” as well.
By adhering to the conventions of their profession, journalists superficially kept
themselves out of their texts, but they aimed for identification by defending what they
believed to be a widely accepted conception of science: observing and recording the
physical world, using accepted methods, submitting to peer review, keeping a low public
profile, defending consensus reality, maintaining a skeptical attitude toward challenging
views.  They attempted to identify with their audiences by spotlighting deviance from the
norm and maintaining order. Those same professional values and conventions, however,
and perhaps personal values as well, sometimes led journalists to frame the maverick
Mack as an admirable and even heroic figure.  For journalists, Mack was a physical
manifestation of the institution of science, in particular the authority of science, the
power to establish what is real and what is not. In their stories, Mack, and science, were
heroic figures transversing the boundary between the known world of everyday life and
unknown worlds where conventional science could not explain everything there is.
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Some journalists employed the strategy of debunking to respond to Mack’s claims. Debunking
aims to “discern an evil” (Burke, 1973, p. 168) and then attempts to eradicate it. But the
debunker “perfects a mode of argument that would, if carried out consistently,” undermine his
own argument as well (p. 171). “In order to combat a bad argument, [the debunker] develops a
position so thorough that it would combat all arguments — and then must covertly so rework this
position that he may spare his own argument from the general slaughter,” typically “by an
unintentional ambiguity whereby he throws something out by one name and brings it back by
another name” (p. 174). Journalists claimed Mack failed to make a credible case for the reality of
abduction as a phenomenon and, thus, the legitimacy of abduction as a research subject. Hence
there was no need for an expanded worldview. For debunking journalists, Mack’s knowledge
and understanding became belief; his worldview became his vision; his professional interests
became his personal obsessions; his self-described naivety and innocence became credulity and
gullibility. As Burke explained, these debunkers did not apply the same test to their own
understandings/beliefs, their worldviews/visions. They did not consider that the scientific truth
that debunking defends “is no less a ‘stylization’ than any other” (p. 128). Indeed, Mack made
the point that the conventional scientific worldview was a belief system embodying elite values,
an ideology serving elite interests.
Journalists’ rhetorical strategies in this case succeeded in catching this reader’s eye. They
used the elite status of Harvard, the sensationalism of aliens, and the titillation of weird
sex to grab readers’ attention. Harvard stood in for scientific authority, aliens for forces
out of the control of that authority, and sex for violation of that authority. In their stories
journalists used “Harvard” to brand Mack a representative of scientific authority, “alien”
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to frame him as a threat to that authority, and “sex” to establish him as an overt violator
of that authority. Journalists employed frames of rejection in examining Mack’s
abduction research, especially his method of hypnosis and his validation of repressed and
recovered memory. Though these stories appeared to be dominated by frames of
rejection, frames of acceptance employed in the very same texts may ultimately have
cancelled out or even overpowered the frames of rejection.
News as ritual
“The dramatic ritual materializes...by reference to an audience’s interests,” said Burke
(1973, p. 403). It appears that journalists in this case presumed their audiences shared a
scientistic worldview. In Burkean terms, scientism presupposes that science, rationality,
nature, and reality are consubstantial; it is a perspective whose circumference establishes
that positivistic science is the only means of acquiring legitimate knowledge about
reality, and legitimate knowledge is what can be learned by means of approved methods
and instrumentation. Stories about Mack functioned as ritualistic acts of boundary
tending, staged in the form of news reports, telling audiences about the activities of
official boundary-tenders, both normal and deviant. The pragmatic function of these
stories was to inform audiences — and, perhaps, to entertain as well, in the case of at
least some texts. Journalists were consistent in following their professional conventions
to report on Mack’s abduction research. Some put their individual marks on their stories
as well, interpreting material in accordance with their own values and interests. The news
was controversy, and the controversy was worth paying attention to because it involved
elite scientists. But the ritual drama that journalists enacted in these texts was more
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complex than that. The ritual function of these stories was to maintain culture over time
— to maintain the cultural boundaries of science and scientific authority. In some cases,
journalists constructed “well rounded” epideictics, as it were, enumerating Mack’s
praiseworthy qualities while at the same time also blaming him for an array of social and
cultural transgressions. At least one journalist (Gleick, 1994) constructed an elaborate
rhetorical victimage ritual to banish Mack from “science” and strip him of his authority.
In some texts, epideictic became epic, with journalists recapitulating the form of Mack’s
heroic journey.
Doing what they believed they were supposed to do, complying with the journalistic
convention of balance and maintaining the journalistic stance of skepticism, reporters
liberally sprinkled their stories about Mack’s abduction research with references to
supermarket tabloids (e.g. Jefferson, 1992; Miles, 1994; Neimark, 1994; Tery, 1992);
science fiction (e.g. Falk, 1993), myth (Gleick, 1994; Rucker, 1994), nonsense (Falk,
1993), cults (Falk, 1993; Gleick, 1994; Rucker, 1994), fantasies (Gleick, 1994),
hallucinations (Gleick, 1994; Rae, 1994), claptrap (Rucker, 1994), fairies (Rae, 1994),
and incubi and succubi (Falk, 1993; Gleick, 1994; Rae, 1994). By linking Mack’s
research with this cluster of non-science terms journalists kept Mack’s claims at
rhetorical arm’s length, achieving a pragmatic aim.  But the ritual function of this action
was to reinforce the boundaries of conventional science and affirm the claims to scientific
authority of those who draw those boundaries.
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Mack’s texts were colored by his personal and professional interests in war and peace,
social change, consciousness and identity, spiritual awareness, and trauma relief.
Journalists’ texts were colored by their professional interests in reporting what’s news,
attracting an audience, consulting authorities, enforcing norms and flagging deviance.
Interviews (see below) revealed how journalists’ personal interests colored stories as
well. Mack labeled himself a psychiatrist, clinician, and scientist. He characterized his
role as a psychiatrist and clinician to be that of helping troubled people, his role as an
M.D. and scientist to be that of pushing the boundaries of science toward improving
understanding of the human condition. Journalists played out their roles to encompass
defending and questioning the norms, the boundaries, of science. For Mack, challenging
the boundaries of science, pushing them outward, was in the public interest; for
journalists, tending and defending the boundaries of science, pulling them inward, was in
the public interest.
Mack’s texts were responses to cultural cues, assertions he heard in the ongoing dialogue
about human experience, assertions that large numbers of people believe they have been
abducted by aliens, that positivistic science can explain everything, that Western culture
is suffering a spiritual crisis. Mack followed cultural cues about what a scientist is
supposed to do (ask questions, test limits, solve problems), what a psychiatrist is
supposed to do (help troubled people), what a clinician is supposed to do (treat patients),
what a man of social conscience is supposed to do (act on his beliefs), what an expert and
authority is supposed to do (tell non-experts what they need or want to know).
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Journalists’ texts about Mack’s abduction research were responses to other cultural cues,
assertions they heard in the ongoing dialogue about science: that abduction cannot be real
(or can it?), that positivistic science can/cannot explain everything (in the physical
world…), that good science depends on observation and evidence (but what kinds of
evidence?), that hypnosis is not scientific (but then what is it?), that memories cannot be
repressed and recovered (or can they?). Journalists’ texts were also responses to cultural
cues about what journalists are supposed to do: report timely, interesting, and potentially
significant news; shine a spotlight on experts, authorities, and elites; describe the world.
In writing about Mack, journalists followed cultural cues about how journalists are
supposed to deal with authority (heed, affirm and question it), how they are supposed to
deal with science (respectfully and skeptically, minding the boundaries of convention),
how they are supposed to deal with controversy (cover it, in a fair and balanced way).
As noted in Chapter 2, “Journalists are trained to rely on scientific authority figures,” but
they “are also trained to distrust authorities” (Dearing, 1995, p. 343). Journalists homed
in on Mack’s credentials — Harvard-psychiatrist-professor-Pulitzer — to verify his
credibility. They delved into Mack’s interests, in consciousness, identity, social and
political issues. Gitlin (1980) asked of news accounts, “Why this frame and not another?”
(p. 7), but Burke (1973) observed, “There is no need to ‘supply’ [a writer] motives.” That
motivation, the situation “out of which [a writer] writes is synonymous with the structural
way in which he puts events and values together when he writes” (p. 20). As Burke
pointed out, the conventional scientific worldview reduces action to motion, thereby
removing agency from action. In this worldview things happen according to the laws of
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nature, not the agencies of intelligence(s). Hence journalists were compelled to question
Mack’s claims of his own, and of aliens’, agency. Their motives in writing about Mack’s
abduction research were to shine a light on deviant behavior by a scientific authority but
also to cheer on the deviant, “maverick” researcher.
Terministic screens, associational clusters
Burke (1973) asked, what is the underlying imagery through which an agonistic
rhetorical contest takes place? One way to look for this imagery is to examine what
Burke called terministic screens (see Chapter 3), groups of words employed by rhetors to
filter texts, frames of power and act and order affecting the scope and circumference of
texts. Burke’s (1973) so-called terministic dynasty of power terms include words
invoking social, sexual, physical, political, military, mental, and moral power; terms of
emancipation, separation, fascination, wisdom, understanding, knowledge. Mack
employed a terministic screen of power words in his texts that directed readers’ attention
away from questions about the absence of physical evidence of abduction, the legitimacy
of hypnosis, the validity of the idea of repressed and recovered memory, the lack of peer
review, and the extent of publicity and toward his own interests in the nature of
knowledge, knowing, and being; the scope, circumference, and function of scientific
worldview; and the origin and deployment of scientific authority. This terministic screen
extended readers’ views outward, to consider possibilities.
Among the “power” terms Mack used most consistently were the words subtle,
numinous, profound, fundamental, powerful, shattering. Mack’s power screen sorted into
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several overlapping and interlinking associational clusters: terms relating to ontology,
epistemology, and phenomenology, including the words reality, real, phenomenon,
experience, being, meaning, cosmos; a spiritual cluster, including the words subtle,
numinous, fundamental, profound, cosmos and cosmic, transcendent, meaning, god; and
a cluster of “authority” words, including expert, clinician, psychiatrist, powerful. A
couple of randomly selected pages in the last chapter of Abduction are loaded with such
terms: for instance, “there is evidence that the alien encounters have been responsible for
healing…abductees seem to gain powers” or “undergo profound personal growth and
transformation” (Mack, 1994a, p. 398); the abduction phenomenon is “transcending” (p.
398), “redemptive” and “transformative,” a way to “new realms of psychical
awareness…expansion of consciousness or broadening of knowledge…breaking the
psychological boundaries that limit our perception of reality” (p. 402). Mack described
himself, and reporters described him, as shocked, stunned, and staggered by the power of
the abduction phenomenon.
Power and authority constitute a primary news value, and journalists report on who has it
and how it is used and abused. As thinkers from Bacon to Foucault observed, power and
knowledge are coupled. Journalists writing about Mack’s work employed opposing
terministic screens that directed readers’ attention away from Mack’s views and toward
their own views on power and authority. The journalistic screens sorted out into several
overlapping and interlinking associational clusters as well: a power cluster, including
words such as credibility, authority, expert, abduction, rape; a “war” cluster, including
the words controversy, criticism, battle, firestorm, rape; and a transgression cluster,
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including terms such as rape, probe, implant, alien sex, pseudoscience, supermarket
tabloids. The screens they constructed with these clusters functioned to contain readers
inside the boundaries of legitimate science, scientific propriety and scientific authority,
pulling readers’ attention inward to affirm official “knowns.” This containment strategy
revealed an attitude of conservation, preservation, a motive to protect the boundaries of
science and the resources of scientific authority.
Elements of the cluster of power terms that repeatedly appeared in headlines and leads of
stories about Mack’s abduction research were Harvard, aliens, and sex. Power terms —
Harvard, psychiatrist, professor, Pulitzer — appeared in story leads to identify Mack as a
scientific authority. Once established as a “normal” scientist, Mack was then associated
with deviance in these stories with references to supermarket tabloids, alien rapes, and so
on. Mack was constructed as news: a Harvard professor, respected author, Pulitzer,
psychiatrist, a scientific advocate with a good academic reputation (Willwerth, 1994). He
had authority. But his authority was challenged.
Mack’s abduction research was described as shoddy; he was accused of misusing his
authority, endangering and even harming people (Willwerth, 1994). He was labeled zany
and foolish, operating at the outer limits of acceptable behavior; his work was labeled
inaccurate (Willwerth, 1994). Mack engaged in “improprieties,” appeared in People and
on “network TV,” was “discredit[ed]” (Kahn, 1994, p. 61). Criticism of Mack was said to
be “damaging,” scientists were said to be “skeptical,” some called his work “nonsense”
and it was subject to “ridicule” (p. 61). Mack was labeled the wrong kind of credulous —
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that is, “gullible” (e.g. Bernays, 1994; Crews, 1996; Moseley, 1995). He “failed” (Kahn,
1994; Willwerth, 1994). But, in keeping with the journalistic convention of balance, at
least some reporters associated Mack and his abduction research (often quoting Mack’s
own words) with spiritual awareness, interpersonal connection, personal growth, and
psychological transformation — after highlighting his deviance. One story returned to
Mack’s own power terms in conclusion with a quote from him in which he invoked spirit,
soul, and the sacred (Willwerth, 1994).
Journalists employed a set of power terms clustering around “war” to establish Mack’s research
as a transgression of boundaries, a flouting of the power of scientific authority to maintain those
boundaries; and also to establish Mack as a heroic warrior. Mack was situated in “alien territory”
(Tery, 1992, p. 20), where wars are waged and boundaries breached. He was placed “on the front
lines” (Tery, 1992, p. 20; also see Rae, 1994) of abduction research (Scribner’s said the same on
the cover of Abduction (Mack, 1994a)). One reporter (Neimark, 1994) placed Mack in “the white
hot center of a [raging] controversy...[a] battle about the...nature of the human mind...a war over
the nature of memory and access routes to it” (para. 10). Another reporter (Rae, 1994) described
the abduction phenomenon as an assault. It was reported that Mack was ripped, attacked, the
subject of shots, “heavy groundfire” and a “publicity blitzkrieg” (Kahn, 1994, p. 61).
Related to this war cluster was a cluster of terms of transgression employed by journalists
to establish that Mack was violating official boundaries: stories made repeated and
prominent references, typically in headlines and in leads, to alien sex, rape, probes and
implants, and theft to establish that Mack’s research was a violation of scientific
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conventions. By emphasizing violation, reporters conveyed the idea of a breach, dissent,
disturbance, malpractice, or offense. Some journalists established Mack’s work as a
violation by characterizing him as a salesman rather than a scientist, with “a hard-eyed
huckster’s zeal” (Rucker, 1994, p. X2), “marketing the abduction myth” and milking “a
cash cow” (Gleick, 1994, paras. 6, 19), perpetrating “a calculated scam” (Gleick, 1994,
para. 42). Some focused on Mack’s use of hypnosis — his own method of overpowering
abductees, as it were, allowing him to probe for repressed “information” (Tery, 1992).
Journalists dramatically opposed Mack’s authority and legitimacy to his violations.
Among the many popular books about abduction, “none” was written “by an authority
with [Mack’s] credentials” (Rae, 1994, para. 6). But at the same time journalists made
much of Mack’s credibility and authority, they also hinted it might be compromised by
his association with an “underground” (Neimark, 1994), a “wacko subculture” (Myers,
1995, p. 7). One journalist asked whether Mack might be legitimizing UFOlogy
(Neimark, 1994). Journalists also employed a power cluster terms describing loss of
power in addressing Mack’s authority. They reported on Mack because he had authority
and credibility. But some speculated on whether he had gone “crazy” (Rae, 1994) and
lost it (control and thus authority).
Mack frequently wrote and spoke of transformation and transcendence, elements of his screen of
power terms. Mack described abduction as crossing over from the spiritual into the material
realm, transforming from a spiritual to a physical experience, transcending the boundaries
between physical reality and what he called the subtle realm. Mack depicted himself as crossing
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over, from conventional to unconventional scientific worldview, from skepticism to belief, from
science to spirituality, from the known world of everyday life over the threshold into unknown
worlds of heroic exploration. “I am a bridge,” one reporter (Willwerth, 1994, para. 16) quoted
Mack. Another reporter wrote that Mack was always building bridges between things (Rae,
1994) — psychiatry and diplomacy, physical and spiritual reality.
A spiritual theme
These terms of transformation and transcendence are elements of what I will call the
“mother cluster” of terms in this metatext: a “spiritual” cluster of terms Mack used, such
as sacred, numinous, divine, and ensouled. Mack employed these terms strategically
throughout his texts to reinforce his claim that abduction had spiritual as well as scientific
implications.
Some journalists made note of the spiritual bent of Mack’s abduction research. The
Boston Herald (Dykes, 1994) deemed Abduction “a transcendent, landmark work that is
finally less about alien phenomena than about realms of spiritual emergence”  (p. 46).
According to Psychology Today, Mack was constructing a new kind of cosmology by
melding ideas drawn from Eastern spiritual traditions as well as Western science
(Neimark, 1994). Out on the fringes, UFO Magazine (Miley, 1994) noted that “where
Mack’s book differs from others of its kind...is in its marked spiritual orientation” (p. 34).
However, few journalists explored Mack’s linkage of science and spirit. Mack himself
distinguished spirituality from religion. In one rhetorical attempt to do so he dramatically
opposed his own conception of a transcendent, transformative, “cosmic” spirituality to
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restrictive dogma by describing science as a sort of religion that had acquired “the
rigidity of a theology” (1994a, p. 20), reinforcing the authority of this claim by quoting
the words of Kuhn to make it. But some writers were compelled, nonetheless, to defend
the demarcation between science and religion against Mack’s transgression. They
decided Mack’s claims blurred that sacred boundary, and they rebuked him, in one case
with dire warnings about consequences (e.g. Miles, 1994; see below).
One reporter quoted Mack saying that the broader worldview he was advocating would provide
access to sacred and divine realms (Daniel, 1994). Mack was quoted claiming that in abduction,
“God has sent scouts…aliens are emissaries of the divine” (King, 1999, p. A11). Mack talked
with another reporter (Lawler, 2001) about “a science of the sacred” (para. 14) and the idea of
abductees as sacred witnesses. Another journalist wrote that Mack had had a “revelatory”
experience regarding “the boundary constraints [of] psychoanalysis...plunged into Eastern
philosophy and shamanism [and] emerged from these explorations with a different worldview”
(Rae, 1994, paras, 16-17). One reporter (Tery, 1992) quoted Mack describing abduction thus:
“’it’s like you’re humbled before God...oh, my god, what an extraordinary thing...has happened’”
(Tery, 1992, p. 22); this reporter wrote that Mack had faith that people would accept what he was
doing. One journalist wrote of Mack’s vision, described him as a seeker and said he was always
on a quest that sometimes took him down “heretical paths” (Rae, 1994, para. 13). This journalist
said Mack was possessed, spoke of gods and spirits and was “almost mystically detached” (para.
37) from criticism of his views. Another reporter (Neimark, 1994) called Mack “a high
priest...seeking God” (para. 1), “a high priest at a most sanctified temple of science” (para. 32), a
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“paterfamilias and healer” (para. 1), “a man with a halo of perfection” (para. 32); abductees were
described as “spiritual seekers” (para. 3) who “flocked to him” (para. 2).
Mack employed the metaphors of cosmos and the profound to conjure the highest, farthest,
deepest, strangest reaches of reality, the unknown and perhaps unknowable. For Mack, the
profound was worthy of serious contemplation. And thus his contemplation of it was profound.
Journalists, on the other hand, metaphorically placed abduction in the realm of supermarket
tabloids and science fiction.
For journalists, peer review, approved methodology, proper data and physical evidence
stood in for scientific authority in their stories about Mack’s abduction research. Mack
identified, and was identified, with the scientific establishment, and journalists used
Mack himself, and Harvard, too, to stand for that establishment. Mack represented
Harvard’s scientific authority, and Harvard represented the cultural institution of
scientific authority. White, male, a graduate and a faculty member of Harvard and an
M.D. to boot, winner of a prestigious prize, and an over-achiever, Mack epitomized the
authority of science. By dramatically opposing the very real Mack, the prototypical
scientific authority, with unreal aliens, the ultimate threat to scientific authority,
journalists created conflict, the stuff of news.
Journalists made Mack a scapegoat for any and all perceived threats to the boundaries,
the authority, of science, especially focusing on the threatening idea of repressed and
recovered memory. The underlying imagery through which the agonistic trial took place
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in stories about Mack was an imagery of violation, trespass, transgression, rape, betrayal,
sham. Journalists metaphorically depicted Mack’s abduction research as a rape, with
references to probes, implants, and hybrid babies. Examined from a slightly different
perspective, however, those violations were heroic leaps across the boundary between the
known and the unknown….
A meditation on meanings…
For the purposes of this analysis it is worth probing some of the components of Mack’s
and journalists’ screens and clusters to think about the scope (range) and circumference
(limits) of meanings they might convey.1 The word “power” conveys strength or force,
authority and control. The power term “profound,” a word Mack used frequently to
describe the abduction phenomenon, derived from the Latin profundus, “before the
bottom,” means deep, coming from a great depth. Used as a noun, “profound” means the
deep, the sea, the abyss — a terrifying, unknown source of power. The meanings that
“profound” conveys range from intellectually deep to deeply felt, far-reaching,
unqualified and absolute, pervading, overmastering, and deeply humble, lowly and
submissive.
Related to “profound,” and serving as a synonym for it, is “fundamental,” another word
Mack used frequently in describing his abduction research. “Fundamental” derives from
the Latin fundus, meaning “bottom,” and the English word “mental,” meaning “of the
mind” — primarily the intellect, as opposed to the emotions. “Mental” can also mean
crazed — that is, intellectually diseased. The meanings of “fundamental” range from
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basic, central, key to foundational, underlying, primal, rudimentary, structurally essential,
systemically necessary, “of great significance or entailing major change.” Related to
“profound” is “subtle,” another term Mack used frequently, deriving from the Latin
subtilis, meaning fine or thin. “Subtle” means slight, barely detectable, or even unseen.  It
also can mean abstruse, hard to understand; or sly, clever, crafty, devious, insidious,
treacherous.
In communicating about his abduction research, Mack often brought up epistemology,
ontology and phenomenology — the studies of knowing and knowledge, being, and
perceiving. He was crusading for an expanded epistemology, new cognitive maps of
reality. It could be argued that these three terms are irreducible: an entire online database
of thesauri yields no synonyms for epistemology, ontology or phenomenology (though
ontology is offered as a synonym for philosophy). Yet “phenomenon,” the root of
phenomenology and the label Mack chose for abduction accounts, has dozens of
synonyms, with denotations and connotations spreading over such a wide range as to
render the word meaningless, or meaning anything and everything. “Epistemology”
typically refers to the philosophy or study of the nature of knowledge, what counts as
knowledge, how knowledge is acquired and legitimized. Its root is the Greek word for
knowledge, epistem, deriving from epistasthai, to understand, and histasthai, to place or
determine. To know something, then, is to locate it somewhere – say, on a cognitive map,
somewhere in one’s worldview or one’s cultural landscape — and to understand it in that
context.
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Mack (2000a) wrote of the blurring of “boundaries [between] fantasy, metaphor and
actuality” as if it were a fact, a fact creating a need for “newer descriptive words” (p. 19).
“Ontological and linguistic categories,” he said, “fall so short as to leave us gasping for
new words” (p. 19). Ontology is typically defined as the philosophy of the nature of
being. Ontology appears to derive from a Greek word meaning “the things which exist.”
Mack said abductees experienced “ontological shock” (1994a, p. 26) upon accepting their
abduction experiences as real experiences, some sort of contact with an unknown reality
that required them to redefine the boundaries of what had previously constituted reality in
their worldview. Ontological shock is a philosophical term for the experience of
becoming aware — or altering one’s awareness, in this case — of the nature of being or
reality.2 This remapping of worldview, Mack claimed, required a concomitant remapping
of one’s conception of self, identity, in relation to the world (or cosmos).
“Phenomenology” is typically defined as a philosophy positing that reality consists of
objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of
anything independent of human consciousness. More simply, phenomenology can also
refer to a description, history, or explanation of phenomena. The term has a specific
medical definition as well: “the way in which one perceives and interprets events and
one's relationship to them in contrast both to one's objective responses to stimuli and to
any inferred unconscious motivation for one's behavior...a psychology based on the
theory that phenomenology determines behavior.” Mack employed this term in a way that
appeared to blend elements of the philosophical and medical definitions.
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As compared to the relatively clearly defined phenomenology, its root word
“phenomenon,” as noted above, has dozens of synonyms and a conflicting plethora of
meanings. The root of phenomenon is the Greek phainomenon, from phainesthai, “to
appear.” A phenomenon is typically defined as an occurrence or fact perceivable by the
senses, “a fact or event of scientific interest susceptible of scientific description and
explanation.” Another common meaning of phenomenon is an “unusual, significant, or
unaccountable fact or occurrence; a marvel.” Synonyms for phenomenon include:
abnormality, accident, adventure, anomaly, apparition, chance, delusion, display, event,
exception, experience, fantasy, hallucination, happening, illusion, materialization,
meaning, miracle, paradox, peculiarity, quirk, rarity, reality, revelation, show, sight, sign,
spectacle, symptom, thing, wonder. Considering the range of meanings embedded in
“phenomenon,” including “meaning” itself, it is no wonder why Mack was so fond of the
word. It provided plenty of room for exploration and interpretation of abduction. It is also
clear in the metatext examined for this analysis that for others, “phenomenon” had a more
limited range of meanings, restricted to the realm of physical reality perceivable by the
senses.
In communicating about abduction, Mack kept the epistemological door open by
employing a cluster of terms to maintain an attitude of ignorance: he insisted on “not
knowing,” he repeatedly called himself  “naïve” and “innocent.” Derived from the Latin
natives — meaning innate, natural, native — “naïve” ranges in meaning from natural,
unaffected, guileless, and artless to simple and unsophisticated to credulous and lacking
critical judgment. For Mack, “naïve” meant unaffected, guileless; for journalists, it meant
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credulous, uncritical. Some journalists accused him of being credulous, publicity-hungry
and profit-driven (e.g. Gleick, 1994; Rucker, 1994). Both “credibility” and “credulity”
convey meanings about belief and thus inject ambiguity into journalists’ texts. Credibility
is the quality, capability, or power to elicit belief; reliability or trustworthiness; or a
capacity for belief. The Latin root of credibility is credere, “to believe.” Credulity is a
disposition to believe too readily. The Latin root of credulity is credulitas, derived from
credulus, derived from credere, “to believe.” For journalists, Mack’s scientific credibility
was reliant on his cultural authority, typically defined by the Harvard-psychiatrist-
Pulitzer triad of terms. “Authority” is the power to enforce laws or exact obedience; to
command, determine, or judge; power to influence or persuade resulting from knowledge
or experience; “confidence derived from experience or practice”; self-assurance. An
authority is an accepted source of expert information or advice. The Latin root of
“authority” is auctor, meaning creator. Mack presented himself as an authority — and
while journalists questioned that authority, in the end they did not, perhaps could not,
demolish it.
The word “belief” played an important part in the metanarrative of Mack’s abduction
research. Mack “believes the experiencers, even if he can’t explain…what they
experience,” one reporter wrote (Thompson, 1994, p. 4A). For journalists, what Mack
thought about abduction became what he believed about abduction. Belief means the
acceptance of, or a conviction in, the truth, actuality, or validity of a thing — an idea, a
claim, a phenomenon. Definitions of belief range from “any cognitive content held as
true” to “a vague idea in which some confidence is placed”; “assent to a proposition or
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affirmation”; “the acceptance of a fact, opinion, or assertion as real or true, without
immediate personal knowledge”; confidence in the senses. (The legal definition of belief
is acceptance of the truth of something based on consideration of “the evidence.”)
Synonyms for belief range from faith or doctrine to expectation or outlook to hope,
assurance, and, most importantly, truth. “Truth” derives from the Old/Middle English
treowthe or trewthe, meaning loyalty. Truth can mean conformity to fact or actuality; a
statement proven to be or accepted as true; sincerity; integrity; conformity to rule. The
root of truth and the root of trust are related, and the meaning of trust is linked to the
meaning of belief. Trust is reliance on — belief in — the integrity, ability, or character of
a person or thing. To trust in something is to have faith in it.
Mack linked his abduction research with all of his previous — that is, all of his
sanctioned, published, recognized, authoritative — work with the word “identity.” The
“alien” in abduction is the dark side of identity, the Other. The Latin root of “alien” is
alius, meaning other. The most common meaning of “alien” is foreigner, an unfamiliar
person. (The Latin root of “foreign” is foras, meaning outside. Foreign typically means
from another place; it can also mean not natural or not relevant.) Alien can also be used
as a verb to mean “surrender.” Mack repeatedly said his primary interest — scientific,
therapeutic, personal, professional – was identity. He was quoted by one reporter saying
abduction had “implications for...our identity as a species” (Tery, 1992, p. 22).  He was
quoted by another saying “the abduction phenomenon...gets to the core of who we are,”
putting humanity “into a different universe” (Neimark, 1994, para. 11). But while a few
reporters explored Mack’s interest in identity, none made an explicit link between
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identity and abduction. This key word, “abduction,” derives from the Latin abducere, to
lead away. In this case abduction was a leading away, from the familiar physical world
for abductees, from the conventional scientific worldview and its physical limits on
reality for Mack, from the boundaries of legitimate scientific knowledge for journalists.
In common law “abduction” has a specific meaning: taking away a girl or woman without
her consent for the purpose of marriage or sexual intercourse. Mack associated abduction
with transformation and transcendence. Journalists associated it with forcible sex,
physical violation, transgression.
The term “sacred” is a good place to start in exploring that “mother cluster” of spirituality
terms. Sacred commonly means dedicated to worship of a deity. It can also mean
dedicated to a single person or purpose, worthy of respect, not profane or common. The
root of sacred is the Latin sacrare, from sacer, meaning holy and also meaning cursed.
For Mack, things sacred were things not corporeal, not rational, not known. Perhaps
journalists found Mack’s things sacred somehow cursed because they were not known.
Journalists are supposed to know; their cultural authority depends on it. They expect
scientists to know, too; it is the source of their authority as well. Mack’s term
“numinous” derives from the word numen, meaning a spirit of place, objects, or natural
phenomena; numen can also mean creative energy or genius. Numinous means
supernatural, spiritually elevated, divine. (The Latin root of these words is numin,
meaning a nod of the head….) Mack’s term “ensouled” means endowed with a soul;
placed, received, or cherished in the soul. The origin of “soul,” from which ensouled
derives, appears to be as uncertain as current understanding of “soul” appears to be….
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Conventions and interests: more on core texts
A few core texts published in top-tier elite media are analyzed in greater depth here to
explore further the rhetorical ambiguity that characterized this case. Information I
gathered in interviews with some of the authors of these texts (See Appendix B) sheds
light on how journalists’ personal and professional values and beliefs can distinguish
their stories and how editors and sources can influence story content and structure. (I
should note here that my findings in each of these interviews were both predictable — for
instance, in revealing how journalistic conventions drove the framing of stories — and
unexpected — in showing how individual as well as professional interests can affect
media content. I also should note that the fact that I identified myself as a former
journalist as well as an academic researcher when arranging these interviews may have
affected how both journalists and scientists responded to my questions.) These detailed
analyses are especially revealing of how the everyday world of conventions and routines
is intertwined with the symbolic realm of meaning making.
Freelance writer Sara Tery, author of the Boston Globe’s Sunday magazine profile of
Mack, is a former staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor who also has written for
The New York Times Magazine. In an interview with me (see Appendix B) she said she
specialized in cultural criticism. Her assignments from the Globe magazine were
typically stories she pitched to the editor, she told me, but in this case it was the editor
who pitched the Mack story to her. This editor did not have a particular take on the Mack
story and wanted Tery to explore it.  “I think there was something unique to my
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personality” that made it possible to communicate well with Mack — perhaps the fact
that she was a Christian Scientist, Tery proposed. “I’ve lived a life where things deemed
physically impossible” are accepted as possible — healing, for example. “I’ve seen cases
where disease was present, and then it was gone – I can explain it to you…but it requires
a basis of reasoning that is spiritual.” She said skeptics of Christian Science healing
techniques had not examined them. She told Mack about her Christian Science
background in the course of their interview. “I had a real sense of conscience, almost a
moral concern” about the way she would treat the subject of Mack’s abduction research.
“I wasn’t going to do a rah-rah piece,” she said, but she was “willing to hear what he had
to say,” and she told Mack she thought he had a right to tell his story.
Mack was wary of reporters, Tery said, and told her he would not talk with her if she
planned to interview skeptics who had been criticizing his abduction work; Mack claimed
none of them had looked at the research and therefore should not be commenting on it.
Her editor, however, told her that she needed to include some skeptical views in her
story. She told Mack about this directive and agreed to find an “agnostic” expert source
to talk with. “I thought it was a far more interesting way to tell the story, to find someone
who was being persuaded” rather than someone who flatly rejected Mack’s work. Tery
ended up quoting Harvard’s Edward Khantzian as an expert source, for balance. “I did
call” some of Mack’s critics, Tery said, and she found they had not read anything about
Mack’s work; she observed that she thought it wasn’t fair for these critics to disguise
uninformed opinions as scientific assessments. She told me she was sensitive to the fact
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that she was writing her story for an elite media outlet and knew the sources that she cited
might subsequently be used by other journalists as authoritative sources.
“This man’s a psychiatrist,” Tery said, and “I think he deserved a fair hearing…not to be
ridiculed.” She said she believed Mack believed something had happened to abductees,
“and conventional science didn’t explain” it. Science doesn’t have all the answers, she
said; there is an “arrogance to the idea that we know everything.” Tery said her father,
who worked with the U.S. space program, used to tell her that he thought it was
incredibly arrogant for us to think we were the only intelligent life in the universe. She
described Mack’s work as “symptomatic of the post-Reformation movement in thinking
and science and reason” and said, “I think John Mack’s work frightens the people who
draw the cloak of scientific authority around them.” She told me she felt “very proud
about keeping an open mind” in writing the Mack story, avoiding the knee-jerk, right-
wrong, approach to considering the reality of abduction. (The far more interesting issue,
she added, was whether Mack was making people change their minds.) She said she
probably would not have accepted an assignment to write about a lesser figure in
abduction research, say, Budd Hopkins. Mack loved the article, she said. “There’s
probably a lot in that article that’s directed to my own feelings about science and the
search for truth,” she acknowledged, and she told me she believed her article helped set
the tone for future media coverage of Mack. Perhaps Tery did set the tone for other
coverage, given that her story framed Mack as a stereotypically heroic scientist, a lone
explorer on a quest into unknown, “alien territory,” as the headline of her story called it.
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Writing to a different audience, freelancer Jill Neimark (1994) structured her story about
Mack for Psychology Today as an in-depth examination of the validity of the idea of
repressed and recovered memory and the method of hypnosis. Her story was also an epic
tale about the yet-unfinished journey of a heroic figure. Following a tradition in science
journalism, Neimark heroicized Mack as a scientist and a spiritual leader: she framed him
as one of Harvard’s best and brightest — a significant claim given Harvard’s high status
in elite science, “a high priest at a most sanctified temple of science: Harvard Medical
School…a high-profile idealist…a man with a halo of perfection about him, an honorable
man given to just causes, a man with reputation for kindness” (para. 32).
While my efforts to obtain an interview with Neimark were unsuccessful, her journalistic
oeuvre3 reveals something about her interests and hints at why she may have approached
Mack as she did in her story, and perhaps even why she took on the assignment. For
Psychology Today, Neimark has also written about Harvard sociobiologist Edward O.
Wilson, dreaming, the psychology of memory, and psychologist Elizabeth Loftus
(Neimark, 1996) (whom Neimark tagged “the diva of disclosure,” an expert on
“memory’s malleability…stand[ing] at the highly charged center of…the war over
memory” (para. 1)). Neimark has also served as a contributing editor for Science & Spirit
magazine.
In her story on Mack, Neimark appeared less interested in his abduction research than in
what she characterized as the “furor” it had generated among other scientists involved in
what she called “a war over the nature of memory, and access routes to it, particularly
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hypnosis” (para. 9)  — a furor she herself was helping to construct. She placed Mack in a
battle, but she made him somehow bullet-proof: “he shrugs off the controversy” (para.
11), responds to protests with a “helpless shrug” (para. 53) and displays “an almost
bedazzled helplessness” (para. 14), she wrote. As she further explored this alleged furor,
Neimark engaged in some obvious boundary-work by marginalizing hypnosis as a
scientific method, reporting that Mack’s use of the method “enrages some psychologists,
because it opens a very dark Pandora’s box” (para. 42). In keeping with this murky
metaphor, Neimark ended her text with ambiguity: the flawed hero of her story had not
been able to complete his journey and bring back the knowledge we need, she concluded,
“even though he could” (para. 60). Neimark said “the issue is not whether Mack is right
or wrong, but that he has abdicated scientific objectivity” by adopting methods that
“preclude...getting an answer” (para. 50). While Neimark did not explain in her story how
Mack “could” solve the mystery of abduction, readers might reasonably conclude that
this “high priest” should possess the tools to do the job.
Neimark took a superficially critical stance in her story, maintaining the posture of a
proper journalist. She criticized what she called Mack’s unabashed bias, but she was
intrigued by his exploration of the borderlands where science and spirituality make
contact, and ultimately she depicted Mack as a heroic figure. Embedding him in the upper
echelons of the scientific establishment, she wrote that Mack is not “your garden-variety
shrink” and said he compared himself with “Simmel’s...’Stranger,’ the marginal man who
participates in the culture but is not part of it” (para. 16). She described Mack’s tenure at
Cambridge Hospital as a “major departure from the beaten track” (para. 18), his book
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about Lawrence as “another departure” (para. 19), and she cited other examples of what
she depicted as departures from scientific convention, including his involvement in
“nuclear disarmament, global peace, and conservation” (para. 20), his interest in
“alternative approaches to consciousness” (para. 21) and his “final break with tradition”
(para. 21) — using holotropic breathwork as a method of recovering repressed memories.
She thus set the stage for abduction research as a logical next step in his heroic journey.
Mack was “now an explorer of consciousness, at play in the fields of the universe” (para.
26), Neimark wrote. She quoted Mack: “’Some other intelligence is reaching out to us.
It’s the most exciting work I’ve ever done....  I’m shocked in a way to hear myself saying
such things. But I’ve been as careful as possible to exhaust conventional explanations’”
(para. 5). Neimark associated Mack’s foray into abduction research with a spiritual quest,
“seeking God” (para. 2), and she linked it to “a battle...a war over the nature of memory”
(para. 9), locating his work in a place where heroic acts typically take place.
Stephen Rae’s (1994) profile of Mack for The New York Times Magazine was
superficially a tart critique of a flaky scientist with a questionable agenda. But the
underlying story appeared to be, like Neimark’s (1994) story, a sort of heroic epic. Rae’s
story opened, like many reports on Mack’s research, with an account of abduction laced
with terms of sexual violation. It quickly zeroed in on Mack’s transgression of the
boundaries of objective scientific knowledge: Mack’s interest in abduction stories “would
not have caused a stir.  Except that he believed them” (paras.4- 5). In this story “the
tapestry unfolded” (para. 2), leading readers through the looking glass, as it were, into a
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world of weird science. Rae identified Mack, the protagonist in this drama, as a character
worth watching: a man “with credentials,” (para. 6); a diplomat, do-gooder (para. 11),
“emerging activist” (para. ); a “quixotic figure” (para. 9) (noble, idealistic and
impractical);  “a seeker” (para. 11) on a “quest” (para. 12) down “heretical paths” (para.
12). Rae placed Mack on stage, then, as a larger-than-life figure on a mythical journey of
departure, from the institution of psychoanalysis and the conventional boundaries of
science; initiation, into unfamiliar realities and spiritualities; and return, or emergence
from his explorations with new insights.
“Mack is increasingly being compared,” Rae reported (though he did not specify where
or by whom) “to Timothy Leary, who gave LSD for homework and was dismissed from
Harvard” (para. 29). Rae noted that at times Mack’s “colleagues...feared he had gone
mad” (para. 8) and that Mack was “predisposed to seeing entities” (para. 18). He reported
that an anonymous “friend” had called Mack’s work an “obsession” and “raise[d] the
specter of Wilhelm Reich, the psychiatrist whose notions about orgone energy destroyed
his career” (para. 31). Rae described Mack’s methods of holotropic breathwork and
hypnosis as “us[ing] Eastern breathing techniques and percussive music to produce LSD-
like changes in consciousness” (para. 14) and helping people “recover memories
in...screamathons” (para. 23). But in tandem with this critique, Rae, like Neimark (1994),
framed Mack as a man on a spiritual quest. He reported that Mack had “plunged into
Eastern philosophy and shamanism” (para. 16) and quoted a colleague of Mack who had
described his abduction research as “’part of an ongoing search that he’s had for issues he
defines as spiritual’” (para. 28). Toward the end of his story Rae quoted an alleged
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abductee: “’Did John’s spiritual bent affect all of us, or did our experiences influence
him?… Is it real?…. How much of my memories are real?’” (paras. 48-49). Rae declared
early on in his story that it was a “given that Mack’s ‘Abduction’ is likely to obscure all
his past accomplishments” (para. 11). But ultimately he constructed a text that
highlighted rather than obscured Mack’s achievements and left readers in the end with an
image of Mack moving forward— still a Harvard expert, still doing research, still on a
quest — and an image of abduction claims as questionable but not discredited.
In an interview with me (see Appendix B), Rae, a freelance writer, disclosed interests that
influenced his choice of subject and his treatment of it as well. “I’m drawn to fringe
subjects and write a lot about cults,” he said. “I also write on psychiatry…. I broke into
print with a funny ‘My Turn’ column in Newsweek and two op-ed pieces in the Times, so
I have a strong voice and sense of humor, which I try to bring to all my reporting…. I’m
a generalist with a science sideline.” Rae said he had written many stories about
psychology and psychiatry, “especially aberrant psychology…. I don’t know if I’d call it
an expertise, but I have a background in delusional thinking. I’m fairly well versed in the
literature of false-memory syndrome. I…read medical journals, including those of
psychiatry.” Rae told me he had “always been interested in UFOs. It seemed to me that
everyone who claimed to have seen one — including police officers and pilots —
couldn’t all be hallucinating, or seeing the planet Venus…. They didn’t like to talk about
it, but a cousin’s parents saw something in their…yard that left a burnt circle of earth.
These are not flakey people…. I thought that, given my sympathies, I could write a fair
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story. I never thought of it as a ‘science’ story.” He said he had written about abduction
before, in an article for Cosmopolitan on what he called “psychic trends.”
“I was at Harvard in the days after Timothy Leary, and I’d heard about Mack’s work,”
Rae said. “I wondered how staid Harvard was dealing with him. I suspected I’d find
conflict, always good in a story, and a colorful central character in Mack.” Focusing on
Mack in a story pegged to the publication of Abduction “could be a good way to upscale
the whole UFO abduction phenomenon for the Times.” Rae said he chose his sources for
his story through personal contacts and suggestions from Mack’s staff. “One of the most
telling things to me as a reporter was how many of the people Mack steered me to
wouldn’t talk to me,” he noted, “and I was persistent…. I knew I’d need to speak with a
debunker, so I called Philip Klass, whom I think I’d interviewed previously…. I knew I
had to speak with psychiatrists, including those in the field of false-memory syndrome.
Carl Sagan had written about UFO abduction [in Parade magazine] and knew Mack, so it
made sense to call him.” Rae told me he mapped out his story in consultation with an
editor: “you have to introduce Mack. You have to present his work, hopefully with a
human face. You have to show others in his department at Harvard and the larger world
responding to his work…. You have to quote his bosses at Harvard. You must raise the
issue of academic freedom, you need the voice of an abductee who claims to have been
helped by Mack. And then you have to put Mack in a larger context. Once you have the
outline, it just becomes a matter of filling in the best data…. I had a lot of trouble
focusing my material, my editors were very demanding, but ultimately…the story read as
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I’d intended — with fondness and charity, I think, toward Mack, if leaving the reader
with the idea that he may have taken too much LSD.”
Boston Globe staff reporter Joseph Kahn (1994) wrote a story for his paper on the
publicity Mack was receiving for Abduction. The Globe assigned him to write this story,
Kahn said in an interview with me (see Appendix B), because Mack was a high-profile
local figure in the Boston-Cambridge community, attached to high-profile Harvard, and
“there was a buzz around Mack’s book.” The paper likes to cover local authors before
they get a lot of publicity elsewhere, he told me. Kahn said he reported for the
“living/arts” section of the Globe; he did not cover a specific beat but did do a lot of
author interviews. He also noted that he often takes a whimsical or skeptical view in his
stories; he called it his personal style. Kahn said his editor asked him if he wanted to do a
story about Mack, and “I know a little bit about the subject” of abduction because “I
know Budd Hopkins,” he told me, through family connections. Kahn said he had not
written about Hopkins’ work with abductees but had talked with Hopkins about it. He
said his mission in writing the Mack story was to take Mack’s book seriously but
skeptically.
Kahn told me Mack took the stance that he believed abductees believed they were
abducted; “sounds great,” but Kahn wondered whether this was the sort of help these
people needed. He considered the possibility that Mack’s research might be “junk
science,” benign or otherwise. “One of the things that intrigued me” about both Hopkins
and Mack, Kahn said, was that they had made their reputations through other endeavors
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(art for Hopkins) before they began working with abductees. “They didn’t need this” to
validate themselves as professionals. Kahn told me he had read Abduction before
interviewing Mack. At the time of that interview, Time had not yet published its Mack
story (Willwerth, 1994), and Kahn said neither he nor Mack knew it was about to come
out. After the Time story was published, Kahn interviewed key Time source Donna
Bassett and author James Willwerth and talked with Mack again to update his story
before publication. (While many other journalists cited Time’s story in critiquing Mack,
Kahn alone quoted Willwerth as well as Bassett in his story.)
Kahn told me he thought it significant that Bassett found Mack gullible enough to accept
her phony abduction story. He recalled that someone at the Globe might have known
Bassett’s husband and helped track her down for an interview. His editor’s most
noticeable influence on his story, Kahn said, was the direction to cover Time’s story in it.
“I didn’t think that that I was writing a negative piece,” he said, but he indicated that if he
had a chance to do it over again he might shade some things in the story more
sympathetically or cynically. Kahn said he did not write the headline (“E.T. phone
Harvard…”) for his story. “To my surprise,” Kahn said, Mack’s PEER group liked his
story and invited him to participate in a panel discussion with Mack and a local TV
reporter on media coverage of abduction research. “It went okay”; the event was open to
the public but did not draw a big crowd, he told me.4
Boston Herald staff reporter Stephanie Schorow’s (1997) story on Mack reflected the
contrast between the Herald’s style and the Globe’s style and also her own personal style
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and interests. In an interview with me (see Appendix B), Schorow said she was a former
Associated Press reporter and a soft-news writer, not a science writer, at the Herald. In
her story Schorow framed a local event billed as a “dialogue” between Mack and Budd
Hopkins as a conflict. The Herald headlined the event as a “battle of the UFO titans”;
Schorow introduced it as “a close encounter of the academic kind” (p. 1). In our
interview Schorow said she had been assigned to report on this local event “to fill a hole”
in the Herald’s Sunday edition; her editor had decided “it looked like a Herald-esque
story.” (Her story ran on page one.) She told me she had always been “fascinated” by
“this stuff” – aliens and UFOs; she mentioned that her office was full of UFO books, and
she described the UFO phenomenon as thoroughly ingrained in contemporary culture.
While attending Northwestern University, she told me, she had taken a “stars for jocks”
course taught by astronomer and UFOlogist J. Allen Hynek (the well known head of the
Center for UFO Research at Northwestern — see Chapter 7). Hynek had finished up that
course with a lecture on the UFO phenomenon, she said, noting that she had “loved” the
course. “I do a lot of wacky stories,” she said; “I’ve developed this reputation” based on
an interest in science fiction and ‘Star Trek’.”
In journalism, Schorow told me, “you risk ridicule from your colleagues unless you inject
a note of skepticism in what you write.”  So she took a skeptical stance toward the Mack-
Hopkins event, according to convention, and a humorous stance, too, according to her
own style. She said she had heard a lot of joking about the conference so she felt okay
about making her story amusing. It was a feature, not news, so it had to be “readable,”
she noted.
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Schorow also told me that at the Herald, “we always like to dig Harvard.” She said she
was looking for a different angle on this story, not the standard are-they-real-or-are-they-
not angle; she decided the difference of opinion between Hopkins and Mack was worth
focusing on. “What I tried to do was give a fair shake to each person’s position…to
present what I saw there” and interpret it. Hopkins is not a scientist and he has no
objectivity, Schorow said; Mack believes abductees have had real experiences, and “I
don’t see why we can’t give [Mack] the benefit of the doubt.”
Two key reviews
I am examining reviews of Abduction published in the Boston Globe (Miles, 1994) and
The New Republic (Gleick, 1994) at length in this analysis because Mack singled them
out for response in the revised paperback edition of Abduction. These texts (see Appendix
C) were key rhetorical moments in The Case of the Deviant Doctor. The book review
format freed their authors from the constraints of a variety of journalistic conventions —
the standard who-what-when-where narrative structure, the requirement of objectivity,
the need for fair and balanced treatment. The moral of Gleick’s review was that Mack
was a dangerous player in the memory wars and had to be stopped. Miles’s moral was
that Mack was doing a dangerous deed by blurring the boundary between science and
religion. Both had plenty of complaints about Mack’s book (and both excoriated his
writing style), but what they were primarily concerned about was Mack’s authority, or
more precisely what they perceived to be his abuse of it. Gleick’s review, taking the form
of a victimage ritual, receives special consideration, as it calls out for a comic corrective.
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For the Globe’s music-critic-turned-book-reviewer Milo Miles (1994), Mack’s Abduction
was worth writing about because Mack had credibility. In his first paragraph Miles
associated a cluster of credibility terms with Mack: “reputation,” “top Harvard
psychiatrist,” “Pulitzer Prize,” “among the most prestigious authors to champion
extraterrestrial visits as factual,” “his studies of nightmares...revered among
professionals,” “founded the psychiatry department of [Harvard’s] Cambridge Hospital”
(p. B15).  Miles rebuked Mack for engaging in memory recovery, acting more like a guru
than a psychiatrist, and blurring the boundaries between science and spirituality,
objectivity and subjectivity — all unacceptable activities for a legitimate, let alone elite
legitimate, scientist. For Miles, Mack’s “crossing over” (p. B15) was a transgression.
Standing on the wrong side of the tracks dividing science and non-science, Mack “relies
on no more valid evidence than a supermarket tabloid would,” Miles argued,
“immediately tosses logic and science overboard” and just as casually “breezes past the
issue [of “furious controversy” over repressed memory and “brushes...aside...earthly
explanations” (P. B15). In the penultimate paragraph of his review, Miles stated the
purpose of his text: to censure Mack for violating the sacred boundary between science
and religion. “The secular world and the spirit world must be kept as separate as church
and state in a free society,” Miles wrote. “Lucid reasoning is endangered,” and “the post-
scientific subjectivity [Mack] advocates is so slippery it could just as easily become a tool
of fear and violence as of spiritual unity.” Miles concluded, “Mack should beware that if
rationality and objective truth are thrown out the door, no one can predict what will rush
in” (P. B17).5
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In his 4,612-word review of Abduction for The New Republic, James Gleick enacted a
rhetorical victimage ritual disguised as a book review. Gleick has journalistic authority:
he made his reputation as a science writer for The New York Times, and, like Mack, he is
a graduate of Harvard and a best-selling author (see Chapter 5). He deployed his cultural
authority to propel the polemic he constructed, condemning Mack for his trespasses of
the boundaries of science. He rejected Mack’s worldview, methods, and claims about
abduction, identifying himself, and thus his readers, with legitimate, rational science and
scientists and identifying Mack and his abduction research with an oppositional, irrational
community of “alien abduction mythology,” “anti-science cults,” “tawdry belief manias,”
“paranormals...crystal healers [and] psychic crime solvers” (para. 5). Gleick began his
polemic with a story about gullible “Marks” and street-wise “Smarts” to establish that
“Smarts know” and “Marks believe” (para. 1) and to declare Mack a Mark posing as a
Smart (and, by implication, himself an outright Smart). He concluded his polemic by
observing that “by and large, the Smarts aren’t interested in arguing with the Marks”
(para. 48)— which is what he himself appeared to be doing in his text. Gleick made
Mack worthy of attack by noting that he had “authority” (para. 20). Gleick framed Mack
as a questionable authority by avoiding direct recitation of Mack’s credentials,
identifying him only “as his book jacket labels him” (para. 2). Gleick framed Mack as a
scientist who was engaging in theatrics rather than science and an authority who was
breaking rather than enforcing the rules.
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In this polemic Mack stood for Harvard’s scientific authority (in addition to criticizing
Mack’s abduction research, Gleick also criticized him for putting “his Harvard Medical
School imprimatur” (para. 18) on the results of a 1991 Roper poll about abduction), and
Gleick made himself and his readers victims of Mack’s breach of his responsibilities as a
scientific authority. Gleick charged Mack with violating numerous social contracts: with
the science community, tasking him with reinforcing its sanctioned conception of reality
(what Mack himself called consensus reality); with journalists, the public, and even his
own clients, requiring him to provide “expert” facts and truth. Mack’s failures to live up
to these contractual responsibilities rendered “all of us more vulnerable to faith-healers
and Holocaust-deniers” (para. 5), Gleick wrote.
In his review Gleick created a screen of power terms associating Mack with authority,
Harvard, status, medicine, “professional trappings” (para. 20) and the Pulitzer Prize. He
then constructed an opposing screen of power terms, conveying the idea of violation, to
direct readers’ attention away from Mack’s authority and toward what he argued was
Mack’s transgression of the boundaries of legitimate science, his “blurring [of]
distinctions between real knowledge and phony knowledge” (para. 5), his breach of
authority, even his violation of the Hippocratic oath to do no harm. In constructing his
victimage ritual Gleick employed two key interlinking associational clusters, making
Mack and his abduction research theater — a sham — and also a violation — a shame.
He dismissed Mack’s work as fiction, mythology, entertainment, demarcating it from
science; and he deemed Mack a fake — a gullible believer posing as an expert, a
theatrical performer posing as a scientist.
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Gleick censured Mack for reporting his research to a mass-market audience, talking about
it on “Oprah” and “48 Hours” and “in supermarket tabloids” (para. 4) — making it
theater, not science. He accused Mack of attempting “to cash in” (para. 8) on popular
interest in aliens. And he dismissed Mack’s use of hypnosis as theater, not science,
calling it “a fringe practice...as useful to carnival magicians and moviemakers as to
clinical psychiatrists...a conspiracy between hypnotist and willing subject” (para. 26).
Gleick peppered his victimage ritual with references to sexual violations reported in
abduction stories: “extraterrestrial sex abuse” (para. 31), “harrowing descriptions of rape
and torture” (para. 36), “cosmic rapists,” (para. 3) “gangs of alien sex abusers” (para. 8),
“little gray rapists…galactic sex crime” (para. 9), “the one-sexual-fantasy-after-another-
as-told-to-me genre…sex in a ‘pod’” (para. 22), and so on. He accused Mack of invading
clients’ minds by implanting traumatic memories under hypnosis, and he used images of
sexual violation to highlight his concerns about Mack’s claims of recovering repressed
memories. In this victimage ritual Gleick made Mack’s work akin to rape by claiming the
probing of memories violated clients’ privacy, safety, security, identity and mental well-
being. He censured Mack for numerous violations of scientific standards of evidence,
methods, and corroboration, coupling these transgressions of the ethos and the boundaries
of science with yet more images of sexual violation.
In constructing Mack’s research as non-scientific, Gleick drew the boundaries of what he
considered legitimate science. Mack “doesn’t provide information about his hypnotic
techniques,” Gleick wrote, and:
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Provides no data from psychological tests.... There is nothing remotely resembling
a control...no explanation of how he selected [his] case studies...it’s never clear
where Mack finds his subjects.... Mack’s anecdotal descriptions give only a
cardboard sense of who they are...there is little to flesh out his sweeping claim
(paras. 29-30).
Gleick located Mack atop a “new wave of marketing the abduction myth” (para. 6)
instead of doing science. He associated Mack’s abduction research with popular culture,
not “respectable” science. Gleick depicted Mack as a boundary-transgressing Harvard
professor who, as a member of the “Smart” community, should “know better” (para. 5).
In defense of the boundaries of conventional science, Gleick condemned the blurring of
boundaries between fiction and fact. In opening and closing his story, he made the claim
that the abduction phenomenon was “a leading case of the anti-rational, anti-science cults
that are flourishing with dismaying vigor” (para. 5), he wrote. “The blurring of
distinctions between real knowledge and phony knowledge” is “a dangerous trend” (para.
5), he wrote; “outside of hard science, too many academics have fallen into the literary
conceit that anyone’s version of reality is as valid as anyone else’s” (para. 49).
Gleick took a stand in the memory wars by emphatically rejecting the idea of repressed
and recovered memory, linking it with “UFO-obsessed therapists” (para. 27). Mack did
not know that people have been abducted, Gleick asserted: he believed it. Gleick depicted
Mack’s suggestion that abduction might have a spiritual element as another violation of
the boundaries of science, this time that sacred boundary keeping science separated from
religion. Gleick made the case that science is about knowledge and religion is about
belief, and he deemed belief in abduction “antiscience” and “antirational” (para. 5). He
made Mack an “unrepentant” sinner who refused to confess that his work was tainted by
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“contaminating influences” (para. 35). Gleick made Mack a scapegoat for all challengers
of the boundaries of science, likening him to every kind of trespasser from “faith healers”
to “Holocaust-deniers” (para. 5), covering a broad spread of scientific boundary
violations.
Gleick wrapped up his review by challenging the idea that there might be “something
clinically respectable” (para. 47) about the study of abduction. Decrying an attitude he
described as “anything goes these days in the mental health business” (para. 46), he
concluded his review by censuring Mack once more for his breach of authority, with this
assertion: “Memories can’t be trusted...we are susceptible to suggestion…. The painful
irony is that of all the people...who should know these lessons and articulate them for the
rest of us, none are better placed than professors of psychiatry” (para. 53-54).
In an interview with me (see Appendix B), Gleick said he wrote his review of Mack’s
book because “I was angry about the [media] coverage” it was receiving. “I knew this
was garbage, and I was frustrated that the press was institutionally unable to say, ‘It’s
garbage’…. Journalists ought to be responsible,” he said, for knowing the difference
between science and non-science. Gleick told me he was especially angered by The New
York Times Book Review’s treatment of Abduction (Gordon, 1994), because, he claimed,
the reviewer took the book seriously. Gleick, like Mack a Harvard alumnus (he is a 1976
graduate of Harvard College), said he solicited the book-review assignment. “I had
actually met Mack,” at a Harvard event, “so I knew about him.” Gleick said he was
“interested in pseudoscience,” and “I thought I could write a fun and intelligent review.”
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(Gleick has posted his review on a personal Web site he maintains.) “You can’t convince
people” that work such as abduction research is pseudoscientific by writing an article
about it, he told me. “I’m not sure it’s possible” to dissuade believers of pseudoscience,”
he said; it was his choice to use the book-review format in making his case….
A comic corrective?
Gleick used his book-review format as a foundation for constructing a frame of rejection,
a victimage ritual. “Frames stressing the ingredient of rejection tend to lack the well-
rounded quality of a complete here-and-now philosophy,” Burke (1984) observed; they
caricature their subjects and “make for fanaticism” (p. 28). Gleick’s victimage ritual did,
indeed, attempt to caricature Mack, as a “mark,” a huckster, a gullible believer. Gleick’s
stabs at humor were of the mean-spirited sort (not uncommon in journalism these days, I
would observe); they were not comic in the Burkean sense. Burke believed criticism was
inherently comic, and he believed the comic frame more useful “for the handling of
human relationships” (1984, pp. 106-107). The comic frame is “charitable, but...not
gullible,” he said, it is humane and accepting, depicting people “not as vicious but as
mistaken” (p. 41). Ambivalence — a notion compatible with Mack’s fuzzy boundaries of
reality but incompatible with Gleick’s conventional hard boundaries of reality — is “an
essential comic notion” that “provides the charitable attitude towards people that is
required for purposes of persuasion and cooperation,” Burke said (p. 166).
While Gleick’s victimage ritual did pack some rhetorical punch, it was confusing. Gleick
labeled Mack a “Mark” — a dupe who cannot distinguish fantasy from reality —
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“masquerading as a Smart” — someone who can distinguish fantasy from reality but also
enjoy the fantasy as entertainment. And yet Gleick was ultimately unable to make the
case that Mack was a Mark, not a Smart. Mack’s authority was too durable for Gleick to
dismantle. Indeed, Gleick’s victimage ritual depended on the assumption that Mack was a
legitimate scientific authority. Mack was flouting authority, Gleick claimed, and he was
getting away with it because he himself was an authority. Gleick’s positivistic frame of
rejection did not accommodate non-visible, non-material, non-measurable things, so he
declared abduction unreal and those who claim it possible wrong, and he depicted Mack
in violation of public trust for his claims. In his view Mack had failed to live up to his
credentials — but in the end he made a case for Mack’s maintenance of credibility,
arguing that psychiatrists were best qualified to address the “phenomenon.”
In light of his own apparent embrace of the conventional scientific worldview, however,
Gleick might be persuaded to agree that posing questions and formulating hypotheses are
standard elements of scientific method. He might agree that the aim of science is to make
known the unknown. Mack was asking questions and formulating hypotheses in an
attempt to explain a phenomenon that no one understands; he proposed that abduction
might be a clue to a mystery worth solving. Gleick asserted that there is no phenomenon
and therefore no mystery.  But in spite of Gleick’s efforts to marginalize Mack’s
research, a mystery remained, and Mack was arguably taking a scientific approach to
solving it. In the conventional scientific worldview, disagreement with a theory or a
finding does not warrant dismissal; an alternative theory or finding must be offered that
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ultimately can stand up to scrutiny. What Gleick attempted in his victimage ritual was to
dismiss Mack’s theories and findings because he did not like them.
Gleick oversimplified the abduction phenomenon by declaring it a fantasy — not real and
thus not requiring explanation. He foregrounded both Mack’s willingness to believe and
the prevalence of sexual violations in abduction accounts to justify his frame of rejection.
But Gleick’s victimage ritual diverted attention from at least two points that warrant
attention, from scientists, journalists, and the public. One, trivializing the abduction
phenomenon and blaming Mack for encouraging public interest in it enabled Gleick to
skirt around a question worth attempting to answer: why are abduction stories so
prevalent in our culture, why do we pay attention to them, and what do they mean? And
two, oversimplifying Mack’s views and blaming him for undermining the authority of
science enabled Gleick to avoid addressing where exactly the boundaries of science
should lie and who should be able to participate in defining them. Gleick was defending
the conventional scientific worldview, as communication researchers have found
journalists typically do. But was he considering why he was doing so?
The tragic frame of rejection Gleick employed located Mack’s abduction research outside
the boundaries of legitimate science. Inside those boundaries, reality is material and
observable, thus knowable and predictable. Mack’s boundary-stretching perspective was
strategically ambiguous, providing a frame of acceptance for a conception of reality both
bounded and unbounded, material and immaterial, predictable and unpredictable,
observable and unobservable, knowable and unknowable. Gleick explicitly challenged
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Mack’s expanded scientific worldview by claiming that he “should know better” (para.
X). Mack said abduction warrants study. Gleick called it fantasy, mania, a craze not
worth a legitimate scientist’s attention.  Mack claimed his motive for studying the
abduction phenomenon was scientific curiosity and a desire to help troubled people.
Gleick said Mack was “toying” with his clients, motivated by a desire for profit.
Mack (1995) characterized the conventional scientific worldview as a threat to scientific
progress, excluding as it does “human consciousness and experience as legitimate ways
of knowing about reality” (pp. x-xi). Mack (1994a) suggested broadening the frame to
accommodate experience, including abduction. He could choose, he said:
Either to stretch and twist psychology beyond reasonable limits, overlooking
aspects of the phenomenon that could not be explained psychologically...i.e. to
keep insisting on a psychosocial explanation consistent with the prevailing
Western scientific ideology [or] open to the possibility that our consensus
framework of reality is too limited and that a phenomenon such as this cannot be
explained within its ontological parameters.  In other words, a new scientific
paradigm might be necessary in order to understand what was going on (p. 20).
But while attempting to broaden his frame, at the same time Mack described his work as
real and legitimate science by conventional standards: maintaining objectivity, using
sound methods, attempting to falsify claims, and submitting data to peer review. Mack
asserted in Psychological Inquiry (McLeod, Corbisier, & Mack, 1996) that the discourse
on abduction was:
Skewed due to a lack of first-hand clinical information and to cultural biases to
which we all are vulnerable....  An adequate analysis of subjective abduction
experience should be corroborated across reporters, should predict the form of
future reports, and should predict the general future behaviors of the persons
involved (p. 160).
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He explained in Abduction (1995): “I am reporting the experiences of the abductees as
told to me and not presuming that everything they say is literally true....  [T]he objective
distance between me and the experiences...should be understood” (p. ix)  He depended on
the standard vocabulary of science: “Efforts to establish a pattern of psychopathology....
Psychological testing...has not revealed evidence...that could account for... reported
experiences....  My own sample demonstrates…” (p. 4)  He took a disinterested rhetorical
stance: “As personal reports are our principal source of knowledge...we must be
especially rigorous in evaluating their authenticity, affective intensity, and consistency
...as well as the motivation, skepticism, believability and sincerity of the reporter....” (p.
424)
By attempting simultaneously to expand and confine his perspective, Mack disturbed the
boundaries of science without necessarily extending them. Mack was not able to persuade
his critics to adopt a broader perspective on reality. A comic corrective to Gleick’s
victimage ritual and other debunking efforts would provide an expanded perspective on
reality that would be better than other, more narrow perspectives because it would
explain more and exclude less; it would be more useful, not “either-or” but “both-and.”
Such a corrective would enable both Gleick and Mack to maintain their own cultural
authority while respecting the other’s authority. Such a frame ideally would
accommodate all questions that might be asked. Gleick’s concern was knowledge, while
Mack’s concern was understanding.  Gleick expected his scientific authorities to employ
crisply drawn cognitive maps, depicting exactly what is “there” and “real.”  Mack
deemed such maps incomplete and called for new ones. A comic corrective to Gleick’s
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victimage ritual would posit that reality is not absolute but evolving, that it is what one
needs to know in order to get along. Such a corrective would provide a new cognitive
map that would point the way toward the kind of knowing that may answer the question
“what is there?” without actually putting the knowledge of “everything” on the map.
Scientific worldviews are “perspectives”; motives derive from perspectives, and actions
derive from motives (Burke, 1984, p. 92). Gleick depicted Mack’s post-positivistic
worldview as a threat to the positivistic worldview — represented by rationality itself —a
threat to its explanatory authority, the cultural authority of the scientific establishment,
the power to explain everything. But Mack did not reject the positivistic worldview — he
proposed that it might be inadequate to explain all there is. In the positivistic worldview,
truth cannot be relative, and relativism — the idea that true and absolute knowledge of
reality is impossible because knowledge is contextual — is anathema to science. The
word “absolute” — derived from the Latin absolutus, meaning “to set free” — has come
to mean perfect, unerring, certain. (One synonym for “absolute” is “God.”) “Relative” is
typically opposed to “absolute” and tends to convey the idea of imperfection, error,
uncertainty. However, relative can also mean relational, related to. Although Burke
asserted that he was not a relativist, his conception of knowledge as both contextual and
true to the nature of reality is a relative conception in this sense. The key to constructing a
comic corrective to Gleick’s critique is to explain how the two are linked.
Transformation and transcendence occurs, as Burke (1969a) noted, in areas of ambiguity.
In attempting to transcend the apparent dichotomy of absolutism and relativism, it is
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worth considering not only that “relative” can mean relevant and pertinent but also that
“transcendence” derives from the Latin word meaning “to climb across.” Haraway (1991)
showed a way toward climbing across the absolute-relative divide in her critique of
scientific absolutism and relativism as impossible stances promising “vision from
everywhere and nowhere equally and fully” (p. 191). A better alternative, she proposed,
“is partial, locatable, critical knowledge sustaining the possibility of webs of connections
called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology” (p. 191).
A positivistic (Burke used the term “reductionist”) perspective on reality reduces reality –
it generalizes, simplifies, narrows, lessens, lowers, and debunks, Burke explained
(1969a). Such a perspective does not accommodate the ambiguity and complexity that
characterize reality. Burke favored rhetorical strategies aiming for representativeness,
providing not only an accurate but also a complete (that is, complex) representation.
Strategies of transcendence and transformation, Burke explained, rest on the assumption
that there is no ultimate truth, just a constant process of seeking truth. And not all ways of
seeking the truth are equal: some ways are better.  Transcendence is a means of finding a
better way, Burke said; it involves adopting a perspective — choosing a position — from
which two seemingly opposing points of view “cease to be opposites” (Burke 1984, 336).
A comic corrective to debunking efforts such as Gleick’s victimage ritual would
transform and transcend absolute and relative conceptions of reality by acknowledging
that partial, situated perspectives are neither absolute nor relative and, together, provide a
more complete — thus, better — knowledge of reality. Such a corrective would depend
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upon a conception of science as a practice of exploring reality from different
perspectives. It would acknowledge that the stance of objectivity dictated by the
conventional scientific worldview is what Haraway (1991) called a god trick — a
disembodied, dislocated, and thus impossible stance.
Haraway proposed a more realistic, situated and embodied scientific perspective. She
argued that partial perspective is not only a valid perspective but ultimately a better one:
a multiplicity of partial perspectives might yield, collectively, the broadest possible
perspective on reality, certainly broader than the non-situated, hypothetical, objective
perspective. The contextualized perspective is better: in Burkean terms, it is more well
rounded. Synthesizing and integrating information gathered from as many different
perspectives as possible should yield a broader understanding of reality: this approach
might be the best way to get as close to the truth as possible. A more well rounded
perspective on reality provided by a comic corrective would recognize that subjective
experience is not better than objective knowledge, or vice versa: they are different and
partial perspectives that together come closer to the truth than either one does alone. They
are relative in the sense that they are relational and pertinent.
A comic corrective to Gleick’s victimage ritual would not require a wrenching change in
perspective, then, only a broadening. As Burke acknowledged, however, most people are
not willing to do what they need to do in order to get along: that is, they are not willing to
be tolerant, to round out their frames of reference. Gleick was comfortable with the
conventional scientific worldview because it provided him with a familiar, dependable,
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highly readable cognitive map and a good defense against chaos and confusion, the
enemies of good journalism.
Conclusion
Textual analysis, as Dow (1996) has noted (see Chapter 3), should be able to reveal
“something interesting and useful about the text itself” and also something “about the
kind of symbolic activity the text represents” (pp. 4-5). This analysis has shown
something useful about the texts selected for analysis, how they contain rhetorical acts of
boundary-work. And it has shown something interesting about the texts, how they also
contain ritual acts of cultural maintenance. As noted in Chapter 3, the aim of qualitative
research is to examine people’s interpretations of experience toward comprehending the
meanings they construct and use to guide their actions in everyday life (Christians &
Carey, 1989), to enable insights into “the complexities of beliefs, understandings, and
responses” (Wynne, 1991, p. 113).  In this analysis of the Case of the Deviant Doctor I
have examined journalists’ interpretations of Mack’s interpretations of experiencers’
experiences and considered the meanings and beliefs expressed in Mack’s accounts of
abduction and in journalists’ accounts of those accounts. In Chapter 7, I compare some
other cases of controversial science with the Case of the Deviant Doctor. In Chapter 8, I
further consider possibilities for journalistic (and scientific) frames of acceptance and
other productive rhetorical strategies.
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Notes
1. Subsequent to his Mack/Abduction story, Kahn wrote three stories for the Boston
Globe about an episode of Boston public television station WGBH’s science
series “Nova” on abduction. The “Nova” episode featured Mack, and Mack wrote
a long letter of complaint to its producer about its content. (I obtained a copy of
this letter from PEER.) One of Kahn’s stories about the episode ran before the
segment aired, one reviewed the program, and one reported on the alteration of
the program’s content after Mack complained.
2.  In an interview with me (see Appendix B), Mack said he found Miles’s Globe
review “strident,” its accusations “irrational.” What people mean by “irrational” is
not fitting with “accepted notions of reality,” he said. Something
“mysterious...which seems to open up our boundaries” is not necessarily
irrational. “For me, it’s a rock-bottom assumption that if something is truthful,
and opens up our notions of what exists, what is, the universe, that’s a good thing,
the truth is a good thing,” Mack said. If something is truthful, it is “worth fighting
for”; then it’s a matter of deciding “how you fight.”
3. Definitions and synonyms discussed in this section were obtained between August
1, 2004, and December 1, 2004 from two online databases:
http://www.dictionary.com and http://www.thesaurus.com. Each of these
databases includes a number of well-known sources of information on words,
including the American Heritage and Webster’s dictionaries and Roget’s
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thesaurus, in addition to specialized sources such as legal and medical
dictionaries.
4. A Google search initiated to explore the origin and meaning of the term
“ontological shock” revealed that the soundtrack to the popular science fiction
film “The Matrix” (1999) included a track entitled “Ontological Shock”; and that
a character in an episode of the TV series “The X-Files”, entitled “Patient X,”
used the term “ontological shock” in reference to an alleged abductee’s awareness
of the abduction experience. The search revealed little else.
5. Information on Neimark’s publications retrieved December 20, 2004, from
http://www.nyu/edu/classes/neimark/.
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Chapter 7
Pseudoscientists, skeptics, pseudoscientist-skeptics:
some comparisons
In The Case of the Deviant Doctor, as explained in the previous chapter, the controversy
ultimately was not only about Mack’s scientific claims. From the beginning, it was also
about Mack himself, a scientific authority and expert who was perceived to be
transgressing important boundaries. The case may never have materialized if the doctor
making the claims had been someone of lesser authority and credibility — someone
without the Harvard professorship, the Pulitzer Prize, the national reputation and long
record of accomplishments. In fact, others had made similar claims before him, “but
none,” as The New York Times Magazine noted, “with the credentials of John Mack”
(Rae, 1994, para. 6), that is, none with what others would perceive as real scientific
authority. Comparison of The Case of the Deviant Doctor with other cases of
controversial, boundary-bending science provides an opportunity to examine similarities
and differences in the deployment of rhetoric and the role of journalists, toward further
illuminating the process of constructing scientific authority.
As noted in Chapter 2, research has explored how controversial scientific claims can
engender what Gieryn (1999) has called “credibility contests” (p. xi). Brante (1993)
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distinguished between epistemological contests over “contradictory scientific beliefs and
sociopolitical conflicts that constitute “scientific controversies,” asserting that such
epistemological conflicts “merely reflect the existence of contrary accounts of a
phenomenon,” while “sociopolitical conflicts over science” involve “contending
knowledge claims” (p. 181). The boundary Brante drew between these two types of
conflicts lies within a fuzzy gray area where contending knowledge claims may depend
on particular scientific beliefs, or worldviews. The controversy over Mack’s abduction
research falls into this fuzzy gray area, in my view.
Controversy in the Mack case was multifaceted. As shown in Chapter 4, the legitimacy of
his research subject (alien abduction), research methods (hypnosis, co-creative process),
theories (validation of the idea of repressed and recovered memory), and his scientific
worldview (of physical and numinous reality) were questioned. Implicitly and explicitly,
his right as a Harvard authority to engage in the study of such a borderline phenomenon
as abduction was criticized. Mack labeled himself a scientist and his abduction research
scientific, but critics disputed those labels. Mack espoused an unconventional scientific
worldview that could accommodate the abduction phenomenon, as well as his approach
to exploring it, but critics defending the conventional scientific worldview placed
abduction outside the boundaries of reality and scientific legitimacy.
Dearing (1995) examined newspaper reporting of three cases of controversial claims,
which might be compared in some respects to the Mack case, in a content analysis of
media coverage of what he called “maverick” science. The cases Dearing examined were
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business consultant Iben Browning’s 1990 earthquake predictions, Peter Duesberg’s
contrary views on the cause of AIDS, and Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann’s cold
fusion work. In each of these three cases, Dearing found news stories were telling readers
“which way to think” about these contested claims, “and according to a majority of
relevant scientists, it was the wrong way [emphasis in original]” (p. 355). In the Mack
case, most media accounts of his abduction research reported Mack’s views as well as
opposing views. In this case the “right” way to think about abduction did not become
clear, though one could argue, a la Dearing, that simply by reporting Mack’s views, the
stories about his abduction research gave credence to his claims. In my analysis (see
Chapter 6) I found that some reporters heroicized Mack, wittingly or unwittingly, in the
process of writing about his abduction research, locating him on a ritual journey to some
sort of new understanding.
Hagendijk and Meeus (1993) examined what they called “the Buck-Goudsmit Affair” (p.
391), a Dutch public controversy over claims of a breakthrough in AIDS research.
Comparing this case to the Pons and Fleischmann cold fusion case (see below), the two
researchers observed that in both cases “the ways in which the issues at stake were
understood by participants and the news media changed drastically over time” (p. 392).
In this sense the Mack case differs from both the Pons-Fleischmann and the Buck-
Goudsmit case, in that the ways in which the abduction phenomenon and his claims about
it appear to have been understood by participants in the discourse, including journalists,
did not seem to change much over time.
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The Buck-Goudsmit case involved controversial science claims that that the two
researchers submitted to Science. Their paper was peer-reviewed and published in
Science, then retracted. This controversy prompted Buck’s institution, the University of
Eindhoven, to investigate labor and management practices in Buck’s department (though
not his scientific claims per se), and the results of this investigation led to Buck’s
resignation. Buck’s university also issued a press release reporting the retraction of
claims Buck made in Science. Goudsmit’s institution, the University of Amsterdam’s
School of Medicine, established an investigative committee to review his research, and
this committee “concluded that the measurement of [research] results was not correctly
represented in the Science article” (p. 408). However, “the report did not change
Goudsmit’s public identity substantially,” according to Hagendijk and Meeus, and
Goudsmit remained at the medical school, while Buck continued to be linked with
“misrepresentation and misconduct” (p. 408). There are similarities and differences
between this case and the Mack case: Mack published his abduction claims in
Psychological Inquiry, not the more prestigious Science or Nature, and he did not retract
any claims published therein or made public anywhere else. As with Goudsmit, Mack’s
institution, Harvard Medical School, investigated his research, directed him to be more
careful, and kept him in the fold. Unlike Goudsmit’s case, Harvard Medical School did
not publicly critique Mack’s published claims.
Caudill (1989) addressed the role of journalists in a historical rather than a contemporary
controversy, over the scientific legitimacy of Darwin’s theory of natural selection.
Caudill documented how Darwin’s legitimacy as a scientist and the legitimacy of his
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theory as good science were attacked in the press.  The New York Times, for example,
gave Darwin’s work “a good hearing” upon publication of The Origin of Species in 1860,
according to Caudill, but ultimately the Times “concluded that his theory was
unacceptable on scientific as well as religious grounds” (p. 22). The Times dismissed
Darwin as a “naturalist” rather than a scientist, criticized him “for not making a grand
general statement” (p. 22) and faulted him for lacking scientific knowledge sufficiently
specialized to legitimize his claims.
Examining other historical cases, Gieryn (1983, 1999) has documented rhetorical styles
employed in the social construction of scientific authority. For example, 19th century
English scientist John Tyndall did boundary-work in his advocacy campaign for science
by attributing characteristics to science — practical utility, empiricism, theoretical
foundation, skepticism, objective knowledge — that “demarcated it from religion or
mechanics, providing a rationale for the superiority of scientists in designated intellectual
and technical domains” (Gieryn, 1983, p. 784). This rhetorical strategy was employed in
the Mack case as well, but with some differences. Mack, like Tyndall, attributed
“selected characteristics to the institution of science” — in Mack’s case, a scientific
worldview that can explain the nature of reality, careful methods of recording
observations and organizing data, the need to keep an open mind — “for purposes of
constructing a social boundary” (p. 791), thereby framing his abduction research as inside
the boundaries of science. Journalists reporting on Mack’s abduction research tended to
employ the same rhetorical strategy as well to distinguish science from other institutions
and endeavors, including religion, cataloging what they considered to be the hallmarks of
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legitimate science in questioning the legitimacy of Mack’s research. But at the same time,
Mack also argued for expanding the boundaries of science to accommodate a larger
reality, and he did not maintain a boundary between his science and questions of religion
or spirituality, and in fact he argued for some linkage between science and spirit.
Another case that Gieryn (1983, 1999) has examined is 19th century Edinburgh
phrenologist George Combe’s failed attempt to locate his work within the boundaries of
legitimate science. Combe’s description of science “as expandable into religious
questions, as estimative or subjective in methodology, and as capable of being evaluated
by non-specialists,” Gieryn said (1983, p. 789), lost out to the definition of science
advocated by anatomists, and Combe’s transgression caused him to lose his credibility
contest. Like Combe, Mack advocated expanding the accepted scientific worldview to
accommodate spiritual matters (see Chapters 4 and 5). While Mack’s critics would likely
judge that he lost his credibility, too, it is important to note that Mack retained his
position and his tenure, his credentials and his funding. Upon concluding his abduction
project, he was able to return to the work he had been doing for decades and to continue
to publish, in scientific and mainstream media. Consequently, in my judgment, Mack
retained at least some cultural authority in the face of criticism.
The case of cold fusion: pathological science?
One of the most thoroughly documented cases of controversial scientific claims in the
literature of science studies is the 1989 cold-fusion story (e.g. Collins & Pinch, 1993;
Gieryn, 1992; Gross, 1995; Huizenga, 1992; Lewenstein, 1995; Sullivan, 1994; Taubes,
281
1993; Toumey, 1996). The scope of journalistic reporting on the Mack case, though
extensive, pales when compared with the flood of media coverage generated by Pons and
Fleischmann’s 1989 cold fusion claims, and media coverage played an important role in
both cases. Similarities and differences between the Case of the Deviant Doctor and “the
Ballad of Pons and Fleischmann” (Gieryn, 1992, p. 217) are worth a brief look,
nonetheless.
Like the Mack case, the cold fusion story involved legitimate scientists making
controversial science claims, using controversial research methods, and circumventing
peer review. The two cases also differed in some significant ways. Credentials are a key
in cases of controversial science, and the Mack and cold fusion cases were no exceptions.
Stanley Pons of the University of Utah and Martin Fleischmann of the University of
Southhampton had proper academic/scientific credentials and decent reputations among
peers. Taubes (1993) has described Fleischmann as “one of the most distinguished
electrochemists in the world” (p. xix) and claimed “it was Fleischmann who gave cold
fusion its…credibility” (p. 10). However, in the case of both Pons and Fleischmann,
neither their degrees nor their affiliations were “Harvard,” and they were known only
within their own fields, while Mack had earned some national recognition inside and
outside his field.
Methods were disputed in both cases, but in the cold fusion case the replicability of
experiments was key, while in the Mack case it was not: the former involved laboratory
apparatus, the latter human subjects. Pons and Fleischmann were chemists in a dispute
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with physicists, who considered themselves the elite among scientists (see, for example,
Kevles, 1978). After the April 1989 announcement of cold fusion claims, Pons reportedly
appeared to cheers at a meeting of the American Chemical Society, while at a meeting of
the American Physical Society Pons and Fleischmann were heaped with criticism for
their claims (Lewenstein, 1995). Mack, a psychiatrist, drew the harshest criticisms for his
abduction research from psychologists and psychiatrists, his peers but also two
communities in a tug of war over authority (see Chapter 1).
Mack and Pons and Fleischmann were criticized for bypassing peer review in announcing
their claims. While Pons and Fleischmann had a paper accepted for publication in a peer-
reviewed scientific journal in their field before they made their public announcement of
their claims (Lewenstein, 1995), Mack’s first peer-reviewed scientific journal publication
about his abduction research came two years after his popular book Abduction (Mack,
1994a) was published. Institutional politics played important but different roles in both
the Mack and cold fusion cases. In the cold fusion case, the president of the University of
Utah and attorneys for the university played a role in Pons and Fleischmann’s premature
announcement (Huizenga, 1992). In the Mack case, Harvard Medical School officials
were not happy about Mack’s bypassing of peer review and initiated an investigation of
his work after his book came out (see Chapter 4).
Pons and Fleischmann were reported to be in competition with another research team at
Brigham Young University, and some observers have said this competition played a role
in their premature announcement (e.g. Huizenga, 1992; Taubes, 1993). I found no
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evidence that Mack’s airing of claims about abduction was prompted by any kind of
competitive pressure. In the cold fusion case, potential profits from patents were also said
to have contributed to premature announcement of Pons and Fleischmann’s claims
(Huizenga, 1992; Taubes, 1993). Toumey (1996) found in his examination of how media
coverage affected public perception of cold fusion that journalists’ reporting on it
contributed to creating “a naïve hope about abundant cheap energy [that] displaced the
science behind the hypothesis” (p. 121). Though some journalists (e.g. Gleick, 1994;
Willwerth, 1994) hinted at a profit motive behind Mack’s abduction work, profit did not
appear to be a major factor in the Mack case, and neither Mack nor anyone else involved
in the discourse about it was promising any public economic benefit from his work. Pons
and Fleischmann’s claims were addressed in congressional hearings and examined by the
U.S. Department of Energy, while I have found no evidence that Mack’s claims attracted
the attention of the government.
Journalists played important but different roles in these cases. In the cold fusion case,
premature reporting of Pons and Fleischmann’s claims in the media made a pre-
publication announcement by the university seem virtually necessary, and once the
announcement was made “the role of the mass media in [the] scientific controversy
quickly became a central issue” (Lewenstein, 1995, p. 403). Albeit in different ways and
for different reasons, the media played a major role in the Mack case as well. As noted
above, my judgment is that the Mack case may never have materialized if the expert
making the claims had been someone without Mack’s Harvard pedigree. In the Mack
case, media attention to Abduction (Mack, 1994a) may have prompted Harvard Medical
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School’s investigation of his research; and journalists’ criticisms (i.e. Gleick, 1994;
Miles, 1994) did, indeed, prompt Mack to rewrite parts of his book in rebuttal. Pons and
Fleischmann’s cold fusion claims made the covers of both Time and Newsweek, “which
by their writing style foster a sense of authoritativeness” (Lewenstein, 1995, p. 418). But
Mack’s abduction claims did not make the covers of these authoritative news magazines,
and when the magazines did report on his claims they did not frame them seriously or
favorably (see Plagens & Bryant, 1994; Willwerth, 1994).
Gross (1995) examined the cold fusion case as “an extended rhetorical transaction, a tale
of consensus threatened and renewed” (p. 48). Consensus, according to Gross, was “ the
crucial variable” in the cold fusion story, constituting “the set of facts, theories, and
methods that are a discipline’s intellectual capital” (p. 48). In social reality consensus is
“commonly…a result of…pressures to conform backed by the threat of social and
political sanctions”  (p. 49). Gross argued that Pons and Fleischmann were “well-treated
in the peer-review process” and that “their decision to hold a press conference in lieu of a
peer review was not genuinely the object of criticism”  (p. 53). What critics objected to
given the key roles of peer review and experimental validation in the cold fusion case,
Gross claimed, was “Pons and Fleischmann’s inappropriate and continuing reticence
concerning the technical details of their work” (p. 53). In the Mack case, while Mack
gave indications that he would have liked his peers to come around to his way of thinking
about abduction, he did not give any indications that he could or would not proceed with
his research without that consensus. One of the results of Harvard Medical School’s
investigation of Mack’s methods, however, was a directive to submit his research to
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broader peer scrutiny. In the case of cold fusion, all parties involved in the controversy
appeared to be applying the same scientific worldview in evaluating Pons and
Fleischmann’s claims (including the claimants). In the case of Mack’s abduction
research, one of the key elements of controversy was Mack’s advocacy of an
unconventional worldview, while critics defended the conventional one.
“The history of cold fusion,” Gieryn (1992) concluded, “puts it outside good science,
inside pathological science” (p. 236).1 Many scientists might dismiss Mack’s abduction
research as pathological science –which has been defined as “the science of things that
aren’t so” (Huizenga, 1992, p. 203, quoting Langmuir, Physics Today, October 1989) –
or not even science at all. In reviewing the case of cold fusion, Huizenga (1992) asked,
“How is it possible for different people to examine the same…claims and reach opposite
conclusions?” (p. 212). One could ask the same question about Mack’s abduction
research. In his case, he stood by his controversial claims, and to those who advocated
more mundane explanations he suggested that they broaden their worldviews. In previous
chapters I have shown how Mack framed himself as a scientist and his abduction research
as science and how journalists framed it accordingly, evaluating Mack’s claims on the
basis of such conventional standards as peer-reviewed publication (or the lack thereof),
approved research methods, and physical evidence.
In the cold fusion case, professional science societies as well as scores of physicists and
other scientists played a role in evaluating cold fusion claims. In the Mack case, however,
as described in Chapter 4, the role of official science in the discourse about his abduction
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claims was limited to the dedicated issue of Psychological Inquiry, Sanford Gibbons’
review of Abduction in the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Harvard
Medical School’s investigation, and an external advisory group of scientists Mack
assembled at the behest of the medical school. I found no evidence that either the
American Psychiatric Association, American Psychoanalytic Association (beyond
Gibbons’ review), American Psychological Association, or American Medical
Association played a significant role in the Case of the Deviant Doctor.
Gieryn (1992) observed that Pons and Fleischmann’s cold fusion claims became more
than science — they became a story, “a narrative that got everybody else interested and
converted many to a belief in its reality” (p. 218). In my examination of texts about
Mack’s abduction claims I discerned the development of a narrative, in which journalists
reporting about the Mack case appeared to get other journalists interested in reporting
about it as well. Though audience research is beyond the scope of this analysis, I suspect
that the narrative of the Case of the Deviant Doctor did not convert many skeptics into
believers, or vice versa. In the Mack case, both skeptics and believers provided evidence
that once people become attached to a belief system — whether the conventional
scientific worldview or an expanded worldview of numinous reality — they find it
difficult to let go.
Pseudoscience and paranormal science
As the case of cold fusion has shown, a conflict over scientific knowledge claims can
become an endless round of boundary-work, in which advocates and opponents of
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disputed claims invoke the same cultural norms and employ the same rhetorical strategies
to establish and maintain their legitimacy. Previous chapters have addressed how
intellectual elites can construct and maintain a dominant scientific worldview and shape
public opinion about science. Ross (1991) has explored how “sublegitimate, alternative,
marginal, or oppositional” scientific cultures simultaneously “embody and contest”
dominant scientific claims by employing “different versions of and various challenges to
these elite languages in popular and alternative cultures…. Scientific countercultures
share many of the methodological norms and claims about absolute truths in nature
observed by establishment science” (p. 9), and members of these outlaw cultures make
alternative knowledge claims “through appeals to the rationalist language and
experimental procedures of the dominant [scientific] paradigm” (p. 20), Ross has
observed. “Assuming the mantle of a rationalist style is an indispensable discourse,”
according to Ross, “for those whose business it is to contest orthodox claims about the
natural world” (p. 17). In his examination of the  “New Age” science of biofeedback and
other “brain-machine technologies” (p. 32), for example, Ross found that “the yuppie
ideology of personal control is reinforced by biofeedback’s promise of individual
dominion over bodily functions” (p. 32), couched in conventional scientific terms.
For years, the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal
(CSICOP)2 is dedicated to combating the sorts of outlaws Ross has written about,
primarily by employing the rhetorical strategy of debunking3 — an attitude that, as Burke
(1984) observed, is not an especially effective approach to identification and persuasion.
CSICOP is an organization of self-described skeptics devotted to defending what they
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perceive to be the boundaries of conventional science. According to CSICOP, rational
thinking and proper scientific skepticism get short shrift in public discourse about
science, especially in media coverage. Religion and alien abduction, subjects that
CSICOP deems outside the boundaries of legitimate science, are the target of a
considerable amount of the organization’s attention. CSICOP is adamant that a hard
boundary must be maintained between science and religion.  CSICOP Chairman Paul
Kurtz, an emeritus professor of philosophy at the State University of New York-Buffalo,
is also founder of the Council for Secular Humanism, which maintains a Committee for
the Scientific Study of Religion and frames science in opposition to religion.
CSICOP claims a pseudoscientific, anti-rational perspective is dominant in public
discourse: the organization calls its own conventional scientific worldview “alternative”
and complains that proponents of its view do not have equal access to the media.
CSICOP members fashion themselves as "media watchdogs willing to exert grassroots
pressure on media conglomerates in response to paranormal and pseudoscientific
programming” (n.p.). In 1996, CSICOP established a Council on Media Integrity as “an
educational outreach and advocacy program,” involving “a network of distinguished
international scientists, academics, and members of the media concerned with the
balanced portrayal of science in the media” and aiming “to actively promote the
importance of scientific literacy and the appreciation of the scientific method and critical
thinking” (n.p.). The Council created a “Candle in the Dark” award program to recognize
accurate science reporting and a “Snuffed Candle” award program to criticize inaccurate
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reporting. CSICOP claims around 70 newspapers have adopted a policy recommended by
the Council to print disclaimers with stories about pseudoscientific topics and claims.
In writing about what he has called “the anti-science problem,” CSICOP Chairman Kurtz
(1998) has said, “If the alternative to objectivity is subjectivity, and if there are no
warranted claims to truth, then the views of the postmodernists cannot be said to be true,
either” (p. 67). Kurtz has credited the origins of contemporary “attacks on science” to
fear of nuclear holocaust, “some excesses of the environmental movement…widespread
attacks on orthodox medicine,” interest in “Asian mysticism” and “revival of
fundamentalist religion,” not to mention “multicultural and feminist critiques of science
education” (p. 68-70). “A kind of paranormal spiritual point of view totally dominates the
media,” according to Kurtz, “a pro-UFO point of view...propaganda for a pro-paranormal
universe” (n.p.).4
As advocates of paranormal science tend to do, CSICOP representatives tend to locate
themselves rhetorically in the underdog position, as people with an “alternative”
perspective, as noted above. One CSICOP fellow has characterized his fellow skeptics as
“small islands of rational thought in the vast ocean of scientific illiteracy” (Schneour,
1998), positioned “across the chasm that separates the skeptic from the convinced” (p.
41). Nonetheless, if, as CSICOP has argued, non-scientific thinkers “stand in firm
defense of their convictions” (Schneour, 1998, p. 41), then it can also be argued that
CSICOP stands just as firmly in defense of the conventional scientific worldview as the
only legitimate way of interpreting reality. Ross (1991) has called CSICOP “a
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ghostbusting organization” that is “as much a symptom of the crisis in scientific
rationality and materialism as it is a grudging acknowledgement of New Age’s resurgent
interest in the...non-rationalist traditions of Euro-American cultures” (p. 18). John Mack
himself (1992b) once described CSICOP as “an established, highly biased group of self-
appointed watchdogs of science...that has assigned itself the task of investigating reported
experiences of the ‘paranormal’ (whatever ‘normal’ may mean)” (p. 5).
Media coverage of paranormal science claims is one of CSICOP’s reasons for being. It
has been argued that the clash between normal and paranormal science makes news in
itself, regardless of specific claims (Meyer, 1986). The discourse on paranormal science
encompasses two contrasting scientific worldviews, according to Collins and Pinch
(1982): the conventional “belief in the unity of science (implicit) and the incompatibility
of psi phenomena with science” and the unconventional “belief in the existence of psi
phenomena and the incompatibility of psi phenomena with some part of science [leading]
to the conclusion that science must be changed” (p. 48). (As reported in Chapter 4, Mack
advocated a variation of the latter view, claiming the conventional scientific worldview
was not broad enough to explain abduction.) “Believers” take boundary-challenging
claims as true until proven false and worth checking out, while “skeptics” assume they
are false until proven true and not worth testing (p. 45).  Though “scientific phenomena
are not reproducible with great reliability…this is usually explained as being a
consequence of scientists’ mistakes, or ‘anomalies’ [or] ‘gremlins’...confidence in the
correct way to describe and manipulate nature survives this manifest intractability” (p.
159). The replicability and falsifiability of experimental results — whether normal or
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paranormal — depend not on definitive test results, according to Collins and Pinch
(1993), but on consensus about what constitutes sufficient testing.
Paranormal scientists are generally excluded from what Collins and Pinch (1982) have
called the constitutive, or professional, forums where science claims are typically
legitimated. Tactics employed by paranormal scientists in contingent (popular) forums to
legitimate their claims include what Collins and Pinch have called metamorphosis, or
acquiring the trappings of legitimacy — Ph.D.s, academic posts, research funding,
professional associations, and peer-reviewed journals as well as adoption of accepted
scientific methods such as careful observations with meticulous recording and analysis of
data.5 Tactics of rejection employed by legitimate scientists, in constitutive and
contingent forums, to dismiss paranormal claims include ad-hominem attacks,
magnification of anecdotal evidence, the blocking of journal publication, “blank refusal
to believe,” “association with unscientific beliefs,” and “accusations of triviality” (p.
257). McClenon (1984) examined how parapsychologists employ the ideology of
scientism — “the body of ideas used by scientists to legitimate their practices” (p. 2) —
to legitimate their work. Scientism “is necessary in maintaining the boundaries of the
scientific community.... One aspect of maintaining boundaries is deciding whether any
specific anomaly should be allowed into the scientific process” (p. 3). McClenon
emphasized “the importance of...deviance labeling in defining the modes of rhetorical
conflict” (p. 82) to be employed in tending the boundaries of science. “Development of
rhetorical strategies using the media which demonstrate the frequency and unexceptional
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nature of psi” — that is, their non-deviance — “could weaken the philosophical
arguments of critics” (p. 103).
The Parapsychological Association (PA)6, established in Durham, NC, in 1957,
represents an attempt to “normalize” paranormal research and provides a good example
of the tactic of legitimation that Collins and Pinch (1982) have called metamorphosis. It
is interesting to note that this group has succeeded in deploying the tactic in both
contingent and constitutive forums. One of the PA’s primary aims has been to “advance
parapsychology as a science” (n.p.). Psychology professor J.B. Rhine (deceased), director
of a parapsychology laboratory at Duke University in the 1950s7, proposed the formation
of the PA as a professional society. The PA maintains professional and educational
requirements for membership, holds annual conventions, runs an awards program, and
publishes the Journal of Parapsychology. In 1969 the PA became an affiliate of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, a bastion of scientific authority
and legitimacy since the 19th century, and it has sustained this affiliation into the present.
The PA says it now has 211 full and associate members.
Along with the PA, some additional examples of deployment of the tactic of
metamorphosis (Collins & Pinch, 1982) to construct legitimacy for fringe science are the
the Society for Scientific Exploration8 and the National Institute for Discovery Science
(NIDS).9 The Society for Scientific Exploration (SSE) was created by a group of self-
described scientists and scholars interested in promoting “the study of all questions that
are amenable to scientific investigation without restriction” (n.p.). The SSE’s founding
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president was Stanford University physicist Peter Sturrock. The society claims 800
members, holds annual meetings, and publishes its own peer-reviewed Journal of
Scientific Exploration. The SSE characterizes itself as:
A professional forum for presentations, criticism, and debate concerning topics
which are for various reasons ignored or studied inadequately within mainstream
science. A secondary goal is to promote improved understanding of those factors
that unnecessarily limit the scope of scientific inquiry, such as sociological
constraints, restrictive world views, hidden theoretical assumptions, and the
temptation to convert prevailing theory into prevailing dogma. Topics under
investigation cover a wide spectrum. At one end are apparent anomalies in well
established disciplines. At the other, we find paradoxical phenomena that belong
to no established discipline and therefore may offer the greatest potential for
scientific advance and the expansion of human knowledge (n.p.).
In its mission statement NIDS describes itself as:
A privately funded science institute engaged in research of aerial phenomena,
animal mutilations, and other related anomalous phenomena…. NIDS maintains a
large database of anomalous activity and investigates reports whenever possible,
using a combination of high quality ex-law enforcement investigative teams and
contract research involving nationally accredited laboratories in the veterinary,
biological (including bacteriological, virological and DNA), chemical, and
materials sciences. The results of these investigations are published in peer
reviewed journals and on the NIDS website (n.p.).
The Velikovsky case
The case of Immanuel Velikovsky and his claims about the natural history of Earth
(Bauer, 1984; Carroll, n.d.; de Grazia, 1966; Friedlander, 1995) is examined here for a
number of reasons. Velikovsky, like Mack, was a psychiatrist and a Freudian analyst. He
received his medical degree in Moscow in 1921 and studied psychoanalysis in Vienna
with a student of Freud. In 1940, he began exploring ancient historical records for
evidence of natural catastrophes that might explain certain occurrences such as the end of
Egypt’s Middle Kingdom. In the 1950s, he published the results of his research, in
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Worlds in Collision (1950) and Earth in Upheaval (1955) – like Mack, choosing to make
his claims in popular books rather than in professional journals. A key element of
Velikovsky’s controversial claims, as with Mack’s, was the concept of repressed and
recovered memory. Velikovsky mixed psychoanalytic theory with ancient history to
develop his thesis that global cataclysmic events of the biblical era were not recorded as
such in history due to what he called collective amnesia; his goal, he asserted, was to
reconstruct a forgotten mass trauma (Bauer, 1984). In Worlds in Collision Velikovsky put
forth a claim of an ancient, catastrophic cometary impact with Earth and said cosmic
collisions were “implicit in the dynamics of the universe” (Velikovsky, 1950, as cited in
Bauer, 1984, p. 19). Velikovsky’s claims, like Mack’s, generated media coverage and
scientific uproar.
Collier’s, Harpers, and Newsweek magazines ran favorable early reviews of Worlds in
Collision; most pre-publication coverage reportedly was positive (Bauer, 1984). Once the
book came out, scientists threatened to boycott its publisher, which quickly dropped the
title (though another publisher picked it up). Opponents fought Velikovsky’s claims
“polemically” (Bauer, 1984, p. 78). Critics complained that Velikovsky lacked
“acceptable credentials” (Friedlander, 1995, p. 21) and that his theories rested on flawed
conceptions of physics and astronomy. The New York Times Book Review called Worlds
in Collision “a soggily written, heavily annotated, ‘scientific’ explanation of Old
Testament miracles” (Dempsey, 1950). Many scientists who commented on his books
belittled Velikovsky’s scholarship, though what was said to distinguish these books from
other pseudoscientific works was an appearance of scholarship, created by copious
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footnotes and citations (Friedlander, 1995). “Velikovsky’s “most intense…opposition”
(Bauer, 1984, p. 64) apparently came from scientists at Harvard. His scientist-critics
claimed that Velikovsky exhibited what they perceived to be “a deeply rooted hostility to
science that draws its strength from both ignorance and misunderstanding” and that
promotion of his books “traded on the public’s general inability to judge critically”
(Friedlander, 1995, p. 16).
Nonetheless, like Mack’s Abduction (1994a), Velikovsky’s books were best sellers.
Velikovsky’s advocates described his work as “a formidable assault on certain
established theories of astronomy, geology and historical biology,” a challenge to “the
general orthodoxy of an ordered universe” (de Grazia et al, 1966, p. 1). Others said
Velikovsky’s supporters were “people not only without formal and relevant credentials,
but more importantly…without an adequate understanding of the subject matter”
(Friedlander, 1995, p. 13). As some journalists did with Mack, supporters depicted
Velikovsky as a heroic figure, challenging authority. “The issues are clear,” said
Velikovsky’s advocates: “Who determines scientific truth? Who are the high priests, and
what is their warrant?” (p. 2). Advocates claimed opposition from “the scientific mafia”
(Pensee, 1976, p. 5) and “censorship of Velikovsky’s interdisciplinary thesis” (p. 13). A
quarter of a century later, The New York Times was still reporting on Velikovsky,
depicting him as a “writer” colliding with scientists, locking horns with the scientific
community (Sullivan, 1974).
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Some critics have blamed “the New York literati” for championing Velikovsky’s ideas:
“in love as they were with all things Freudian” (Sullivan, 1974, p. 9), they embraced
Velikovsky’s theory of mass repression of the memory of a global traumatic event.
Velikovsky’s writings have been said to contain little “scientific discussion…. What one
finds instead are exercises in comparative mythology, philology, and theology…an
impressive demonstration of ingenuity and erudition…but it isn’t science. It isn’t even
history” (Carroll, n.d., n.p.). A piece in The New York Times Book Review entitled
“Velikovsky lives again” (Thomsen, 1977) noted:
It is often difficult to explain to non-scientists why the name of Immanuel
Velikovsky or any of his followers makes scientists go purple in the face. The
books seem intelligent and scholarly. They are full of undoubtedly real names,
dates and facts. Book-length treatises have been written in refutation (p. BR3).
Upon his death, The New York Times called Velikovsky “a star-crossed theoretician of
the cosmos” (Jastrow, 1979, p. E22). Bauer (1984) has concluded that “Velikovsky’s
ideas about physics, chemistry and astronomy [were] in large measure invalid and
uninformed” but also has found that much of the criticism levied at him contained
“errors, logical non sequiturs, wrong and misleading statements” (p. 151). In his
judgment Velikovsky was “a pseudo-scientist, but…not necessarily wrong”  (p. 152).
According to the Astronomical Society of the Pacific (2003), Velikovsky’s writings were
“once very popular…now only a small underground of true believers keeps his work
alive” (n.p.). Since Velikovsky first published his theories, other global catastrophe
theories have been published— for instance, the theory that a massive comet or asteroid
impact with Earth caused extinction of the dinosaurs (see Alvarez, 1997; Raup, 1986).
But science has not validated the theory of Worlds in Collision.
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UFOlogy
If Bauer (1984) were to examine the claims of UFOlogists and skeptical scientists’ and
journalists’ attempts to debunk them, perhaps he might conclude that UFOlogy was a
pseudoscience, but not necessarily wrong…. Efforts to construct UFOlogy as a legitimate
scientific endeavor are examined here in particular because some UFOlogists have
claimed a link between alien abduction and their own study of unidentified flying objects
(e.g. Appelle, 1996).
Blake (1979) called UFOlogy “a science in development,” characterizing it as “an
intellectual product of social groups not of the intellectual elite” (p. 333). That the study
of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) has come to be known as an “-ology” is but one
small aspect of that development. As Collins and Pinch (1982, 1979) reported, acquiring
the trappings of scientific legitimacy is a standard tactic of legitimation employed by
paranormal scientists. And as Bourdieu (1991) observed, names and labels are important,
serving as a means of creating social reality and the power and authority that operate in
that reality. UFOlogy has created for itself the labels and other trappings of legitimate
science, and media coverage plays a role in this construction of legitimacy. The
contributions of journalists to construction of the concept of UFOs (and, concomitantly,
UFOlogy) are worth examining, Blake (1979) said. While, as he noted, many journalists,
official sources, and members of the scientific community have ridiculed reports of UFOs
and deemed the subject “unsuitable for serious scientific study” (p. 330), nonetheless
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official attention and mass media coverage have made and kept UFOs and UFOlogy
salient over the years (see Smith, 1983).
One strategy that UFOlogists have employed to establish credibility for UFOs as a
legitimate research subject and themselves as legitimate researchers, Blake said, is to
rhetorically construct UFOs as phenomena in the natural world, thus locating them inside
the boundaries of legitimate science. Another strategy has been to locate the UFO
phenomenon outside the boundaries of conventional science, where the authority of
conventional science does not apply. (As documented in previous chapters, Mack did a
little of both, labeling abduction a real phenomenon and also claiming reality was
something more than the conventional scientific worldview described.) Similarly,
UFOlogist J. Allen Hynek (see below) sorted scientists working on “the UFO problem”
into two groups: those who treat it “with ridicule and contempt, refusing even to examine
it, denouncing the subject out of hand”; and those who “maintain — or might come to
believe after examination — that there is a strong possibility that UFOs are purely
psychological phenomena, that is, generated by individual or group mental activity”
(Hynek, 1972, as cited in Smith, 1983, p. 37). In addition, UFOlogists reportedly are
divided among those who locate the abduction phenomenon on their “turf” and those who
argue that validating abduction accounts detracts from the scientific credibility of
UFOlogy (Rosen, 1999). But even some of those UFOlogists who reject abduction claims
reportedly may “go to great lengths…to establish that they believe in extraterrestrials and
that that aliens have visited Earth” (n.p.).
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UFOlogists have adopted the standard scientific methods of observing, data collection,
record keeping and reporting. As Blake (1979) reported, UFOlogy “has developed as a
distinct body of data studies by distinctly ‘credentialed’ investigators, some of them
affiliated with organizations devoted to the study of UFOs” (p. 315). UFOlogists also
have a substantial archive of official records to tap for validation (see Smith, 1983). The
U.S. Air Force studied UFOs from 1948 to 1969, receiving over 12,000 reports of
sightings and commissioning several projects such as Sign, Grudge, Blue Book, and the
so-called Condon report. Records of congressional hearings on UFOs are available along
with reports on the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s 1969 UFO
symposium in Boston (Smith, 1983). The “grassroots” Mutual UFO Network (MUFON),
established in 1969, publishes its own journal, holds symposia and produces proceedings.
The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, an association of aerospace
professionals, published an appraisal of the UFO “problem” in 1970. In 1976, the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress produced a comprehensive
report on the history and status of UFO sightings and studies, updating it in 1983.
Astronomer J. Allen Hynek (who died in 1986) played a role in producing some of the
official record on UFOs described above (Smith, 1983). Hynek was one of the first
properly credentialed scientists to establish and maintain credibility and authority as a
UFO researcher and a legitimate scientist as well. Hynek reportedly began exploring the
UFO phenomenon as a skeptic but later came to believe that UFO reports pointed to a
mystery that needed to be solved, though he often asserted that he was not a “believer” in
UFOs (Smith, 1983). With a Ph.D. in a legitimate science and a professorship at the well
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known Northwestern University, he served as a consultant to the U.S. Air Force for its
UFO studies in the 1960s. Hynek also testified to Congress on the subject. In 1972 Hynek
published The UFO Experience: a Scientific Inquiry (Chicago: Henry Regnery), and in
1973 he founded the Center for UFO Studies (CUFOS) at Northwestern. CUFOS
established its own journals (which continue to publish today), the Journal of UFO
Studies (JUFOS) and the International UFO Reporter.
One of Hynek’s collaborators, Jacques Vallee, also was able to develop credibility and
authority both as an UFOlogist and a legitimate scientist. Vallee, who has a Ph.D. in
computer science from Northwestern, appears to have constructed separate public
identities for himself, as a UFOlogist and a venture capitalist specializing in Silicon
Valley business development. A biography posted at his personal Web site10 identifies
him as a general partner of SBV Venture Partners, a Silicon Valley investment group, and
says about his interest and expertise in UFOlogy only that he “has had a long-term
private interest in astronomy, in writing and in the frontiers of research, notably
unidentified aerial phenomena [UAP].” His corporate biography11 cites his degrees in
mathematics, astrophysics, and computer science and his work with the Shell and RCA
corporations, Stanford University and the U.S. government but does not make any
reference to his interest in UFOs (or UAP).
One must consult a source other than Vallee’s biographies for a complete list of his
publications (I consulted the Library of Congress catalog) — his UFOlogy books include
Anatomy of a Phenomenon: Unidentified Objects in Space — A Scientific Appraisal
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(1965), Challenge to Science: The UFO Enigma (1966), Edge of Reality: A Progress
Report on UFOs (1975, with J. Allen Hynek), Confrontations: A Scientist’s Search for
Alien Contact (1990), and Forbidden Science: Journals 1957-1969 (1992). His “real
science” books include Network Revolution: Confessions of a Computer Scientist (1982)
and Heart of the Internet: An Insider’s View of the Origin and Promise of the On-Line
Revolution (2003).
One recent study of the potential scientific value of studying UFOs likely drew media
coverage because it was convened by Stanford University physics professor Peter
Sturrock — a fully credentialed and legitimate scientist attached to an elite institution, a
familiar name in UFOlogy, and a founder of the Society for Scientific Exploration (see
above). The Sturrock-led study was financed by philanthropist Laurance Rockefeller (one
of the backers of Mack’s abduction research) and conducted by a panel of authoritatively
credentialed “senior physical scientists,” as the authoritative Science magazine described
them (Kestenbaum, 1998, p. 21).  The study reportedly concluded that some UFO
sightings warrant scientific study.
Panel co-chair Thomas Holzer, a geophysicist at the National Center for Atmospheric
Research, was quoted in Science, “Anything not explained is something science at some
level ought to be interested in” (p. 21). University of Maryland physicist Robert Park,
spokesman for the American Institute of Physics, was quoted in Science deeming the
study of UFOs “a total waste of time....  Calling in all the people who have seen strange
things just gets you a roomful of strange people” (p. 21).  Even The New York Times
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made note of this group’s report, in its Science Times section (Wade, 1998).
A recent initiative undertaken by cable television’s Sci Fi Channel is worth considering
here because it was framed as an effort to construct scientific authority for UFOlogy but
took the form of a media campaign and served the purpose of promoting TV
programming. Sci Fi initiated a series of activities that Sci Fi officials said were intended
to convince government officials to take UFOs seriously. These activities were also part
of a publicity campaign for “Taken,” a Sci Fi mini-series on abduction.12 They included a
series of online “chats” with UFO experts (including an interview with John Mack — see
Chapter 5); the commissioning of a Roper public opinion poll on UFOs; a symposium in
Washington, DC, on “interstellar travel and unidentified aerial phenomena”; a
symposium in New York on “the reality of the abduction phenomenon” featuring Mack,
Budd Hopkins, and David Jacobs; and a National Press Club briefing in Washington on
the formation of a Coalition for Freedom of Information (CFI).13 The CFI was a Sci Fi-
sponsored project of the Washington public relations and lobbying firm PodestaMattoon,
which orchestrated the network’s UFO campaign.14 One journalist described Sci Fi’s
campaign as “seeking the truth through savvy marketing” (David, 2002).15
Sci Fi’s Washington symposium took place on the campus of George Washington
University. I attended this event to observe the rhetoric of UFOlogy in action, and the
following account of it is based on my observations (all quotes are taken from my notes).
The university’s vice president for academic affairs said his institution and the Sci Fi
Channel had a common interest in promoting interdisciplinary scientific research and
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“dispassionate discussions” about controversial subjects. A well known journalist with
the Public Broadcasting System, Ray Suarez, moderated the event — “to keep things
honest,” he told me. The panel of seven experts assembled for this UFOlogy symposium
included five Ph.Ds, among them physicists Michio Kaku (a science popularizer as well
as a college professor), Peter Sturrock (of Stanford), and UFOlogist/venture capitalist
Jacques Vallee. Given the importance of labeling in constructing authority, I should note
that while I am referring to this event as a UFOlogy symposium, the Sci Fi Channel did
not use this term in publicizing the event, and speakers at the event avoided use of the
term “UFO,” employing the alternative term “unidentified aerial phenomenon” (UAP).
Credentials, expertise and authority were emphasized in speaker introductions,
biographies and presentations.
Physicist/astrophysicist Bernard Haisch, director of the California Institute for Physics
and Astrophysics and keeper of the Web site www.ufoskeptic.org,16 said at the
symposium that “the field is full of nonsense and hoaxes” but noted that legitimate
scientific research “started out this way.” Haisch said research journals and research
societies are helping to establish “respectability” for UAP studies (see below regarding
one of Haisch’s journal contributions.)  In his remarks at the symposium Jacques Vallee
said that, while “this has not been done so far…reports of the phenomenon can be studied
objectively with the methods of today’s science without pre-judging their nature. New,
radical hypotheses may be needed to account for the phenomenon.” Some panelists
recommended that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or National
Science Foundation should devote some funding to the study of UAPs. Speakers
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discussed at length the need to (and the how-to) persuade the mass media to take their
stories seriously. One speaker said the media should “take a leadership role” in telling the
story of UAPs.
The Washington Post reported on the event (Gugliotta, 2002), leading with an account of
an alleged spaceship crash. If extraterrestrial beings are visiting Earth, the Post observed,
“somewhere some sentient beings must have figured out a way to transit interstellar
space. Discussions about unidentified flying objects march hand in hand with the
feasibility of interstellar space travel,” and “serious people took up these two topics” (p.
A12) at the symposium. A report on the symposium posted to a UFOlogy email list (Hall,
2002) claimed “someone fell down on the job” (n.p.) of promoting the event to
journalists, as “only a handful of news media showed up (including Channel 4 TV and
the Washington Post).”
The Associated Press (Associated Press, 2003) later reported on a Sci Fi Channel-backed
lawsuit to make NASA divulge records of  “a UFO that reportedly crash landed [near
Kecksburg, PA] and was recovered by government workers” (para. 1) in 1965. “The
cable network announced in June,” the story reported, “that it was backing the effort to
research the Kecksburg incident in promoting a documentary, ‘Out of the Blue,’ which
examined various UFO reports” (para. 11). This story noted, “Sci Fi channel officials said
they’re looking for an explanation of what occurred. They’re also looking for viewers. A
November 2002 documentary on the suspected 1947 UFO crash in Roswell…was the
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highest-rated special in the network’s 11-year history…seen by nearly 2.4 million
people” (para. 13-14).
Physicist Haisch coauthored a paper published in 2005 in the Journal of the British
Interplanetary Society (Deardorff, Haisch, Maccabee & Puthoff, 2005) in which the
claim was made that advances in scientific knowledge in recent years provide a scientific
justification for taking UFO claims seriously. “It has recently been argued,” the
authors wrote:
Anthropic reasoning applied to inflation theory reinforces the prediction that we
should find ourselves part of a large, galaxy-sized civilization…. Furthermore,
superstring and M-brane theory allow for the possibility of parallel universes,
some of which in principle could be habitable. In addition, discussion of such
exotic transport concepts as ‘traversable wormholes’ now appears in the rigorous
physics literature (p. 43).
Consequently, the authors asserted, the proposition that humans may be the only
intelligent life in the universe is “inconsistent with new developments in our best current
physics and astrophysics theories” (p. 43). Thus scientists should consider seriously
investigating UFO reports, they said. Space.com (David, 2005) reported that, according
to Haisch, many scientists have  “been turned off” by UFO claims that have turned out to
be the products of “misinterpretations, delusions, and hoaxes” (para. 16), and
consequently they dismiss UFOs as a legitimate subject of study.
A so-called “X-Conference” held in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, DC, in 2004
was, its organizers asserted, designed to attract the attention of journalists and public
policy makers to the subject of UFO visitations, “extraterrestrial engagement and societal
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denial,” according to a press release about the conference.17  As I did with the Sci Fi
Channel’s Washington symposium, I attended this conference to observe the rhetoric of
UFOlogy in action. Phenomena magazine (Dolan, 2004) judged that the X-Conference
failed to meet its aim of generating media coverage and government action — neither the
Washington Post nor The New York Times covered the event. While the conference was
not covered as national news, it was covered, however, as a local event by a local
newspaper.
The Gaithersburg (MD) Gazette (Stanley, 2004) led its story on the conference with the
observation, “The certainty of alien life on Earth is usually not at the top of the list of
socially acceptable topics of conversation. Yet those wishing to delve into such a realm”
were able to do so, the paper said, at the conference. The story reported comments from a
number of speakers and attendees. For balance, it cited James Randi (who did not attend
the conference), identified in the story as a magician and “investigator of paranormal
claims” (para. 40). The story concluded by reporting that, according to Randi, “people
who speak at UFO conferences either believe themselves, are trying to scam people…or a
bit of both” (para. 48). The Gazette story was framed as a conventional who-what-when-
where-why news report. But it prompted one attendee, UFO proponent and would-be
journalism critic to complain that “the ‘writer’ has an expansive ignorance, an obvious
bias, and a non-constructive attitude” and should “be remembered as a bad example of
[her] tortured and ever more discredited craft” (Lehmberg, 2004).
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SETI
While many proponents of UFOlogy relate the search for extraterrestrial intelligence
(SETI) to the study of UFOs and alien abduction, SETI scientists demarcate their
legitimized scientific endeavor from the out-of-bounds study of UFO sightings and alien
contacts. 18 “The bane of SETI researchers is the cult of U.F.O. conspiracy theorists,” The
New York Times has noted (Nieves, 1999, p. A14). Nonetheless, reporters historically
have made the link, which is arguably logical, between SETI and alien beings, and they
continue to do so, though in recent years they have been making note of SETI’s growing
credibility as well. The narrative of SETI as a legitimate scientific endeavor began in
1959 with the publication of a paper in Nature, by Giuseppe Cocconi and Philip
Morrison, then professors at Cornell University, proposing that technology and scientific
knowledge had advanced to the point of enabling a search for interstellar radio signals of
extraterrestrial intelligent origin (Cocconi & Morrison, 1959). The scientific endeavor
known as SETI is now generally accepted as a legitimate subject of research,
acknowledged in decadal surveys of astronomy and astrophysics published by the
National Academy of Sciences (Dick & Strick, 2004), recognized by the Committee on
Space Research and the International Astronomical Union, and conducted by scientists
holding chairs endowed for the endeavor.
Scientists tend to be of two opinions when it comes to SETI: some think it is worthwhile,
whether they themselves are interested or not; and others think it is not worthwhile, for
any number of reasons deemed scientific or otherwise. These two camps make it easy for
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journalists to write “balanced” stories about SETI. Media coverage of SETI has been
plentiful since scientists first began to talk about it, and SETI scientists pay close
attention to what journalists say about their work. Some journalists have given SETI
book-length treatment, including a science editor of The New York Times (Sullivan, 1964)
and a science writer for Time (Lemonick, 1998). Despite its relatively remote location,
the October 1992 startup of NASA’s SETI project at the Arecibo Observatory in Puerto
Rico attracted a considerable number of reporters, from The New York Times (Wilford,
1992) to local media outlets, and generated worldwide media coverage.
Names and labels have always been important in the SETI community. Cocconi and
Morrison (1959) referred to “interstellar” rather than “extraterrestrial” communications in
the title of their famous paper. SETI scientists have been known to scrupulously avoid the
use of certain terms such as “alien.” SETI critics have tended to pick at the “E.T.” in
SETI (Billings, 1990). Rep. Silvio Conte (R-MA) once argued that the government
should not be spending money looking for evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence
because tabloid newspapers offered plenty of “proof” (Garber, 1999). In the early 1990s
congressional staff persuaded NASA officials to change the name of their search program
from the SETI Microwave Observing Project to the High Resolution Microwave Survey.
The Washington Post said the name was changed because of “unscientific associations”
between SETI and E.T.s, reporting that “in the public mind,” SETI was linked “with
Hollywood fantasy and supermarket tabloids” (Sawyer, 1992, p. A3). The following year
Congress cancelled the project. Sen. Richard Bryan (D-NV) characterized the SETI
cancellation as the end of taxpayer financing of a hunt for “Martians” (Garber, 1999).
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While a number of factors likely contributed to the cancellation of NASA’s SETI
program, its location on the borders of legitimate science made a contribution.
The SETI community has built credibility and authority by recruiting credible scientists,
attaching SETI to other credible scientific endeavors  (radio astronomy, astrobiology),
and creating its own research organization (the SETI Institute). A report from the
National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council, 2003) noted that while SETI
“has had a checkered reception by scientists and federal lawmakers,” the SETI Institute
“has accomplished in a spectacular way the founding of a science institute and the
procurement of stable private funding to carry on the search” (p. 6). The institute’s SETI
project “is a carefully designed effort and worthy of notice by the scientific community
and relevant federal agencies,” largely “because world-class scientists lead the SETI
Institute”  (pg. 6). The Institute has “maintained a high standard of scientific research
through its peer-reviewed research activities and articulated clearly and authoritatively
the rationale for approaches to a comprehensive search for extraterrestrial intelligence”
(p. 6).
SETI scientist Jill Tarter holds an endowed chair for SETI at the SETI Institute. Radio
astronomer William Welch occupies the Watson and Marilyn Alverts Chair for the
Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence at the University of California, Berkeley. Welch’s
chair “is a recognition that [SETI] is a serious endeavor,” Welch told The New York
Times (Nieves, 1999, p. A14). Frank Drake, a University of California astronomy
professor, president of the SETI Institute, and the scientist who conducted the first SETI
310
search, told the Times the chair was “an affirmation” that SETI had become mainstream
science.
Inside and outside the scientific establishment, however, SETI continues to be connected
with “little green men” and UFOs — what SETI proponents call “the giggle factor.”
NASA and the National Science Foundation continue to fund research on the origin,
evolution and distribution of life in the universe up to but not including intelligent life,
and SETI remains an endeavor that must depend on private funding to proceed.
Complementary and alternative medicine
Defenders of science tend to categorize complementary and alternative medicine (CAM)
as pseudoscience, and thus it is worth a brief examination here. The National Institutes of
Health has given CAM legitimacy by establishing a National Center for Complementary
and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) that is tasked with “exploring complementary and
alternative healing practices in the context of rigorous science, training complementary
and alternative medicine (CAM) researchers, and disseminating authoritative information
to the public and professionals.”19 Nonetheless, some critics continue to classify CAM as
“quackery”  — for example, physician Stephen Barrett (n.d.), who maintains what he
calls a “Quackwatch.”20
While he has not called it quackery, Arnold S. Relman, M.D., emeritus professor at the
Harvard Medical School, is not a fan of CAM. Relman is a vocal defender of the
conventional boundaries of science, in particular the boundaries of his own area of
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expertise, allopathic medicine. He is also a colleague and one-time mentor of John Mack,
and he chaired the medical school investigation board that examined Mack’s abduction
research. Relman (1998) constructed a victimage ritual against CAM in the pages of The
New Republic — where Gleick’s (1994) polemic against Mack appeared. Relman (1998)
made his case for the benefits of allopathic medicine and the pitfalls of alternative
approaches in his 9,000-word piece, which was, like Gleick’s, ostensibly a book review.
But like Gleick’s review, Relman’s critique of eight books by Harvard Medical School
graduate and CAM practitioner Andrew Weil on health and healing — subtitled “Andrew
Weil, the boom in alternative medicine, and the retreat from science” — was more a
critique of the author as a scientist than a writer. As Gleick did with Mack, Relman used
Weil to represent all scientists who should know better than to stray so far outside the
boundaries of conventional science
Relman identified Weil as a physician-writer, “guru” and leader in “the alternative
medicine movement” (Part I, para. 1-2). As Gleick did with Mack, Relman portrayed
Weil as a huckster, head of  “a large and astonishingly successful medical marketing
enterprise that might be called Dr. Andrew Weil Inc.,” the “CEO of alternative medicine”
(Part I, para. 3). As Gleick and other journalists did in writing about Mack, Relman noted
that Weil had “revolted against [the] academic bastions” of Harvard, “experimented with
mind-altering drugs” (Part I, para. 7) and pursued non-traditional interests (for Weil,
Relman reported, they included yoga, vegetarianism, herbal medicine and ritualistic
healing practices).
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Labeling allopathic medicine scientific, standard, and “regular,” Relman tagged Weil’s
alternative medicine old, pre-Christian, associating it with “Hinduism,” “shamans” (Part
I, para. 4) faith healing, and cults. “Leaders of the [medical] establishment believe in the
scientific method…the rule of evidence, and…the laws of physics, biology and
chemistry” (Part I, para. 5), Relman declared. Practitioners of alternative medicine “either
do not seem to care about science or explicitly reject its premises” (Part I, para. 5). Their
methods are “often based on notions totally at odds with science…. In advancing their
claims, they do not appear to recognize the need for objective evidence” (Part I, para. 5).
Weil’s thinking “defies rational belief or is just plain wrong” (Part I, para. 13),
encompassing “sweeping generalizations that cannot stand analysis” (Part I, para. 14).
Some of Weil’s claims “come ex cathedra from his own self-asserted authority as guru
and healer” (Part II, para. 7).  Weil “has published nothing in the peer-reviewed medical
literature” (Part III, para. 15) to back his claims. Relman noted that Weil was editor of
Integrative Medicine, a self-described “peer-reviewed journal...committed to gathering
evidence for the safety and efficacy of all approaches to health according to the highest
standard of scientific research, while remaining open to new paradigms and honoring the
healing power of nature" (Part IV, para. 7). Relman dismissed the journal, saying “there
already exist many leading peer-reviewed medical journals that will review…studies of
alternative healing methods on their merits,” and also noting that “only a few such studies
have passed rigorous review and have been published in first-rate journals” (Part IV,
para. 7). “In the absence of supporting evidence…skepticism is surely in order” (Part IV,
para. 1). “If Weil cannot produce credible evidence to validate [his] claims,” Relman
asserted, “he cannot presume to wear the mantle of science” (Part IV, para. 5). “Do we
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follow the universal rule of science…that objective, verifiable observation is the ultimate
and final judge of the truth” (Part V, para. 11), Relman asked, or turn to Weil’s subjective
methods.
Again echoing critics of Mack, Relman blamed Weil and his ilk for contributing to “a
swelling current of…anti-scientism that runs deep in our culture…a growing public
distrust of the scientific outlook and a reawakening of interest in mysticism and
spiritualism” (Part V, para. 6).  Like Gleick and others did in their stories about Mack,
Relman tagged Weil a believer rather than a knower: “he really does believe in miracles
and in faith healing” (Part I, para. 19). Relman broached the subject of the separation of
science and religion with his claim that “the rituals and meditations” Weil recommends
for health and healing “contribute a quasi-religiosity to [CAM] practices” (Part V, para.
2). While allopathic medicine needs improvement, its practitioners must be vigilant in
defending the boundaries of the field: “the medical establishment…must not lose its
scientific compass or weaken its commitment to rational thought and the rule of
evidence” (Part V, para. 12), Relman concluded.
In an interview with me (see Appendix B) Relman said The New Republic had
approached him about writing the Weil review, and the idea “appealed to a long-standing
interest I had in alternative medicine.” Relman said he thinks of science as “a way of
thinking, a tradition.” The conventional scientific worldview is that “we live in a material
universe [that] exists outside of the human brain” and can observe and participate in this
universe. “The thinking mind doesn’t create reality, but it interacts with that reality,” he
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said. Observations of that external reality indicate that it appears to behave according to
fundamental laws, and survival depends on the ability to understand those physical laws,
Relman said — in other words to describe and predict. The only way to know if
something is true is to make a prediction based on a hypothesis and determine whether
the hypothesis is falsifiable. “That’s my view of the scientific basis of conventional
medicine,” Relman said. Weil and Mack “do not accept that formulation.” They believe
that mind, spirit, and emotion have an existence independent of the brain and can produce
effects in the physical world. “We have to be very careful in teaching and practicing
medicine” to distinguish what we know and what we conjecture in the science of
medicine. “I don’t think many people call [alternative medicine] science.” Allopathic
medicine “is both an art and a science,” he said, a profession involving “humanistic as
well as biological concerns.” The aim of the science of medicine “is to understand,
diagnose and treat,” and it “depends critically on the development of new knowledge.”
The aim of the art of medicine is to understand the human heart and spirit, he said.
Conclusion
Ultimately the Case of the Deviant Doctor was unique in featuring a 100 percent
“Harvard” professor; a blurry, contested, complex and ambiguous map of psychoanalysis,
psychiatry, and psychology; an alternative scientific worldview; and perceived
transgression of the boundary between science and religion. Comparison of the Mack
case with other cases of contested science, however, highlights some important
similarities: the importance of credentials, the rhetoric of claims making, and the
resistance to rhetorical frames of acceptance in discourse about controversial science. In
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some of the cases reviewed in this chapter, implicit or explicit links between science and
spirituality were apparent: in paranormal science, for example, with the idea of a spirit
world or afterlife; in SETI, with questions about the purpose and meaning of human
existence. In the case of CAM, Relman’s remarks about the science and the art of
medicine hint at a means of transcending the conflict between his and Mack’s scientific
worldviews….
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Notes
1. Whether inside or outside the boundaries of legitimacy, cold fusion has not
disappeared from the science scene, however. The Washington Post (Weinberger,
2004) recently reported that while Pons has moved to France and “no longer
works on cold fusion,” Fleischmann has retired, and “research money has dried
up” (p. 34), that a few respectable scientists, with enough clout to prompt a
government review, continue to work on the cold fusion problem.
2. Information on CSICOP, unless otherwise attributed, was retrieved August 10,
2004, and May 11, 2005, from: http://www.CSICOP.org.
3. See, for example, CSICOP investigator Joe Nickell’s rhetorical attempt to debunk
John Mack’s abduction claims, “A study of fantasy proneness in the thirteen cases
of alleged encounters in John Mack’s Abduction” (Skeptical Inquirer, May/June).
Accessed on the World Wide Web October 12, 1999, at:
http://www.csicop.org/si/9605/mack.html.
4. I heard Kurtz make these remarks at a convention of the Cultural Environment
Movement in Athens, Ohio, on March 3, 1999.
5. Collins and Pinch (1982) reported that by the 1940s parapsychologists had
obtained “endorsement of their statistical methods by one of the most
authoritative groups of scientists, the mathematicians” (p. 157).
6. Information on the Parapsychological Association was retrieved May 10, 2005,
from http://www.parapsych.org.
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7. The former Duke University parapsychology lab was succeeded by the
independent Rhine Research Center, a parapsychology research organization
based near the Duke campus in Durham, NC. Information on the Rhine Research
Center, which continues to operate today, was retrieved May 10, 2005, from
http://www.rhine.org. (A search of Duke University’s Web site for information on
parapsychology research and the Rhine Research Center yielded only secondary
references, in campus newspaper articles and in the university’s archives.)
8. Information on the Society for Scientific Exploration was retrieved August 21,
2003, from http://www.scientificexploration.org/mission.html.
9. Information on the National Institute for Discovery Science was retrieved May 7,
2005, from http://www.nidsci.org. Las Vegas real-estate mogul Robert Bigelow is
the creator and funder of NIDS.
10. See www.jacquesvallee.net.
11. See http://wwww.sbvpartners.com/vallee.html.
12. Sci Fi described “Taken” as fiction based on true stories. The series was broadcast
in December 2002. Sci Fi said it sponsored the various elements of its “Taken”
campaign “to shed light on the facts behind the fiction” of the series. Journalism
professor and science writer Timothy Ferris (2003) wrote in CSICOP’s Skeptical
Inquirer that “Taken” told “a story that swallows every absurdity of the alien
abduction myth,” and he dismissed the series as “claptrap.” (Ferris cited Mack in
his article as “the Harvard psychologist who went belly up for abduction yarns.”)
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13.  The CPI briefing took place on October 22, 2002; the Roper poll results were
released in November; the UAP symposium occurred on November 8, and the
abduction symposium occurred on November 22, 2002.
14. John Podesta, a principal in PodestaMattoon, served as White House chief of staff
in the Clinton Administration. Along with Sci Fi representatives, Podesta
participated in the Press Club announcement of the CFI.
15. On the day of the New York abduction symposium, for example, Sci Fi also aired
a documentary, “The Roswell Crash: Startling New Evidence.”
16.  On his Web site Haisch states: “I believe that examining evidence that may
challenge prevailing scientific dogma is good for science and a necessary part of
searching for the truth….” He advocates “true skepticism…neither the gullible
acceptance of true belief nor the closed-minded rejection of the scoffer
masquerading as the skeptic.” His Web site, he states, is intended to be “a
respectable point of entry for any professional scientist interested in educating
himself or herself on this controversial but possibly significant topic.”
17. Press release, September 15, 2003, “1st annual Exopolitics Expo — the X-
Conference — Hilton Washington, DC, North/Gaithersburg, April 16-18, 2004,”
Paradigm Research Group, Bethesda, MD. Available from
http://www.paradigmclock.com/X-Conference%202004/X-Conference.htm.
18. From 1988 through 1993, off and on, I worked with NASA SETI project
scientists on communication and advocacy planning. Some of the information in
this section on SETI is based on my experience. Also see Note 25, Chapter 1.
19. Information obtained from http://nccam.nih.gov.
319
20. Barrett maintains a Quackwatch Web site dedicated to debunking “health-related
frauds, myths, fads, and fallacies,” such as the practice of chiropracty. The site is
part of a larger Web-based service called Skeptic Ring. According to Barrett,
quackery involves “promotion [of] “questionable ideas as well as questionable
products and services” and “entails the use of methods that are not scientifically
accepted.” A quack practitioner “may be scientific in many respects and only
minimally involved in unscientific practices.”
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Chapter 8
Discussion and conclusions: journalistic business as usual…
Discussion
The question driving this analysis was: how did journalists participate in the social
construction of scientific authority in The Case of the Deviant Doctor? The answer is, in
a word, routinely. Journalists did boundary-work by adhering to established journalistic
practices and news routines, by following professional conventions. I began this study
suspecting that journalists were acting atypically in reporting on Mack’s abduction
research, overreacting and exaggerating. But my analysis revealed that journalists were
simply doing business as usual. As other studies have shown (e.g. Gans, 1979; Gitlin,
1980; Nelkin, 1995b; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1972, 1974) and this study
affirms, established journalistic practices and conventions lead reporters to reinforce the
values, beliefs, and authority of their official sources. It is also the case that these same
practices and conventions lead journalists, just as routinely, to maintain a skeptical
attitude toward authority (see Dearing, 1995).
In interviews with me some of the journalists who wrote about Mack and his abduction
research indicated, in other words, that their primary interests in writing these stories
were complying with journalistic conventions and upholding journalistic values — doing
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what journalists are supposed to do, the way they are supposed to do it, that is, reporting
news, engaging readers, providing fair and balanced coverage, maintaining an objective
stance and a skeptical attitude. In these interviews they also told me about personal
interests that may have affected their reporting. None of the journalists I interviewed
explicitly acknowledged playing any role in reinforcing worldviews and spotlighting
deviance, nor did any explicitly refer to journalistic “values” or “conventions” or
“routines.” But, again, as shown by previous research and as illustrated by this analysis,
following professional conventions is the means by which journalists participate in
constructing and maintaining social and cultural conventions. In exploring how
journalists participate in the social construction of scientific authority, I have at least
begun to address why they participate as well. If “how” is routine, then “why” is to
maintain order. If “how” is symbolic action, then “why” is meaning making.. If “how” is
ritual performance, then “why” is to maintain culture over time.
Journalists decide on what is news, Schudson (2003) said, out of routine adherence to
“durable journalistic conventions” (p. 50). They “live in a world of practices,” as Carey
(1997) observed, focusing on “the procedures, rules and conventions by which [they] go
about their business” (p. 331). This study has shown that these conventions and practices
can be durable over time and place, individual reporters, and specific media outlets; the
findings of key studies now 20 to 30 years old (e.g. Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Tuchman,
1974, 1972) appear to hold fast. “Of all the institutions of daily life,” Gitlin observed
(1980), “the media specialize in orchestrating everyday consciousness.... They certify
reality as reality” (p. 2). Journalists apply “principles of selection, emphasis, and
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presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what
matters,” Gitlin wrote, “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation
of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize
discourse” (pp. 6-7), for themselves and for their audiences. Journalists in this case
appeared to follow Gitlin’s template routinely. Schudson (2003) noted that “decisions
inherent in the manufacture of news” are influenced by “the marketplace, the nature of
organizations, and the assumptions of news professionals” as well as with “individual
bias” (p. 47). That said, Schudson also noted, “The person who writes the story matters”
(ibid. p. 47). This analysis affirms Schudson’s assessments.
Journalistic rituals
This analysis has examined the work of journalists situated in  what Zelizer (1994) called
“an interpretive community,” a community “united through its shared discourse and
collective interpretations of key public events” (p. 402). It is a community in which
journalists may abide by accepted conventions and respect accepted boundaries “without
ever actually being informed of them by superiors” (p. 403). Even journalists’ repetition
of particular narratives across media may be a community-building exercise, having “as
much to do with connecting journalists with each other as it does with audience
comprehension or message relay” (p. 404). As noted in Chapter 1, Zelizer (1997a) has
suggested that it could be useful for mass communication research to examine the ritual
functions of journalism, as narrative or as performance. This study illuminates a case of
journalistic ritual that could be described as either a narrative — the story of a heroic
journey — or a performance — journalists doing their part to maintain social order.
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Routine drove journalists’ participation in constructing the cultural authority of science in
this case, but of course the process was more complex than that. “Culture is the ensemble
of practices through which order is imposed on chaos. These practices constitute
communication,” according to Carey (1997, p. 314). If communication is conceived as
culture, as it is in this analysis, then journalism has a ritual function. Ritual, Carey said,
“is the principal means…through which chaos is controlled and order is imposed
on…human action” (p. 314), and journalism ritually contributes to containing cultural
chaos and maintaining social order. Journalism is a cultural practice “of world making, of
the making of meaning” (p. 331). By following journalistic routines and enforcing
established news values, as Gans (1979) noted, journalists fulfill a range of functions,
from maintaining social order and safeguarding moral values to making myths,
performing prophetic and priestly rituals, and managing “the symbolic arena” (p. 298).
The function of journalistic routines was notable in this case. The function of journalistic
ritual was evident as well.
Initially it was disappointing to see how conventional these stories appeared to be. But
beneath the veneer of journalistic business as usual — the pragmatic, routine spotlighting
of conflict, authority, and transgression and striving for fairness, balance and clarity — I
ultimately saw order-keeping, boundary-tending rituals being performed. And as ritual
acts, the texts became interesting all over again. As shown in Chapters 5 and 6, some
served as ritual, public, punishments for Mack’s transgression of the boundaries of
science (the rhetorical equivalent of a flogging in Harvard Square). In some sense, I
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would argue, the entire body of media texts selected for analysis in this study functioned
as a ritual flogging, a public spectacle, with even those stories that did not explicitly
criticize Mack contributing to the overall public examination of his perceived
transgressions.
Stories served a parallel and conflicting ritual purpose, too, depicting Mack as a heroic
figure and recapitulating his journey into the unknown. They told a tale of Mack’s call to
the adventure of abduction research, his departure from the positivistic worldview and
other conventions of science, his initiation into “numinous” reality and “subtle” realms,
and his attempt to return, if not with the world-restoring elixir of new knowledge at least
with a vow to continue to look for it. The mythic hero typically learns on his journey that
the worlds of the divine and the human “are actually one” (Campbell, 1949, p. 217).
What the hero comes to understand is that “the realm of the gods is a forgotten dimension
of the world we know”  (p. 217) — a claim that Mack made, and journalists reported,
frequently.
This study might be described as what McKerrow (1989) called a “polysemic” rhetorical
critique, an analysis that “uncovers a subordinate or secondary reading which contains
the seeds of subversion or rejection of authority, at the same time that the primary reading
appears to confirm the power of the dominant cultural norms” (p. 108). Overtly and
pragmatically, journalists in this case did boundary-work routinely, by following
conventions. More subtly and symbolically, journalists did boundary-work by the ritual
reinforcement of scientific norms. The journalistic metanarrative explored in this study
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aimed at identification with “the public” and with elites, offering entertainment coupled
with affirmation of social order in the form of the conventional boundaries of science.
The subversive subtext aimed at identification with the maverick, division from elites.
In keeping with the idea of the polysemic reading, Burke’s (1969a) concept of the
representative anecdote is useful to apply in this analysis. A representative anecdote,
Burke said, is a selection rather than a reflection of reality, conveying the essential
vocabulary of a common narrative. (Campbell (1949) or Carey (1992) might call them
myths.) There may be two competing representative anecdotes in this case. One — a
narrative of an expert’s transgression of the boundaries of convention, a warning against
taking the risk of a fall from grace and a loss of authority — maintains the ideology of the
conventional scientific worldview. The other — a narrative of an authority’s long history
of accomplishments and transgressions, his foray into controversial research, and the
maintenance of his authority in the face of rejection — maintains the ideology of
scientific/academic/American freedom of thought and speech, affirming that scientists
may ask outrageous questions and tread unbeaten paths, that (tenured) academics may
march to their own ideological drummers, that Americans may trip the quite-fantastic and
still keep their jobs. Both affirm beliefs about what scientific authority is and should be.
One asserts that within the confines of the conventional scientific worldview, science can
explain the world, and that the task of scientific authorities is to dispel ambiguity and
complexity by explaining things. The other asserts that ambiguity and complexity are
inherent to reality, that mystery is a fact of life.
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From a philosophical perspective, the basic question of scientific ontology is “what is
there?” (Worrall, 1994, p. xi), and the basic answer to this question is “everything.”
Within a broad rhetorical frame of acceptance, the question and the answer are reasonable
and sensible. The conventional scientific worldview, however, functions as a frame of
rejection, and thus from a scientific perspective the question becomes, more narrowly,
“what, in view of the evidence we have, and in particular in view of the evidence
accumulated by science, is it reasonable to believe that there is?” (p. xi). Mack proposed
that the conventional scientific worldview might be inadequate to explain “everything.”
Journalists responded that “everything” that fit within the frame of the conventional
scientific worldview was what constituted reality. If it did not fit, it was not real. But then
journalists sometimes left the door open to the possibility that Mack might be onto
something.
Brante (1993) delineated a difference between controversial science — epistemological
conflicts over science claims, involving “contradictory scientific beliefs”  — and science
controversies — sociopolitical conflicts over “contending knowledge claims where at
least one of the parties has scientific status” (p. 181). (Brante also noted that, “in certain
respects, the difference between scientific and science-based controversies is a matter of
degree” (p. 181). The Case of the Deviant Doctor was not a typical case of scientific
controversy or controversial science. Stories about Mack’s abduction research ultimately
did not focus on resolving the question of whether abductions were real. Mack himself
became the controversy — an authority, a member of the scientific elite pursuing
questionable research, using unconventional research methods, espousing a contrary
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worldview. The right of a tenured professor at Harvard to speak with authority about
what is real and relevant and what is not generally goes unquestioned. Journalists were
more concerned with the authority, credibility, and legitimacy of the scientist than they
were with the authority, credibility, and legitimacy of his science. For them, Mack
represented Harvard, and Harvard represented scientific authority.
The metanarrative examined herein began with a scientist doing what scientists are
typically expected to do: confronting a mystery, formulating a hypothesis, observing the
phenomenon, and speculating on possible explanations for it. The story ended with the
mystery unsolved, the phenomenon unexplained. Over the course of this case, Mack did
boundary-work like all good scientific authorities do: by ritual incantation of credentials,
methods, evidence, detachment. It may be reasonable to assume that boundary-work by a
scientific authority will be more effective than boundary-work by journalists; while this
analysis does not prove this assumption, it does yield evidence that journalists could not
demolish Mack’s authority because, at least in part, I would argue, he was better than
they were at boundary-work. When the rhetorical dust settled, Mack was still standing,
credentials and funding intact (with at least enough for him to continue doing what he
wanted to do), still able to publish his expert opinions on the prestigious op-ed page of
The New York Times (though not, it must be noted, his opinions on abduction). He still
had his authority, perhaps somewhat scratched and dented, but functional. But it is not at
all clear whether, a hundred years from now, Mack’s case will be depicted in the history
of science as more like Darwin’s or Pons and Fleischmann’s (see Chapter 7).
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Conclusions…
Being productive
The scholarly value of studying communication “in terms of a ritual model,” said Carey
(1992, p. 35), is that it provides a way of thinking about the potential “restorative value”
of communication “in reshaping our common culture,” explaining how ideas and
experiences are shared, how values and norms are constructed and relayed, how order
and authority are created and maintained. “Research on popular science communication,”
Dunwoody (1992) noted, “will endure only to the extent that it illuminates general
processes important to mediated communication of all types of information” (p. 14).
Employing the ritual conception of communication in this analysis has enabled some
illumination of these processes.
In conducting this analysis I have attempted to heed the critique that social constructivists
avoid “intentional interventions in the processes they now only observe” (Hamlett, 2003,
p. 134) and thus fall short of doing relevant work (see Hamlett, 2003, for a review of this
critique). Criticism “that shuns overt politics is either ignorant of or masking its own
investments in the status quo,” according to Cloud (2001); “even when criticism claims to
be descriptive of social reality rather than offering normative correctives…the retreat into
description is profoundly ideological” (para. 1). Cloud’s assertions are relevant to this
analysis, as well as to some of the texts analyzed herein (e.g. Gleick, 1994; Miles, 1994;
Rucker, 1994). Though he often acknowledged his own worldview and interests in
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writing and talking about abduction, even Mack could be faulted for falling back on the
objective, detached language of conventional science in order to distance his abduction
claims from his interests. “Socially and morally involved” rhetorical criticism aims, as
Klumpp and Hollihan (1989) observed to “illuminate the mystery” (p. 84) of social
order— ‘bring it to consciousness, and you introduce the possibility of change” (p. 93).
The aim of this analysis has been productive criticism, described by Ivie (1995) as an
approach to critique resting on the assumption that a critic cannot produce critique
“without purpose, intent, or benefit of perspective” (n.p.). I have attempted to
acknowledge, maintain and refine an awareness of my purpose, intent, and perspective
throughout this analysis. It has been said that productive criticism should prompt its
audience “to think or act differently and in socially responsible ways” (Nothstine, Blair &
Copeland, 1994, p. 4). My hope is that the results of this analysis may prompt its
audience to do so. I intend for the results of this act of productive criticism to be useful in
heightening journalists’ awareness of their own rhetorical strategies and aims, an
awareness that might help them to make more informed decisions about the ways in
which they communicate about science. For this reason I hope these results will be of
interest to teachers of journalism, too. In the best of all possible worlds, these findings
will prove useful to scientists as well, toward the same ends. I am already applying my
findings in my daily work with scientists and journalists.
Journalists and scientists both claim authority to inform the public about science. This
right to inform can be said to entail a responsibility. The linkage between right and
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responsibility may be a bridge by which journalists and scientists might transcend the
debunking strategy so commonly used in discourse about claims made and contested in
the name of science. The frame of rejection known as debunking “becomes a colossal
enterprise in ‘transcendence downwards’ that is good for polemical, disintegrative
purposes,” said Burke (1984, pp. 92-93). Burke recommended broadening and reorienting
rhetorical frames to better understand problems and resolve conflicts. “A well rounded
frame serves as an amplifying device,” he said (1984, p. 103), revealing how things
inside the frame are connected. Burke recommended transcending conflict by developing
“a unifying attitude.” A comic corrective to debunking strategies, as proposed in Chapter
6, would enable both journalists and scientists to develop and maintain their own partial
perspectives without necessarily rejecting others. “The comic frame is charitable,
but...not gullible,” Burke noted (1984, 107). Such a corrective strategy would enable
them to be agnostic (doubting but accepting) rather than atheistic (non-believing and
rejecting). Acceptance does not require approval or endorsement and is thus a suitable
stance for skeptics.
The comic corrective outlined in this critique would aim to broaden, amplify, and
accommodate perspectives on the abduction phenomenon, to reconcile what appear to be
conflicting conceptions of reality. A comic frame of acceptance could provide a way of
establishing common ground and deciding how to proceed from there. Within such a
frame, perhaps there could be agreement that thousands of people believe they have been
abducted by aliens, that these people are not “crazy,” that not enough is known about
their experiences to explain them. Comic corrective is not a panacea, as Burke noted.
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However, a comic corrective such as the one outlined here could aim to promote
tolerance and acceptance, avoid rejection, and broaden public dialogue about the nature,
function, purposes, and effects of the way of knowing, the professional practice, the
cultural institution known as science. Such a corrective would permit those involved in
the dialogue to transcend the sort of polarized debate so common in public discourse
about science, moving beyond disputes over which perspectives are valid to determine
which are useful.
Perhaps journalists and scientists might consider accepting, if only for the sake of peace,
that, as Haraway (1991) explained, multiple perspectives provide a more complete and
thus “better” picture of reality. “The important thing,” as Burke (1984) pointed out, “is to
continue the search for a comic vocabulary of motives...that could provide humility
without humiliation” (p. 344). (Though in Chapter 6 I outlined a possible comic
corrective to his polemic against Mack, I must confess that I suspect James Gleick (1994)
would not be interested in employing comic correctives and other frames of acceptance. I
would like to think, however, that Arnold Relman (1998) might be more open to the
idea….)
According to the mission statement of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ, n.d.),
”People must be well informed in order to make decisions regarding their lives... It is the
role of journalists to provide this information in an accurate, comprehensive, timely and
understandable manner” (n.p.). Most journalists, if asked, would say that their jobs are to
find the news, get the facts, and tell the truth. Some journalists are provided formalized
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rules to follow on the job. Many are not. (And sometimes reporters who have rules to
follow flout them, as in the case of The New York Times and Jayson Blair – see Hindman,
2005). In any case, it is not reasonable to expect that these rules, as far as they exist,
should provide tutorials in rhetorical analysis. But in the public understanding of science,
rhetoric, as Gross (1994) said, “is both a theory capable of analysing [sic] public
understanding and an activity capable of creating it” (p. 3). Thus it is important for
journalists to have some awareness of the roles of rhetoric in science.
By reporting the rhetoric of science as supplied by official sources — unfiltered, as it
were — journalists reinforce the values and authority of those sources. But while
journalists participate in constructing and reconstructing scientific authority in reporting
science news, as illustrated in this case study, they are not necessarily as fully aware as
they might be of what they are accomplishing. While, as Schudson (2003) observed,
journalistic conventions are durable, they are not immutable. If by following established
conventions in doing their work, reporters can reinforce those conventions, then it is
certainly within reason to assume that reporters could examine and adjust them as needed
in the process. Journalistic texts could be viewed as Burkean equipment for living, “a
ritualistic way of arming us to confront perplexities and risks…to protect us” (Burke,
1973, p. 61). The stories examined in this analysis employed narrow frames of rejection
to protect readers from irrationality and uncertainty. Stories constructed in broader frames
of acceptance, “guided by broad and diffuse values and interests” as Restivo (1989) has
proposed, could provide protection from incomplete perspectives.
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Mindful journalism, multiperspectival news
Stocking1 recommends that journalists practice what she calls “mindful journalism,” a
more thoughtful way of going about their jobs. For me, the term invokes the Buddhist
concept of mindfulness. The attitude of mindfulness requires a sort of de-self-centering,
thinking with one’s “whole mind” and avoiding “one-sided” thinking (Suzuki, 1970, p.
115). “The point is to be ready for observing things, and to be ready for thinking. By
being prepared, “there is no need to make an effort to think. This is called mindfulness”
(p. 115). This conception of mindfulness meshes neatly with Burke’s conception of
broadening the frame.
By being more mindful — thoughtful, open, aware — in their reporting, by routinely
contemplating what they are doing before, during and after doing it, journalists reporting
on science, and other things, could enrich their existing routines, expand their frames of
reference and sharpen their awareness of the values, biases, and assumptions embedded
in official sources of news and in their own attitudes about the news. In science reporting,
journalists could benefit by improving their understanding of the cultural values
embedded in the news their official and authoritative science sources provide. More
conscious participation in maintaining the boundaries of science and sustaining the
cultural authority of scientists could render the deployment of that authority, and the
authority of journalists as well, more productive and responsive.
Gans (1979) proposed that media outlets adopt a model of “multiperspectival news”
toward broadening their perspectives and giving their audiences more well-rounded
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pictures of reality.  Multiperspectival news would be less biased and more national (for
instance, less Washington-centric). It would provide bottom-up as well as top-down
views, offer more “output news” and “service news,” and “aim to be more
representative” (p. 313). Reporting of science and other sorts of news could benefit from
such a multiperspectival approach.
As noted in Chapter 2, M. G. Durham (1998) has pointed out that journalists typically
operate “inside the dominant social order,” reporting “about those who are either inside
or outside it, with no overt acknowledgment of these social locations or the implications
thereof” (p. 129). Elite print media coverage of John Mack’s abduction research, as
described herein, appeared to fit this description. Following Gans and drawing on
feminist science theory, Durham has argued for “strong objectivity” in journalism, a
concept derived from feminist standpoint epistemology (see Harding, 1991; Keller,
1985). A convention of strong objectivity could, she argued, "advance journalism by
compelling journalists to rethink themselves and their craft from the position of
marginalized Others" (p. 132).
Analyst’s perspective, part I: productive options
My current work involves observation and analysis of science communication in action. I
have observed that many scientists who claim an interest in improving science
communication are operating on the assumption that as scientists they are better qualified
to communicate about science than professional communicators are, while these
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communicators are more likely to operate on the assumption that good science
communication depends on collaboration between communicators and scientists. I have
found that collaboration is by far the best route to successful science communication. I
have had many privileged encounters with prominent scientists, up close and at arm’s
length, over 30 years of working in Washington. But in spite of this privileged access, the
more I learn about the practice and the politics of science, the more deeply concerned I
become about the potential for abuse of the power that scientists (and others) wield in the
name of science. The politics of science in the Bush administration, as documented by the
Center for Science in the Public Interest, Union of Concerned Scientists, and U.S.
Congressman Henry Waxman, among others, have made me all the more distrustful. But
yet I still yearn for science to come to the rescue — from environmental degradation,
food shortage, global plagues, toxic poisoning…. And at the same time I grow less
hopeful that science will come through.
My work puts me in daily contact with journalists and scientists. These scientists are
responsible for government-funded research programs worth hundreds of millions of
dollars a year or more. These journalists report on science and technology for a variety of
outlets ranging from The New York Times to Aviation Week & Space Technology. When I
talk with scientists about their cultural authority and the responsibilities it entails, they
shake their heads: some other scientists might have authority, they say, but not them.
Journalists I talk with have little conception of their own cultural authority. My plea, to
all journalists and scientists who are interested in making their professions better, is that
they acknowledge their possession of cultural authority, understand what it is and where
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it comes from and what they can accomplish with it, and act responsibly in accordance
with these understandings. I believe that journalists and scientists would benefit, as would
their constituencies, from acquiring a more thorough understanding of the histories and
cultures of their own as well as each others’ professions. I intend to apply the findings of
this study in working with journalists and scientists on improving communication with
the public about science, focusing especially on developing and deploying strategies for
communicating about science that avoid debunking and other strategies of rejection.
Communicating with the public about science from a stance of acceptance is necessary to
advancing my goal of expanding public participation in science policy making.
In my everyday life I have already begun to take what I intend to be productive action
based on my findings in this study. I am participating in a science communication
working group sponsored by the NASA Astrobiology Institute (NAI) and including
members from science, academia, and journalism; this group is a promising forum for the
exchange of ideas about communications between scientists and journalists. I intend to
submit a paper for presentation to the biennial congress of the international Committee on
Space Research (COSPAR) (scheduled for July 2006 in Beijing) entitled, “Scientists are
from Saturn, journalists are from Jupiter,” characterizing scientific and journalistic
cultures and practices and speculating about how what is called the gap between
scientists and journalists may be bridged (and I will likely propose a similar presentation
for the NAI’s 2007 biennial meeting).
I have accepted an invitation from the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences to
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participate in a discussion about bridging this gap at the association’s 2005 annual
meeting in Washington, DC; I am also organizing a panel discussion for this meeting on
best practices in science and risk communication (featuring, of course, speakers whose
thinking I like…). I am organizing a session for the National Association of Science
Writers’ (NASW’s) fall 2005 workshop in Pittsburgh, PA, entitled “Who speaks for
science?” – I intend for this panel discussion to feature academics and practitioners who
can speak about the construction and deployment of scientific authority. I am mentoring
an NASW student member who aspires to be a science writer. In 2004 and 2005, I hosted
lunchtime discussions about space science reporting at NASW workshops in Seattle,
WA, and Washington, DC. At the Society for Environmental Journalists’ (SEJ’s) 2005
annual meeting in Pittsburgh, I hosted a dinner discussion on the same subject. I intend to
continue practicing what I preach.
Analyst’s perspective, Part II: science in culture
I keep hearing and reading that scientists are abandoning the cognitive deficit model of
communication, that the science wars are over, that science communication is vastly
improved compared to the dark ages of the 1970s and before. While I cannot refute these
claims, I can say that I continue to encounter defensive maneuvers against perceived
threats to the conventional scientific worldview. For example, in 2003 a handful of self-
described scientific thinkers initiated the so-called “bright” movement, a rhetorical
campaign waged in the mass media to defend “skeptics, nonbelievers, nontheists,
atheists, agnostics, heretics, infidels, free thinkers, humanists, secular humanists and the
like” (Shermer, 2003) against fundamentalist “believers” who reject the accepted
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scientific worldview and its explanations for the origin of the universe and the evolution
of life. Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins affiliated himself with the bright
movement and published an editorial about it in The Guardian of London. In The New
York Times, philosopher of consciousness Daniel Dennett declared himself a bright.
Dinesh D’Souza praised the brights in the Wall St. Journal. Dawkins (as cited by
Shermer, 2003) claimed “brights constitute 60% of American scientists, and a stunning
93% of those scientists good enough to be elected to the elite National Academy of
Sciences” (n.p.). Dennett (as cited by Shermer, 2003) declared, “We are the moral
backbone of the nation: brights take their civic duties seriously precisely because they
don’t trust God to save humanity from its follies” (n.p.). Even some fellow skeptics,
however, took offense at the elitist attitude conveyed by the “bright” rhetoric, and the
movement has not picked up much steam since its advocates went public.
Lawrence Krauss, chair of the physics department at Case Western Reserve University
and better known as the author of The Physics of Star Trek, claims science is under
attack, by proponents of creationism, intelligent design, and other ideas that blur the
boundary between science and religion. Krauss (2004) has said scientists should not be
fearful of offending religious sensibilities, especially when they are “nonsense.” He has
also asserted that theologians would benefit from listening to knowledgeable scientists
(such as himself) and should feel obligated to do so; he has said scientists should feel no
obligation to listen to them, however. Intelligent design is “close-minded, dishonest, and
unfair,” Krauss (2003) has asserted, “a case of creating controversy when there isn’t
any...debate when there isn’t any” (n.p.). Science has an ethos of “honesty, open-
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mindedness, creativity, egalitarianism, full disclosure” (n.p.). Keeping an open mind is a
matter of conforming one’s thinking to reality, he has observed, while close-minded
thinkers make reality conform to their thinking. “In a democratic society,” Krauss (2004)
has said, “everything should be open to debate” (n.p.). However, journalists need to
consider “that some things are not open to debate…. Many times there are two sides” to a
story, and “one side is wrong,” and in these cases “journalists have an obligation” (n.p.)
to report the scientific, right, view. Complaining about public interest in UFOs and aliens,
Krauss (1999) wrote in The New York Times, “Mountains of statistics suggest that the
public is…susceptible to scientific nonsense…. Many people simply do not have the
tools to distinguish charlatans from honest researchers” (p. A21), and journalists must
take care to distinguish fact from fiction in reporting on these subjects.
Like Mack, Krauss is a tenured professor at a well known research university. Like
Mack, he has sold enough books about science to be able to publish his opinions about
the subject in The New York Times. He received the American Association for the
Advancement of Science’s 1999-2000 Award for the Public Understanding of Science
and the American Physical Society’s 2001 Edgar Lilienfeld Prize, for “extraordinary
achievement in communicating the essence of physical science to the general public.”2
His favored rhetorical strategy, however, is debunking. The foundation of his terministic
screen of debunking terms is a cluster of words at whose center are “wrong” and
“nonsense.” Krauss’s rhetorical motive is to identify with people who think scientifically
— that is, like he does — people who make sense, not nonsense.
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New York University physicist and popular science author Michio Kaku employs a
similar rhetorical style. Kaku (1999) has asserted that journalists do not know about or
understand science, blaming them for public ignorance about scientific matters.
Employing a terministic screen of terms of ignorance, he has further spread the blame,
complaining of stupid science teachers, stupid people, stupid ideas, and stupid claims
disguised as facts. Like Krauss, Kaku attempts to identify with scientific thinkers rather
than aiming to persuade people with different perspectives to consider his views.
While public opinion is generally favorable toward science and scientists (National
Science Board, 2004), people are nonetheless inclined to be skeptical about claims to
scientific authority and “right” scientific knowledge (Lewenstein, 1995; Nelkin, 1996).
Public opinion researcher Daniel Yankelovich (2003) has asserted that scientists and non-
scientists “operate out of vastly different worldviews, especially in relation to
assumptions about what constitutes knowledge....  Scientists share a worldview that
presupposes rationality, lawfulness, and orderliness,” while public life “is shot
through...with irrationality, discontinuity and disorder…. Science has reached greater
heights of sophistication and productivity, while the gap between science and public life
has grown ever larger and more dangerous.” While scientists “are highly respected,” he
has said, they are “not nearly as influential as they should be” (n.p.).
Broader frames
I am disheartened to see the kinds of rhetorical strategies that Dawkins and Krauss
employ singled out as worthy of praise, and even emulation (and, toward being
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productive, I am campaigning for the nomination of more deserving candidates for the
kinds of science communication awards that have been bestowed upon the likes of
Dawkins and Krauss). Such narrow frames of rejection are not effective strategies for
identifying with audiences who have not already embraced the rhetor’s views. As Carey
(1992) has observed, “the presumption that living in scientific frames of reference is
unequivocally superior to aesthetic, commonsensical, or religious ones” is a “scientific
conceit” (p. 66). Restivo (1989) has argued that the best epistemic strategy is not the
Western scientific worldview, depending on the demarcation between science and non-
science and therefore inherently limiting. A preferable, broader perspective would be a
“general strategy distinguished by its capacity for criticism, reflexivity, and meta-
inquiry” (p. 168). The idea of objectivity, in Restivo’s view, “depends on inquiry that is
guided by broad and diffuse values and interests rather than by the values and interests of
specific organizations, institutions, or social classes” (p. 174). What science needs in
order to thrive is anarchy — that is, “opposition to the principle of Authority, and to all
constraints rooted in institutions organized in terms of that principle” (p. 145).
Harding (1991) has suggested “eliminating sexist bias” in science “might require
redefining objectivity, rationality, and scientific method” (p. 19). Keller (1985) has
proposed re-conceiving objectivity as “dynamic objectivity” — the idea of “pursuit of
maximally authentic and reliable understanding of the world,” relying on “our own
connectivity with [and subjective experience of] that world” (p. 116). “Sustained,
rational, objective inquiry” is possible in an “epistemology of partial perspectives”,
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Haraway (1991) has observed; “the goal is better accounts of the world, that is, ‘science’”
(pp. 191, 196).
To non-experts, perhaps science does appear to be “a golem,” as Collins and Pinch
(1993) observed, a powerful entity that “grows a little more powerful every day...will
follow orders, do your work, and protect you” but “is clumsy and dangerous. Without
control, the golem may destroy its masters with its flailing vigor” (p. 1). Ben-David
(1991) surmised that the rise of “anti-science” sentiment is a product of growing
“disillusionment with the Western democratic liberal social order of which science has
been an integral part” (p. 20). “New Age,” alternative science, Ross (1991) observed,
“has assumed a virtuoso, experimental role in reconstructing a humanistic personality for
science — science with a human face…. This appeal to personalism is deeply rooted in
popular distrust of authority and the desire for self-control” (p. 28).
Perhaps public interest in what science advocates call pseudoscience, New Age science
or mysticism is not an indication of “anti-science” sentiment. In a broader frame of
acceptance, it could be seen as an indication of a desire to expand the boundaries of
science and broaden possibilities for answering questions, resolving mysteries, explaining
and understanding reality. What science advocates interpret as an expression of public
distrust or ignorance of science may be, instead, an expression of increasing public
knowledge and understanding about science and a resulting tendency to turn to science
more frequently for problem solving.  As Toumey (1996) observed, “science is a matrix
of meanings…abstract and intangible. To understand them…we…need…symbols: stories
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rituals, image, emblems, slogans, virtues and role models” (p. 131). If positivistic science
cannot explain a phenomenon, perhaps some other sort of science can.
Future directions
As I noted in Chapter 1, given the individual perspective and idiosyncratic approach I
have applied to this analysis, the results of this analysis are unique. But I hope that my
findings may provoke some new studies. The purpose of qualitative research, Pauly
(1991) said, is not to answer questions but to foster discussion and debate. This analysis
has yielded an answer to the question that drove it. I believe it is likely generalizable,
given its affirmation of a solid body of literature. The results of this exercise in
productive rhetorical criticism certainly raise other questions worthy of further discussion
and exploration.
As Gross (1995) observed, while everything scientific may not necessarily be rhetorical,
“everything scientific is, potentially, subject to rhetorical analysis” (p. 38). As I noted in
Chapter 1, this study was not designed to be replicated.  The interpretations and analysis
offered herein are uniquely mine. It would be interesting to see, however, what other
analysts with other perspectives and taking different approaches might come up with if
they took on this case. The metanarrative constructed for the purposes of this analysis is
rich with material for further exploration, in any case. Winch (1997) concluded in his
study of boundary-work in journalism that further studies of boundary-work should
“examine [1] how audiences perceive these same boundaries, and [2] how the public
confers cultural authority....” (p. 164). Both of these questions are worthy of study and
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could guide further analysis of the Case of the Deviant Doctor. Lamont & Molnar (2002)
suggested that “more work is needed to integrate the psychological, cultural, and social
mechanisms involved in this process of boundary construction” (p. 170). While this study
focused on rhetorical critique, further analysis of the Case of the Deviant Doctor could
address their interests.  Some of the individual texts examined in this study — for
example, Gleick’s (1994) and Relman’s (1998) intriguing defensive reviews for The New
Republic — are worthy of deeper exploration and could stand alone as subjects of
rhetorical analysis. It would be interesting to apply the analytic framework I employed in
this case study to analysis of other cases of controversial science. And some of the
comparative cases examined briefly in Chapter 7 are ripe for deeper sociological or
rhetorical exploration.  Further exploration of the fringe media, especially the
proliferation of online media catering to audiences interested in UFOlogy and paranormal
science, seems especially promising, particularly in light of what appears to me to be a
stalemate between committed skeptics concerned about what they call science illiteracy
and dedicated proponents of what Mack would call more expansive worldviews.
This analysis, while informed by critical and cultural theoretical perspectives, has not
been conducted strictly as a critical cultural study. This case, however, appears to be rich
ground for such a study focused on the deployment of cultural authority (scientific or
journalistic), a study of power operating from the bottom up, as Foucault (1980, 1972)
described it, power that arises out of everyday practices, the continual jockeying among
social actors for authority, status, and control. This case is also a promising site for a
Foucauldian exploration of the power struggle between local knowledge (experience) and
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“the institutions and…effects of the knowledge and power that invests scientific
discourse” (Foucault, 1979, p. 87).3
According to McMullin (1987), scientific controversies end by resolution, closure, or
abandonment. In this case there was no resolution or closure. Journalists may have
abandoned the story. But it is more likely that they simply responded to Mack’s
avoidance of the press. This case will likely remain unsolved, the drama inconclusive,
until and unless a scientific authority of Mack’s stature (Harvard-Pulitzer equivalent) and
character (boundary transgressor) attempts to continue and complete it.
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Notes
1. Indiana University journalism professor S. Holly Stocking is writing a book about
mindful journalism. My understanding of this concept is based solely on
conversations with her.
2. Information obtained from Krauss’s online biography. Accessed on the World
Wide Web December 29, 2004, at: http://www.cwru.edu/~krauss/bio.html.)
3. In May 2005, as I was completing this manuscript, I attended several sessions of
the journalism studies section of the International Communication Association
(ICA) at ICA’s annual meeting in New York City and was (and am) intrigued by
discussions there about developing new and improved theories and models of
journalism. Should scholars develop a theoretical model to explain what
journalism is and how it works and then shoehorn the everyday practice of
journalism into this model? Or should scholars observe how journalism functions
and the roles it fills in everyday life, think about why it is the way it is, and
speculate about how it might be? (In the Mack case, of course, a similar
discussion took place, in which scientists defending what they presented as the
conventional scientific worldview argued that reality must fit
theory/model/worldview, while Mack argued that theory/model/worldview should
fit reality.) I prefer the inductive approach of theorizing from observation, though
both perspectives likely have something to contribute to the ongoing discourse
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about journalism. I hope that my findings might be of interest to scholars
interested in better understanding journalism.
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Epilogue
On September 27, 2004, eight years after I first encountered The Case of the Deviant
Doctor in the texts explored for this study, John Mack died, victim of a drunk driver in
London, where he had traveled to speak at a symposium of the T.E. Lawrence Society.
An obituary in The New York Times (Bayot, 2004) identified Mack as “a Pulitzer Prize
winner and Harvard psychiatrist who studied people who said they had encounters with
alien beings” (p. A27). The Times reported that Mack “was drawn to psychoanalytic
analysis of the misunderstood or vulnerable, including children contemplating suicide,
teenagers troubled by the threat of nuclear war and finally, people plagued by what they
believed to be recurrent alien encounters” (p. A27). Citing Mack’s abduction research,
the book Abduction (Mack, 1994a), and Harvard Medical School’s Mack investigation,
the Times also noted that Abduction “focused less on whether aliens were real than on the
spiritual effects of perceived encounters, arguing that ‘the abduction phenomenon has
important philosophical, spiritual and social implications’ for everyone” (p. A27).
In its obituary, the Boston Globe (Feeney, 2004) described Mack as “a Pulitzer Prize-
winning author and Harvard Medical School professor whose research on purported
extraterrestrial abductions generated widespread publicity and controversy” (para. 1). An
obituary in the Los Angeles Times (Rourke, 2004) identified him as “a Pulitzer-Prize-
winning author and professor of psychiatry at Harvard” who “stirred controversy with his
research,” and concluded, “Though his critics at [Harvard] claimed he was no longer
taken seriously, others saw him as a pioneer in the field of mental health” (para. 8).
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Science magazine’s obituary tagged Mack an “explorer of the unknown” (Bhattacharjee,
2004, p. 405). Like the newspapers, Science identified Mack as “a Harvard psychiatrist
whose research into claims of alien abduction sparked controversy” and who was “best
known for his work that takes a sympathetic view of those describing encounters with
aliens” (p. 405).
Through their online communication networks, UFO/abduction/conspiracy buffs
processed the news of Mack’s death.1 There was some speculation that perhaps the U.S.
government had had Mack assassinated. At an atheism Web site, a critic characterized
Mack as a Harvard professor “who became famous in popular American culture for his
unscientific promotion of the idea that people are abducted by aliens for weird medical
experiments…this man was an embarrassment to Harvard and to the medical
community….” In a posting at Above Top Secret (which bills itself as “the Internet’s
most popular conspiracy discussion forum”) an admirer said Mack “was the kind of
scholar the world needed: openminded to new possibilities, and thinking outside the box,
pushing the boundaries of what is acceptable to believe in. He was a blessing for the UFO
community.”
Boston University film professor Steve Geller, who knew Mack, remembered him as “a
perfect definition of the best of the methods of science and of academic discipline.
Because of the nature of his work, he made enemies in his profession, and in academia.
But by his behavior during the Harvard debacle, he proved himself to be tougher, more
rigorous academically, and more the gentleman than political elements of that body of
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learning had themselves evinced. He won; they did not. “ Overall, Mack’s lifetime of
accomplishments before, after, and in addition to his abduction research weighed heavily
in post-mortem assessments. It is arguable, but reasonable, to say that he died a scientific
authority.
Analyst’s perspective: the last word…
In his preface to Abduction (1994a), Mack said, “The contemporary Western tenet that
we are alone in the universe...is, in fact, a minority perspective, an anomaly” (p. 5). This
minority view was defensible in 1994. Ten years later, it is less so. In 1996, scientists
announced they had found what they believed to be evidence of past life on Mars. In
2004 robotic exploration of Mars produced historic evidence of liquid water on its
surface, indicating an environment conducive to life at some point in the planet’s life.
During the years in between, scientists produced a steady stream of discoveries about life
in the most extreme environments on Earth and environmental conditions on other
planetary bodies, and they located more than 100 extrasolar planets (see Deardorff,
Haisch, Maccabee, & Puthoff, 2005). Astrophysicists now say the universe is, roughly,
about 26 percent dark matter, about which they know very little; 4 percent matter as we
know it; and 70 percent dark energy, about which they know virtually nothing (Irion,
2003; Rowan & Coontz, 2003). In the ever-broadening frame of scientific understanding
of reality, perhaps Mack’s expanded conception of reality is not so far beyond the
boundaries of legitimate science as it was when he first proposed it.
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Every time I have made a presentation on this research project or talked with a friend or a
stranger about it, scholars and others alike have wanted to hear about...what I know about
UFOs, abductions, and government conspiracies to hide crashed spacecraft and alien
corpses. People have not asked about my data or my methodology. They have asked what
I think about alien visitations to Earth. To satisfy those readers who may have such
questions on their minds, I offer the following “FAQ” (frequently asked questions).
Q: Do you think abduction is real?
A: I have no clue.
Q: Do you believe in UFOs?
A: I do not believe in UFOs, and I do not disbelieve in them, either. I have never
seen a UFO.
Q: Do you think the government has conspired to hide crashed UFOs and the
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corpses of their alien passengers?
A: Based on what I have observed about how the U.S. government operates, I do not
believe so.
Q: Have you been abducted?
A: No. But ever since I began this project I have yearned for it to happen, off and on…. I
have talked with someone — a graduate of Harvard and of Columbia University’s School
of Journalism — who believes he has been abducted; he did not appear to be crazy.
Q: Do you think John Mack was crazy?
A: My impression is that he was not. But I am not a psychiatrist, and therefore I am not
qualified to make such a judgment.
Q: Do you think Mack was heroic?
A: I do not know enough to judge. I do know enough to be able to say that I respect him
for knowing and defending his beliefs, and for using his authority to question authority.
353
Notes
1. Among Web sites visited were: http://atheism.about.com,
www.abovetopsecret.com, www.anomalist.com, www.beyondtopsecret.com,
www.surfingtheapocalypse.net, www.ufoevidence.com, and
www.xenophilia.com. Information cited in this epilogue came from these sites.
Some obituaries and “remembrances,” including Geller’s, were found at
www.johnemackinstitute.org.
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Appendix A
Human Subjects Research Approval
This project was granted a Notice of Approval, Exempt Review, by the Bloomington
Campus Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects, Indiana University  (From;
Cybil Cole, Research Risk Compliance Officer, Re: Protocol entitled: Elite Media, Elite
Scientists: Controversial Research and Boundary Work, Protocol # 99-2846, Approval
Date: February 18, 1999). This appendix includes a copy of the informed consent form,
interview questions, and exempt research statement as submitted to and approved by the
Committee. All subjects interviewed for this project signed informed consent forms before
interviews were conducted. Interview subjects are listed in Appendix B.
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Indiana University -- Bloomington
Informed Consent Statement
Dissertation Project: Elite Media, Elite Scientists, Controversial Research, and
Boundary Work
You are invited to participate in a dissertation research project as an interview subject.
The purpose of this project is to explore, through text analysis, interviews, frame
analysis, and rhetorical analysis, how elite media cover controversial research conducted
by elite scientists.  Researchers have studied how the media cover science, but a search of
the literature on science journalism has not revealed reports on elite media coverage of
controversial research conducted by elite scientists. This study should enhance
understanding of this phenomenon.
Information
This study will be a qualitative research project, exploring a topic by asking questions.
To address these questions, a case study will be conducted of media coverage of
controversial research conducted by an elite scientist: psychiatrist John E. Mack, M.D., a
tenured member of the faculty at Harvard Medical School who is engaged in the study of
people who claim they have been abducted by aliens.  Textual analysis is under way and
will continue throughout this year.  Frame analysis and rhetorical analysis will be
conducted upon completion of interviews.  Interviews for this project will be conducted
with journalists who wrote texts chosen for analysis and scientists who served as sources
in these texts.  Questions to be asked in these exploratory interviews are: How and why
did you come to write this story or serve as a source for this story?  How did you choose
your sources for this story or decide to be a source for this story?  What role, if any, did
other colleagues (reporters, editors, scientists) play in producing this story?  These
interviews should take about an hour.  Interviews will be audiotaped to back up the
principal investigator’s notes; these tapes will not be used for any other purposes, and
they will be stored along with printed source materials once the study is completed.
Risks and Benefits
Journalism and science play significant roles in our society.  By participating in this
study, you will be helping to advance understanding of working relationships between
journalists and scientists.  Approximately 12-20 subjects will be interviewed for this
project.  As interviews will concern published texts, interview subjects will be identified
by name and affiliation in the dissertation.  No risks are foreseen to participating in this
study.  If you have any questions at any time about this study or procedures employed in
this study, you may contact the principal investigator: Linda Billings, Indiana University
School of Journalism, EP 200, Bloomington, IN 47405 (home address: 1377 W. Allen St.
#E3, Bloomington, In 47403), phone 812/339-8307, email: libillin@indiana.edu.  If you
feel that you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or your
rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you
may contact the office for the Human Subjects Committee, Bryan Hall 110, Indiana
University, Bloomington, IN 47405, 812/855-3067, or by email at iub_hsc@indiana.edu.
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Participation
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may withdraw at any time.  If you
withdraw from the study before data collection is completed, your data will be destroyed.
Consent
I have read and understand the above information.  I have received a copy of this form.  I
agree to participate in this study.
Subject’s signature____________________________
Date____________________
Investigator’s signature_________________________
Date____________________
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Linda Billings 1999
Dissertation Research Project -- Interview Questions
For journalists:
How and why did you come to write this story?
How did you choose your sources for this story?
What role, if any, did other colleagues play in producing this story?
For scientists:
How and why did you come to serve as a source for this story?
How did you decide to be a source for this story?
What role, if any, did other colleagues play in your decision to serve as a source for this
story?
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L. Billings, ID #XXXXXXXXX February 12, 1999
EXEMPT RESEARCH STATEMENT
A.  The purpose of my dissertation research project, “Elite Media, Elite Scientists,
Controversial Research, and Boundary Work,” is to improve understanding of the
relationships among journalism and journalists, science and scientists, and society.   In
my dissertation, I will explore these relationships, through textual analysis, interviews,
frame analysis, and rhetorical analysis, by examining how elite media cover controversial
research conducted by elite scientists.  I intend to conduct a qualitative research project,
exploring my topic by asking questions.  In order to address these questions, I will
conduct a case study of media coverage of controversial research conducted by an elite
scientist: psychiatrist John E. Mack, M.D., a tenured member of the faculty at Harvard
Medical School, a Pulitzer Prize winner, and a well known authority in his field of
psychiatry who is now engaged in the study of people who claim they have been
abducted by aliens.   I plan to enter interviews for my case study with questions in mind
but without expectations of answers.  I intend for these interviews to be exploratory; I
will ask my interview subjects to tell me their stories.   I will audiotape my interviews to
back up my notes.  Once I finish my dissertation, I will store these tapes along with other
research materials; I do not plan to use them for any other purpose.
B.  The subjects with whom I intend to seek interviews are the authors of texts I have
chosen to analyze for my dissertation and sources cited in these texts.  I hope to
interviewing 12-20 subjects for my project, depending on availability.  I will not be
paying my subjects to participate in these interviews, and I have no previous relationship
with any of my intended subjects.
C.  I will be doing most of my dissertation research at IU-Bloomington.  I wish to
conduct a number of face-to-face interviews in Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts,
where a number of subjects are located.  (See Appendix.)   I will likely be interviewing
other subjects by telephone, email, or letter because they are in several different
geographical locations.  I anticipate asking my subjects for an hour of interview time.  I
can follow up face-to-face interviews by telephone or email if I need to clarify any
information.  All of my intended interview subjects have authored published stories or
served as on-the-record sources in these published stories, so the preservation of
confidentiality will not be necessary.
D. I am the sole investigator on this project.
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Appendix B
Interviews
The following subjects were interviewed for this study. All subjects signed informed-
consent forms before interviews were conducted:
• John E. Mack, Harvard Medical School, March 15, 1999, Cambridge, MA
• Arnold Relman, Emeritus Professor, Harvard Medical School, March 19, 1999,
Cambridge, MA
• Joseph Kahn, staff reporter, Boston Globe, March 17, 1999, Boston, MA
• Stephanie Schorow, staff reporter, Boston Herald, March 18, 1999, Boston, MA
• Sara Tery, freelance writer, Boston Globe Magazine, March 19, 1999, Boston, MA
• Stephen Rae, freelance writer, New York Times Magazine, January 8, 2003, (via email)
• James Gleick, freelance writer, The New Republic, April 23+, 2003 (via telephone)
(I produced digested rather than full transcripts of the Mack and Relman interviews,
which I audiotaped, for my own use in this analysis. I did not audiotape the interviews
with Kahn, Schorow, Tery, Rae and Gleick, as taking notes seemed more comfortable for
the subjects than making tapes.)
The following people were contacted repeatedly for interviews but did not respond to
requests:
• David Chandler, Boston Globe
• Milo Miles, Boston Globe
• M. A. J. McKenna, Boston Herald
• James Gordon, M.D., Center for Mind-Body Medicine (New York Times Book Review)
• Jill Neimark, Psychology Today
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